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Abstract
This thesis consists of two parts within the field of environmental economics. The first
part contributes to the literature on the relationship between firms’ environmental and
economic performance. The second part investigates distributional questions within
environmental economics.
The first part of this thesis consists of three co-authored chapters. Chapter 1 provides
a systematic and detailed literature review on the relationship between firms’ environ-
mental and economic performance. It is an introductory and scene-setting chapter to
the subsequent two chapters. Chapter 2 examines how diversifying production towards
low carbon goods and services impacts the financial performance and market valuation
of firms. Using new data on firms’ revenues that are generated from the production of
green goods and services, we are able to measure shifts from non-green to green activ-
ities at the firm level. The paper provides novel insight into the relationship between
such green revenues and a comprehensive set of accounting- and market based eco-
nomic performance measures. Chapter 3 uses event study methodology to assess the
impact of the Paris Agreement on stock returns. We show that green firms, have ex-
perienced significant positive abnormal returns in the week following the agreement
compared to the overall market. In addition, we show that emissions-intensity appears
to be a less precise determinant for firms’ stock performance.
The second part consists of two single-authored chapters. Chapter 4 examines distribu-
tional preferences for international climate finance. Understanding public preferences
for climate policies is crucial to ensure and increase public support for such policies.
Using a choice experiment on a representative sample of the UK population this chap-
ter elicits preferences with respect to distributional dimensions of adaptation finance.
The findings provide new insights into preferred payment mechanisms and support the
adoption of egalitarian policy mandates among international climate adaptation funds.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on distributional outcomes of natural resource
wealth. We use panel regression techniques as well as the quasi-experimental synthetic
control method at the country- and US state-level to estimate the effect of an oil price
boom on income inequality. The paper does not find strong evidence for a significant
relationship. It discusses challenges in empirically identifying effects on aggregate
inequality metrics.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of two parts. The first part (chapters 1, 2, and 3) examines the
relationship between environmental and economic performance at the firm level. The
second part explores distributional questions within environmental economics.
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 reviews the extensive literature on the re-
lationship between environmental and economic performance indicators at the micro-
level. It provides the background for the first part of this thesis. A shortcoming of the
existing literature is that it has relied largely on cross-sectional data, binary environ-
mental performance variables, or limited sector coverage. Chapter 2 builds upon this
review and is able to overcome some of the limitations of the prior literature. It uses
a novel continuous variable capturing firms’ revenue share generated from producing
‘green’ goods and services. It allows us to explore the relationship in a multi-year
panel across a broad group of sectors for listed firms covering approximately 98% of
global market capitalisation. In particular it examines the relationship between green
revenues and a comprehensive set of profitability indicators as well as firms’ market
valuation. We draw on the financial accounting literature and offer novel insights on
the relationship between the individual profitability indicators. We show that produc-
ing green goods and services is positively associated with firms’ operative profit mar-
gins across a broad group of sectors. Such higher operative profit margins do however
not necessarily increase firms’ overall profitability. Producing green goods and ser-
vices tends to entail higher investment requirements, which impose a downward drag
on their overall profitability. In terms of market based performance, higher green rev-
enues are neither punished nor rewarded by investors, except for utility sectors, which
tend to face unique regulatory settings. We show that important heterogeneities exist
across sectors. The findings suggest that public policies can support the transition to-
wards low-carbon technologies by facilitating cheaper access to capital for investments
into low-carbon technologies and by helping to create and expand markets for green
goods and services. Sector-specific R&D support can also be important in helping to
reduce costs for low-carbon technologies.
Chapter 3 uses event study methodology to examine whether financial markets reward
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environmental activities of firms. We use the Paris Agreement as it created a large, dis-
crete and plausibly exogenous shift in the reward for being green to identify the effect.
The paper shows that green firms have significantly outperformed the market in the
week following the Paris Agreement. The greenest firms experienced approximately
10% higher returns over the week following the agreement. We show that the effect
exists both at the extensive and intensive margin of firms’ green revenue share. More-
over, the results suggest that firms’ emissions-intensity is a less clear-cut determinant
for their stock performance following the agreement. While some emissions-intensive
sectors have experienced negative abnormal returns, we show that emissions-intensive
electricity generating firms have actually outperformed the market following the agree-
ment. By combining the green revenue and emissions-intensity data we observe that
these emissions-intensive electricity-generating firms also generate sizeable shares of
renewable electricity. The findings suggest that investors value particularly the grow-
ing opportunities for firms active in green technologies following the Paris Agreement.
This chapter provides novel insight into the reaction of financial markets to a detailed
green product-based measure. Moreover, it allows us to assess investors’ perception of
the post-Paris policy landscape, and of the perceived credibility of the Paris Agreement
with respect to the anticipated diffusion and adoption of low-carbon technologies.
The second part of the PhD begins with chapter 4, which examines distributional pref-
erences in the context of climate finance. Understanding public preferences for climate
policies is crucial to ensure sustained public support for such policies over the long run.
Previous research has shown that in particular the distributional outcomes of policies
determine their overall acceptability. The chapter is motivated by the observation that
collecting and allocating international climate adaptation finance will involve difficult
moral judgements with respect to such distributional dimensions. For this chapter, I
conducted a discrete choice experiment on a representative sample of the UK popula-
tion, a large donor for climate finance. I elicit distributional preferences in particular
with respect to (1) the preferred burden sharing principles among UK individuals, as
well as (2) the allocation of resources among eligible recipients. The chapter pro-
vides novel insights on the preferred design for climate adaptation policies. It shows
that individuals tend to prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach over a ‘polluter-pays’ prin-
ciple in the context of climate adaptation. This is contrary to previous findings for
preferred climate mitigation policies and suggests that respondents see a less direct
link between individual emissions and a potential responsibility to contribute to cli-
mate change adaptation. Hence, using carbon pricing to collect revenues for a global
adaptation fund would likely be less popular compared to a progressive fee based on
income levels. Moreover, the chapter reveals distributional preferences with respect to
the allocation of funds to the most vulnerable individuals, which supports the adop-
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tion of egalitarian allocation criteria among international climate funds. The results
also suggest that adopting a communication strategy that focuses on benefits to donor
country residents may be a promising avenue. Overall, the findings reveal that public
support for climate adaptation payments is vastly insufficient in light of the overall
requirements, highlighting the importance of further work in this field.
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on the impacts of natural resource booms on
socio-economic outcomes. It examines the impact of the shift from a low- to a high
oil price regime on income inequality for resource dependent countries and US states
using panel data. The chapter specifically contributes to the literature in two ways.
First, it applies a quasi-experimental methodology to study distributional outcomes of
the oil price shock post 1998 at the country-level, which to the best of my knowl-
edge has not been done before. Second, this is the first paper to provide evidence of
the effect of this oil price boom on income inequality within US states. We analyse
the relationship for a time period that is characterised by particularly high levels of
inequality, for which outcomes may systematically differ from earlier low-inequality
periods. By adopting panel regression techniques, as well as the quasi-experimental
synthetic control method, we are able to show average effects across all resource rich
units, as well as identify unit-specific effects, which allows for a more detailed insight.
Overall we do not find strong support for an effect of the post-1998 oil price boom
on income inequality within resource dependent countries or US states. The chapter
discusses challenges in empirically identifying effects using the available inequality
metrics.
The thesis concludes with a brief chapter summarising the findings and providing some
suggestions for further research and for policymakers.
I would like to explain why this thesis consists of two parts. It reflects the learning jour-
ney over the past years. When I embarked on my PhD, I was keen to investigate distri-
butional questions within environmental economics. The motivation for this part of my
thesis was driven partly by the work of Thomas Piketty (Piketty, 2013), Joseph Stiglitz
(Stiglitz, 2012) and others that showed how high levels of inequality can be detrimental
to societies. If high levels of inequality can reduce societal cohesion and have nega-
tive impacts on the willingness to pursue public goods, it may provide an additional
barrier in mitigating climate change and managing other environmental problems. The
management of environmental and natural resources may in itself also influence such
socio-economic inequalities. Similarly, the way the international community manages
climate change and its consequences will have distributional implications, which need
to be managed carefully to ensure public support.
For my chronologically first paper I contribute to the literature on the relationship be-
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tween natural resource wealth and inequality (chapter 5). In this paper I use income
inequality data to examine the relationship between natural resource booms and in-
come distribution. One limitation of secondary distributional data is that it is typically
only available for monetary metrics such as income or wealth. Distributional out-
comes and preferences may however be highly context specific and thus may require
case-specific elicitation using primary data. Hence for chapter 4 I collected primary
data on distributional preferences using a choice experiment. The chapter provides
specific distributional preferences in the context of climate adaptation finance that can
help to inform policy design.
Halfway through my PhD my focus and interest shifted towards topics of low-carbon
innovation and firm-level analysis in particular. I began this part of my PhD by con-
ducting an extensive literature review on the relationship between environmental and
economic performance variables at the firm-level (chapter 1). The review paper as
well as initial analysis on a newly developed dataset, which captures the production of
‘green’ goods and services at the firm-level, sparked my interest in the topic. I there-
fore decided to pursue this avenue further for my thesis. Chapter 2 builds upon the
review and explores the relationship between firms’ involvement in green technolo-
gies and their financial performance as well as market valuation. The third chapter
examines investors’ perceptions of green technologies following a climate policy an-
nouncement.
This second part of the thesis is motivated by the observation that the international
community requires a substantial increase in investments into climate compatible in-
frastructure and low-carbon technologies to limit global warming to 1.5◦C or well
below 2◦C (OECD, 2017). The private sector needs to play a crucial role in mobilising
the financial resources and in reducing the costs of the transition (CPI, 2018). There-
fore, it is important to understand the market environment for low-carbon technologies
to design potentially new policies. Furthermore, financial markets can provide a useful
platform to assess the credibility and potential effectiveness of already existing climate
policies.
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Chapter 1
Do Environmental and Economic
Performance go Together? A Review
of micro-level empirical evidence from
the past decade or so.
Abstract
This article reviews the empirical literature combining economic and environmental
performance data at the micro-level, i.e. firm- or facility-level. The literature has
generally found a positive and statistically significant correlation between economic
performance, as measured by profitability indicators or stock market returns, and en-
vironmental performance, as measured by emissions of pollutants or adoption of in-
ternational environmental standards. The main reason for this finding seems to be that
firms that reduce their material and energy costs experience both better economic per-
formance and lower emissions. Only a small and recent literature analyses the joint
causal impact of environmental regulations on environmental and economic perfor-
mance. Interestingly, this literature shows that environmental regulations tend to im-
prove environmental performance while not weakening economic performance. How-
ever, the evidence so far is limited to a handful of environmental regulations that are
not extremely stringent, so the result cannot be easily generalised. More research is
needed to assess the joint effects of environmental regulations on environmental and
economic performance, to explore the heterogeneity of these effects across sectors,
countries and types of policies, and to understand which policy designs allow improv-
ing environmental quality while not coming at a cost in terms of economic performance
of regulated businesses.
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1.1 Introduction
The emergence of green growth as a new paradigm has come in part in response to the
recognition that environmental challenges could not be addressed seriously, or at least
not effectively, unless they were fully integrated in the development of comprehensive
growth-enhancing policy strategies. Governments have long been concerned with en-
vironmental issues but “green” and “growth” objectives and policies were essentially
pursued by different ministries and agencies operating for the most part in silos. This
has often resulted in policy incoherence and a low degree of effectiveness in the pur-
suit of environmental objectives. The push for the wider adoption by governments of
green growth strategies as a means to better pair the objectives of growth with those of
environmental sustainability gained more traction in the aftermath of the global finan-
cial crisis. The desire to reduce the negative impact of the crisis in a way that could
simultaneously meet environmental and economic objectives created a context more
favourable to policymakers being receptive to adopting a green growth approach to
economic recovery.
One direct implication of the joint pursuit of growth and green objectives in develop-
ment strategies is the acknowledgement of policy trade-offs and synergies. The exis-
tence of trade-offs is predicated on the assumption that the transition to green growth
necessarily imposes constraints on the optimal allocation of resources, thereby raising
production costs and reducing productivity. The aggregate costs of pursuing environ-
mental objectives have often been reported in the form of economy-wide GDP losses
measured against a business-as-usual scenario whereby output growth is assumed to
continue unabated, based on a production process and assumptions that largely ignore
the environmental constraints (i.e. both the constraints to reduce pollution externali-
ties and the adverse feedback effects from environmental degradation on output). One
major OECD study looking at the economic impact of climate change mitigation high-
lighted how the adoption of cost-effective measures coordinated at the international
level could limit the size of such costs to a relatively small amount, especially in
comparison to the estimated costs arising from climate change-related damages and
required adaptation (OECD, 2009).
One strand of literature has gone even further, calling into question the assumption
that environmental policies necessarily entail a short-run trade-off by raising produc-
tion costs and reducing efficiency. The challenge to conventional wisdom has been
originally laid-out in a landmark paper by Porter and van der Linde (1995) , who have
argued that improving a company’s environmental performance can result in better
economic or financial performance, without necessarily leading to higher costs (Am-
bec and Lanoie, 2008). The authors made the case based on the notion that by pushing
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firms out of their comfort zones, environmental policies can act as a catalyst for in-
vestment in innovation that might not have taken place in the absence of the regulatory
constraint. Such investment can result in an improvement in both the environmental
and business performance. What became referred to as the Porter Hypothesis stim-
ulated a large amount of research, both to provide theoretical underpinnings and to
assess whether it can be supported by empirical evidence.
The growing importance of this debate in policy circles has sparked a large empirical
literature that analyses the relationship between economic and environmental perfor-
mance at the level of firms, and assesses the joint impact of environmental regulations
on these outcomes. The objective of this chapter is to provide an up-to-date review
of this empirical literature that combines economic and environmental performance
data at the micro-level1. In this review, we focus largely on GHG emissions, air pol-
lution and toxic release emissions as environmental performance variables2. For each
of the papers surveyed, we discuss the pros and cons of the data used and present the
empirical approach taken by the authors. A comprehensive table summarises these
micro-level studies that combine environmental- and economic performance variables
(see Appendix A.1)3. Compared to ex-post analysis based on more aggregated data
at sectoral, regional or national level, or to ex-ante Computable General Equilibrium
models, analyses based on micro-data have several advantages. Sample sizes are typ-
ically much larger, allowing for more precisely estimated effects, smaller biases due
to unobserved heterogeneity (for example, through the inclusion of firm-level fixed
effects) and exploration of heterogeneous impacts across time or sectors. More gener-
ally, micro databases allow for a more credible identification of the treatment effects of
a given regulation. In particular in combination with quasi-experimental techniques,
they provide a robust approach to identify causal impacts of environmental policies
(List et al., 2003; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016). For
example, the European Union Emissions Trading System, which regulates the carbon
emissions of around 12,000 industrial sites and power generating facilities across Eu-
rope, only regulates installations above a certain threshold in terms of production ca-
pacity. Therefore, it is possible to construct a control group of unregulated installations
the size of which falls just below these administrative thresholds, but which are very
similar to regulated installations in terms of all other observable characteristics. With
a “treated” and a “control” group that are statistically identical before the introduction
1Note that the existing literature predominantly covers evidence from the United States and Western
Europe due to greater availability of micro-data in these regions.
2Regulations targeting e.g. solid waste, water pollution, contaminated sites, biodiversity, or live-
stock (and associated firm performance along these variables) are therefore not covered.
3The inclusion criteria for papers covered in the summary table are that they use both environmen-
tal and economic performance variables at the micro-level (i.e. that they use firm- or plant-specific
observations for both outcome variables).
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of the regulation, it is possible to identify the causal effect of the policy on regulated
entities after the introduction of the regulation (Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).
Analyses based on micro-datasets also have drawbacks, however. In particular, they
are ill-equipped to capture general equilibrium effects. For example, it is not possible,
using the sort of quasi-experimental methods mentioned above, to analyse the potential
impact of the EU ETS on unregulated firms facing higher energy prices because they
purchase electricity from regulated firms.
The chapter is organised along two main strands of the literature. The first section
reviews the literature that analyses the direction of the correlation between environ-
mental and economic performance at the firm level. The key feature of this literature
is that it generally abstracts from the drivers of environmental performance, which
could be induced by environmental regulations but could also come from voluntary
efforts of companies. Because high environmental performance could be driven by
profit-enhancing motivations (for example, improving energy efficiency to reduce in-
put costs), one should not necessarily expect a negative relationship between environ-
mental and economic performance. The second section focuses on the literature that
analyses the impact of environmental regulations on environmental outcomes and eco-
nomic performance, with a focus on papers that simultaneously evaluate the impact
of environmental policies on both outcomes. Here, basic economic theory predicts
regulations to improve environmental performance while weakening economic perfor-
mance, but alternative theories related to the Porter Hypothesis claim that a different
outcome is possible.
1.2 Does it really pay to be green? Micro-level evidence
on the correlation between environmental and eco-
nomic performance
There is a large literature on the relationship between environmental performance and
economic performance at the firm level. However, this literature usually focuses on es-
tablishing correlations and does not properly address causality, i.e. the vast majority of
studies cannot say with confidence whether improvements in firms’ environmental per-
formance cause improvements in firms’ economic performance. This is an important
limitation because good environmental and economic performance could be driven by
unobserved factors such as good management practices or the quality of the workforce,
in which case the solution to improve both environmental and economic performance
could reside in implementing policies in the non-environmental domain, for example
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education policies.
Still, establishing the sign of the correlation between environmental and economic per-
formance at the micro level is interesting in its own right, as it can shed light on the
widespread concern that there is a systematic negative relationship between the two.
The main upshots from the literature focusing on this issue are summarised in this
section. Most of the literature focuses on the energy production and manufacturing
sectors, as firms in these sectors tend to be the main source of pollution across coun-
tries. In comparison, the services sector is an understudied area.
1.2.1 Environmental performance and economic performance:
Friends or foes?
Numerous papers have analysed the correlation between environmental and economic
performance and several surveys and meta-analyses are available, including Wagner
(2001); Blanco et al. (2009); Horva´thova´ (2010); Albertini (2013); Crifo and Sinclair-
Desgage´ (2013); Crifo and Forget (2015). Different measures of economic perfor-
mance are used, including return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS) and return
on equity (ROE). Measures of investors’ valuation are also used to express expecta-
tions of future profitability (e.g. Tobin’s Q)4. Environmental performance measures
include toxic release inventory (TRI) emissions, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, en-
vironmental management certification (e.g. ISO 14001)5 and the adoption of other
international environmental standards.
Overall, the literature surveys tend to conclude that better environmental performance
is associated with greater financial performance, although there is some variation in the
results across studies. For example, Ambec and Lanoie (2007) survey 12 studies that
rely on regression analysis of financial performance on environmental performance
across multiple years. Nine studies showed that better environmental performance is
associated with better economic performance. Two studies show no impact, while one
concluded that a negative relationship exists. Similarly, Horva´thova´ (2010) reports
that about 55% of studies find a positive effect and 15% of studies find a negative
effect. Blanco et al. (2009) focus on manufacturing firms and conclude on a prominent
absence of penalty for being green. However, this result is affected by the typology of
the firm, the methods utilised for implementing environmental initiatives, the intensity
4Tobin’s Q is often measured as market capitalisation divided by assets. It is a measure to capture
investors’ valuation of a firm relative to the replacement costs of its assets. Hence, it is used to indi-
cate market expectations of future profitability of the firm. Since it requires a value of firms’ market
capitalisation it can typically only be computed for firms listed on a stock exchange.
5ISO 14001 is a standardised environmental performance system that covers many aspects of envi-
ronmental management such as life-cycle assessment and environmental performance indicators.
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of the abatement efforts and stockholders’ valuation of green firms.
Particularly in earlier studies, which use cross-sectional data or pooled regression anal-
ysis, it remains unclear whether it ‘pays to be green’ or whether profitable companies
decide to engage in green activities. Telle (2006) illustrates in detail the potential
omitted variable problems existing in earlier studies using a sample of Norwegian man-
ufacturing plants. Starting with a pooled regression, controlling for observable plant
characteristics such as size or industry, the author confirms results of earlier papers that
find a positive association between environmental and economic performance. How-
ever, when controlling for time-invariant unobservable plant characteristics (such as
time-invariant quality of management, or employee motivation) using plant fixed ef-
fects, the effects become insignificant, meaning that environmental performance is not
significantly associated with firms’ financial performance. Consequently, the author
cautions against premature conclusions based on these early pooled regression analy-
ses. He concludes that future emphasis should be placed on analysing the necessary
conditions and the specific industries or plants for which it may pay to be green.
In the following subsections, we examine to what extent heterogeneous findings in
the literature are due to actual heterogeneities across samples or are simply a result of
using different outcomes and explanatory variables. We categorise studies according
to (a) the type of environmental performance variable (e.g. adoption of standards,
emissions, pollution abatement investments), (b) the time-horizon of the effect, and (c)
the economic performance variable (profitability and investors’ expectations of future
profitability).
(a) Environmental Performance Variables
Adoption of standards and environmental management systems
A crude measure of environmental performance is provided by international environ-
mental management standards such as ISO 14001. The implementation of an environ-
mental management standard does not provide information on the actual environmen-
tal outcomes, which remain unobserved and may be pure signalling of confounding
issues, such as management quality. Moreover, such an indicator is binary: within
firms having adopted the standard, it is not possible to rank firms according to their
performance, while there is also heterogeneity in the environmental performance of
firms not adopting the standard. Bearing these limitations in mind, Hibiki et al. (2003)
find that the introduction of the ISO 14001 certification system is associated with a
statistically significant increase in the market value by 11% to 14%, based on a sample
of 573 Japanese publicly-listed firms in the manufacturing industry listed at the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. A similar finding is reported by Jacobs et al. (2010).
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An alternative proxy for environmental performance is the implementation of an en-
vironmental management system (EMS) at the firm level. Wagner and Blom (2011)
examine nearly 500 firms from the UK and Germany and find that the implementation
of an EMS is only positively associated with firms’ financial performance for already
financially well-performing firms. A negative association exists for financially less-
well performing firms. Yet, a limitation of their approach is that the implementation of
the EMS does not provide information on the actual environmental outcomes, which
remain unobserved.
Emissions releases: Toxic releases and greenhouse gases
Emissions releases can be broadly divided into two types of groups: local pollutants
such as toxic releases and waste and global pollutants such as greenhouse gas emis-
sions.
Using toxic release inventories allows for an accurate measurement of environmental
performance, and many studies have used this indicator. One of the most cited is by
Konar and Cohen (2001), who use a sample of 321 (mostly) manufacturing firms in the
S&P 500 and relate the market value to toxic chemicals emitted relative to the firm’s
revenue. After controlling for variables traditionally thought to explain firm-level fi-
nancial performance, they find that poor environmental performance - as measured by
toxic chemicals emissions - is negatively correlated with the intangible asset value of
firms. The average ‘intangible liability’ for firms in their sample is USD 380 million,
which equals 9% of the replacement value of tangible assets in their sample. The au-
thors conclude that toxic chemicals, even if legally emitted, have a significant impact
on the intangible asset value of publicly listed firms. A 10% reduction in emissions
of toxic chemicals is associated with a USD 34 million increase in market value. The
effect is heterogeneous across industries. Traditionally polluting sectors experience
larger losses. A similar result is reported by King and Lenox (2001).
Other studies have obtained similar results based on improved methodologies, such
as Al-Tuwaijri et al. (2004) who analyse the relationship between environmental and
economic performance based on a cross-sectional dataset of 198 US firms. They find
that better environmental performance is associated with significantly better economic
performance. This is consistent with the idea that investors view good environmental
performance as an intangible asset. To measure environmental performance, they use
the ratio of toxic waste recycled to total toxic waste generated. They measure a firm’s
economic performance using an industry-adjusted annual return, which is calculated
as the change in stock price during the year (adjusted for dividends), scaled by the
beginning-of-year stock price minus the industry median return (based on two-digit
SIC codes). This annual industry-adjusted stock return thus represents a measure of
26
the firm’s current-period economic performance relative to other firms in the same
industry (they find a similar result when directly using stock price as a measure of
economic performance).
A couple of papers have found evidence of a non-linearity of the relationship between
environmental performance and economic performance by adding quadratic terms in
their regressions. For example, Fuji et al. (2013) examine the relationship between
environmental performance - as measured by chemical emissions relative to sales -
and economic performance in Japanese manufacturing firms. ROA, ROS and Capital
Turnover (CT) are used as indicators of economic performance. They demonstrate a
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between toxic releases and ROA and CT.
While Fuji et al. (2013) solely analyse manufacturing industries, Trumpp and Guen-
ther (2017) include service industries as well. In a global dataset of 2,361 firm-years
with 696 unique firms, they find a U-shaped relationship between carbon performance
and profitability as well as between waste intensity and profitability. Hence, the level
of environmental performance affects the direction of the relationship between the two
variables. Trumpp and Guenther (2017) conclude that only after passing an environ-
mental performance threshold it starts to ‘pay to be green’.
While studies using toxic emissions as a measure of environmental performance report
a positive relationship between environmental and economic performance, this might
not be the case for other environmental outcomes. We might expect heterogeneous
effects across pollutants, as investors might value reductions in toxic releases more
strongly as they reduce the risk of environmental liabilities and lawsuits and reputa-
tional damage to the company. Yet, with the emergence of carbon trading systems and
penalties associated with non-compliance with GHG regulations, these effects across
pollutants might have converged recently. Few papers look at GHG emissions as an
environmental performance indicator, but a notable exception is Fuji et al. (2013) who
use CO2 emissions alongside chemical emissions. They show that environmental per-
formance measured by CO2 emissions contributes positively to ROA.
Most papers in this literature rely on secondary data collected through official govern-
ment surveys or mandatory reporting. An exception is a 2003 OECD survey, which
contacted 4,188 facility managers from seven OECD countries (Canada, France, Ger-
many, Hungary, Japan, Norway, the United States) (Darnall, 2009). It examines the
relationship between self-reported firm-specific environmental performance and self-
reported profitability. Environmental performance is measured as a change in environ-
mental impacts per unit of output in the last three years, separately for six environ-
mental impacts: natural resource use, solid waste, waste-water effluent, air pollution,
GHG emissions, and overall environmental impact. Financial performance is mea-
sured as changes in the facility’s profits over the past three years. Furthermore, facility
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managers were asked to rate the environmental policy stringency to which they were
subject. They find a positive relationship between environmental performance and
financial performance and observe a negative correlation between facility-specific per-
ception of policy stringency and profits. Yet, a limitation of this approach remains the
reliability of the managers’ responses, as well as the cross-sectional nature of the study,
which does not allow an assessment of the direction of the effect.
Pollution abatement investments
Investments in pollution abatement technologies have been used as a proxy for firms’
environmental performance, relying on the assumption that such investments result in
actual pollution abatement. One concern of such investments is that they may reduce
firms’ productivity, particularly when a specific abatement technology is prescribed by
an environmental regulation. The empirical evidence finds that pollution abatement
investments have not had a strong influence on productivity.
Gray and Shadbegian (2003) and Shadbegian and Gray (2005) find insignificant effects
for the relationship between firms’ pollution abatement investments and productivity.
Gray and Shadbegian (2003) examine 116 US pulp and paper plants between 1979 and
1990 and observe that the effect of pollution abatement investments on productivity
differs substantially by plants’ technology. On average, they observe that plants with
higher abatement costs have lower productivity levels. Yet, this negative relationship
between higher abatement costs and lower productivity levels is largely driven by mills,
which incorporate a pulping process. For mills without such technology, the impact is
negligible. Similarly, Shadbegian and Gray (2005) examine the contribution of pollu-
tion abatement expenditure to firms’ productivity for 68 paper mills, 55 oil refineries
and 27 steel mills. In their sample, they are able to distinguish between productive
and pollution abatement expenditures for each production input. They find little evi-
dence that abatement inputs contribute to production with nearly all coefficients being
insignificant.
Ayerbe and Gorriz (2001), Broberg et al. (2013), and Sanches-Vargas et al. (2013) find
modest negative relationships between firms’ environmental performance and produc-
tivity. Ayerbe and Gorriz (2001) examine whether pollution abatement investments
designated for compliance with environmental performance- and technology standards
impact firms’ productivity. In their sample of 53 large Spanish companies, they find a
weak negative relationship with firms’ productivity. Yet, the authors conclude that this
finding might be specific to their small sample and the specific pollution abatement
technology.
Broberg et al. (2013) use a stochastic frontier model to estimate the relationship be-
tween environmental protection investment and technical efficiency in five Swedish
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manufacturing industries. Environmental protection investments are again used as a
proxy for environmental performance, assuming that such investments result in actual
environmental protection. They observe a weak negative relationship between environ-
mental investments and technical efficiency. Sanches-Vargas et al. (2013) use a 2002
cross-sectional dataset of 900 Mexican manufacturing plants to identify nonlinearities
in the relationship between plants’ pollution abatement expenditure and productivity.
They find an overall negative relationship between pollution abatement expenditure
and plants’ productivity. However, the relationship is nonlinear and depends on plant
size: the negative effect is larger for small plants and nearly negligible for larger ones.
(b) Short-term vs. long-term performance
An important question in understanding the relationship between environmental and
economic performance is whether improving environmental performance induces costs
in the short run but benefits in the longer run. A few studies seem to confirm this hy-
pothesis. Khanna and Damon (1999) evaluate the impact of the US Environmental
Protection Agency’s (EPA) 33/50 program on the economic performance of firms in
the US chemical industry relative to non-participants. The 33/50 Program is a volun-
tary initiative launched by the EPA in 1991. It encourages firms to cut their emissions
of 17 high-priority toxic chemicals. Of the firms emitting at least one of these 17
chemicals in 1988, 14% had pledged their participation in the program by 1993. Af-
ter controlling for the effects of firm-specific factors, the authors obtain two separate
findings. An increased probability of participation in the program is significantly as-
sociated with a decline in return on investment, implying a negative effect on short run
profitability. However, it is also associated with an increase in market valuation vari-
ables (measured as the excess of market value over the book value of assets normalised
by sales). Hence in the short run, participation in the programme is associated nega-
tively with profits relative to non-participants. In the long run participating companies
are however expected to be more profitable, which is reflected in the higher market
valuation (Khanna and Damon, 1999).
Similarly, Horva´thova´ (2012) distinguishes between short- and longer-run effects. Us-
ing a sample of 136 Czech firms observed over several years, she finds that better envi-
ronmental performance decreases financial performance in the subsequent year, but in-
creases financial performance after two years. The net (cumulative) effect seems to be
negative, but the author does not test whether it is statistically significant. The study’s
indicator of environmental performance is a composite indicator constructed using the
European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (E-PRTR), which provides data on
93 pollutants releases to air, water and land, as well as off-site transfers of waste and
of pollutants in waste water from industrial facilities in the European Union Member
States. Economic performance is measured using ROA and ROE. Rassier and Earnhart
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(2011) also focus on the inter-temporal effect of environmental performance on finan-
cial performance. They study U.S. firms and measure the environmental performance
by permitted wastewater discharge limits and use the returns on sales as the financial
performance measure. In contrast to Horva´thova´ (2012), they find that lower emissions
levels improve firms’ financial performance both in the short and the long run with a
stronger effect in the long run.
(c) Profitability and investors’ valuation
The theoretical channels through which environmental performance impacts short-
term profitability (ROA, ROE, ROS) are somewhat different from the drivers of in-
vestors’ valuation of a firm, as measured by Tobin’s Q. For the former effect to exist
there must be a tangible impact on firms by either increasing their income or reducing
costs. The latter is driven by investors’ expectations of future profitability. It captures
how the market values a firm relative to the replacement value of its assets. It is com-
mon to observe firms which receive a high valuation by investors even though they do
not operate profitably over a period of time. Consequently, it is necessary to separate
the two channels and we might expect different effects across these variables.
In a series of studies, Rassier and Earnhart (2010b,a, 2015) analyse the extent to which
firm-specific limitations on emissions have heterogeneous effects on firms’ actual prof-
itability and investors’ expectations on firms’ future profitability6. Across all studies,
they examine the effects of facility-specific wastewater discharge limits regulated by
the US EPA7. Although the authors do not observe actual emissions, the enforced
facility-specific discharge limits are used as a close proxy for facilities’ emissions.8
Using ROS as their financial performance measure, Rassier and Earnhart (2010b) use
quarterly data on 59 firms and annual data of 73 firms to examine the relationship
between financial performance and discharge limits. For both datasets, they find a neg-
ative relationship between clean water regulation and firms’ actual profitability. A 10%
reduction in the average permitted discharge leads to a decline in the return on sales of
between 0.8% and 2.7%.
In a separate paper, Rassier and Earnhart (2010a) examine the effect of permitted
wastewater discharge levels on future expected financial performance of 54 manufac-
turing firms in the US using annual data. They find that tighter permitted discharge
6For a comprehensive summary on the differences between the studies see Table C.1 in Rassier and
Earnhart (2015).
7All of their three papers use wastewater discharge limits for biochemical oxygen demand (BOD)
and total suspended solids (TSS). These are conventional and highly prevalent pollutants, which receive
regulatory scrutiny by the EPA.
8The facility-specific discharge limits are based on state-or industry-level water quality standards.
These state water quality standards differ across water bodies and time. Moreover, the discharge limits
differ across facilities and time since the assimilative capacity of water bodies differs across location
and time (Rassier and Earnhart, 2015, p.133).
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limits significantly decrease the market’s expectations of future profits. In a more re-
cent paper, Rassier and Earnhart (2015) build upon their earlier studies and estimate
the effects on actual and expected profitability jointly using a sample of 740 observa-
tions from 47 unique firms using quarterly data. They are able to improve upon their
earlier work by including additional control variables. Their results on actual prof-
itability are consistent with the Porter Hypothesis indicating that tighter clean water
discharge limits are positively associated with profitability. However, their results on
expected profitability suggest that investors appear to expect a negative relationship
between clean water discharge limits and profitability. This finding suggests that in-
vestors do not value the positive effect of regulation on firms’ profitability, but instead
seem to expect a negative impact on firms’ profitability from tighter regulation. The
authors explain these results with behavioural biases and lack of information among
investors.
Summing up
Overall, most studies have focussed on toxic releases or pollution abatement invest-
ments and their short-run effects on economic performance variables. This emphasis
is at least partly driven by data availability. To observe firms’ environmental manage-
ment systems (EMS) over time, regular industry surveys would be necessary. Firms
might also not be willing to share detailed data on their management systems, which
limits further analysis on EMS. The lack of long panel data has limited the possibili-
ties to study long-run profitability effects, although more data is becoming available.
The most extensive evidence is found for reductions in toxic release emissions which
seem to be positively related with firms’ valuation and profitability, although contrary
findings exist as well. Similarly, pollution abatement investments do not seem to hurt
firms’ productivity significantly. Most of the evidence covers the power generation or
the manufacturing sector. Moving beyond these sectors to incorporate service indus-
tries remains an important avenue for future research. Similarly, most of the evidence
covers firms located in one or a small group of developed countries. Hence, further
work focussing on developing countries is necessary to assess the generalisability of
the results.
1.2.2 Understanding the drivers: why environmental performance
can go hand in hand with economic performance
The vast literature that has looked empirically at the relationship between environmen-
tal and economic performance overall points to a positive correlation. This section
tries to understand why such a positive relationship may emerge empirically.
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1.2.2.1 Theoretical background
While the conventional wisdom regarding environmental protection is that it comes
at an additional cost imposed on firms, which should thus lead to weaker economic
performance, this plausible prediction has been challenged over the past two decades
following the famous paper by Porter and van der Linde (1995), who argued that im-
proving a company’s environmental performance can result in better economic or fi-
nancial performance without necessarily increasing costs (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).
Porter and van der Linde (1995) did not provide any strong theoretical motivation for
that prediction, but many authors have subsequently provided theoretical grounding
for it.
Ambec and Lanoie (2008) argue that there are at least seven ways in which improving
a company’s environmental performance can lead to better economic performance (see
Figure 1.1). This could happen through either an increase in revenue or a reduction in
production costs. Better environmental performance could lead to an increase in rev-
enues through three channels: (a) better access to certain markets; (b) differentiating
products; and (c) selling pollution-control technology. Better environmental perfor-
mance can lead to a reduction in costs in four categories: (a) risk management and
relations with external stakeholders; (b) cost of material, energy, and services; (c) cost
of capital; and (d) cost of labour (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008, pp.46-47). In the follow-
ing sub-sections we present the empirical literature that has analysed these potential
determinants of the mostly positive relationship between environmental and economic
performance uncovered by studies reviewed in section 1.2.1.
cost of labor. These mechanisms are summarized
in Figure 1.
Interestingly, opportunities to increase reve-
nues or reduce costs can reinforce each other,
leading to the arrows between both sets of oppor-
tunities. For instance, producing greener products
through a differentiation strategy may enhance
workers’ commitment toward a company, and this
could facilitate recruiting and retaining workers.
In the same vein, reducing the material or energy
costs of a product may facilitate the incorporation
of environmental features into the product, help-
ing to develop a differentiation strategy.
IncreasedRevenues
BetterAccess toCertainMarkets
Better environmental performance may facilitateaccess to certain markets. First, generally speak-ing, reducing pollution and other environmental
impacts may improve the overall image or prestige of
a company, and thus increase customers’ loyalty or
support sales efforts. Although this argument seems
pretty straightforward, it is difficult to find strong
empirical evidence that customers are influenced by
a company’s “green” image. Consumers may be
aware of a company’s environmental performance
through its offer of green products, but they are less
likely to be familiar with its environmental perfor-
mance as measured by its emissions to water or the
atmosphere.
Second, more specifically, purchasing policies
of public and private organizations may reward
green suppliers. It is becoming increasingly com-
mon for public administrations to include envi-
ronmental performance as a criterion for choosing
suppliers of goods or services. This phenomenon is
known as green public purchasing (GPP). As an
illustration, Kunzik (2003) reported that, in gen-
eral, the central U.K. government, in its Greening
of Government Operations policy, aims to:
● Encourage manufacturers, suppliers, and con-
tractors through specifications to develop envi-
ronmentally preferable goods and services at
competitive prices.
Figure1
Positive LinksBetweenEnvironmental andEconomicPerformance
2008 47Ambec and Lanoie
Figure 1.1: Potential positive links between environm tal and economic performance
(Source: Ambec and Lanoie (2008, p. 47)).
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1.2.2.2 Better economic performance through increased revenues
The empirical evidence on environmental performance providing better access to cer-
tain markets is usually available from case studies with small samples. An excep-
tion is the paper by Antweiler and Harrison (2003), which tests the prediction that
‘environmentally-leveraged’ firms with consumer market exposure experience larger
emission reductions. Indeed, they find that companies that are relatively more exposed
to final consumers and that have a greater diversity of emissions across products (thus,
are more “environmentally-leveraged”) reduce their releases to air and transfers of
wastes off site most strongly. Interestingly, they also increase relatively more their less
visible releases to subsoil via underground injection. The authors obtain these findings
by making use of firms’ responses to the publication of Canada’s National Pollutant
Release Inventory (NPRI) between 1993 and 1999. NPRI covers around 2,500 facil-
ities which have to report their emissions of 192 pollutants into the air, water, land,
and subsoil. The main problem faced by the authors is that they do not observe pur-
chases from households and businesses at a sufficiently high level of disaggregation
and they cannot link products to individual plants. Thus, they rely on the idea that, if
consumers use the NPRI to identify facilities with high levels of pollution and to iden-
tify the companies that own them, the only way they can then punish these firms is by
not buying any products from these firms since they cannot link products to particular
facilities. Therefore, multi-product firms will experience a “spillover” effect through
which high-emission products will negatively impact sales of low-emission products.
Only a handful of papers analyse the correlation between the introduction of green
products and firms’ economic performance. This small literature has mostly focused on
the relationship between introduction of new green products and employment growth.
Rennings and Zwick (2002) and Rennings et al. (2004) examine the determinants of
employment changes due to the introduction of new environment-friendly products.
The data stem from telephone surveys in five European countries. Some 1,594 inter-
views were conducted with environmentally innovative establishments from both the
industry and services sectors. The authors classify environmental innovations of these
establishments into new products and services, new processes, adoption of end-of-pipe
technologies, and enhanced recycling. Based on results of discrete choice models, they
show that if the most important environmental innovation is a product or a service in-
novation, i.e. the introduction of a new green product or service, then this has a positive
and statistically significant effect on the probability that the firm increases its number
of employees. However, if the most important environmental innovation is an end-of-
pipe innovation, this increases the likelihood that the firm decreases its employment
base.
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While both studies use cross-sectional data, similar results are obtained using a panel
dataset (Horbach, 2010). Firms in the environmental sector that developed new or
modified products from 2002 to 2003 significantly increased their employment from
2003 to 2005. Furthermore, the magnitude of the impact of innovation on employment
seems to be larger than in non-environmental fields. The empirical analysis is based
on the establishment panel of the Institute for Employment Research (Nuremberg) and
includes 900 firms operating in environmental sectors and 12,400 firms operating in
non-environmental fields. The authors explain that the effect may be more pronounced
in environmental fields due to the fact that environmental technologies and products
are characterised by an earlier market development phase compared to other innovative
products connected with higher employment dynamics.
A recent study conducted by Palmer and Truong (2017) examines the relationship
between the introduction of new products based on green technologies and firm prof-
itability. According to their definition “new technological green products” include “any
new product that builds on technological advances to limit or lower its environmental
footprint or that of other products, for instance, through improved energy efficiency
or waste management” (Palmer and Truong, 2017, p. 87). While past studies have
mostly used survey-based questionnaires to capture firms’ new green products, Palmer
and Truong (2017) use the press releases of actual new product introductions instead
of relying on respondents’ reporting which may be less reliable and less objective. The
sample consists of 1,020 technological green new product introductions (NPIs) cov-
ering 79 global firms between 2007 and 2012. The authors find a positive correlation
between technological green NPIs and firm profitability, as measured by turnover or
return on total capital. Since the authors do not control for new product innovations
in general, this result could simply reflect the impact of new product innovations in
general. However, when the authors use as an alternative explanatory variable the ratio
of technological green NPIs to the total number of NPIs, they interestingly still find a
positive effect, although only statistically significant at the 10% level, suggesting that
there might be extra profitability associated with a higher proportion of green products.
Overall, the findings suggest that some financial incentives for firms already exist to
use green technologies to limit the environmental impact of new product introductions.
1.2.2.3 Improved economic performance through reduced cost of inputs
While there is so far only limited empirical evidence to back the hypothesis that in-
creased environmental performance could be associated with an increase in revenue,
or this evidence is based on small samples from which no general conclusion can be
made, much more evidence is available on the cost side.
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Energy and materials
Perhaps the most natural way in which better environmental performance could be
associated with greater economic performance is through reduced cost of inputs, and
in particular of energy. The empirical evidence available confirms this prior. Existing
studies examine this question often through measures of firms’ productivity (Total Fac-
tor Productivity or TFP). This captures the effect on firms’ output from the introduction
of an environmental regulation with a constant set of production inputs. According to
the Porter Hypothesis, regulation may increase productivity, as it reduces firms’ waste-
ful energy inputs. Firms facing some costly regulation may also react by improving
the productivity of other inputs such as labour. The opposing view is that regulation
reduces firms’ productivity as it poses additional constraints on their production. Over-
all, the empirical literature shows that environmental regulations do not appear to be a
major driver of firms’ productivity.
A number of studies examines the relationship between energy- and emissions-
intensity and overall production efficiency. Overall, results are mixed, yet, the
most robust studies tend to find positive effects. Using a sample of 68 US paper
mills, Shadbegian and Gray (2003) find that plants with lower emissions are also
generally more efficient: plants with 10 percent higher productivity have 2.5 percent
lower emissions. This indicates that productive efficiency and pollution abatement
efficiency are complements. Better managers are better at both production and
abatement (rather than substitutes, with managers concentrating on the efficiency of
production at the expense of their pollution abatement performance). Shadbegian and
Gray (2006) also report a positive correlation between production efficiency and
pollution abatement efficiency in the US paper, oil, and steel industries, even after
controlling for observable factors.
Bloom et al. (2010) examine how much the energy intensity of firms (energy costs per
unit of output) and total factor productivity correlate with the quality of management,
by matching firm-level information on management practices to production and energy
usage data from the UK census for the establishments owned by these firms. They find
that firms with good management practices are less energy-intensive while being more
productive. Thus, lower energy intensity is associated with better economic perfor-
mance as measured by TFP. In terms of magnitude, improving the quality of manage-
ment practices from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with a 17.4% reduc-
tion in energy intensity and with a 3.7% increase in TFP. Martin et al. (2012) report a
similar result when focusing specifically on management practices related to climate
change for 190 randomly selected manufacturing plants in the UK. The authors inter-
viewed the managers of these plants to derive measures for the companies’ practices
in the areas of energy use and climate change and combined their responses with en-
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ergy consumption data from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) and economic
performance data from official business microdata. They find that climate-friendly
management practices, as measured by an index constructed from survey responses,
are associated with lower energy intensity and higher productivity.
Similarly, Horbach and Rennings (2013) show that the introduction of cleaner produc-
tion process innovations leads to higher employment of firms. Noticeably however,
end-of-pipe technologies (in particular air and water process innovations) have a neg-
ative impact on employment. This confirms an earlier result by Pfeiffer and Rennings
(2001) who show that cleaner production processes are more likely to increase em-
ployment compared to end-of-pipe technologies. Van-Leeuwen and Mohnen (2017)
obtain similar results from a panel of Dutch manufacturing firms for the period 2000-
2008. They show that only production process innovations are positively correlated
with firms’ productivity, whereas end-of-pipe innovations are negatively correlated.
Kumar and Managi (2010) also find a positive relationship between environmental and
economic performance. They analyse the US emission allowance trading scheme for
SO2 emissions, which was introduced as part of the 1990 US Clean Air Act Amend-
ment (USCAAA). Again, as in the case of the EU ETS, participation in the SO2 trading
scheme is not a direct measure of environmental performance. However, since these
companies face a price on their firm-specific SO2 emissions, they should emit less than
in the absence of the trading scheme. They find that between 1995 and 2005 electricity-
generating plants are able to increase electricity output and reduce SO2 emissions due
to the allowance trading scheme.
Alongside papers based on regression analysis of past data, a new literature is emerg-
ing that uses experimental data to assess the environmental-economic performance of
firms. Gosnell et al. (2017) implemented an experiment in partnership with Virgin
Atlantic Airlines (VAA) in order to test the impact of various incentives (monitoring,
performance information, personal targets, and prosocial incentives) on fuel efficiency
of their captains in three key flight areas: pre-flight (aircraft fuel load), in-flight (fuel-
efficiently between take-off and landing), and post-flight (taxi). They find that, by
simply informing the captains that the academic researchers and VAA Fuel Efficiency
personnel overseeing the study are measuring their behaviours, captains considerably
reduce fuel consumption: captains in this experimental group significantly increased
the implementation of Efficient Flight and Efficient Taxi by nearly 50 percent from the
pre-experimental period. These behavioural changes generated more than 7,700 tons
of fuel saved for the airline over the eight-month experimental period (i.e. $6.1 million
in 2014 prices), which translates to approximately 24,500 tons of CO2 abated. More-
over, monitoring and targets also induce captains to improve efficiency in all three key
flight areas. The study provides the lowest ever calculated marginal abatement cost per
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ton of CO2, at negative $250 (i.e. $250 savings per ton abated), showing that airlines
can improve both environmental as well as economic performance at the same time.
Experimental studies of this sort are only emerging, but constitute a fruitful avenue for
future research.
Labour costs
Some authors have also argued that better environmental performance can lead to a
reduction in the cost of labour, because environmentally-friendly companies are able
to attract and retain motivated employees who work harder for lower wages. Indeed, if
people prefer their employer to be socially responsible, they will, if faced with a choice
between two otherwise identical job offers with equal pay, choose the employer they
perceive to be more responsible. Therefore, the less responsible employer should offer
a higher wage to make those people indifferent (Nyborg and Zhang, 2013). There is
empirical support for the idea that social responsibility of firms is valued by employees.
For instance, job satisfaction is considerably higher when top management is regarded
as supporting ethical behaviour. Lanfranchi and Pekovic (2012) use data on 11,600
employees at 7,700 French firms and find that employees of firms that have adopted
voluntary environmental standards report a considerably, and statistically significantly,
higher feeling of usefulness at work.
Nyborg and Zhang (2013) carried out a survey on 100,000 Norwegian employees and
show that firms with higher Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pay substantially,
and statistically significantly, lower wages. Three studies using data for French firms
and employees find that employees are more likely to work uncompensated overtime
hours for firms that have adopted voluntary environmental standards (Lanfranchi and
Pekovic, 2012; Nyborg and Zhang, 2013), labour productivity is higher (Delmas and
Pekovic, 2013), and difficulties with recruitment are smaller (Grolleau et al., 2012). It
is not clear, however, whether this is driven by self-selection of more productive and
motivated employees into CSR firms or whether working for a socially responsible
employer in itself increases motivation at work. This literature is still in its infancy and
future research might enable to shed light on this issue.
Cost of capital
Better environmental performance could be associated with a lower cost of capital, in
particular because of lower exposition to environmental risk and liabilities. For exam-
ple, El Ghoul et al. (2011) examine the effect of CSR on the cost of equity capital for
a sample of around 2,000 US firms. They find that firms with better CSR scores ex-
hibit cheaper equity financing. Attig et al. (2013) find that credit rating agencies tend
to award relatively high ratings to firms with good social performance. Cheng et al.
(2013) show that firms with better CSR performance face significantly lower capital
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constraints. Goss and Roberts (2010) use a sample of 3,996 loans to US firms and
find that firms with social responsibility concerns pay between 7 and 18 basis points
more than firms that are more responsible. A common limitation to all these studies is
that they use indicators of CSR that include not only environmental performance but
also other measures of social responsibility, such as responsible practices towards em-
ployees. Therefore, it is not possible to determine whether the relationship stems from
better environmental performance or better performing or more committed employees.
1.2.3 Summing up
While numerous measures of environmental performance are used, the measure of
economic performance usually applied is financial performance based on market value
data. While market data has the advantage of being widely available, it is also - by def-
inition - restricted to listed firms and, as such, the results may be affected by a sample
selection bias and might not be representative of the population of firms, in particu-
lar of smaller firms that are typically not listed. Moreover, this literature generally
abstracts from the drivers of environmental performance, which could come from vol-
untary efforts of companies or be induced by environmental regulations. Because high
environmental performance could be driven by profit-enhancing motivations (for ex-
ample, improving energy efficiency to reduce input costs), it is perhaps not surprising
that many studies report a positive relationship between environmental and economic
performance.
Ambec and Lanoie (2008) suggest two main theoretical channels through which en-
vironmental performance can impact economic performance positively: (1) increas-
ing revenues or (2) reducing costs of inputs. The empirical evidence on the revenue
channel is relatively scarce. This is at least partly due to a lack of sufficiently disag-
gregated data of new green product introductions at the firm level and suitable control
groups to take into account non-green product introductions. Yet, the existing stud-
ies suggest that a positive association may exist between environmental and economic
performance through an increase in revenue. More evidence is available on the cost
side: The cost channel suggests that environmental performance can improve eco-
nomic performance by reducing costs of inputs. Overall, the empirical evidence finds
support for this channel. The majority of studies focused on energy- and material in-
puts for which a positive relationship is observed. Yet, the effect seems to be limited to
cleaner production process innovations. For end-of-pipe innovations, which maintain
the same production process but reduce emissions through installing additional filters,
most studies do not find a positive effect on economic performance. In addition, the
results of some papers suggest that firms with better environmental performance also
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have lower costs of labour and have access to cheaper financing.
1.3 The separate impact of environmental policies
on economic outcomes and environmental
performance
Positive economic and environmental outcomes can go hand in hand, particularly when
environmental performance is aligned with a firm’s profit-enhancing strategy such as
investments in energy or material efficiency to reduce costs. While this suggests that
firms might benefit from better environmental performance in economic terms, it does
not imply that (exogenous) environmental regulations aiming at improving firms’ en-
vironmental performance would improve firms’ economic outcomes.
Environmental regulations are accused by some of jeopardising economic activity but
are viewed by others as potential drivers of economic growth. The traditional think-
ing among economists has been that environmental regulations add costs to compa-
nies and slow down productivity, because they divert resources away from productive
investments such as investments in research and development and towards pollution-
control activities (Rose, 1983; Schmalensee, 1993; Walley and Whitehead, 1994; Jaffe
et al., 1995). Since it is reasonable to assume that firms would have reduced pollution
in the absence of environmental regulation if it was profitable for them to do so, any
environmental regulation is likely to come at a cost for businesses. If the stringency
of policies differs across countries or regions, then environmental regulations may not
only add costs to businesses, but may also affect the competitiveness of the domestic
industry, putting some companies at a competitive disadvantage vis-a`-vis their foreign
competitors (Levinson and Taylor, 2008). Discussions about the effects of environ-
mental regulations on competitiveness are often framed in terms of ‘jobs versus the
environment’ (Morgenstern et al., 2002). This applies particularly in countries and
regions where employment in manufacturing sectors has been decreasing, making en-
vironmental regulation a contentious political issue (Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).9
However, a different view of the world has been articulated since the 1990s, with what
has become widely known as the Porter Hypothesis (Porter, 1991a; Porter and van der
Linde, 1995). The basic idea is that environmental regulations should foster innova-
tion in environmentally-friendly technologies which would not have been developed
otherwise, and the adoption of these new technologies could well, in the medium run,
9For instance, aggregate manufacturing jobs declined by 35 percent in the United States between
1998 and 2009. Over the same time period total manufacturing sector production grew by 21 percent
(Kahn and Mansur, 2013; Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).
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improve firms’ productivity or allow regulated firms to achieve technological leader-
ship.
Ambec et al. (2013) illustrate the main causal links involved in the Porter Hypothe-
sis (see Figure 1.2). If an environmental regulation is well-designed and sufficiently
flexible, it may not only lead to improved environmental performance, but it may also
lead to innovation offsets. These offsets can partially, or sometimes more than fully,
offset any additional costs from the regulation, thereby increasing firms’ business per-
formance. Thus, according to the Porter Hypothesis, while effective environmental
regulation improves the environmental performance of firms, well-designed regulation
could also improve business performance.
Figure 1.2: Causal links involved in the Porter Hypothesis (Source: Ambec et al. (2013, p. 3))
The Porter Hypothesis can take different forms according to the strength of the effect
and the type of regulation (Jaffe and Palmer, 1997). The ‘weak’ version states that reg-
ulation will spur innovation. Thus, firms respond by innovating to reduce their costs
from the environmental regulation (i.e. the first causal link in Figure 1.2). Yet, this
weak version does not indicate if this innovation is good or bad for a firm’s economic
performance. The ‘strong’ version says that the regulation induces firms to find new
products or processes that increase profits while complying with the regulation. Ac-
cording to this strong version, the benefits of the regulation more than offset its costs.
This would make the regulation socially desirable even when ignoring any environ-
mental improvements arising from it. The ‘narrow’ version of the Porter Hypothesis
states that only certain types of regulation (e.g. flexible instruments) will encourage
innovation.
The regulation needs to be sufficiently flexible and focus on the outcome (i.e. the emis-
sion reduction) rather than the process (i.e. the technology firms need to adopt) to in-
duce innovation. Market-based regulations (taxation, emission trading schemes) would
therefore be preferable to command-and-control regulations (Ambec et al., 2013). The
firm-level empirical literature tends to fall into one of two categories: studies testing
the weak version (i.e. the link between environmental regulation and innovation activ-
ity), and those testing the strong version (i.e. the impact of environmental regulation
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through innovation on business performance). The former is often assessed through
R&D expenditures or the number of registered patents. The latter is often assessed
through effects on productivity, profits or stock market returns.
The Porter Hypothesis was initially criticised for its lack of theoretical foundation, as
it rests on the idea that firms ignore opportunities to improve their business perfor-
mance. Following Porter and van der Linde (1995) a sizeable literature has emerged to
provide the theoretical basis for the hypothesis, by highlighting the existence of addi-
tional market failures (beyond the environmental pollution externality). Examples for
such market failures include asymmetric information within firms (Ambec and Barla,
2002), learning-by-doing (Mohr, 2002), and market power (Greaker, 2003). For ex-
ample, in a theoretical model, Mohr (2002) assumes that the existence of knowledge
spillovers prevents the replacement of an old polluting technology by a new one even if
it is cleaner and more productive. Second-mover advantages benefit firms that wait for
other firms to adopt the technology first. In this case, additional environmental regula-
tion can induce firms to adopt a new, and cleaner technology. This example illustrates
that the strong version of the Porter hypothesis is theoretically possible. Regulation can
improve environmental quality and ultimately increase productivity (Dechezlepreˆtre
and Sato, 2017).
The growing importance of the debates over the many consequences of pollution on
health, biodiversity loss, climate change, and so on, and the potential negative con-
sequences of environmental regulations on economic performance has led to a large
number of studies that aim to empirically quantify the impact of environmental regu-
lations on the economic and the environmental performance of businesses. Multiple
dimensions of economic performance of regulated businesses have been analysed, in-
cluding productivity, innovation, employment, profitability, output and trade (Calel
et al., 2017). Similarly, numerous environmental performance indicators have been
used, including energy consumption, carbon emissions, emissions of various local pol-
lutants (NOx,SOx, etc.) as well as composite indicators. These are typically used based
on absolute values (e.g. emissions in tonnes, energy consumption in kWh) or relative
values (e.g. energy intensity).
1.3.1 The impact of environmental policies on economic outcomes
The empirical literature on the effects of environmental policies on economic outcomes
- such as growth, trade, investment, productivity and employment - is well developed.
Most investigations have focused on the impact of environmental policies in the con-
text of corroborating fears of the losses of competitiveness and productivity - broadly
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related to the so-called Pollution Haven Hypothesis10 - and hopes of reaping poten-
tially overlooked productivity gains in the context of the so-called Porter Hypothesis
(Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).
The richness of this literature also implies that it has been extensively reviewed. In
particular, a series of recent reviews (Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017; Cohen and Tubb,
2017; Koz´luk and Zipperer, 2014) does a thorough job and our intention is not to
attempt to replicate that. Instead, we summarise the findings of these reviews, com-
plemented by most recent papers. Empirical papers tend to look at outcomes such as
innovation, productivity, profits, sales, employment, entry and exit, and trade and FDI.
Most papers are within-country studies, focusing on the effects of the introduction or
increase in the stringency of a specific environmental policy.
A broad interpretation of the results of the empirical literature is that the cost-burden
of environmental regulation has been found to be rather small. However, effects of
more stringent environmental policies are context-specific and existing analyses focus
on short-term and partial equilibrium effects. Effects on economic outcomes tend to
be statistically insignificant in general (though a large amount of studies finds positive
effects too), but environmental regulations can also result in statistically significant
adverse effects on economic performance in the short-run, particularly in pollution-
and energy-intensive sectors, for which the environmental or energy regulatory costs
are substantial (Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017). However, a general consensus seems
to be that these adverse effects tend to be “small” relative to other changes going on in
the economy (e.g. changes in transport costs, proximity to demand, potential to cost-
pass-through etc.) and often depend on firm or industry characteristics. Moreover,
evidence of the “weak” version of Porter’s hypothesis - i.e. that environmental policies
tend to induce innovation - seems well established (Bellas and Lange, 2010; Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016; Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017), while there seems little reason
to believe that this innovation leads to overall better economic performance, as would
be in the case of the “strong” version of the Porter Hypothesis (Dechezlepreˆtre and
Sato, 2017; Koz´luk and Zipperer, 2014).
The “small” nature of the effects is further confirmed in more recent cross-country
panel studies such as Albrizio et al. (2017) for productivity growth. This paper tends
to find heterogeneous effects across firms depending on how far away they are from
10The so-called Pollution Haven Hypothesis (PHH) suggests that when the costs of pollution in-
crease, environmental policies provide industries with incentives to relocate some parts of their pro-
duction to jurisdictions with less strict environmental regulations or to source inputs from them (for
reviews, see Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004); Copeland and Taylor (2004); Jaffe et al. (1995)). As
a result of costs induced by stringent environmental policies, jurisdictions that introduce them are seen
as potentially loosing competitiveness against those that maintain laxer regulation. For comprehensive
reviews of the empirical literature on such claims see Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato (2017) and Koz´luk and
Timiliotis (2016).
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global industry leaders in terms of productivity. Moreover, it finds heterogeneous ef-
fects across time - with (small) short-term effects, eventually disappearing.
The recent literature on economic effects of environmental policies tends to be more
preoccupied with causality - benefitting from more advanced micro-econometric meth-
ods and better data availability. On the one hand, micro studies exploiting thresholds
and policy discontinuities are now the most popular approach, allowing the identifi-
cation of causal effects. The downside is that they are difficult to generalise - as any
event studies - and it is difficult to control for other local or concurring policies and
developments. Micro studies by nature tend to be partial equilibrium, and would tend
to be better placed to capture the direct “costs” - i.e. the negative effects, particularly
as they often focus on energy and pollution intensive industries - than to capture the
second order benefits, such as those coming from a cleaner environment or healthier
workers, which may generally be more difficult to be appropriated by a firm. Finally,
a general feature of these studies is a fairly loose approach to the timing of effects -
many studies would not attempt to distinguish potentially different short and longer
term effects. However, the distinction can be crucial due to the way competitiveness
and costs are measured. For example, environmental policies that induce increased
investment (in capital and innovation) or increased employment (e.g. R&D staff) can
show up as reduced profits and productivity resulting in losses of competitiveness in
the short term. However, such investments can in principle have offsetting beneficial
effects over the longer term - hence increasing economic outcomes of firms.
To address the shortcomings of micro studies, a strand of literature looks at effects
from a cross-country perspective, allowing better control for national policies and cir-
cumstances, better generalisation of results, but being generally less clean on causality.
As cross-country natural policy experiments are scarce, such studies tend to use more
recently available environmental policy stringency proxies, such as the OECD’s En-
vironmental Policy Stringency (Botta and Koz´luk, 2014) or international and sectorial
variation in energy prices (Sato et al., 2015). As such policy proxies tend to be avail-
able at the national level, an identification strategy similar to Rajan and Zingales (1998)
is commonly applied, whereby effects on global value chains (Koz´luk and Timiliotis,
2016), on investment (Dlugosch and Koz´luk, 2017) and on FDI (Garsous and Koz´luk,
2017) are analysed.
Going back in time, the first significant review of the literature on the impact of envi-
ronmental policies on economic outcomes, Jaffe et al. (1995), found little evidence of
large resulting losses in competitiveness. It is fair to say, that over two decades later,
and notwithstanding the caveats discussed above, this view tends to be confirmed - en-
vironmental policies generally do not tend to have large negative effects on economic
activity.
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1.3.2 The impact of environmental policies on environmental out-
comes
In principle, the main objective of environmental policies is to enhance environmental
quality. Yet, the empirical evidence on the environmental performance of environmen-
tal policies is surprisingly shallow - i.e. de facto, the environmental effectiveness, at
the firm level, tends to be more assumed than investigated. The epidemiology literature
predominantly researches the link between pollution levels and public health, but puts
less attention on the precise origins of the changes in pollution levels. Economists,
on the other hand, tend to focus on environmental policies’ effects on economic out-
comes such as competitiveness. Since - as argued in the previous section - most papers
concerned with economic effects such as loss of competitiveness, tend to find small,
if any, negative effects of environmental policies, the scarcity of empirical evidence
on the policies’ environmental effectiveness is even more surprising. Understanding
the environmental effectiveness of environmental policies is crucial for answering the
basic question: Do we see hardly any negative impact on competitiveness because
environmental policies are a red herring - i.e. they do not have much environmental
impact either? Or is it that they are more of a free lunch - i.e. they can provide substan-
tial benefits in terms of environmental protection without harming the pure economic
performance?
Evaluating the impact of environmental policies on pollution levels in a causal man-
ner is still challenging. One reason is the nature of environmental policies. Many of
them have an exhaustive coverage, covering a population of operating entities in the
respective state or country. This prevents researchers from observing a credible coun-
terfactual, i.e. how emissions would have evolved in the absence of the policy. For
others, where discrete changes in policies - such as different stringency applying to
different facilities - are analysed, the selection into treatment is based on endogenous
characteristics of the facility, making the disentangling of such effects cumbersome.
Another key reason for the lack of analysis is the scarcity and nature of environmental
performance data. Data on emissions is often gathered through ambient monitoring -
and hence reported on an aggregated country or regional level or for a given location -
without the attribution of the origins of the emissions. Sectoral and facility level data is
often not monitored directly, but estimated - based on industry and technology specific
parameters - again making monitoring the actual effects problematic. Some registries,
such as the European Union Transaction Log or the national Pollution Release and
Transfer Registers (PRTRs), provide micro data, but cover only installations that are
affected by the respective policy, or above certain thresholds.
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Nevertheless, the progress in collection of environmental data such as data from mon-
itoring stations recording air pollution or installation-level data from PRTRs has be-
come increasingly available in the last two decades, allowing researchers to make
advances in the understanding of effects of policies. Policies analysed in empirical
studies using micro data include the Clean Air Act and the SOX Trading Scheme in
the United States, the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme and more recently
British Columbia’s carbon tax in Canada.
1.3.2.1 The effectiveness of command and control regulations
The US Clean Air Act and its Amendments (CAAA) is one of the most extensively
studied command and control regulations. It defines federal guidelines to reduce emis-
sions, but leaves much of its implementation and enforcement to the county level.
If a county exceeds a federally set emissions ceiling for a certain pollutant, it is in
‘non-attainment’ status and, hence, faces incentives to introduce regulations for re-
ducing emissions, which counties in attainment do not face. These incentives include
more stringent regulations for new manufacturing firms, stricter requirements to re-
duce source emissions for existing firms, and submissions of plans how to be brought
into attainment. The majority of studies on the CAAA make use of monitoring sta-
tions and analyses the effect of the policy on ambient emissions (Ozone, SO2, PM10)
using temporal variation of counties’ compliance status to proxy environmental strin-
gency11. Overall, they find that being assigned non-attainment status under the CAAA
results in a decline of ambient emissions. Yet, recent studies suggest that counties put
particular effort in reducing pollution around monitoring stations rather than improv-
ing the overall air quality. This finding reveals a key limitation of relying exclusively
on monitoring stations for policy analysis and shows a key advantage of source-based
micro-data (Auffhammer et al., 2009, 2011; Bento et al., 2015).
Firm- or plant-level micro data allow for a more precise attribution of policies’ ef-
fects because changes in ambient emission levels might also be caused by other fac-
tors, which are not always controlled for (e.g. weather conditions, traffic or changes
in population demographics and consumption patterns). Greenstone (2003) uses data
from the U.S. Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) to analyse the impact of CAAA’s air
pollution standards between 1987 and 1997, focussing on the iron and steel sector.
Using a differences-in-differences (DiD) approach, this study finds that plants in non-
attainment counties reduced their total emissions from lead by 7.1% relative to instal-
11Henderson (1996), Greenstone (2004), Chay and Greenstone (2003), and Chay and Greenstone
(2005). Researchers have also used the CAAA as an instrument to estimate the impact of pollution on
infant mortality (Chay and Greenstone, 2003; Sanders and Stoecker, 2015) housing prices (Chay and
Greenstone, 2005; Grainger, 2012), distributional aspects of environmental policy (Bento et al., 2015),
worker reallocation (Walker, 2011), and worker productivity (Isen et al., 2017).
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lations in attainment counties (PM: 3.5%; VOC’s: 5.6%). Focussing on the chemical
industry, Gamper-Rabindran (2009) finds that VOC emissions decreased by 21% be-
tween 1988 and 2001 using the same methodology as Greenstone (2003). More re-
cently, Gibson (2018) expands Greenstone’s approach by including all industries. He
finds that treated plants reduced their PM10 emissions by between 33 and 38% relative
to non-treated plants. This reduction is much higher than the 11 to 14% reduction re-
ported in Auffhammer et al. (2011) for ambient concentrations - potentially because of
the limited direct contribution of industrial emissions.
Combining pollution data from the Canadian National Pollution Transfer and Release
Inventory with financial data on the firm level from the Annual Manufacturing Sur-
vey, Najjar and Cherniwchan (2018) analyse the impact of air pollution regulation in
Canada on pollution levels and pollution intensities. Much like the CAAA, the Canada
Wide Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone (CWS) divides the counties into at-
tainment and non-attainment counties, but also explicitly address ‘targeted industries’
that were subject to stricter regulations. This allows for exploiting variation in the strin-
gency of regulation across regions, industries, and time. Using plant-level data from
2004 to 2010, they find that the CWS is associated with a 15% reduction in PM2.5
emissions and a 33% reduction in NOX emissions. Overall, Najjar and Cherniwchan
(2018) conclude that the CWS explains up to 61% of the clean-up of the Canadian
manufacturing.
1.3.2.2 The effectiveness of environmental taxes
Most papers of the empirical ex-post literature analyse the impact of carbon taxes using
sector-level or country-level data on CO2 emissions (for example: Li and Lin (2011);
Elgie and McClay (2013); Rivers and Schaufele (2015)). Examining the environmen-
tal effectiveness of the British Columbian carbon tax, Ahmadi (2017) provides one of
the first assessments using plant-level GHG emissions. He uses data from the Annual
Survey of Manufacturing (ASM) to estimate the causal effect of the BC carbon tax on
emissions using more than 20,000 plant-year observations12. Combining the data for
plant-level fuel purchases from the ASM with fuel prices and embodied GHG emis-
sions of each fuel type, the author is able to calculate plant-specific GHG emissions.
The analysis is complicated by the fact that the economic recession starting in 2009
seems to have affected Canadian provinces in a different way. To address this concern,
Ahmadi (2017) exploits the variation in exposure to the carbon tax and assigns only
BC installations with high exposure, proxied by high emission intensity, as treatment
12Besides Ahmadi (2017), Martin et al. (2014) is currently the only paper that assesses the impact of
a carbon tax using micro-data. This paper is reviewed in the next section.
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group. To control for unobserved time-varying province-specific heterogeneity, he es-
timates a triple difference regression that compares the differential change in emissions
for plants with high and low emission intensity in BC before and after implementation
of the carbon tax, to the same differential change in the counterfactual plants in other
provinces. While the standard DiD approach points to a significant reduction of CO2
emissions in the order of 8%, the triple difference method yields a 2% reduction which
is not statistically significant from zero. Yet, the emission-intensity of plants declined
significantly by 7%. The lack of a decline in carbon emissions could be due to the
revenue-neutral design of the policy. In parallel with the carbon tax, corporate tax
rates were lowered to reduce negative impacts on competitiveness. The author con-
cludes that firms appear to have increased their output as a response to the decline in
the corporate tax rates, which prevented a decline in emissions, but in combination
with the carbon tax resulted in a decline in emissions intensity.
Most studies using firm-level data do not explicitly evaluate the impact of carbon or
energy taxes, but focus on the relationship between energy prices and energy demand,
assuming that more stringent environmental regulation will translate directly or indi-
rectly into higher energy prices. These papers usually set up factor demand models
to estimate the own-price elasticity and the cross-price elasticities for energy, labour,
and capital. Pioneering works on panel data and cross-section estimations have been
performed by Woodland (1993) on Australian firms, Nguyen and Streitwieser (1999)
on US firms, and Bjørner and Jensen (2002) on Danish firms, all of which report own-
price elasticities of energy to be negative in the range between -0.4 to below -3.8. More
recent studies report similar results for Denmark (-0.45, Arnberg and Bjørner (2007)),
Ireland (-1.5, Haller and Hyland (2014)), and Italy (-1.13, Bardazzi et al. (2015)).
Few papers look at non energy-related environmental taxes with micro data. Millock
and Nauges (2006) analyse the effect of the French tax on air pollutants (SO2, NOX ,
HCI, and VOC) based on a sample of 226 plants from the chemical, coke and iron and
steel sector. Estimating a fixed effects model without control group, they find that the
elasticity of emissions with respect to the tax to be between -0.21 and -2.67 depending
on the pollutant and economic sector. The Swedish nitrogen oxide tax with refund pay-
ments has been studied most extensively. Although this literature does not provide a
direct estimate of the effectiveness regarding emission reductions, it provides evidence
that plants have invested in advanced abatement technologies (Isaksson, 2005), using
a variety of different technologies (Sterner and Turnheim, 2009), thereby reducing the
emission intensity. Ancev et al. (2012) evaluate the load based licencing (LBL) scheme
for NOX emissions in New South Wales on NOX emissions based on a sample of 85
industrial plants between 2000 and 2009. They exploit the variation of the pollutant
fee, which originates from area-specific emission rates varying over time, to identify
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the impact of the LBL on NOX emissions. Their results suggest that the LBL had a
negative, but statistically not significant effect on reducing emissions, potentially due
to the relatively low levels of the fee (the Swedish tax on NOX emissions is 100 times
higher). This result is confirmed by Contreras et al. (2014) who do not find a significant
impact of the LBL on emission intensities of NOX , PM, and Fine Particulate Matter
for electricity generating units.
1.3.2.3 The effectiveness of emissions trading schemes
Emissions trading schemes have become more and more popular in the last years, in
particular for mitigating climate change. The basic idea is that a central authority
sets the maximum level of pollution, i.e. the cap, while polluters are required to hold
permits equal to the amount of their emissions. Polluters can trade the permits among
each other, thereby guaranteeing to achieve the given environmental target at the least
cost.
By far the biggest market for tradable emission permits is the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System (EU ETS), implemented in 2005 and covering the GHG emis-
sions of more than 12,000 power plants and industrial facilities in 31 countries. A
comprehensive review on ex-post evaluations of the EU ETS on emission reductions is
provided by Martin et al. (2016). As for any comprehensive environmental regulation,
assessing the effectiveness of the EU ETS requires to know the counterfactual emis-
sions. Counterfactual emissions have been estimated based on aggregate emissions,
and based on firm or plant-level data.
McGuinnes and Ellerman (2008) use power plant-data from the United Kingdom in
order to estimate the effect of the EU ETS on abatement for the first phase. Based on
a fuel switching model, they estimate that natural gas utilisation increased by about
22 percent while coal utilisation decreased by 17 percent, resulting in annual emis-
sion reductions between 13 and 21 Mt CO2. Six other studies until now have used
installation-level data to provide causal estimates of the effect of the EU ETS on regu-
lated installations’ carbon emissions. As these studies also shed light on the economic
performance of ETS-installations, they are reviewed in the next section.
Another local carbon market, established in 2009, is the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative (RGGI) that covers the emissions of fossil-fuelled power plants in 10 north-
eastern U.S. states. Fell and Maniloff (2018) estimate the impact of the RGGI program
on reducing emissions using daily and yearly generator-level data from 2004 to 2012.
They use a DiD design to estimate the causal effect of the programme on power gen-
eration capacity, focusing in particular on coal plants. Their findings suggest that the
RGGI program led coal fired power plants to reduce their capacity utilisation by 10
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percentage points and that the generation was not compensated by gas-fired generation
in the same regulated region. Thus, they examine possible leakage to non-regulated
regions and observe that power generation capacity increased in neighbouring unregu-
lated regions. However, the leakage increased the capacity of relatively cleaner plants
so that overall emissions still declined as a result of the policy.
The SO2 trading program (Acid Rain Program) in the US was the first large experi-
ment with a cap-and-trade mechanism. In Phase I (1995 - 1999), the 263 most SO2-
emission intensive units were covered, while Phase II covered virtually all generating
units (Stavins, 2005). The bulk of the literature assumes that the SO2 trading was effec-
tive in reducing emissions (Schmalensee et al., 1998). Most reduction estimates rely
on EPA’s projections of the counterfactual, but this projection is complicated by major
uncertainties with respect to the remaining lifetime of existing facilities, the rates of
adoption of clean production processes and the growth in electricity demand (Chestnut
and Mills, 2005). EPA (2015) reports that units covered by the Acid Rain Program
reduced annual SO2 emissions in 2015 by 13.5 million tons or 87 percent relative to
1990.
The design, the performance, and the challenges of other emissions trading schemes
are reviewed in Schmalensee and Stavins (2017). Two papers use a quasi-experimental
study design to estimate the impact of trading schemes on emissions reductions in a
causal manner. Descheˆnes et al. (2017) analyse the NOX Budget Trading Program
(NBTP) that operated between 2003 and 2008 covering around 2,500 electricity gen-
erating units in eastern and mid-western states in the US. Since the NBTP aimed at
reducing ozone pollution, which typically reaches its highest levels in summer, the
market operated only between 1 May to 30 September. Hence, Descheˆnes et al. (2017)
make use of a triple difference technique comparing the emission levels between par-
ticipating and non-participating states, before versus after, and summer versus winter.
Using unit-level data, they find that the NBP led to a statistically significant reduc-
tion between 391,000 and 521,000 tons NOX in each summer, which translates into a
decrease of the mean summer ozone by about 6 percent. Fowlie et al. (2012) exam-
ine the Southern California REgional CLean Air Incentive Market (RECLAIM) that
started in 1994 and included 392 industrial NOX and SO2 emitters. They exploit the
fact that RECLAIM covers only facilities in Southern California, whereas all other
Californian installations continue to be regulated under command-and-control. Using
installation-level data and applying a matched DiD study design they estimate that RE-
CLAIM facilities have reduced their NOX emissions by 20% relative to non-regulated
installations in the first 10 years of RECLAIM.
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1.3.2.4 Summing up
In the last ten years, this literature strand has seen much progress by using more ad-
vanced estimation techniques such as matched DiD study designs and by making use
of new micro datasets that allow for establishing a causal relationship between en-
vironmental policies and its impact on environmental quality. This trend is likely to
continue in the future as more and more environmental data from various sources be-
comes available. However, some challenges in the evaluation of environmental policies
will remain. The comprehensive coverage of environmental policies exacerbates the
policies’ assessment in a causal manner. Hence, making use of randomised controlled
trials, that are increasingly used in other policy areas such as labour market policies
and welfare programmes (Gueron and Rolston, 2013), would certainly facilitate the
evaluation of the effectiveness of environmental policies.
Across the board - regardless of the environmental policy instrument analysed - most
of the reviewed papers find a significant reduction of emissions as a result of the policy.
As shown above, both command and control policies and emission pricing are effective
environmental instruments. At the same time, it is often argued that pricing instruments
provide incentives to reduce emissions in a cost-effective way since economic agents
internalise the emissions price in their abatement decisions. Although this insight dates
back to Pigou (1920), environmental taxes only have become popular in the last three
decades and emission trading schemes are even more recent (OECD/IEA, 2017). To
what extent they actually deliver on the expectation is an empirical question that can
only be addressed when looking at the environmental and economic effects jointly.
1.3.3 The joint impact of environmental regulations on environ-
mental and economic performance
Most studies have so far assessed the impact of environmental regulations on environ-
mental and economic performance separately (for reviews, see Ambec et al., 2013; Ar-
linghaus, 2015; Cohen and Tubb, 2017; Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017; Endrikat et al.,
2014; Friede et al., 2015; Iraldo et al., 2011; Jaffe et al., 1995; Koz´luk and Zipperer,
2014; Lankoski, 2010; Martin et al., 2016). However, a critical input for policy makers
implementing environmental regulations is an understanding of how such policies will
impact both environmental quality and local businesses’ economic performance. As a
consequence, some recent studies have started to jointly analyse these dimensions.
A large literature has analysed the impacts of environmental regulations on environ-
mental performance, while another strand of the literature - somewhat less rich - has
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looked at the consequences on economic performance. Ideally, we would like to know
whether environmental policies were effective in environmental terms and whether or
not they were accompanied by detrimental economic effects. Observing only one of
the two dimensions does not allow for a comprehensive evaluation of the respective
policy. Yet, despite some progress in the last years the empirical literature regarding
the joint economic effects and the environmental outcome is still very scattered. This
makes it hard to draw conclusions about the joint environmental and economic impact
of specific environmental policies because the respective results originate from stud-
ies using different datasets, focussing on distinct countries and/or economic sectors.
Notably, the key papers have focused on climate change regulations, and within this
literature, most papers analyse the effect of the European Union Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS).
1.3.3.1 The joint impact of the EU ETS on carbon emissions and firm perfor-
mance
In 2005, the EU ETS - the EU’s flagship climate change policy - was launched in
24 countries across Europe. The policy regulates the carbon emissions of around
12,000 installations, together representing approximately 40% of the total greenhouse
gas emissions in the EU, by allocating pollution permits to these installations, which
can then be freely traded on an international permit market. The objective of this
cap-and-trade programme is to achieve a set reduction of aggregate CO2 emissions at
minimal cost. Across Europe, power stations and industrial plants were categorised
by their primary activity such as: combustion, cement, pulp and paper, among others.
The EU ETS provides a unique context to examine the causal impact of environmental
policy on both environmental and economic performance. It is the first and largest
environmental policy initiative of its kind anywhere in the world up to now (Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016; Martin et al., 2016; Calel et al., 2017).
Importantly, to reduce administrative costs, the EU ETS covers only large installations.
This is an important characteristic of the regulation, which can be exploited for identi-
fication in empirical research. Size thresholds of the EU ETS are defined specifically
for each primary activity and determine whether an installation is included in the reg-
ulation. For example, the regulation only covers combustion installations, which have
an annual thermal input exceeding 20 MWh. Smaller installations are not included in
the regulation (Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016). Researchers can therefore use these
inclusion criteria at the installation-level to compare firms or installations with similar
environmental and economic performance prior to the introduction of the EU ETS, as
long as some installations are regulated since 2005 and some other are not. This al-
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lows researchers to apply quasi-experimental methods, to examine the causal impacts
of environmental policies (List et al., 2003; Greenstone and Gayer, 2009; Calel and
Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016; Calel et al., 2017).
The main outcome of interest for the EU ETS are CO2 emissions. Yet, confidential
business surveys, maintained by statistical agencies, are the only source for representa-
tive emissions data for both EU ETS and non-EU ETS plants. Access to these datasets
is restricted and subject to disclosure control. This is one of the explanations for why
few studies have so far examined the impact of the EU ETS on the economic and en-
vironmental performance of regulated installations by using plant-level data. To date,
four studies have explored the joint effect of the EU ETS on firms’ and installations’
environmental and economic performance, respectively in France, Germany, Norway
and Lithuania (Horbach, 2010; Calel et al., 2017).
France
Wagner et al. (2014) use comprehensive plant-level data for around 9,500 French man-
ufacturing firms to explore the economic and environmental response of plants to the
introduction of the EU ETS. The analysis is based on a combination of energy con-
sumption and economic performance data at the facility and firm level. The EACEI
(Enquete Annuelle sur les Consommations d’Energie dans l’Industrie) is a survey con-
ducted annually in France. It provides quantities and values of energy consumed by
energy type (electricity, vapour, natural gas, coal, lignite, coke, butane, propane, fuel
oil, heating oil, wood, etc.). About 12,000 establishments are part of the sample: all
industrial establishments employing 20 employees or more in the most energy con-
suming sectors, all establishments with more than 250 employees, and a sample of
establishments with employment between 20 and 249 employees in sectors that are
not energy intensive. Fuel consumption information at the plant level is then converted
into carbon emissions based on widely available carbon content data on the various fu-
els consumed. This dataset is combined with EAE (Enqueˆte Annuelle des Entreprises),
which collects balance-sheet data at the firm level on turnover, employment, capital,
and aggregate wages, as well as information about firm location and industry classifi-
cation. The data are available for all firms with more than 20 employees and all the
plants of those firms. Finally, the data is matched on the European Union Transaction
Log, which contains the list of all installations regulated under the EU ETS. Notably,
in France, the national registry is managed by the Caisse des De´poˆts and their website
provides a link between the EUTL permit identifier (GIDIC) and the French unique
firm identifier SIREN, allowing a quasi-perfect matching of the two databases (Hor-
bach, 2010).
To examine the causal effect of the EU ETS on environmental and economic perfor-
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mance, Wagner et al. (2014) combine matching with difference-in-differences. For
each EU ETS-regulated plant, they use propensity score matching to identify the most
similar non-EU ETS plant (nearest neighbour), which becomes part of the control
group and helps determining what would have been the behaviour of regulated plants,
had they not been regulated. Ideally, one would want to directly use the production
capacity of the plants to create such pairs, since it is production capacity pre-EU ETS
that determines inclusion into the system. However, this variable is not observed by
the researchers. Therefore, they use carbon intensity of each plant in the year 1999, the
year in which the EU ETS was announced, as the main matching variable. They also
match each plant exactly on sector at the NACE two-digit level. This means that each
EU ETS plant is compared with a non-EU ETS plant operating in the same two-digit
sector and having the same carbon intensity before the announcement of the EU ETS.
A potential problem is the absence of size variables in the matching process, which
might induce the authors to compare plants of different sizes and thus different on
unobserved characteristics as well (see also Horbach, 2010).
Their results imply that ETS-regulated manufacturing plants in France reduced emis-
sions by an average of 15%. The analysis shows no effect of the EU ETS during Phase
I (2005-2007) and a 15% reduction in emissions during Phase II compared to unreg-
ulated plants. Having facility level data, Wagner et al. (2014) can explore if there is
any evidence of within firm leakage for firms with both unregulated and regulated fa-
cilities. It might be easier for such firms to shift emissions to unregulated plants as
they are experiencing lower transaction costs compared to firms which have no exist-
ing links with unregulated facilities (Horbach, 2010). However, they do not find any
evidence for such within-firm carbon emissions reallocation effects. Instead, the re-
duction in emissions appears to be driven mostly by reductions in the carbon-intensity
of production. In particular, about half of the reduction in emissions is due to an in-
crease in the share of gas, which is less carbon intensive than coal and oil. In terms
of economic outcomes, Wagner et al. (2014) do not find any statistically significant
results on employment. This suggests that the EU ETS reduced emissions of regulated
plants without a significant effect on domestic jobs in France (see also Horbach, 2010;
Calel et al., 2017).
Germany
Petrick and Wagner (2009) analyse the causal impact of the EU ETS on German man-
ufacturing firms using comprehensive panel data from the German production census.
Contrary to Wagner et al. (2014) who use data on French plants, their analysis is con-
ducted at the firm level. They are able to match 1,658 EU ETS facilities to the German
AFiD company database, a database comprising official firm-level data from the Ger-
man Federal Statistical Office. They use propensity score matching to select a group
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of comparable but unregulated firms, and base this on a comparably much richer set
of observable pre-treatment characteristics: CO2 emissions, gross output, export share
of output, number of employees, average wage, the squares of all these variables, and
dummies for two-digit industry (WZ classification) and state (Bundesland) wherein the
firm is located.
Petrick and Wagner (2009) show robust evidence that the second phase of the EU ETS
caused treated firms to reduce their emissions by a substantial margin of around 25 to
28 percentage points compared to non-treated firms. In parallel, carbon intensity de-
clined between 18 and 30 percentage points faster at EU ETS firms than at the control
firms. This suggests that firms responded to the introduction of the EU ETS mainly
by changing the carbon intensity of production, not the scale. Furthermore, firms were
found to have reduced their carbon emissions by switching from high-carbon fuels
(natural gas and oil) to low-carbon fuels (electricity) (see also Calel et al., 2017, for a
discussion of the results).
Turning to economic outcomes, Petrick and Wagner (2009) find no statistically signif-
icant effects of the EU ETS on employment. In a word, putting a price on carbon does
not seem to come at the expense of domestic job destruction. As for gross output, they
estimate that the EU ETS increased gross output at regulated firms by a statistically
significant amount of between 4 and 7 percent. While this allows the authors to reject
the hypothesis that the EU ETS caused firms to reduce the scale of production, the
positive effect on gross output is surprising and consistent with both firms producing
more or charging higher prices. Unfortunately, they cannot distinguish between these
two responses because they lack a measure of physical output. Similarly, they reject
the hypothesis that the EU ETS caused regulated firms to reduce their overall exports,
but they even find that the EU ETS increased total exports by 6% to 11% for phase I
and by 7% to 18% for phase II. Again, it is not clear whether the increase in exports
reflects an increase in the volume of shipments or a price increase, or a combination of
both.
Norway
In a panel study of Norwegian plants, Klemetsen et al. (2016) analyse the effect of the
EU ETS on emission levels and intensity (defined as emissions divided by man hours).
Their results show marginally significant evidence that regulated plants reduced emis-
sions by a substantial amount (-30%) in the EU ETS’ second phase, and a lack of
evidence that emission intensity decreased in any of the phases. This suggests that
during the second phase of the ETS, participating firms reduced emissions by reducing
output rather than emissions intensity.
The authors use plant level data from the Norwegian Environment Agency for the
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period 2001 to 2013 on annual emissions of all Norwegian plants regulated by the
Norwegian ETS or the Norwegian Pollution Control Act, including emissions of CO2,
N2O and PFCs (measured in CO2 equivalents). It allows them to identify which plants
were regulated by the EU ETS. Their sample includes 665 plants of which 150 plants
are regulated by the EU ETS. They consider two measures of economic performance:
First, value added at factor prices, which is the plant’s annual gross production value
minus the cost of intermediates plus subsidies and minus taxes (except VAT). Second,
labour productivity, which is measured as value added at factor prices per man hour.
For the second phase of the EU ETS, the authors find positive and significant effects
for both value added and productivity of around 25%. These surprising effects could
arise due to the free allocation of permits or cost pass-through and their effect on value
added (Calel et al., 2017).
Propensity score matching techniques are used to construct a control group of similar
but unregulated plants. Exact matching is done on type of pollutant (CO2, N2O or
PFCs) and on industry classification at two-digit level. Continuous matching variables
include emissions levels of emissions (as a proxy for capacity limit) and number of
employees (as a measure of plant size) in the pre-treatment year 2001. Not all EU ETS
regulated plants can be matched, hence the final matched sample includes 152 plants
of which 72 plants are regulated by the EU ETS. However, it is notable that the control
group still appears quite different from the treatment group even after matching with,
for example, an average CO2 intensity of 62.1% in the treatment group and only 6.8%
in the control group. Therefore, it is questionable how comparable the treated and
control groups are in this study.
Lithuania
Finally, Jaraite and Di Maria (2016) analyse the effect of the EU ETS on carbon emis-
sions and firm profitability in Lithuania for the years 2005-2010 using plant-level data.
They compare 41 EU ETS firms with 312 non-EU ETS firms matched through propen-
sity score-matching. They find no reductions in emissions and a slight improvement in
emissions intensity in 2006-2007, but their data does not allow them to study effects on
emissions beyond 2007. With respect to economic performance, Jaraite and Di Maria
(2016) find no significant impacts of the EU ETS on Lithuanian firms’ profitability
(see also Calel et al., 2017, for a discussion of the results).
Pan-European studies
At present, only two papers have analysed the joint effect of the EU ETS on CO2 emis-
sions and economic performance based on data from more than one country of the
European Union. Abrell et al. (2011) use data on 2,101 firms across Europe represent-
ing around 60% of EU ETS regulated emissions to assess reductions in CO2 emissions
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induced by the transition from Phase I to Phase II of the programme, which occurred
in 2008. They find that emission reductions were 3.6% higher between 2007 and 2008
than between 2005 and 2006, a difference which they attribute to the increased strin-
gency of the regulation. This finding is robust to controlling for turnover, employment,
profits, and industry and country trends, suggesting that the reduction in emissions is
due to the change in stringency from Phase I to Phase II (i.e. the lower allocation of
permits) and not to a decline in production. Abrell et al. (2011) then apply a nearest-
neighbour matching procedure to their sample of EU ETS firms and show that the
policy caused a small but statistically significant decrease in employment of approxi-
mately 0.9 percent between 2004 and 2008. One limitation of the matching procedure
is that, as Martin et al. (2014) explain, taking control firms only from non-regulated
sectors is problematic. The regulated sectors within the EU ETS were possibly not
selected at random. Hence the study may suffer from selection bias at the sector level
(Martin et al., 2016; Calel et al., 2017).
More recently, Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2018) combine two sources of data. First, they
take carbon emissions data at the installation level from the national Pollutant Re-
lease and Transfer Registers (PRTR) from France, Netherlands, Norway and the United
Kingdom, complemented with data from the European PRTR. Second, financial data
and other firm-level performance data such as employment, fixed assets, profits, and
revenues come from the global financial database Orbis, which includes all 31 coun-
tries covered by the EU ETS. Using the European Union Transactions Log (EUTL),
they can identify installations and firms covered and not covered by the EU ETS.
They employ a matching procedure in which each treated installation and firm is
matched to the closest installation and firm operating in the same economic sector
and country and similar in all other observable characteristics before the introduction
of the EU ETS. This control group combined with a difference-in-differences estima-
tion allows to estimate the policy’s causal impact on installations’ emissions and on
firms’ revenue, assets, profits and employment. Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2018) find that
the EU ETS has led to carbon emission reductions of around -10% between 2005 and
2012 while not having any adverse impact on firms’ economic performance. The EU
ETS has not had any negative effect on regulated firms’ revenue, profits, fixed assets or
jobs. In fact, the EU ETS rather seems to have led to an increase of revenues and fixed
assets of regulated firms - contrary to what could have been expected. Dechezlepreˆtre
et al. (2018) argue that one explanation for these results is that the EU ETS induced
regulated firms to increase investment - likely in carbon-saving technologies - which,
in turn, may have increased productivity.
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1.3.3.2 The joint impact of the UK Climate Change Levy on carbon emissions
and firm performance
The UK Climate Change Levy (CCL) is a carbon tax associated with a scheme of vol-
untary agreements (called Climate Change Agreements) available to plants in selected
energy intensive industries. Upon joining a CCA, a plant adopts a specific target for
energy consumption or carbon emissions in exchange for an 80% discount on the tax
liability under the CCL. Martin et al. (2014a) analyse the impact of the CCL on energy
use, emissions and economic performance of regulated plants for the period 2001-2004
based on micro-level data.
The identification strategy of the paper is to compare changes in outcomes between
fully-taxed CCL plants and CCA plants which pay the reduced tax rate. Since plants
self-select themselves into a CCA, it is not possible to implement a straightforward
DiD strategy. However, a key feature of eligibility for CCAs is that plants needed to
emit pollutants subject to environmental regulation under the Pollution Prevention and
Control (PPC) act which pre-dated the CCL. This variation in eligibility across plants
can hence be used as an instrument for CCA participation. Indeed, since eligibility
is based on pollution intensity, many energy intensive industries are ineligible for the
tax discount. Martin et al. (2014) state that textile wet processing was an eligible ac-
tivity thanks to its high pollution emissions. Yet dry processing, which is also energy
intensive, emits no pollution regulated under PPC. Similarly, both the production and
the recycling of glass containers are energy-intensive. However, only the former is
pollution-intensive, which is the reason why the latter (glass container recycling) was
not eligible for CCA participation. This characteristic of the policy design induces ex-
ogenous variation in the probability of treatment even within narrowly defined, energy-
intensive industrial sectors (Martin et al., 2014).
The core dataset is the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), an annual production
survey that covers about 10,000 plants in the manufacturing sector. Energy use comes
from the Quarterly Fuels Inquiry (QFI), a survey among a panel of about 1,000 manu-
facturing plants which can be matched to the ARD. Information on CCA participation
comes from both the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) websites. Finally, data for the instrumen-
tal variable comes from the European Pollution Emissions Register (EPER). The final
dataset includes 6,886 plants, among which 1,079 have detailed information on fuel
consumption by type.
Instrumental variable estimations show that the CCL had a strong negative impact on
energy intensity (-18%), particularly for larger and more energy intensive plants. The
results are mainly driven by a reduction in electricity use, which results in a decline
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in CO2 emissions. The results suggest that firms substituted labour for energy and
increased output prices in response to the energy price increase. In contrast, the authors
do not find any statistically significant impacts of the tax on employment, revenue or
total factor productivity. Similarly, no evidence is found that the CCL accelerated plant
exit.
1.3.3.3 The joint impact of energy prices on economic and environmental per-
formance
To examine more generally the effect of energy prices on firms’ environmental and
economic performance, Marin and Vona (2017) use three rich datasets provided by
the French Statistical Office covering the period 1997 to 2010: the EACAI survey for
establishment-level energy purchases and consumption, DADS (De´claration Annuelle
des Donne´es Sociales) for data on employment and wages, and FARES-FICUS for
information on firms’ balance sheets. By combining these datasets they can use differ-
ences across establishments in energy intensities, -prices, and -mixes. Hereby, energy
intensities provide a proxy for establishments’ exposure to energy price changes, and
the energy mix (i.e. the use of electricity versus natural gas and other fuels) indicates
establishments’ technology and the relative exposure to price changes for the respective
energy source. Energy use and CO2 emissions capture firms’ environmental impact,
and employment, wages and productivity are used as economic outcomes.
To estimate the effect of electricity prices on firms’ environmental and economic out-
come variables Marin and Vona (2017) use both a simple fixed effects model, as well
as an Instrumental Variable (IV) specification. The latter is important to address con-
cerns of endogeneity due to non-observed variables, which could bias the results of the
simple fixed effects model. Such variables could be firm-specific demand shocks or
technological change as a response to changes in energy prices. These variables are
likely to be correlated with both the outcome variables and energy prices, resulting in a
biased estimation of the model. To overcome this concern the authors require an instru-
mental variable that is correlated with the exogenous variation in energy prices but not
related to establishment-specific technological responses to changes in energy prices.
They use a combination of the nationwide price of energy with a fixed firm-specific
energy mix, which does not change over time (shift-share instrument). Changes in
nationwide prices are uncorrelated with firm-specific demand shocks dealing with the
first concern. Since most endogenous technological change operates through changes
in the mix of energy sources, holding fixed the energy mix addresses the second source
of potential bias.
In their preferred specification with the Instrumental Variable, Marin and Vona (2017)
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identify a trade-off between environmental and economic goals: A 10% increase in
establishment-level energy prices, leads to a reduction in energy consumption and CO2
emissions by 6.4% and 11.5% respectively. Yet, the same increase in energy prices also
leads to a modest negative effect on employment (-2.6%), wages (-0.4%) and firm’s
productivity (-1.1%). The negative employment impacts differ across sectors with
energy-intensive and trade-exposed sectors experiencing the largest decline. However,
preliminary evidence shows a substantial reallocation of production inputs between
establishments of the same firm as a response to energy price changes. This gives
reasons to believe that the estimated employment impacts are upper bounds. Some of
the employees that are observed as losing their job at one establishment are simply
relocated to another establishment within the same firm (Marin and Vona, 2017).
1.3.3.4 The joint impact of environmental regulation on environmental and eco-
nomic performance through innovation
The Porter Hypothesis suggests a causal link from environmental regulation to firm’s
innovation, and profitability. Many studies have studied this chain of causality. They
observe that although there is a positive impact of innovation on economic perfor-
mance, it is typically not sufficient to compensate entirely for the negative effect of
the regulation (Lanoie et al., 2011; Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017). Hence, environ-
mental regulation can come at a cost. Yet, for the total cost calculations it is crucial
to also include the possibility of cost-reductions through innovation. Hence, the total
costs are less than the direct costs of an environmental regulation. Innovation that is
induced by regulation can improve firms’ resource efficiency with respect to energy or
material usage, which in turn increases profitability (Rexha¨user and Rammer, 2014;
Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).
This does not preclude the possibilities that environmental regulations induce new
green technology leaders higher up the supply chain, but to our knowledge no study
has looked at effects of such regulation on the entire supply chain. Yet, some evidence
suggests that environmental regulation can trigger innovation from technology suppli-
ers (Bellas and Lange, 2010; Bellas et al., 2013). Further research could jointly look
at the environmental and economic performance taking into account the whole supply
chain.
Porter and van der Linde (1995) also argue that in the long run environmental regula-
tion can result in a competitive advantage for domestic firms, if foreign firms will be
exposed to the same or a similar regulation in the future. Hence, firms that innovated
to adjust to a regulation will be able to benefit as soon as more firms become subject to
similar types of regulations due to their first-mover advantage. So, while regulations
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may imply costs in the short run, they can benefit regulated firms over longer time
horizons. However, to the best of our knowledge, this link between first-mover ad-
vantages and a potential increase in competitiveness has not been studied empirically
(Dechezlepreˆtre and Sato, 2017).
1.3.3.5 Summing up
Because economists traditionally think of environmental regulations as forcing firms
away from the optimum by requiring them to implement costly abatement activities
that divert resources away from productive investments, it is all the more interest-
ing that this literature - scarce as it is - finds that environmental regulations tend to
improve environmental performance while hardly weakening economic performance.
The evidence on the EU ETS suggests that in particular Phase II of the policy causally
induced reductions in GHG emissions in regulated plants in the range of 15-30% rel-
ative to non-regulated plants. At the same time the regulation has not resulted in loss
of employment and might have even increased gross output of regulated plants. These
findings might be specific to the EU ETS design and due to the overallocation of emis-
sion permits, which have resulted in windfall profits for regulated plants. Whether
these results hold in a stricter policy environment without a surplus in permits will
need to be tested. At the same time, these findings also show that relatively weak en-
vironmental regulation can lead to substantial reductions in emissions without hurting
competitiveness. Similarly, the existing studies on energy-price regulations in the UK
and France suggest that such pricing policies are effective at reducing firms’ energy-
intensity and GHG emissions with at worst small negative impacts on employment and
competitiveness.
So far, no study confirms the so-called strong version of the Porter hypothesis, which
proposes that environmental regulations can improve at the same time environmen-
tal and economic performance. Yet, it is important to note that Porter and van der
Linde (1995) were referring to particular types of ‘well-designed’ environmental reg-
ulation. These regulations would need to be sufficiently flexible and incorporate a
market-based mechanism with clear and reliable price signals that provide incentives
for innovation. Moreover, they would need to cover a comprehensive set of pollu-
tants and economic sectors moving away from “piecemeal solutions” (p.111). Given
the existing deficiencies in environmental regulations (e.g. exemptions for particular
industries, over-allocation and a low permit price in the EU ETS) it might not be sur-
prising that we do not yet observe effects confirming the strong version of the Porter
Hypothesis.
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1.4 Conclusion
There is still a widespread belief among economists of a trade-off between economic
performance and environmental outcomes of firms, claiming that good environmental
performance would jeopardise business activities by adding costs and diverting re-
sources from more productive use, thereby slowing down productivity and reducing
international competitiveness. This article has reviewed two strands of the available
empirical literature, combining economic and environmental performance data at the
micro-level: First, is the issue of whether economic and environmental performance
can go hand in hand, and where the main finding is that the majority of studies report
a positive relation between environmental performance and economic outcomes. This
finding is probably not very surprising because good environmental performance could
be driven by profit-enhancing motivations of firms.
Addressing the potential reverse causality in these findings is an important, albeit chal-
lenging avenue for future research. Moreover, expanding the scope to industries be-
yond manufacturing and energy generation would be valuable to assess the general-
isability of current findings. Improved environmental performance indicators at the
firm-level would also offer promising avenues for future research. These could for
example focus on the ‘greenness’ of firms’ supply chains, production processes, their
product mix or investment decisions. Most studies reviewed here focused on GHG
emissions and toxic release emissions. Further work is required on different environ-
mental performance variables such as firms’ impact on biodiversity.
The second issue reviewed is about the impact of environmental regulations on firms’
environmental and economic outcomes. The conclusion of Jaffe et al. (1995), who
find little evidence of adverse economic impacts of environmental regulation, has be-
come even more robust in the last ten years through numerous studies using different
datasets from different countries and sectors while applying more advanced econo-
metric techniques. This is an important finding for policy-makers, which needs to be
communicated more effectively. It remains crucial that environmental policies allow
sufficient flexibility for firms to adjust. Environmental taxes or market based mecha-
nisms fulfil these requirements and have the potential for Porter-type effects. Redis-
tributive mechanisms and revenue-neutrality of pricing policies can play an important
role in increasing the political acceptance and in cushioning socio-economic impacts
for particularly affected groups. The political acceptance and the political economy of
environmental policies play an increasingly important role and should be considered
when designing and implementing new policies.
The vast majority of studies on the impact of environmental regulation focus on eco-
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nomic impacts, while abstracting from the effectiveness in environmental terms. In
fact, environmental effectiveness is often assumed, but not investigated in more detail.
Given the evidence from studies finding only small, if any, adverse impact of environ-
mental policies on economic outcomes, the question of whether environmental policies
are improving environmental performance is even more pressing. In the last ten years,
this strand of literature has seen much progress, particularly as more and more environ-
mental data has become available. The recent evidence suggests that both command
and control policies and economic instruments lead to a statistically significant im-
provement of the environmental performance. While economic theory suggests that
pricing an environmental bad reduces emissions in a cost-effective way, the empirical
literature on the cost-effectiveness of different environmental policy instruments still
lacks evidence and is one avenue for future research.
Another avenue for future research is to continue the evaluation of the economic and
environmental performance of environmental policies by making use of new (micro)
datasets in different contexts and countries to update and reassess the existing evidence.
Most of the evidence originates from studies that analyse the impact of environmental
policies on economic and environmental outcome separately. Ideally, we would like to
know the impact of the same environmental instrument in the same regulatory context
on both firms’ environmental performance and their business activities. Only the joint
analysis of both outcomes is appropriate for this kind of evidence and, thus, should be
followed further.
The joint analysis of economic and environmental performance is still in its infancy
and has obvious limitations. Most studies have used a single policy experiment, the
EU ETS, and focus on a single country. They rely on relatively small samples, and tend
to cover a very narrow subset - of albeit important - environmental policy instruments.
This has some key implications, limiting the ability to distinguish e.g. short versus
longer term effects or finding counterfactual references. Only two multi-country stud-
ies are currently available, while cross-country studies would enable researchers to
determine which combination of public policies (instruments for environmental pol-
icy, innovation policy, fiscal policy, etc.) works best at inducing the greatest benefits in
terms of improved environmental performance, while implying the smallest costs or,
potentially, the greatest improvements in terms of economic performance.
Still, while the generalisation is difficult, the relative freshness of this literature means
that it tends to at least attempt to look for causal effects, which is hardly the case in
the earlier studies of effects of environmental policies. Because the implementation
of environmental regulations can sometimes be claimed to be exogenous (this is in
particular the case for the EU ETS, which uses arbitrary administrative thresholds to
determine inclusion), this allows for more confidence in the identification of causal
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links.
Establishing causal relationships between environmental regulations and firms’ out-
comes will remain the gold standard in the empirical literature. However, the com-
prehensive coverage of most environmental policies exacerbates the compliance with
this standard. This calls for policy designs that allow for a more robust evaluation of
the effectiveness of regulations, including the phase-in of new regulations in different
regions at different points in time or the use of randomised controlled trials. In fact,
randomised controlled trials are already successfully used in other policy areas such as
labour market policies and welfare programmes. Making use of these policy designs
in combination with new data sources such as pollution data of point sources gathered
from satellites would significantly improve the available evidence on the impact of
environmental policies on both environmental and economic outcomes.
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Chapter 2
Green Revenues, Profitability and
Market Valuation: Evidence from a
Global Firm Level Dataset.
Abstract
Substantial private investments in low carbon technologies and capital assets are neces-
sary to meet climate change mitigation targets. This paper examines how diversifying
production towards low carbon goods and services impacts the profitability and market
valuation of firms. Using new and unique data on firms’ revenues that are generated
from the production of green goods and services, we are able to measure shifts in firms’
commercial focus towards green activities over time. Our dataset is comprehensive,
covering approximately 98% of global market capitalisation for the period 2009-2016.
We show that operating profit margins tend to increase with higher shares of revenues
generated from green goods and services. However, higher operating profit margins do
not necessarily increase profits per unit of investment, because the production of green
goods and services tends to entail higher asset requirements. In terms of market valu-
ation, higher green revenue shares are neither rewarded nor punished by investors on
the stock market, except in utilities, hence investors generally do not value green firms
more compared to non-green counterparts. Our findings suggest that governments can
support driving forward a market-led low-carbon transition across the broad economy
by, for example, facilitating cheaper environmental capital expenditures and helping
the creation and expansion of markets for green goods and services.
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2.1 Introduction
Responding to environmental problems and policies as well as changing demand to-
wards low-pollution or energy efficient products, a growing number of firms are chang-
ing commercial focus towards the production of environmental goods and services.
According to FTSE Russell (2018) the “green economy”, at 6% of the globally listed
equity market, was worth as much as the fossil fuel sector in 2018. This paper ex-
plores how a shift from non-green to green activity affects the financial and market
performance of these frontier firms in the green economy.
The question of whether environmental performance and economic performance can
go hand in hand has been around, ever since the major environmental policies were
enacted in the 1970s. The conventional view is that, because firms are perfectly rational
and have already exhausted all profitable opportunities, any additional effort to provide
public goods by reducing pollution necessarily has to come at a cost (Palmer et al.,
1995). These arguments are used to oppose stringent unilateral environmental policies
on the grounds that there is a trade off-between environmental performance (social
benefits) and the economic performance of regulated firms (private costs). This rather
static view was challenged by Porter (1991b) and Porter and van der Linde (1995)
who argued that firms in fact do not always make optimal choices and that continual
opportunities for resource efficiency and technological improvements exist, because of
incomplete information, organisational inertia and other problems that plague the real
world. Under this view – what has become known as the Porter Hypothesis – the trade
off can be relaxed with well designed and stringent environmental policy, for example,
by reducing uncertainty around investments and stimulating innovation that improves
resource productivity and economic performance. Porter and van der Linde (1995)
also argue that as consumers become more sophisticated and green market segments
open up globally, the early-mover “clean” companies can gain a lasting competitive
edge.
A vast empirical literature has put these conflicting predictions to the test. There is
general agreement that the introduction of environmental policies has led to higher
pollution abatement costs (as share of business capital expenditures) (Pasurka, 2008),
but firms typically do not face the full burden of regulatory costs due to exemptions
and compensation measures (Ekins and Speck, 1999; Stavins, 2003). Moreover, en-
vironmental regulation can signal companies about inefficiencies and induce technical
change (as measured by R&D or patents) (Calel and Dechezlepreˆtre, 2016; Fabrizi
et al., 2018), especially with market-based instruments (Ambec et al., 2013). Hav-
ing established that firms can innovate in response to environmental policies, the sec-
ondary question is, how this affects firms’ bottom line. The Porter Hypothesis focuses
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on whether the regulatory cost can be partly, fully or more than fully recovered by the
“innovation offsets”. A number of studies explicitly test this question, but the evidence
remains inconclusive according to recent reviews (e.g. Ambec et al., 2013; Cohen and
Tubb, 2017).1
The majority of empirical studies contributing to the evidence base for the Porter
Hypothesis instead tackle smaller pieces of the puzzle. Ambec and Lanoie (2008)
distinguish two channels through which environmental innovation can impact firms’
environmental and economic performance: the “cost channel” whereby firms reduce
input costs through improving efficiency and mitigating risk, and the “revenue chan-
nel” whereby firms increase revenues by developing new, cleaner products in response
to changing customer preferences and capturing market share (Ambec and Lanoie,
2008). So far, most studies test the former channel and find on the whole that pol-
icy induced innovation can lead to reduced costs through improving energy efficiency
(Bloom et al., 2010; Kumar and Managi, 2010; Gosnell et al., 2017) or productivity
(Van-Leeuwen and Mohnen, 2017). Meta-analyses on the relationship between firms’
environmental and financial performance find that overall, the relationship is positive
(Endrikat et al., 2014; Horva´thova´, 2010; Albertini, 2013)2 but that this effect is hetero-
geneous, for example according to their initial level of financial performance (Wagner
and Blom, 2011). Studies on stock market impacts usually find that dirty firms tend to
be punished by investors and suffer negative abnormal returns for example following
disclosure of emissions data (Baboukardos, 2017; Lourenc¸o et al., 2012b), whereas the
effect of being clean or being perceived to be committed to sustainability (for example
with adoption of environmental management systems, Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity (CSR) announcements or being included in a sustainability stock index) could be
positive (Flammer, 2015; Song et al., 2017) or negative (Oberndorfer et al., 2013).
Fewer studies examine the “revenue channel”. In theory, shifting commercial focus
towards environmental goods and services could lead to higher profitability for firms
because a) they result from a long-term investment plan in research and development
which allows for more product differentiation and can lead to higher price premiums
and lower competition (Berrone et al., 2013), b) green product differentiation is more
visible than internally-driven green activities and thus hold higher commercial value
1Ambec et al. (2013) finds that the positive effect on innovation are realised with some time lag, and
that generally, it does not outweigh the negative costs of environmental regulation, thus supporting the
weak version of the Porter hypothesis. On the other hand, a meta analysis by Cohen and Tubb (2017)
finds that a positive effect of environmental policies is more likely at the country level rather than the
firm level, supporting the “strong” version of the Porter hypothesis i.e. that environmental policies
induce innovation and increase competitiveness over time.
2Horva´thova´ (2010) finds that negative relationships between environmental and financial perfor-
mance tends to be found in studies using less sophisticated methods, whereas a positive effect tends to
be found when more advanced methods (panel data estimation with reduced omitted variable problems)
and better data with longer time frames are used.
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(Dangelico and Pontrandolfo, 2010) or c) company reputation improves through mar-
keting (Gonza´lez-Benito and Gonza´lez-Benito, 2005; Driessen et al., 2013). Exam-
ining whether diversifying into the environmentally friendly market space is privately
rewarded is important, as it can inform policy designs to harness market forces to stim-
ulate innovation and foster a profit-driven response to environmental problems. This
can keep the costs of the low carbon transition down and is politically appealing espe-
cially in the context of market economies.
This study builds on the handful of studies that empirically test the “revenue channel”
- whether orienting production towards low carbon goods and services contributes to
market value creation, or if not doing so is penalised. In terms of financial performance,
Gonza´lez-Benito and Gonza´lez-Benito (2005) finds that ecological product design has
no impact on return on assets using a cross sectional regression on a sample of 186
Spanish companies, Jabbour et al. (2015) finds that green product development has a
positive influence on firm performance on a variety of measures (marketing, opera-
tional and environmental) for a sample of 62 Brazilian companies, while Palmer and
Truong (2017) find higher net income in firms that introduce green new products using
a sample of 79 global firms using OLS regression. In terms of stock market perfor-
mance, few studies explicitly examine the effect of market-oriented environmental ac-
tivities. Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2017) uses the share of clean patenting to capture firms’
strategic focus on low carbon innovation and analyses knowledge spillovers from clean
and dirty technologies using patent citations. They show that clean-patented inven-
tions have higher spillovers, and also observe a positive relationships between more
spillovers from clean patents and Tobin’s Q, suggesting investors attribute a higher
value to green technologies compared to non-green counterparts.
While the evidence is not conclusive, they largely point to the difficulty in rejecting
the Porter Hypothesis. The possibility prevails, that a well-designed, stringent envi-
ronmental policies could simultaneously reduce environmental impact and enhance
economic performance of firms, such that the provision of public goods from the pri-
vate sector results in a “win-win”. However, the question still remains, how can private
sector investments in low carbon technologies be accelerated on a greater scale? In-
deed to address the looming climate emergency (IPCC, 2018), it is estimated that each
year trillions of US dollars of investment are required to drive the low carbon transition
(Stern, 2015b; OECD, 2017)3. Given the scale of the challenge, both public and pri-
vate sector investments are needed. Yet private sector investments will be key to drive
forward low carbon innovation and keep the costs down, as was seen in the earlier IT
revolution (Mazzucato et al., 2015; CPI, 2018). Thus it is important to understand how
3The OECD (2017) estimates for instance that approximately 7 trillion US dollars are required
annually until 2030 in infrastructure investments to comply with the Paris Agreement, half of which in
the energy sectors.
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policy design can be improved to enhance the economic viability of “going green”
such that large scale private sector low carbon investments can be mobilised.
This paper contributes to the evidence on the “revenue channel” by exploiting the vari-
ation across firms in the degree to which they have already shifted company attention
to “green” activities in recent years. The fact that growth in low carbon innovation and
new green markets is observed (Popp, 2019) indicates that environmental policies are
working to some extent and in some sectors, to correct market failure and harness the
ability of markets to deliver public goods. We examine if these strategic moves into
new markets for low carbon goods and services4 by frontier firms pays off, and if they
are rewarded or punished by investors. We aim to shed light on how policy can be
fine-tuned to unblock barriers to mainstreaming shifts into the low carbon economy.
We use newly constructed firm level data that records green revenue shares, key firm
characteristics and firm financial performance variables. Our dataset includes infor-
mation on over 16,000 global publicly listed firms across 48 countries operating from
2009 to 2016 in a wide range of industries.5 We identify over 3,500 firms which derive
revenues from production and sale of green goods and services. Using this data, we
are able to test if changes to the share of green revenues affect the financial and market
performance of firms, overcoming a number of key limitations in the previous liter-
ature. First, our green revenue share variable is able to capture within-firm strategic
shifts away from the non-green and into the green economy. Indicators of the degree
of firms’ environmental efforts are hard to come by, particularly for a large sample
of firms spread across geographically. We use a unique firm level dataset from FTSE
Russell which, to our knowledge, is the first database that provides comprehensive and
detailed information into the environment-focused commercial activities of publicly
listed firms, tracking the share of revenues generated through green goods and services
over time.
Second, we overcome the external validity issue present in previous studies that were
typically limited in geographic or sectoral scope - the dataset we construct covers
global publicly listed firms representing approximately 98% of global market capi-
talisation over an eight year panel across 48 countries. Third, we examine the impact
of firms’ green revenue shares on a range of financial performance variables including
both accounting based and market based measures, capturing both current and expected
profitability. For accounting based measures, we examine both operating profit margin
4These are either produced with technologies that economise on exhaustible resources and emit less
greenhouse gases, for example electricity produced by renewables, or emit less carbon during its use
phase whilst providing similar functions as conventional goods and services, for example hybrid and
electric cars.
5The raw data is provided for the years 2008-2017. We limit the analysis to the years 2009-2016
due to data quality concerns in the first and last year.
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(how successful the management is in creating profits from its sales) but also more
comprehensive measures of profitability that capture return on investments, such as re-
turn on assets and return on equity. An important contribution of this paper is to show
the linkages between the variables. Fourth, an important limitation of existing studies
is that potential selection bias is largely ignored, even though the group of “treated”
frontier firms that move into the green space early are likely to differ from the non-
green group. We show that indeed green firms tend to be on average larger and more
profitable and employ inverse propensity score weighting (Guadalupe et al., 2012) to
address this selection bias. Lastly, we disaggregate our results by sectors, providing
new insights into sectoral heterogeneities. Our estimates provide the first compre-
hensive empirical assessment of the impact of diversifying towards green goods and
services on financial and market performance.
Our results provide a number of new insights with clear policy implications. We find
that across all industries, increasing the share of revenue generated from the sale of
green goods and services is associated with higher operative profit margins. This sug-
gests higher price premiums can be yielded from proactive moves into the environ-
mentally friendly market space. Hence an important role that public policy can play
to accelerate and harness, private sector low carbon investments is to ensure the level
of firms’ “green effort” is known to consumers and investors, for example through the
provision of information or clear labelling. Why then is a rapid and broader shift into
the production and sale of low carbon goods and services not observed? Interestingly,
we find that higher operating margins do not translate to higher return on investments,
except in the utilities sectors. We show that this is in part due to the higher asset re-
quirements of engaging in the production of green goods and services as shown by
Hirth and Steckel (2016). High asset requirements pose a barrier for firms to shift into
the green space. Hence policy should tackle this barrier to make green shifts more
economically viable across a broader range of sectors, and mobilise large scale private
sector investments, for example by facilitating cheaper access to green capital through
reduced interest rates or risk sharing through public-private partnerships.
In addition to accounting based measures of current profitability, we also assess ex-
pected profitability using market-based measures to assess how a change in commer-
cial focus towards green affects how investors in stock markets value firms. We find
that an increase in firms’ green revenue share affects investors expectations positively,
again largely only for utilities. These findings deliver a cautionary note because meet-
ing the climate goals requires switches to low carbon alternatives across a broad set
of sectors. While utilities, and electricity generation in particular, are key for the low-
carbon transition, policies need to increasingly target non-utility sectors to achieve a
broad diffusion of green technologies.
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In line with the Porter Hypothesis, our results suggest that the environment - com-
petitiveness trade-off could be relaxed with well designed and targeted environmental
policies. Important sectoral heterogeneities exists in the relationships between produc-
ing green revenues and firms’ economic performance. The automobile sector plays a
distinct role, as the manufacturing of hybrid- and electric vehicles is associated with
lower earnings-margins. The finding is supported by industry reports, which state that
higher component costs, especially for battery technology, reduce operating margins
for hybrid- and electric vehicles compared to vehicles using combustion engines. Ad-
ditional R&D subsidies, such as tax credits, may be necessary to accelerate the cost
decline for these technologies. The observed heterogeneities across sectors and eco-
nomic performance indicators can help in explaining the often inconclusive findings in
the existing literature and can guide policy design.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2, we provide further background by
elaborating on the previous literature, focusing on a) the limitations in existing perfor-
mance measures that capture firms’ efforts to reduce their environmental impact and b)
the choice of financial performance variables. In Section 2.3, we familiarise ourselves
with the data including the new measure of firms’ green revenue share and describe
the changing size and composition of the green economy in recent years. We set out
the different measures of current and expected profitability and provide descriptive
statistics. We then turn to empirically assessing the impact of green revenue shares on
current profitability in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 we begin by reporting the average
results for our full sample. We then discuss their robustness and disaggregate the ef-
fects by sectors in Sections 2.5.3 and 2.5.4. We examine in detail the heterogeneous
effects for utilities and non-utilities, as well as the largest manufacturing sectors. We
discuss the findings and conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Greening of firms, financial performance and mar-
ket performance
2.2.1 Measures of firms’ green activities
One of the key challenges when assessing the impact of engaging in the green economy
on firms’ performance has been the difficulty to precisely measure how much firms
shift from non-green to green activities. This is rarely measured and good proxies are
hard to obtain, not least because of the lack of precise and widely accepted frame-
work for defining and measuring production of goods and services that have a positive
environmental outcome (OECD and Eurostat, 1999), but also because all human activ-
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ities have an impact on the environment hence efforts to reduce environmental impact
relative to other activities is inherently difficult to measure (de Melo and Vijil, 2016).
Previous studies have used a number of indicators to capture internally-driven environ-
mental efforts that are relevant to the “cost channel”, but they are often crude, binary
measures such as the adoption of voluntary environmental management systems as an
indicator of firms’ environmental performance (Wagner and Blom, 2011; Hojnik and
Ruzzier, 2017; Jacobs et al., 2010; Yin and Schmeidler, 2009), whether or not a firm
is included in a green stock index (Ziegler, 2012; Oberndorfer et al., 2013), or the
announcements of philanthropic gifts for environmental causes (Jacobs et al., 2010).6
One problem with these variables is that it is not clear that the control group firms
are untreated (makes no environmental effort), hence there is likely to be considerable
measurement error. Alternatively, studies have used pollution intensity data such as
CO2 emissions and toxic chemical substance emissions (e.g. Fuji et al., 2013)), toxic
waste (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), water waste (Rassier and Earnhart, 2015) and other
waste (e.g. Trumpp and Guenther, 2017). A major constraint with using many of these
measures is that the sample size is restricted because such information is usually ob-
tainable only for a few companies in a few sectors7 in a single country. Moreover, a
meta analysis by Horva´thova´ (2010) shows that the pollutant type for environmental
performance indicator affects the environmental-financial performance relationship,
hence a composite pollution indicators is preferred (Horva´thova´, 2012).
On measures of the level of attention a firm pays to the environment that are more
relevant to the “revenue channel”, one main data source is the number of patent ap-
plications. Specifically, studies have looked at the share of “green” or “clean” patents
relative to total patents, to capture firms’ strategic shift towards low carbon markets
(Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Jaffe and Palmer, 1997; Veugelers, 2012; Dechezlepreˆtre
et al., 2017). While patent counts and their citations offer a relatively homogeneous
measure of technological novelty and are available for a long time series, they also have
well known drawbacks as indicators of firm innovation activity. Not all innovations are
patented, different technologies are differently patentable, and the propensity to patent
innovations varies considerably across types of firms, sectors and countries (Malerba
and Orsenigo, 1995). Granted patents capture only successful innovations, therefore
representing only a fraction of innovation activity (Lychagin et al., 2016). Moreover,
they mainly capture inventions and do not capture the diffusion or adoption of new
technologies. Finally, given that some sectors rely more on patents than others, using
patent data may lead to a biased view of the green economy. Alternatively, studies
6For detailed reviews see (Blanco et al., 2009; Albertini, 2013; Ghisetti and Rennings, 2014; En-
drikat et al., 2014; Crifo and Forget, 2015; Friede et al., 2015; Dechezlepreˆtre et al., 2019).
7Usually energy sector, traditional environmental sectors such as water and waste, or energy inten-
sive sectors
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have utilised information on green innovation and green product introductions through
questionnaires (Rennings and Zwick, 2002; Rennings et al., 2004; Bloom et al., 2010;
Martin et al., 2012; Jabbour et al., 2015) or analysis of press releases (Palmer and
Truong, 2017) to capture firms’ commercial shifts towards environmental products.
Robust statistical analysis is difficult when using these indicators not least because
sample size tends to be small (external validity is also threatened because of limited
sectoral and geographical coverage) but also because there is usually no time variation.
It is more difficult to obtain data that captures within firm variation in environmental
effort over time, but such variables enable panel data analysis which is strongly prefer-
able for assessing how shifting towards green activities affects firm performance. Fixed
effects can be used to control for unobserved heterogeneity at the firm, time, or sector
level. This is important because, environmental effort may be driven for example by
firm specific characteristics such as corporate culture or time specific shocks such as
an introduction of regulation.
This study uses a unique measure, tracking the share of revenues derived from green
goods and services over time at the firm level, using data from FTSE Russell. This
database provides detailed information into the environment-focused commercial ac-
tivities of publicly listed firms, thus capturing firms’ decision to shift towards the low
carbon economy over time. This dataset covers firms across a broad range of sectors,
thus acknowledging the fact that environmental goods and services are provided not
only by firms belonging to the narrowly defined environmental sector (See section 2.3
for detail). In the analysis, we are able to control for time invariant sector fixed effects
and the results can be interpreted as a general effect across the economy. This is im-
portant because both the propensity of firms to generate revenues from environmental
goods and services, and how that shift affects profitability is likely to vary considerably
by sector, for example due to the role of technology or policies. This data is particu-
larly suited for assessing the “revenue” channel through which changing commercial
focus towards the production of environmental goods and services may impact finan-
cial and market performance. Its panel structure and wide coverage capturing within
variation in green activities of a firm allows us to circumvent many limitations in pre-
vious analysis highlighted above. Lastly, it also allows us to explore sector-specific
heterogeneities.
2.2.2 Unpacking firm level financial performance measures
Changes in the share of green revenues occur at the level of a firm, and we link this
data to firm level financials to construct a panel of firm level green and financial data.
Reflecting the fact that changing focus towards green activities may affect firms’ cur-
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rent profitability or their expected profitability in the future, the literature has assessed
the link between environmental and financial performance, using a wide range of mea-
sures. Current profitability is typically captured by accounting-based variables such as
net income (e.g. Palmer and Truong, 2017), return on sales (ROS) (e.g. Wagner and
Blom, 2011; Ghisetti and Rennings, 2014), return on assets (ROA) (e.g. Fuji et al.,
2013; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017) and return on equity (ROE) (e.g. Przychodzen and
Przychodzen, 2015). Expected profitability is instead captured by market-based vari-
ables including market value of equity (e.g. Moliterni, 2018), total shareholder return
(e.g. Trumpp and Guenther, 2017), or Tobin’s Q (e.g. Hibiki et al., 2003; Rassier and
Earnhart, 2015).
Horva´thova´ (2010) argues that the type of financial variable used is likely to influence
the results when quantitatively assessing the link between firm environmental and fi-
nancial performance, primarily focusing on the distinction between financial variables
that contain market expectations vis-a´-vis accounting-based measures. No study in
this literature has yet explained further the differences in what the various profitabil-
ity measures capture and in what way the results are expected to differ. We therefore
start to unpack the key financial performance measures and show the linkages between
them to aid our choice of dependent variables and estimation strategy, as well as the
interpretation of our results.
Accounting based measures of current profitability
Current profitability measures are largely grouped into two: those capturing operating
profit margins (how much profit is being produced per dollar of sales) and those captur-
ing return on investments (how efficient a firm is at using its assets or equity to generate
earnings). The former group typically use Returns-on-Sales (ROS) or earnings ratios
(Ebit- and Ebitda-margin).8 The latter group represents more comprehensive measures
of profitability, that set earnings against investments. Common variables in this group
are Return-on-Assets (ROA) and Return-on-Equity (ROE), which take into account
firms’ asset- or equity resource requirements respectively, and in essence measure how
efficient a firm can generate profits given the capital investment entrusted to it. These
indicators are related through the DuPont decomposition (Equation 2.1 to 2.3) (see e.g.
8These may also be referred to as the operating margin. Both terms are used interchangeably. Ebit-
margin is measured as Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by Revenues. Ebitda-margin
is measured as Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation & Amortization (EBITDA) divided by
Revenues. The ebit-margin and ROS are often used interchangeably, the main difference being that
the nominator of the Ebit-margin (EBIT) includes non-operating income and non-operating expenses
which are not in the nominator of ROS (Operating Income). Non-operating income (expense) includes
for example interest or tax income (payments). Operating Income is: gross income - total operating
expenses. Ebit is: pre-tax income + interest expense + tax expense. We use all three variables in our
analysis.
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Fairfield and Yohn, 2001; Soliman, 2008):
ROS =
Operating Income
Sales
(2.1)
ROA =
Net Income
Assets
= ROS · Sales
Assets
(2.2)
ROE = ROS · Sales
Assets︸ ︷︷ ︸
ROA
· Assets
Equity
(2.3)
If a higher share of revenues derived from green goods and services is associated with
higher ROS, this indicates that going green increases operative efficiency. In other
words, a higher share of “green” sales can be turned into profits. As shown in Equation
2.2, ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets, or ROS multiplied by the inverse
asset requirement (Sales/Assets, also known as asset turnover). Certain sectors or
activities may exhibit higher asset requirements, for example capital intensive indus-
trial production, or innovative processes that require higher initial investments. ROE
is similar to ROA, but also takes account of debt or equity requirements. The term
Assets/Equity is known as the equity multiplier and captures the amount of leverage
used by a firm to operate i.e. the proportion of a firm’s assets that has been financed by
equity rather than debt. Even though it is the most comprehensive measure, assessing
firms’ profitability using ROE alone can be potentially misleading - it is possible that a
firm’s ROE increases due to higher equity multipliers implying that a firm is increasing
its debt level (potentially increasing its default risk), rather than achieving higher oper-
ative efficiency or asset turnover.9 The decomposition into its components is therefore
important and provides additional insight into the drivers of firm profitability.
Market based measures of expected profitability
An arguably more interesting question to ask is whether increasing the share of rev-
enues derived from green goods and services changes market expectations of a firm’s
expected profitability. A large, closely related literature explores, using various finan-
cial modelling methods, how investors’ respond to companies’ voluntary environmen-
9High dept ratios can be perceived as more risky since they require firms to have relatively stable
cash flows to be able to pay off debt. A low ratio indicates that a business has been financed in a
conservative manner, with a large proportion of investor funding and a small amount of debt.
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tal efforts including improving Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), announcements
about sustainability commitments, inclusion in sustainability stock indexes or by En-
vironmental Social and Governance (ESG) scores. These environmental efforts more
closely relate to reducing in-house environmental impacts and are thus more relevant
to the “cost channel”. The evidence has been mixed but studies using more recent data
tend to find that investors penalise firms that do not embrace sustainability and cli-
mate mitigation (Moliterni, 2018). In these studies, expected profitability is typically
captured by market value of equity or market capitalisation (see e.g. Moliterni, 2018;
Lourenc¸o et al., 2012a), or Tobin’s Q (see e.g. Hibiki et al., 2003; King and Lenox,
2001; Ziegler, 2012; Rassier and Earnhart, 2015), which are measured as:
Market Capitalisation = Share Price (End of Year) ·Number of Shares Outstanding
(2.4)
Tobin’s Q =
(Market Capitalisation+Total Assets−Common Equity)
Total Assets
(2.5)
Market capitalisation (or market value of equity) is simply the aggregate market value
of a firm at a point in time. In contrast, Tobin’s Q is a more comprehensive measure
that also takes firms’ assets into account. The denominator here is the total value
of a firm’s assets. This is important as it scales the market capitalisation relative to
the total assets that are available for distribution in case of firm liquidation. Building
upon the Efficient Market Hypothesis,10 Tobin’s Q isolates the perceived value of the
firm beyond its assets, and reflects investors’ expectations about expected profitability
(Fama, 1991; Ball, 1995; Bharadwaj et al., 1999). Tobin’s Q is measured as the market
capitalisation plus the book value of debt (which is computed as the difference between
the book value of assets and the book value of equity), divided by total assets (see e.g.
Claessens and Laeven, 2003; Klapper and Love, 2004)11. Another way of interpreting
the measure is by separating firms’ assets into tangible and intangible ones. For firms
without any intangible asset value, Tobin’s Q equals 1, as the market value equals the
replacement value of the firms tangible assets (Konar and Cohen, 2001). It is important
to note that any analysis using Tobin’s Q requires firms’ to have a share price and a
related market capitalisation. Thus any analysis using this measure is limited to listed
firms.
10This is a hypothesis in financial economics that states that financial markets fully and immediately
reflect all available information.
11The book value of common equity measures common shareholders’ investment in the company
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2.3 Data and Descriptives
We combine two main datasets for the analysis: FTSE Russell Green Revenues and
Thomson Reuters Worldscope. Merging the two results in a panel of approximately
16,500 firms for which we can determine the annual level of green activity in addition
to information on their economic and financial performance. This database provides
comprehensive and detailed information into the green activities and the financial and
economic performance of global publicly listed firms.
2.3.1 Green Revenues
The FTSE Russell Green Revenues is a proprietary dataset from the financial ser-
vices company, which records detailed information on listed firms’ annual revenues
attributable to “green” goods and services. It covers global publicly listed firms across
48 countries representing approximately 98% of global market capitalisation for the
period 2008 and 2017. Due to missing data in the first and last year, we limit our
sample period to 2009-2016. To estimate each firm’s contribution to the green econ-
omy, FTSE Russell (2010) first define the green economy, using what is called a Green
Revenues classification model. Ten broad green sectors and 60 green sub-sectors are
identified (See Table B.1 in Appendix). It covers a wide range of activities related to
the environment, both goods and services. This includes sectors traditionally know as
green, such as low carbon energy generation, energy efficiency equipment, and waste-
and natural resource management, but also sectors that are not traditionally classified
as green, such as finance and investment, railways operation, smart cities design and
engineering. Thus it recognises that the green economy spreads across many sectors
in the economy, and it comprise of firms of different shades of green.
Having defined the green sectors, taking all globally listed companies as the sample,
a team of analysts search through firms’ annual reports for evidence of engagement in
any of these green subsectors. Revenues that are attributed to that green subsector are
reported where available. For each firm and year, the sum of sub-sector green revenues
is divided by total revenues to express a firm-year level green revenue share with values
between 0 and 100.
A unique feature of this dataset is the level of detail, with information on each firm’s
annual green revenue by sub-sectors. However, there are many cases where firms re-
port being engaged in a green sub-sector but the exact revenue attributed to that activity
is not disclosed. In these cases, the data provider reports a possible range of values –
a minimum and maximum value – of the green revenues by sub-sector. The minimum
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is typically zero where the green subsector revenue is unreported, hence the overall
minimum green revenue share is highly skewed towards zero in the dataset. This issue
affects a large proportion of the dataset. Approximately 70% of the minimum green
revenue share at the firm level is less than 1% (see Figure B.2 in the appendix).
We address this issue in the following way. In our most conservative estimates, we use
the minimum green revenue value where clearly the estimated effect is underestimating
the true effect (see section 2.5.3). For our base-line estimation, we instead utilise the
information on the relative importance of a sector within a firm. To illustrate, imagine
a large automobile company generates 95% of its revenues from passenger cars and
5% from financial and other services. Of their passenger cars, an undisclosed share of
their revenues are derived from electric and hybrid cars. In this case the potential range
of green revenues reported for the firm is 0-95%. In order to improve on this range, we
impute the missing subsector green revenue share using yearly averages of firms in the
automobile sector - say on average, green vehicles account for 5% of total automobile
revenues in this sector. We then use this value, such that the green revenue share range
for this firm is narrowed to 0-4.75%12. This is possible because a company’s sector
revenues are never missing in the data, and the relative importance of a sector within
a company is always known (for further details see Appendix B.2). It is important to
note that the imputation is conducted at the company sub-sector level, hence there is
no threat of introducing additional endogeneity issues into our estimates.13
The green revenue measure allows us to provide the first comprehensive overview of
the size and composition of the global green economy among publicly listed firms.
We observe that global green revenues among listed firms account for approximately
US$1.6 trillion in 2016 (up from about US$ 1 trillion in 2009) (Figure 2.1)14. Accord-
ing to (Forbes, 2018) the global revenue of the largest two thousand firms accounts for
about US$39 trillion. A back-of-the-envelope estimation suggests that green revenues
account for approximately 4% of total turnover globally among listed firms. Further-
more, we can assess the green revenue composition by industry. It is important to note
that non-listed firms such as small-and medium enterprises (SMEs) that also contribute
to the green economy are not in our sample, hence our analysis provides a lower-bound
of the true size.
12Based on the calculation 0.95 ·0.05 = 0.0475
13When referring to “green revenues” we refer to the green revenue measure after applying the sub-
sector imputation. We also refer to this measure as “estimated green revenue” or “augmented” green
revenue variable. When referring to the “minimum green revenue” we refer to the ‘raw’ FTSE Russell
lower-bound minimum green revenue.
14This is based on the green revenue measure after sub-sector level imputation
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Figure 2.1: Green Revenue Trends by Sectors
Approximately 3,500 of the overall sample of 16,500 firms have some green revenue
during the sample. Overall, the average minimum green revenue share increased from
1.8% in 2009 to 2.4% in 2016. For the subset of firms that have positive green revenues
during the sample period, the average minimum green revenue increased from 11.5%
in 2009 and 13.4% in 2016, representing an overall increase of approximately 16%
over seven years.15 Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of green revenue shares is highly
skewed, even after the imputation at the sub-sector level16. In Figure 2.2 the first bar
indicates that a little over 30% of firm-year observations in this sub-sample report low
levels of green revenues between 0 and 2.3%17.
Figure 2.3 shows the green revenue shares and absolute US dollar amounts aggregated
at the 2-digit sector level. We see that the green economy spreads across many sec-
tors but is focussed in energy and manufacturing. Across most sectors we observe that
the revenue share ranges roughly between 2 and 15%. Green revenues and shares are
highest in Electricity, Gas, & Sanitary Services, which generates approximately 25%
of revenues from green goods and services on average. This sector consists largely
of renewable electricity generation, as well as water- and waste-management. Signif-
icant green revenues are also generated by manufacturing sectors. The four largest
manufacturing sectors in terms of green revenues (manufacturing of electronics, in-
dustrial commercial machinery, transport equipment and chemicals) together generate
approximately USD 550 billion (Figure 2.3) (see Appendix B.3 for green revenue de-
composition by 3-digit SIC codes).
15The imputed green revenue increased from 2.4% to 3.2% between 2009 and 2016. For the firms
that have some green revenue during the sample it increased from 15.1% to 17.5%, equivalent to a 16%
increase.
16See Figures B.2 and B.3 for a comparison of distributions before and after the imputation
17About 25% of the firm-year observation in this sub-sample do not report any green revenue.
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Figure 2.3: Green Revenue and Average Green Revenue Share by Industry (2-digit SIC) in
2016
2.3.2 Financial Performance Variables
Firm-level economic variables are obtained from Thomson Reuters Worldscope.18 As
variables are expressed in local currency units, we convert to USD using the annual
official exchange rate obtained from the World Development Indicators provided by
the World Bank (The World Bank, 2018).
We draw on the financial economics literature for rules on sample restrictions to im-
18At an early stage of the analysis we compared the number of observations to Orbis, which had up
to 20% fewer observations on most control variables for our sample compared to Worldscope.
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prove the robustness of our analysis.19 Such rules are applied when using large global
firm-level samples across the universe of industries. We exclude financial firms (SIC
6000-6999) as is conventionally done in financial economics. Firms in these sectors
tend to have statutory capital requirements and the leverage of financial firms has a
different meaning than for non-financial firms (see e.g. Fama and French, 1992; Faulk-
ender and Petersen, 2006). Utility firms (SIC 4000 - 4999) are also often excluded, as
they may face different types of regulations. However, since this sector accounts for
(by far) the largest share of green revenues (in particular electricity generating firms),
we keep them in our main specification. In our assessment into sector heterogeneity
(Section 2.5.4) and robustness checks (Section 2.5.3), we will examine in detail, to
what extent effects might be driven by utilities. This allows us to examine in detail
systematic differences between utility- and non-utility sectors and derive different sets
of policy conclusions across sectors.
We also draw on the financial economics literature for restriction criteria to ensure
results are not driven by three specific factors: (1) accounting anomalies in the data,
(2) specific corporate events (e.g. corporate reorganisations), and (3) extreme values.
There is much debate on these restrictions - while some papers impose few restrictions
on the data (e.g. Fama and French (1992); Khanna et al. (1998); Anderson et al. (2012);
Mollet and Ziegler (2014)), others apply more restrictive exclusion criteria. Being too
restrictive in excluding observations is problematic as the sample-selection may drive
results and can reduce the external validity of the findings. It can also increase the
likelihood of a type 2 error, which implies failing to reject a null hypothesis (of no
difference), even though a true difference exists. We follow the approach by, among
others, Opler et al. (1999), Vermoesen et al. (2013), and Liu et al. (2014) and ex-
clude all firm-year observations with negative equity or sales. Negative equity implies
that firms’ liabilities exceed their assets, which can be driven by large accumulated
losses over multiple time periods, which become liabilities on firms’ balance sheets.
These are exclude to avoid that results are driven by firms in severe financial distress.
Negative revenues capture anomalies in the data or possible errors and are commonly
excluded. Beyond these restrictions, we also exclude all firm-year observations with a
change in total assets greater than 100%, following Duchin et al. (2010) and Vermoe-
sen et al. (2013). Such large jumps typically indicate major events such as mergers and
acquisitions or other corporate reorganisations. By excluding these observations we
aim to avoid that such corporate restructuring events drive our results. We winsorize
all continuous variables symmetrically at the top and bottom 1% to avoid that any
19Papers in the environmental economics literature often ignore sample restrictions that need to be
applied to examine firm-level economic performance. Some closely related papers do not apply any
sample restrictions (e.g. Palmer and Truong, 2017; Trumpp and Guenther, 2017). These papers are
however based on much smaller samples, which might make further restrictions not possible.
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remaining outliers drive the results (following Clarkson et al. (2015) among others).
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample. We see that our sample
contains relatively large firms with an average (median) of about 11,000 (2,600) em-
ployees. The median firm reports short-term profitability indicators of 8% (ROS), 5%
(ROA), and 9% (ROE). The mean values tend to be lower as the distribution of these
indicators tends to be skewed to the left (see minimum and maximum values in Table
2.1). The share of green revenue is on average 3%. The mean (median) Tobin’s Q is
1.89 (1.37), meaning that the median firm is valued higher by the market than the re-
placement cost of its assets, which is in line with previous literature (e.g. Duchin et al.,
2010; Jermias, 2008)20.
When comparing descriptive statistics for firms that have positive green revenue shares
vis-a`-vis firms with no green revenues (see Appendix B.5), green firms emerge on av-
erage to be larger and more profitable than non-green firms, yet have on average lower
values of Tobin’s Q. This indicates that frontier firms in the green economy are sys-
tematically different. This has important implications (e.g. selection bias, endogeneity
concerns) for our empirical strategy, which will be discussed in Section 2.4.1.
We report the pairwise correlation coefficients between the profitability indicators in
Table 2.2. Appendix B.4 shows the correlation coefficients between our explanatory
variables. It shows high correlations between different measures of operating prof-
itability, i.e. the Ebit-, and Ebitda-margin, and ROS. ROA and ROE are somewhat less
(but positively) correlated with the operating profitability measures, but are highly cor-
related between each other. This reflects the difference in operating profit margin and
financial resource-based profitability indicators. Hence, we might also expect to see
relatively similar results for the indicators within these two groups and some hetero-
geneity across the groups. Each of the components of Tobin’s Q (Market Capitalisa-
tion, Total Assets, Common Equity) have respectively relatively low correlations with
the profitability indicators. Similarly, we observe low correlations between Tobin’s
Q and the short-term profitability indicators. We see small negative correlations with
operating profit margin and small positive correlations with ROA and ROE. Investors
would typically be more concerned about these financial resource-based profitability
indicators, as they indicate how efficient a firm is at using investments. However, the
low correlations show that other variables beyond profitability matter for firms’ mar-
ket valuation and that profitability does not linearly translate into market valuation.
This also emphasises the importance of studying accounting- and market-based firm
performance separately.
20Duchin et al. (2010) report a mean Tobin’s Q of 1.77. Jermias (2008) report a mean of (log) Tobin’s
Q of 0.615, which is equivalent to 1.85 in Tobin’s Q.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Ebit-margin 0.08 -0.05 1.06 -9.05 0.73
Ebitda-margin 0.13 0.03 0.94 -7.98 0.88
Return-on-Sales (ROS) 0.08 -0.07 1.12 -9.77 0.53
Return-on-Assets (ROA) 0.05 0.03 0.14 -0.73 0.32
Return-on-Equity (ROE) 0.09 0.05 0.29 -1.50 0.84
FTSE Min Green Revenue 0 0.03 0.14 0 1
Green Revenue Share 0 0.04 0.14 0 1
(after imputation)
# employees 2636 10935 25243.88 7 170953
Log(Assets/Sales) 0.30 0.43 0.88 -1.27 3.87
D(R&D>0) 0 0.40 0.49 0 1
Leverage 0.04 0.12 0.17 0 0.74
Dividends per Share (USD) 0.01 0.27 0.59 0 3.6
Sales Growth 0.06 0.11 0.34 -0.69 1.98
Tobin’s Q 1.37 1.89 1.49 0.51 9.50
Log (Sales/Assets) -0.30 -0.44 0.96 -11.54 1.27
Log (Assets/Equity) 0.69 0.80 0.56 0.03 2.93
Table 2.2: Pairwise Correlations of Profitability Indicators
Ebit Ebitda ROS ROA ROE TQ MC TA. CE.
Ebit-margin 1
Ebitda- 0.99 1
margin
ROS 0.94 0.94 1
ROA 0.62 0.63 0.56 1
ROE 0.49 0.48 0.43 0.88 1
Tobin’s Q -0.06 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.06 1
(log) (TQ)
Market Cap. 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.07 1
(MC)
Total Assets 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.72 1
(TA)
Com. Equity 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 -0.07 0.77 0.89 1
(CE)
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
Our aim is to assess firms’ incentives to engage in green activity. In particular we
are interested in the relationship between producing green goods and services and
firms’ current profitability, and their expected profitability. Most past studies use cross-
sectional data, which does not allow the use of firm fixed effects (e.g. Konar and Cohen,
2001; Hibiki et al., 2003; Rexha¨user and Rammer, 2014). In our eight year panel, firm
fixed effects absorb any time-invariant firm-level characteristics, which would need
to be proxied by additional control variables in cross-sectional studies. Additionally,
we are also able to control for industry-by-year dummies, which absorb any industry-
and year-specific effects. Since the literature and theoretical frameworks on the re-
lationship between firms’ environmental activities and economic performance are not
consolidated on the correct choice of control variables, we prefer to take a rather sim-
ple specification and make use of firm fixed effects and industry-by-year dummies as
well as robustness checks with different specifications.
In our first specification we focus on the relationship between green revenue shares
and various measures of current profitability. We estimate the following model:
Yit = β1GRi,t−1 +β2V ′it +β3SICit +αi + εit (2.6)
where i and t index the firm and year respectively. Yit is a variable of financial perfor-
mance (EBIT-, EBITDA-margin, ROS, ROA, or ROE). GRi,t−1 is a continuous mea-
sure of green revenue share. We have incorporated a one year lag-structure to minimise
the possible concerns about reverse causality. We also include a vector of firm-specific
controls V ′it including the number of employees (log), the (log) assets-to-sales ratio, a
dummy variable indicating whether a firm invests in R&D, and (log) leverage (debt
divided by asset). We use the number of employees as a proxy for firm size following
Telle (2006) and Fuji et al. (2013).21 The assets-to-sales ratio captures capital-intensity
or capital requirements for production. In addition, it also proxies entry-barriers since
in markets with high assets-to-sales ratios, entry is more difficult due to higher capi-
tal requirements and potentially sunk costs. (O’Brien, 2003; Rexha¨user and Rammer,
2014). We include an R&D variable to control for the innovative activity of a firm.
One challenge in controlling for R&D expenditure is that it is not a mandatory or stan-
dardized reporting item for firms. More importantly, firms face substantial incentives
to strategically misreport their R&D expenditure. Knowledge of competitors’ R&D
expenditure allows insight into firms’ short-and long-term strategy and operations (Li,
21We include employees rather than total assets as our control for firm size to reduce issues of
multicollinearity with our other control variables in particular the assets-to-sales ratio.
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2016). Empirical evidence has shown that firms systematically misreport R&D expen-
ditures (Beatty et al., 2013; Li, 2016). Since such misreporting is likely to be correlated
with our dependent and independent variables it is likely to induce bias in our estima-
tion. Thus, we use a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a firm has reported
positive R&D expenditures and we exclude advertising expenditures. We consider this
approach to be more reliable and less likely to result in biased estimation.
We also include Leverage (Debt/Assets) to control for firms’ level of debt and their
financing structure (of debt versus equity financing). The importance of leverage in
models explaining firm performance has been widely discussed in financial economics
beginning with the landmark paper by Modigliani and Miller (1958). The subsequent
literature has underlined and shown empirically the importance of firms’ financing
structure for their profitability and valuation (see also Myers, 2001).22 This has not
received the same level of attention in environmental economics where few papers
control for firms’ leverage-ratio, some exceptions including Konar and Cohen (2001)
and King and Lenox (2001), which control for firms’ debt or leverage in cross-sectional
settings.
The vector SIC represents 3-digit industry-by-year dummies that account for unob-
served year-specific effects. αi are firm-fixed effects that soak up all time-invariant
firm level characteristics such as initial commitment to “going green” or initial pro-
ductivity. Finally, εit is an idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at
the firm level to account for correlation in unobserved components of the outcomes
within a firm.
22Following Modigliani and Miller (1958), many studies investigated the relationship between firms’
financing structure and economic performance and show that existing capital markets are not sufficiently
perfect and that the type of financing and firm leverage impact their economic performance. This lit-
erature has examined the impact of financing on both accounting-based profitability (e.g. ROS, ROA,
ROE), as well as market based profitability such as Tobin’s Q (see e.g. Berger and di Patti, 2006, for
a discussion). A number of theories have been developed to explain the impact of financing decisions
on firm performance. One view focuses on tax advantages of debt over equity financing. Interest (paid
on debt) is often tax-deductible, which implies that an additional dollar of interest paid is partly offset
by lower taxes, making debt financing relatively cheaper. Hence, financing with debt rather than equity
should improve firms’ overall performance. Moreover, financing with equity has substantially higher
transaction costs, in large parts due to fees paid to the underwriting bank (i.e. the “spread”), as well as
other legal and auditing costs (Myers, 2001; Chod and Zhou, 2014). These effects alone would point in
the direction of complete debt financing, which is however not observed in reality. Counteracting effects
have been identified, of which the trade-off theory suggests that higher levels of debt-financing increase
the risk of bankruptcy, implying a cost of financial distress. The threat of default can impact firms’
operating and investment decisions, as it may delay or deter otherwise profitable investments. Such
“underinvestment” problems arising from deterring effect from high leverage-ratios can reduce firms’
economic performance (Myers, 1977, 2001). Debt can also function as a tool to discourage managers
from taking excessive risks or from using financial resources inefficiently through the threat of liquida-
tion (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010) (For a detailed review see also Modigliani, 1982; Myers, 2001; Chod
and Zhou, 2014). Due to the potentially counteracting effects, the net effect of firms’ leverage-ratio on
their economic performance remains unclear and may be case-specific, yet it is an important control
variable in models of firms’ economic performance (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010).
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To investigate the market valuation of engaging in green activity, we examine the To-
bin’s Q of firms (Hall et al., 2005). We use a similar fixed-effects specification as in
the case of short-term profitability. However, the set of control variables differs based
on theoretical considerations. Based on the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1991;
Ball, 1995; Bharadwaj et al., 1999), it is assumed that all information is immediately
priced into firms’ stock price. Hence, there is no time lag between engaging in green
activities and firms’ market valuation. We estimate the following equation:
Tobin’s Qit = β1GRi,t +β2W ′it +β3Divit +β4SICit +αi + εit (2.7)
where Tobin’s Q is measured as specified in Equation 2.5, and GRi,t is the continuous
measure of the green revenue share at time t. We include a vector of firm-specific con-
trols W ′it . We again control for the number of employees as our measure of firm size
following Telle (2006) and Fuji et al. (2013) 23. We use assets-to-sales as our variable
of firms’ capital intensity following O’Brien (2003), as well as the dummy variable
indicating whether a firm invests in R&D. We also add dividends per share to the spec-
ification (Divit) which is relevant for investors’ valuation of a firm. Firms’ dividend
pay-out policies can affect their Tobin’s Q, as firms with high dividend payments may
have higher market values and lower book values relative to low dividend firms since
investors receive an additional income from their investment (Jermias, 2008).24
As with current profitability, the type of financing can impacts firms’ valuation. Fi-
nancing with debt rather than equity should increase market value because it increases
the after tax return to investors due to the tax deductibility of interest payments (Myers,
2001). Yet, increasing debt ratios also increase the risk of bankruptcy and the associ-
ated cost of financial distress, implying a moderating effect on debt financing. Since
the threat of default can impact firms’ operating and investment decisions towards de-
terring profitable investments, high debt-to-asset ratios can also impose a downward
effect on firms’ market valuation (Myers, 2001). Similar to accounting-based prof-
23Papers in this literature also use the total book value of assets as a size indicator. However, this
may induce issues of multicollinearity between the independent variables, in particular with the assets-
to-sales ratio.
24Parts of the existing literature using Tobin’s Q include advertising expenditure as a control variable.
These papers are typically limited in geographical scope to one country, often the US (e.g. Konar and
Cohen, 2001). The Compustat database provides information on firms’ advertising expenditure for
US companies only. Reliable data at the global level to capture advertising expenditure of firms is
unavailable. The variable is neither available in Worldscope nor in Orbis. More importantly, it has
been emphasised that advertising expenditure is likely measured with substantial error and is subject to
significant strategic misreporting as firms do not want to disclose business and marketing strategies to
competitors (Salinger, 1984; Beatty et al., 2013; Li, 2016). This systematic measurement error would
likely bias our results as the misreporting error would be correlated with our dependent and independent
variables. In addition, the estimated coefficient for advertising intensity in Konar and Cohen (2001) is
small and only weakly significant at 10%.
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itability, the net effect of leverage is ambiguous, but it is an important control for the
model.25 Some papers within the literature also suggest that firms’ growth opportu-
nities, as measured by revenue-growth, can be a relevant determinant for market val-
uation (see e.g. King and Lenox, 2001; Rassier and Earnhart, 2015). Yet, again there
is no consensus on the variable’s importance within Tobin’s Q models. For instance
it is not included in Jermias (2008), it is highly insignificant in the model of (Rassier
and Earnhart, 2015)26 and only marginally significant in Khanna and Damon (1999).
The cost of including sales-growth in a panel fixed-effects specification is that auto-
matically one year is dropped from the analysis. Our panel only contains eight years,
and to accommodate this trade-off, we test for the robustness of our results by once
controlling for sales-growth and once without this control.
The vector SIC represents 3-digit industry-by-year dummies that account for unob-
served industry- and year-specific effects. αi are firm-fixed effects that soak up all
time-invariant firm level characteristics. Finally, εit is an idiosyncratic error term. We
cluster the standard errors at the firm level to account for correlation in unobserved
components of the outcomes within a firm.
2.4.1 Propensity Score Weighting
Our descriptive statistics revealed that comparing firms that generate some green rev-
enue with those that don’t engage in any green activities can be problematic. There
may be unobserved variables associated to both the green activity and current prof-
itability or market valuation. Failure to account for these confounders can result in a
biased effect estimate that conflates the true effect of engaging in green activity. In par-
ticular, selection may be driven by lagged firm characteristics and investment decisions
that could be correlated with expected profitability or market valuation. To better con-
trol for selection on pre-sample observable time-invariant characteristics of firms, we
combine a fixed effect regression with an inverse propensity score weighting (IPSW)
strategy. This allows us to fit a regression line not on the overall sample, but to obtain
an more localised regression coefficient after restricting the sample to a more similar
set of firms based on pre-sample characteristics. Propensity score methods, proposed
by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), have gained widespread popularity for balancing
dissimilar groups with respect to baseline covariates.
25It has been noted that a challenges in controlling for leverage is that firm-specific financing strate-
gies exhibit low-levels of variation. With short panels, fixed-effects models may face difficulties in
estimating the coefficient on leverage, which may be a reasons for why it has been omitted in some of
the previous papers (O’Brien, 2003).
26In their fixed- and random effects specifications sales growth has a p-value of 0.43 and 0.92 re-
spectively.
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In our setting, the propensity score is defined as the probability of engaging in green
activity (i.e. having green revenues) as a function of the respective control variables.
We estimate the propensity score on the pre-sample averages (2005-2008) of all con-
trol variables, except for the R&D-dummy.27 We consider firms that generate a pos-
itive green revenue share at any point in the sample as being “treated” and firms that
never generate any positive green revenue share as the pool of controls (Guadalupe
et al., 2012). We use the pre-sample averages of the control variables as well as 3-
digit industry dummies to estimate the propensity score pˆ within each industry. We
apply exact matching at the industry-level to ensure that the propensity score for firms
is generated separately within each industry.28 The estimated propensity scores are
then used to weight firms, thus creating a sample that is similar with respect to the
propensity score distribution (Lechner, 1999; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Guadalupe
et al., 2012; Busso and McCrary, 2014). Specifically, the weight for each “green” firm
is 1pˆ and the weight for each control firm is
1
(1−pˆ) (also known as inverse probability
weighting (IPW)). In the subsequent results section, we compare results with and with-
out IPW restricting the sample to firms with the common support. We winsorize the
weights symmetrically at 1% following Guadalupe et al. (2012).
Figures B.8 to B.14 in the Appendix point to the different variable distributions in the
initial sample and improvements following the reweighing. Prior to the weighting,
firms generating green revenues tend to be larger and on average more profitable. It
is important to note that this does not mean that the coefficient on green revenue after
re-weighting should be interpreted as causal effects of going green. There remains
selection based on unobservables.
27We exclude the R&D dummy from the propensity score estimation as we are worried it might
introduce additional bias. It is the least precisely measured variable and a 0 in the dummy variable
can either mean that a firm does not have any R&D expenses, does strategically not report its R&D
expenses, or that the data point is missing for other reasons. Hence, we exclude it from the propensity
score estimation.
28Exact matching at the industry-level is important, as the propensity score would otherwise be
estimated for firms across industries with similar SIC codes. Since the proximity in SIC-codes is not
a meaningful characteristic, approximate matching on industry codes can induce bias as it treats the
sector-codes as a continuous variable. In other words, a closer proximity in SIC codes does not imply
a more similar or comparable business activity compared to more distant SIC codes. Since we control
for 3-digit industry-by-year dummies in the regressions, failing to impose exact matching at the 3-digit
industry level could induce bias in the propensity score and the corresponding weights
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Current Profitability
We first present our results on the complete sample across all sectors. They represent
the average effects across the entire sample. Starting with measures of operating profit
margins in table 2.3, we observe positive and significant relationships between the
green revenue share and ebit-, ebitda-margin, and returns-on-sales (ROS). The effects
are significant at the 5% level in columns 1-3 which shows results for the full sample
without inverses propensity score weighting, and columns 7-9 with the weighting. We
show also in columns 4-6, the results without weighting where we restrict the sample
to the weighting sample, to show the impact of the weighting vis-a`-vis the smaller
common support sample. Here, the effects are similar in magnitude, but are only
significant at 10%.
To interpret the magnitude of the coefficients and to be able to compare them across
models, we standardise the effects by using standard deviations. A one standard devi-
ation increase in the green revenue share, which is equivalent to an increase of 13 per-
centage points, is associated with a 0.03 standard deviation increase in return-on-sales.
Hence, for the median firm, with a ROS of 0.08, a one standard deviation increase in
Green Revenues is associated with a 0.039 point increase in ROS, equivalent to a 49%
increase29. Regarding the control variables, we observe that larger firms (measured by
number of employees) are more profitable. Both the coefficients on the assets-to-sales
ratio and the leverage are negative. The coefficients highly significant for the assets-
to-sales ratio and marginally significant for leverage. This indicates that higher levels
of assets (per sale) and debt (per asset) are associated with lower profitability.
Moving on to more comprehensive measures of current profitability that measure re-
turn on investments, we see in Table 2.4 that there is a significant and positive relation-
ship between green revenue and return-on-assets (ROA) and return-on-equity (ROE),
albeit small in magnitude on the aggregate sample. For ROA, we observe a coefficient
of 0.03, an order of magnitude smaller than the coefficients of the operating profit
margin indicators. A one standard deviation increase in green revenue (13 percentage
points), is associated with a 0.03 standard deviation increase in ROA. However, since
the standard deviation of ROA is lower than for ROS, this is equivalent to a 0.004 point
increase in ROA. For the median firm with a ROA of 0.05, this is equivalent to an 8%
29This calculation is based on βsROS = β · sdGRsdROS . In our setting, 0.30 ·
0.13
1.12 = 0.03. A 0.03 standard
deviation increase in ROS is equivalent to 0.039 increase in ROS points based on 0.03 · 1.12 = 0.039.
For the median firm, an increase in 0.039 ROS points is equivalent to 49% based on (0.039/0.08) ·100 =
49%
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increase in ROA.30 In the case of return-on-equity, a one standard deviation increase in
green revenue is associated with a 9.6% increase in ROE for the median firm. Overall
we observe a substantially larger increase in operating profit margin associated with
generating revenues from producing green goods and services, compared to the more
comprehensive asset- or equity- based profitability indicators.
To make sense of our result, we refer to the DuPont Decomposition (Equations 2.2
and 2.3). Recall that ROA is the product of ROS and the inverse asset requirement
(Sales/Assets). ROE is similar but has an additional term, Assets/Equity, the equity
multiplier. Thus a positive ROS is compatible with a relatively low effect on ROA or
ROE if the sales to assets ratio is negative, or in the case of ROE the equity-multiplier
is negative. Therefore, we investigate the relationship between leads and lags of green
revenue and sales/assets. Results are reported in Tables B.4 and B.5 for sales-to-assets
requirement and Tables B.8 and B.9 for the equity-multiplier. We find that sales-to-
assets are significantly negatively associated to green revenues for the current and the
next (green revenue) time period (the correlation remains negative up to two years, but
is not significant in the second year). This implies that firms’ generating green revenues
require more assets (per sales) for up to two years.31 We do not observe significant
relationships with firms’ equity multiplier ratios.32 This suggests that engaging in
green activities is associated with higher asset requirements (per sales) for up to two
full years prior to producing green goods and services. This might be the case as firms
need to purchase additional machinery or plants to be able to produce green goods.
Firms’ financing decisions (between debt and equity financing) are not significantly
associated with their decisions to produce green goods and services.
These results provide insight into the performance effects of engaging in green activ-
ities. On the one hand, firms that decide to engage in green activities increase their
ability to earn income. This suggests that firms are moving into the green space in sec-
tors where green goods and services can be differentiated and consumers are willing to
pay a premium for them. Green markets also tend to be less mature, which could indi-
cate less competition resulting in higher markups and higher earnings per sale. These
30The calculation is based on βsROA = β · sdGRsdROA . In our case 0.30 ·
0.13
0.14 = 0.03. A 0.03 standard
deviation increase in ROA is equivalent to a 0.004 point increase in ROA based on 0.03 ·0.14 = 0.0042.
For the median firm (with a ROA of 0.05) an increase in ROA of 0.0042 points is equivalent to 8.4%
based on (0.0042/0.05)100 = 8.4%.
31To keep the tables on the sales-to-assets ratio consistent with our main specifications, we expressed
them as correlations in which green revenues is the ‘independent’ variable and the sales-to-assets ratio
is the ‘dependent’ variable. This allows us to adopt the same econometric specification as in our main
results. B.4 shows that generating green revenues in the next period (1-year lead) is negatively associated
with (sales-to-assets) in the current period. This is equivalent to saying that generating green revenues
in the current period is associated with a higher assets-to-sales ratio in the previous time period.
32One outlier result suggests a significant negative correlation for the correlation with 3-year green
revenue lead. We interpret this as an outlier occurring due to chance (with a 5% probability).
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factors contribute to higher earnings per sales of firms. On the other hand, engaging
in green markets is associated with additional asset and investment requirements. The
cost of additional assets required imposes a downward drag on firms’ overall return
on investment, as measured by return-on-assets and return-on-equity. This provides
a dampening factor, so that we observe relatively lower impacts on these profitability
indicators.
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2.5.2 Expected profitability - Tobin’s Q
Our results for investors’ expectations of future profitability are presented in Table 2.5.
We broadly find positive and significant coefficients of around 0.1, between the green
revenue share and Tobin’s Q across the different specifications, with the aggregate
sample (columns 1-3) and when controlling additionally for revenue growth (columns
4-6). This implies that a one standard deviation (13 percentage points) increase in
green revenues is associated with a 0.02 standard deviation increase in (log) Tobin’s
Q.33 For the median firm, a one standard deviation increase in green revenues is asso-
ciated with a 3.8% increase in Tobin’s Q. Thus, generating revenues from producing
green goods and services is positively and significantly associated with firms’ market
valuation in the overall sample.
Focusing on the controls, we again observe negative and significant coefficients for
assets/sales and the leverage ratio. This suggests that higher investments (per sales)
and higher debt financing are negatively associated with investor valuation. The neg-
ative coefficient for leverage is in line with the theoretical prediction that higher debt
increases the risk of bankruptcy, the cost of financial distress, and may result in con-
strained investment activities. In our sample, this effect appears to dominate any off-
setting effects arising from lower cost of debt financing. In line with expectations we
observe consistently positive and significant coefficients for dividend payments. We
observe significantly negative coefficients for the number of employees and our R&D
indicator variable. The relationship between the number of employees and firm per-
formance is ambiguous as it may capture larger firms, but also more labour-intensive
production, which might be valued negatively by investors. Similarly negative coef-
ficients for employees have been observed by Telle (2006) for instance. While the
R&D variable captures innovation activity the coefficient suggests that innovation ac-
tivity can be associated with additional costs in the current period and uncertain future
benefits. These effects are negatively associated with investor valuation.
33This is based on the calculation: 0.1 · 0.130.58 = 0.02. This 0.02 standard deviation increase in (log)
Tobin’s Q is equivalent to a 0.012 point increase in (log) Tobin’s Q (0.02 ·0.58 = 0.012). In other words,
a 1 standard deviation increase in green revenue is associated with a 0.012 point increase in (log) Tobin’s
Q. For the median firm with a (log) Tobin’s Q of 0.32, a 0.012 point increase is equivalent to a 3.8%
change in (log) Tobin’s Q ( 0.0120.32 ∗ 100 = 3.75). This can be converted back to non-logged Tobin’s Q
through: (e0.037−1)∗100 = 3.77%. Hence, for the median firm a 13% point increase in green revenue
is associated with a 3.77% change in (non-logged) Tobin’s Q.
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2.5.3 Robustness checks and limitations
We perform a number of robustness checks to test the sensitivity of the results to the use
of different variables, as well as the exclusion of particular sectors. First, we control
for loss-making firms, because the reporting and valuation of firms with negative prof-
itability can differ systematically from profit making firms (see e.g. Jiang and Stark,
2013; Darrough and Ye, 2007).34 We include a dummy variable taking the value of 1
if a firms’ operating profit margin (measured by ROS) is negative in a given year. The
magnitude and significance of the effects remain fairly stable (Tables B.10, B.11, and
B.12 in the Appendix). In particular the coefficients for operating profit margin, ROA,
and Tobin’s Q remain significant. The coefficients for ROE are more sensitive to this
additional variable and are largely not significant anymore. As expected we observe a
negative and significant coefficient for the dummy variable on negative profitability.
Second, we examine the sensitivity of our results to the imputed green revenue mea-
sure. We replicate our results using the raw FTSE Minimum Green Revenue variable,
which provides the most conservative estimate. The results hold in magnitude and sig-
nificance (Tables B.13, B.14, and B.15). We observe similar coefficients for operating
profit margin (around 0.3), ROA (around 0.03), ROE (around 0.05), and Tobin’s Q
(around 0.1). We also observe similar coefficients (in magnitude and significance) for
the control variables in this model. Hence, we are confident that our results are not
driven by the imputation of missing values in the green revenue variable.
Third, we test if the results are driven by electricity generating firms, which is by
far the largest 3-digit SIC sub-sector accounting for about 400 billion USD in green
revenues in 2016 on its own (See Figure B.6). Renewable electricity generation has
received substantial subsidies over the past decade and may therefore have experienced
a unique economic performance (e.g. IEA, 2017). Hence, we exclude electricity gen-
eration as an additional robustness check to examine if results might be driven by this
particular sector (Tables B.16, B.17, and B.18).35 The results for our profitability in-
dicators remain stable. We observe a decline in significance for the results on Tobin’s
Q, after controlling for revenue growth. This suggests that once controlling for firms’
growth opportunities, the relationship between green revenues and market valuation
is at most marginally significant for the sample without electricity generating firms.
34In the particular the role of firms’ assets is different for loss-making firms and their valuation.
Assets tend to be valued systematically stronger for loss-making firms, as they provide an indication of
the value of the firm in the case of liquidation. They have also been used as proxies for firms expected
future earnings. Furthermore, the role of carry forward losses to reduce tax payments on anticipated
future profits may lead to systematically different outcomes (Ohlson, 1995; Jiang and Stark, 2013).
35In addition to SIC 491 (Electric Services), we also exclude SIC 493 (Combined Electric, Gas,
and other Utility) to avoid that the effects might simply be driven by firm classification since primarily
electricity generating firms can also be classified as SIC 493. This is a conservative approach as we
exclude a larger set of firms.
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The relationship between green revenues and profitability holds for both the operating
profit margin and return on investment indicators after excluding electricity generation.
Lastly, we exclude all utilities from our sample (SIC 4900-4999), which covers a broad
group of sub-sectors including electricity generation, gas production and distribution,
waste management, water supply and sanitary services among others. Utilities collec-
tively account for a large amount of green revenues in the database and hence excluding
them provides a substantial restriction to the variation in our main independent vari-
able. We observe that the positive effect on the operative profitability margins persists
for non-utility firms (Table B.19). However, the effects on return on investments (ROA,
ROE) and Tobin’s Q are largely insignificant after applying this sample restriction (Ta-
bles B.20 and B.21). Utilities tend to be endowed with a degree of market power. They
can be natural monopolies or can be otherwise protected through price control for in-
stance. As a consequence they operate in unique regulatory settings, in which they are
often sheltered from market forces. (see e.g. Filbeck and Gorman, 2004; Wolak, 2008).
The relationship between green revenues and economic performance may therefore be
different for utilities compared to non-utility firms. Utilities contain however also a
quite heterogeneous group of sectors. Hence it may be important to also distinguish
between different types of utilities as we do in the following section 2.5.4.1.
Our findings suggest that the most generalisable and strongest relationship for green
revenues exists with firms’ operative profitability margins. Even after excluding all
utilities from the sample, which account for a large share of green revenues, we ob-
serve positive and significant relationships between green revenues and firms’ oper-
ative profitability (on the full sample and after applying the weighting). Non-utility
firms are able to obtain higher earnings-per-sales from producing green goods and ser-
vices. However, the higher operative margins are not transmitted into higher return on
investment (ROA, ROE). This is supported by the observation that the negative rela-
tionship between green revenues and firms’ sales-to-assets ratio is more pronounced
for the sample of non-utility firms than for the sample of utility firms (Tables B.6 and
B.7). Non-utility firms have higher assets-to-sales ratios in the current period and the
period prior to generating green revenues, requiring up to two years of higher invest-
ments to produce green goods and services. The effect for utilities only exists in the
current period. For non-utility firms the additional investment requirement imposes a
relatively strong downward drag on their return on investment and their higher opera-
tive margins do not translate into higher ROA or ROE.36
This paper makes significant advances in terms of data and empirical methods that
reduce potential bias in estimates, nonetheless, the associations we find between en-
36In addition, the coefficients on operative profitability for the non-utility sample are also smaller in
magnitude (around 0.2) (Table B.19) compared to the aggregate sample (around 0.3) (Table 2.3).
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vironmental and financial performance of firms cannot be interpreted as causal ef-
fects. A number of potential threats to identification remain, in particular, the most
likely source of endogeneity comes from potentially reverse causal effects, meaning
that better accounting- or market performance may increase the likelihood of investing
in green technologies. We partially address this using a one-year lag structure in our
green revenue variable. Yet this may still be endogeneous if the decision to invest in
green technologies was taken even earlier. Using further lags would not fully resolve
this concern as the true lag in firms’ decision making is unknown and may always be
partly endogeneous. Our relatively short panel makes it difficult to adopt further lag
structures because it reduces the sample size and increases the likelihood of a type 2
error.37
Additionally, the Stable-unit-treatment-value assumption (SUTVA) might be violated
in this context. The most relevant SUTVA assumption here is that the observed deci-
sion (to generate green revenues) is independent of decisions of other firms i.e. there
are no general equilibrium effects across firms. This may be violated, as firms’ de-
cision to invest in green technologies may be conditional on other firms, for instance
due to the fear of falling behind in a growing market or by exploiting second-mover
advantages. This is not an uncommon threat to identification in empirical economic
analysis (e.g. Lechner, 1999). Lastly, even after applying the inverse propensity score
weighting the coefficients may be biased by selection on unobservables. Compared
to previous studies using cross sectional data, the panel data in this study allows us
to reduce omitted variable bias considerably, by using firm fixed effects to absorb any
time-invariant firm characteristics, and 3-digit industry-by-year dummies that account
for unobserved industry- and year-specific effects.
2.5.4 Sector Heterogeneity
In the previous section we tested the robustness of our aggregate results to the use of
additional controls and to omitting specific sectors. In this section we further examine
how the effect of green revenues on profitability and market valuation differs by sector.
To do so, we estimate our models individually for the sectors that account for the largest
amounts of green revenues. The smaller sample sizes in estimations by sector reduces
the power of statistical tests, making the coefficients less stable across specifications
and increasing the likelihood of type 2 errors.38 First, we report the results individually
37Since the green revenues data is provided at the global level of firms and linked to their ‘consoli-
dated’ global accounts, we are also not able to exploit potentially exogenous variation in energy prices
across countries as done for instance by Marin and Vona (2017) using an instrumental variable approach.
38A Type 2 error occurs if we fail to reject a null hypothesis (of no difference), even though the null
hypothesis is false.
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for each of the largest sectors. We then summarise the conclusions from the sector-
specific analysis at the end of this section.
2.5.4.1 Utilities
We begin our sector-specific estimation with utilities (SIC 4900-4999), as they account
for the largest quantity of green revenues in absolute terms (at the 2-digit SIC sector
level; see Figure B.4). As mentioned, firms classified as utilities consists of a broad and
heterogeneous group including electricity generation, gas production and distribution,
water-and waste management, and sanitary services among others. The heterogeneity
in business models across these sub-sectors might lead to different responses to the
production of green revenues.
For utilities as a whole, we observe marginally significant positive coefficients for
operating income, as well as a significant relationship with ROA (Table B.22 and B.23).
On market valuation, we obtain positive and consistently significant effects for green
revenues on Tobin’s Q (Table B.24). Even though the operating income of ‘green’
utilities is only marginally higher than for non-green counterparts, the effects persist
for ROA. Utilities generating green revenues are able to obtain significantly higher
levels of ROA compared to utilities not active in green technologies. They are also
valued significantly higher by investors compared to non-green counterparts.
When utilities are further disaggregated at the 3-digit SIC level, some interesting dif-
ferences occur. For electricity generation, which accounts for more than 70% of the
green revenues within the utilities sector,39 increasing green revenue shares (largely
from renewable electricity generation) is associated with higher levels of operating
profit margin (Table B.25) and marginally significant positive effects on ROA (Table
B.26) but no significant effect on Tobin’s Q (Table B.27). These results reinforce the
observation that effects of green revenues on operative profitability are the most ro-
bustly observed across specifications and sub-samples.
What is driving the positive and significant effect of the green revenues share on To-
bin’s Q for overall utilities are non-energy related utilities (i.e. water-, and waste man-
agement, and sanitary services (SIC 494-497)). For non energy related utilities, we
observe strong positive and significant coefficients (Table B.30) while the effects for
energy-related utilities (electricity-, and gas production and distribution, SIC 491-493)
are insignificant (Table B.31). However, for current profitability measures, we see re-
39See sectoral distribution in Figures B.4 and B.6. As for the robustness checks, we combine sectors
491 (Electric Services) and 493 (Combined Electric, Gas, and other Utilities) together to estimate the
effect for electricity generating firms. Primarily electricity generating firms can be classified in either of
the two classifications.
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verse effects. Green revenues of non-energy utilities are not significantly associated
with profitability in any model (Tables B.28 and B.29). For energy-related utilities we
observe consistently positive and significant coefficients on the operating income and
return-on-assets (Tables B.32 and B.33).
In short the higher profitability of green energy-related utilities is not transmitted into
a higher market valuation. Green non-energy utilities have higher market valuations
despite no difference in profitability. This suggests that investors expect growing busi-
ness opportunities for non-energy related utilities. Firms in these sectors have among
the highest sector-level averages of green revenue shares already (Figure B.7: Water
Supply 72%, Sanitary Services 45% average green revenue shares). Yet the positive
and significant relationship between green revenues and Tobin’s Q still persists af-
ter controlling for firms’ revenue growth, suggesting that investors anticipate further
growth from more specialisation in “green” core activities, for example recycling of
solid waste or water supply- and treatment.40
2.5.4.2 Manufacturing Sectors
After utilities, the largest green revenues in absolute terms are attributable to Manufac-
turing of Motor Vehicles and Equipment (SIC 371), and Manufacturing of Electronic
Components and Accessories (SIC 367) (See Figure B.6 for sectoral distribution of
green revenues at the 3-digit level). For firms in Manufacturing of Motor Vehicles and
Equipment (SIC 371), we observe negative coefficients for the effect of green revenues
on operative profitability (Table B.34 and B.35). Green revenues in these sectors are
largely produced from manufacturing and selling hybrid- and electric vehicles. Our
findings suggest that the earnings margins for such vehicles are lower compared to
fossil-fuel based vehicles. This is backed by industry reports, which state that battery
technology still tends to be more expensive compared to internal combustion engines.
The average cost of production of an electric vehicle still exceeds a comparable com-
bustion engine car by twelve thousand US dollars on average in 2019. Higher com-
ponent costs, particularly of battery technologies, and limited take-up exert downward
pressure on firms’ operative margins (McKinsey & Company, 2019). The car man-
ufacturer Volvo estimates for instance that its earnings-margins for electric vehicles
will only match those of its combustion engine cars by 2025 (Reuters, 2019). Similar
struggles have been reported by other car manufacturers as well (Reuters, 2018).41 Our
findings are in line with these observations. Car manufacturers that shift more aggres-
40Since an increase in business activities results relatively directly in an increase in green revenues
for these sectors, it is important to note that the effect persists after controlling for revenue growth. Thus,
the effect persists beyond a simple effect arising from an increase in business activities.
41See also Forbes (2019) for comments on limited take-up of electric vehicles in Europe.
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sively towards hybrid- and electric vehicles production yield lower operative margins.
Perhaps since the difference in earnings margins are expected to disappear by the mid
2020s and the hybrid- and electric vehicle markets are projected to grow rapidly into
the future, firms’ market valuation are not hampered by lower operative margins to-
day (McKinsey & Company, 2019). We also do not observe significant relationships
between green revenues and market valuations for manufacturers of motor vehicles
(Table B.36).42
Manufacturing of Electronic Components and Accessories (SIC 367) accounts for the
third largest quantity of green revenues in absolute terms. Green activities in this sec-
tor contain the manufacturing of electronic components for energy efficiency improve-
ments, as well as the manufacturing of electronic components for renewable energy
generation among others. For this 3-digit sector, we observe positive and significant
coefficients for the Tobin’s Q models (in the specifications without revenue-growth)
(Table B.39), and no significant results for any of the profitability models (Tables B.37
and B.38). We are concerned that the sensitivity of the results might partly be due to
the relatively small sample size, increasing the likelihood of a type 2 error. Therefore,
we also examine the corresponding 2-digit sector SIC 36 (Manufacturing of Electronic
and other Electrical Equipment and Components except Computer Equipment), which
is the second largest sector at the 2-digit level (See Figure B.4).43
For the 2-digit sector SIC 36, we also do not observe significant relationships with
respect to any of the profitability indicators (Tables B.40 and B.41), but we observe
marginal significance in the Tobin’s Q models (Table B.42). Hence, the effect at the
3-digit level (SIC 367) persists, albeit weakened, at the 2-digit level (SIC 36). One
possible interpretation of these effects is that the sector is expected to benefit from
future growth in renewable energy generation by providing equipment and compo-
nents (see e.g. IEA, 2018, for renewables growth forecasts). With growth in renewable
energy generation the suppliers of equipment and components are also expected to
benefit, potentially increasing their market valuation. Moreover, investors expect large
growth potentials for energy-saving electrical equipment (e.g. McKinsey & Company,
2010). Energy-efficiency technologies are considered to be one of the most impor-
tant and cost-effective components in the low-carbon transition, by reducing energy
consumption. Yet, numerous well-known barriers dampen the wide-spread uptake of
such technologies. These include among others split incentives, high up-front costs,
uncertainty about the amortisation time (see e.g. McKinsey & Company, 2010; Du
42We also do not observe significant relationships between green revenues and firms’ return on in-
vestments as measured by ROA and ROE Table B.35.
43We also analysed the effects for the third largest 2-digit sector SIC 35 (Manufacturing of Industrial
and Commercial Machinery). We do not observe any significant relationship with any of the profitability
indicators nor with Tobin’s Q. The results are therefore omitted.
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et al., 2014; Diaz-Rainey and Ashton, 2015; Nehler and Rasmussen, 2016). The data
does not allow us to precisely attribute our findings to particular barriers or policy
interventions. Yet, the combination of anticipated growth potentials in combination
with limited uptake could help explain the positive impacts on firms’ market valuation
despite no effect on their current profitability.
2.5.5 Summary of results
Our analysis shows that frontier firms that currently comprise the global green econ-
omy and generate revenues from the sale of green goods and services are highly con-
centrated in a few sectors. While there is sector heterogeneity in the impact of moving
into the environmentally friendly market space on financial and market performance of
firms, some generalisable results that hold for a broad group of sectors can be derived
thanks to the comprehensive nature of this analysis. Overall, we found that firms shift-
ing commercial focus towards green goods and services are typically able to obtain
higher earnings per sales. This suggests that firms are moving into the green space
in markets where premiums can be charged for green goods and services through, for
instance, product differentiation. This result is robust across different model specifica-
tions and is generalisable across most sectors, as it holds even when all utility-sectors
are excluded from the sample. The exception is the automobile manufacturing sector,
where a shift towards clean vehicles (increasing the share of hybrid- and electric vehi-
cles production) is associated with lower operating profit margins. This is in line with
auto industry reports that show that higher component costs, in particular for battery
technology, exert downward pressure on operating profit margins.
While most firms are able to increase profits per unit of sales by increasing their green
revenue share, this does not necessarily increase profits per unit of investment (as mea-
sured by ROA and ROE). This is because the production of green goods and services
tends to entail higher investments (per sale). This higher asset requirements impose
a downward drag, such that going green does not significantly improve the ability to
generate profits relative to capital investments entrusted to the firm. One exception is
the utilities sector, and in particular the energy-related utilities, where return on assets
increase with green revenue shares. For the rest of the economy, however, we find that
increasing the green revenue share does not increase return on investments, hence the
economic viability of such green shifts is ambiguous.
We also found evidence of sector heterogeneity in how investors value firms’ decision
to diversify into markets for green goods and services. Our analysis shows that the
higher market valuation for increased green specialisation is largely limited to the non-
energy related utilities sectors, where the green revenue share is associated positively
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with Tobin’s Q. In other sectors, we find no robust evidence of firms being punished or
rewarded by investors.44
2.6 Conclusion and discussion
With the growth in low carbon innovation and new green markets in the recent decades,
this paper set out to assess how decisions to diversify production into green goods and
services affects firms financial and market performance - whether it is a good invest-
ment that pays off for firms, or is rewarded or punished by investors. Prior analyses
on the relationship between firms’ environmental and economic performance found
mixed results, and were often performed on poor quality or small sample sized data
using for example, binary environmental performance indicators, cross-sectional data,
or small datasets with limited sectoral- and country-coverage. This study makes a
marked advancement to the literature on several dimensions including data, methodol-
ogy, empirical findings and policy implications.
We construct a new firm level dataset recording green revenue shares, key firm charac-
teristics and firm financial performance variables, that allows the use of better econo-
metric techniques. The dataset is global, covering approximately 16,500 global pub-
licly listed firms across 48 countries operating from 2009 to 2016 in a wide range
of industries, representing approximately 98% of global market capitalisation. This
dataset enables us to run estimations using panel fixed-effects specifications and ex-
ploit within-firm variation over time. This is possible thanks to the green revenue
share variable that captures firms’ strategic shifts away from the non-green and into
the green economy over time at the firm level. We overcome a number of key lim-
itations in the previous literature including selection and omitted variable bias. We
evaluate impacts on firms’ ability to earn income (using operating profit margin mea-
sures such as return-on-sales, ebit-, and ebitda-margins) as well as ability to generate
profits relative to the capital investments entrusted to firms (using return-on-assets and
return-on-equity). Linkages between these variables give additional insight into how
going green affects firms’ finances and into the current market environment for green
technologies.
Our first main finding is that firms are typically able to obtain higher earnings per sales
(operating profit margin) by moving into the environmentally friendly market space.
This is consistent with Palmer and Truong (2017)’s findings using a much smaller sam-
ple, and our results can be interpreted in a much broader context in terms of geography
44Since the results on Tobin’s Q for Manufacturing of Electronic and other Electrical Equipment dis-
appear after controlling for Sales Growth, we are more cautious in the interpretation of this relationship
and consider it to be less robust.
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and sectors. This suggests that firms are moving into green activities in sectors where
a green premium can be charged. Hence policies that help create clearly distinguished
markets for green goods (e.g. through labelling, other information provision or green
public procurement) may further encourage diversification into green markets. The
automobile sector is an exception, as manufacturing of hybrid- and electric vehicles
is associated with lower operating profit margins. This suggests that additional policy
measures may be justified to accelerate the development and sale of low carbon cars.
Carbon emissions from transportation account for about one quarter of global energy-
related carbon emissions and continue to grow rapidly, even in advanced economies
(IEA, 2017). Even though the costs for hybrid- and electric vehicle technologies have
been declining, targeted R&D subsidies such as R&D tax credits and research grants
or cheaper access to green capital could help to accelerate the decline in component
costs.
The second main finding is that higher operating profit margins do not necessarily
increase profits per unit of investment. We find that consistent with the DuPont De-
composition, this is because the production of green goods and services tends to entail
higher asset requirements, which may be in the form of new machinery or specialised
production facilities. We not only show how a positive effect on profitability as ex-
pressed as operating profit margin can be reconciled with a no effect on profitability
as expressed by return on assets or equity, but highlight how the choice of profitability
measure matters when examining impacts of environmental performance on economic
performance, and how comparing results of studies using different profitability mea-
sures can be problematic.
Why would frontier firms move into the green space if higher profit margins are not
yielding higher return on investments? A number of arguments can be put forward.
Gonza´lez-Benito and Gonza´lez-Benito (2005) find that while ecological product de-
sign has no impact on return on assets, it is at times associated with better operational
performance such as quality, reliability and volume flexibility. It may be argued that
wile investors care about returns on assets (and equity), firm managers may focus (at
least in the short run) on identifying opportunities to increase their operating profits,
hence engage in green activities where they can earn higher returns per sale. Frontier
firms moving into the production of green goods and services may also be driven by
other factors such as environmental regulations (e.g. emission standards for vehicles)
or expectations about green markets in the future. In order to mobilise large scale
private sector investments and achieve a much broader low carbon transition rapidly,
additional policy support will be necessary to ensure that diversifying into green mar-
kets is a sufficiently attractive business strategy. In particular, generating green goods
and services demands a higher asset requirement, hence facilitating cheaper access
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to green capital through reduced interest rates, or risk sharing through public-private
partnerships could encourage further private sector investment into these sectors.
A third main finding is that in general, firms’ decisions to move into the environmen-
tally friendly market space are neither rewarded or punished by investors on the stock
market, except in the utilities sector. This indicates that for our sample time period
(2009-2016) global stock markets did on average not anticipate significant growth op-
portunities for green goods and services in non-utility sectors. Thus, despite higher
operating profit margins, investors do not value green firms more compared to non-
green counterparts. This is consistent with the lack of a positive and significant impact
of green revenue shares on return on investment (ROA, ROE), as investors are predom-
inantly interested in firms’ return on the capital they provide. Thus, they care about
firms’ efficiency of using assets and equity to generate returns. A higher operative
margin is therefore on itself not sufficient to attract further investment. The findings
suggest a cautionary tale on the current policy and investment landscape for low-carbon
technologies. Since the international community requires large-scale investments into
such technologies to meet the climate targets, additional financial resources are neces-
sary (OECD, 2017; CPI, 2018). Therefore investors need to find it sufficiently prof-
itable to invest in such technologies. Providing subsidies on ‘green capital’ to dampen
the effect of additional assets (per sales) and to relatively improve firms’ ROA and
ROE, could help increase green firms’ market valuation and attract additional invest-
ment. Such additional policies may be necessary to create the necessary investment
environment to channel funds into green technologies.45 46
A fourth main finding is around sector heterogeneity. For utilities, which tend to pro-
vide relatively homogeneous goods, the provision and diffusion of green technologies
is largely driven by the supply side. Government regulation has been key to increase
the supply of renewable electricity through renewable quotas and financial incentives
45Adopting the view of entirely efficient capital markets, the results can also be interpreted as mean-
ing that there is no mispricing in the market based on firms’ green revenue share. This view assumes
that stocks are always and immediately priced correctly and that investors cannot find stocks that are
either under- or overvalued (see e.g. Wall, 1995; Mollet and Ziegler, 2014). Empirical evidence how-
ever suggests that capital markets are not sufficiently efficient for this strict view to hold. Stocks and
portfolios have been shown to experience systematic mispricing based on environmental performance
and other indicators (see e.g. Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009; Edmands, 2011; Eccles et al., 2014).
46We would also like to note that it can be argued that by excluding all utilities from the sample,
the likelihood of a type 2 error increases. This might occur as we drop the sectors with a large amount
of variation in the main independent variable. In other words this may increase the likelihood of not
observing an effect, even though a true effect exists. We would fail to reject the null hypothesis (of
no difference) even though it is false (see e.g Ziegler, 2012). If our results on the restricted non-utility
sample were due to a type 2 error, the overall policy implications would however remain largely un-
changed. The negative impact of additional asset requirements on firms’ comprehensive performance
also exists for the sample with utilities. To meet the climate targets large-scale additional investments
into low-carbon technologies are required over the next decades. To accelerate such investments our
findings suggest (across non-utility and utility samples) that reducing the costs for green investments is
an important factor.
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for renewable energy generation (IRENA, IEA, and REN21, 2018). Indeed our results
show that going green is already an economically viable move in the utilities sectors,
and is rewarded by the stock market. To a large degree this may be attributable to
the low-carbon policy support for these sectors in many countries. For example, as
is well known, significant public investments have gone into driving down renewable
energy costs, both through price based instruments such as feed in tariffs and tech-
nology support policies such as R&D tax credits or public research grants (see e.g.
Bloom et al., 2019). Our results highlight that in contrast to utilities, for the rest of
the economy, policy support is less strong and likely insufficient given the urgency and
size of the challenge to decarbonise the economy over the next decades (e.g. IPCC,
2018). Specifically, we show that supporting financing costs for green investments can
help firms to convert higher earnings-margins into higher return on investments, which
may therefore induce more investment in green technologies. For non-utilities, mo-
tives for the adoption and diffusion of green technologies are different because they
are more exposed to international competition. Producers can capture greater global
market shares by responding to changing demands with product differentiation (e.g.
Robinson, 2018). For example in energy efficient appliances or electric vehicles, con-
sumers may have a different willingness to pay for green and non-green products (e.g.
Jovanovic and Rob, 1987; OECD, 2011; Antonnen et al., 2013). Supply side policies,
such as emissions- or energy efficiency standards help drive technologies and demand
forward, as do demand side policies such as subsidies for electric vehicles.
Overall our findings highlight important shortcomings of current policy and invest-
ment landscape for low-carbon technologies. Large-scale investments to develop, de-
ploy and diffuse low carbon technologies are imperative for meeting the climate targets
(OECD/IEA, 2017). It appears that so far, public policies are making some head way
in reducing environmental impact and enhancing economic as well as market perfor-
mance of firms, but only in utility sectors. On the one hand this is encouraging news,
as it demonstrates that policy support can correct market failures and harness the abil-
ity of markets to deliver public goods. On the other hand, it highlights that much
more policy intervention across a broader spectrum of the global economy is needed to
align incentives such that developing new, cleaner products and services in response to
changing customer preferences improves not only firms’ environmental performance
but also financial and market performance, through the ‘revenue channel’.
105
Chapter 3
Do International Agreements Matter
for Financial Markets? New Evidence
from the Paris Agreement.
Abstract
The Paris Agreement is considered a landmark of international efforts to mitigate cli-
mate change, yet it is unclear if it can actually deliver meaningful outcomes since it is
largely built upon voluntary pledges. We use event study methodology to examine if
the Paris Agreement actually mattered for investors and financial markets. In partic-
ular we show that firms, which generate revenues from producing “green” goods and
services have experienced significantly positive abnormal returns in the week follow-
ing the agreement relative to the overall market. We show that this effect exists both
at the extensive and intensive margin of firms’ green revenue share. The effect is not
limited to electricity generation, but holds for a larger group of sectors. Secondly, we
show that emissions-intensity is a less clear-cut determinant for firms’ financial per-
formance following the Paris Agreement. While we observe negative returns for some
emissions-intensive firms, the effect is highly heterogeneous across sectors. Interest-
ingly, the most carbon-intensive electricity generating firms observe positive abnormal
returns. Combining the emissions-intensity and green revenue data, we show that the
most emissions-intensive electricity generating firms are also, and sometimes quite
heavily, engaged in green technologies with substantial renewable electricity shares.
Investors appear to value in particular the growing opportunities for firms active in
green technologies following the Paris Agreement.
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3.1 Introduction
International cooperation to mitigate climate change has a long history beginning with
at least the Rio Conference in 1992 to the Conference of the Parties (COPs) in Kyoto,
Copenhagen and Paris among others. Yet, the past experience of climate negotiations,
and in particular the unsuccessful 2009 Copenhagen conference, led many observers
to disbelieve in the multilateral process. Against this background, the Paris Agree-
ment offered a breakthrough in climate diplomacy (Falkner, 2016). Commentators
described the passing of the agreement as a “landmark” (Davenport, 2015) (The New
York Times) and “milestone” (Tompkins and Levin, 2015) (World Resources Institute)
of international climate negotiations. Moreover, it is considered as “breaking new
ground” (Falkner, 2016, p.1107) and a “turning point” (Stern, 2015a) in international
climate diplomacy. While the unanimity of the agreement has been praised, short-
comings in particular with respect to its stringency and enforceability have been raised
subsequently.
Compared to previous climate summits, the Paris Agreement adopted a new strategy
allowing countries to set their own targets (Nationally Determined Contributions or
NDCs) in combination with an international review process that would scrutinise the
ambitions of individual pledges. This “pledge and review” process will determine the
actual ambition of the agreement and will to some extent depend on the outcome of a
“naming and shaming” process that encourages countries to gradually strengthen their
targets (Falkner, 2016, p.1107). Thereby, COP-21 and the Paris Agreement shifted
away from requiring mandatory emissions reductions from countries, which had been
a major barrier in past negotiations. The non-mandatory approach and the flexibil-
ity, through which countries can determine their own ambition has likely provided the
breakthrough in the negotiation process (Falkner, 2016). It has been argued that such a
decentralised approach may be a promising avenue for global cooperation. It can facili-
tate the gradual building of trust among countries and may lead to incremental strength-
ening of cooperation and coordinated emission reductions. Such decentralised coali-
tions might therefore result in more effective mitigation action compared to mandatory
targets, which have deadlocked negotiations in the past (Bernauer, 2013; Keohane and
Victor, 2016). Game theoretic and experimental work have also increasingly focused
on the potential benefits from non-mandatory international cooperation. Instead of the
required emissions-reductions, the NDC approach might facilitate small-scale coali-
tions, which may encourage laggards to follow and gradually adopt more ambitious
emission reduction goals (e.g. Bosetti et al., 2017; Marchiori et al., 2017). So, one po-
tential avenue for the Paris Agreement to gradually strengthen its emission reductions
is through the formation of coalitions of ambitious countries which encourage others
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to follow.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether an international agreement largely built upon
voluntary pledges can actually deliver ambitious emissions reductions and can facili-
tate the transition towards a low-carbon economy.1 Since climate mitigation is a global
public good, individual incentives to reduce emissions are limited. It remains unclear
whether other countries would follow once some countries start reducing emissions
and adopt a low-carbon development path. The incentives for free-riding and the
absence of a supranational authority provide a major barrier to meaningful interna-
tional cooperation to mitigate climate change (Hardin, 1968; Barrett, 2006). Since the
pledges are voluntary, a particular concern is that observed effects might not go beyond
business-as-usual emission reductions (e.g. due to gradual efficiency improvements).
The concern is reinforced by recent work of UNEP (2018) showing that the current
NDCs imply a global warming of about 3◦C, rather than the intended 1.5◦C. Simi-
larly, a survey among 600 experts from the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) reveal a low level of confidence among experts in voluntary pledges to deliver
ambitious emission reductions (Dannenberg et al., 2017). The US announcement to
withdraw from the agreement provided a major setback, even though the withdrawal
may only take effect the day after the next presidential election in 2020 (see for exam-
ple Mooney, 2017). Lastly, global greenhouse gas emissions have risen again in 2018
and are estimated to continue rising in 2019 (Global Carbon Project, 2018; Met Office,
2019). Thus, it remains to be seen if the voluntary commitment approach of the Paris
Agreement is at all credible.
In addition to agreeing on the NDC approach and the submission of reduction targets,
the international community also agreed to making international “finance flows con-
sistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient de-
velopment” (UNFCCC, 2016, p.22). Thus, the ambition of the agreement goes beyond
emission reductions, but aims to redirect and restructure financial flows towards a low-
carbon and climate resilient economy. Again, it is however unclear if a non-binding
international agreement based on voluntary pledges is able to deliver such an ambitious
goal. Hence, in addition to assessing the immediate impact on carbon emissions, it is
important to assess whether the agreement is credible and effective at providing the
right policy-framework and incentives for a transition towards a low-carbon economy.
One way to assess the credibility is by examining the reaction of the financial markets
1We refer to the agreement as voluntary and non-binding since countries are only legally obliged to
submit a Nationally Determined Contribution, but the level of ambition of this NDC is entirely voluntary.
Furthermore, large parts of the agreement are either non mandatory or non enforceable. This is to be
regarded separately from the discussion in environmental law on whether the agreement, or parts of it,
are “legally-binding” (See for example Bodansky (2016a,b), which refers largely to the legal nature of
the NDCs).
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to the agreement. In particular by analysing the potentially heterogeneous responses
for “green” and “dirty” portfolios. It is important to note that this does not assess the
credibility with respect to emission reductions, but rather the credibility with respect to
the technology diffusion and adoption of “green” or low-carbon technologies, which
are essential to achieve emission reductions.2 Similarly, it provides insight into the
anticipated use of relatively “dirty” or carbon-intensive technologies, which need to
be faced-out to achieve the emissions reductions targets and to remain well below 2◦C
(e.g. UNEP, 2018).
In addition to contributing to the discussion on the credibility of international cli-
mate agreements, we also contribute to the debate within environmental economics
on whether financial markets actually respond to firms’ environmental performance.
So far the literature has provided mixed results. Some evidence suggests that investors
value firms’ improvements in environmental performance when it is related to reduc-
tions in risk from future liabilities or potential future regulations. Khanna and Damon
(1999) show for instance that voluntary participation in the US EPA 33/50 programme
to reduce toxic release emissions is positively valued by investors. Clarkson and Li
(2004) find evidence that investors use environmental performance information to as-
sess potential future abatement spending for firms in the pulp and paper industry. Some
studies have however also shown that firms’ voluntary commitment to improve their
environmental performance is negatively related to stock performance. Fisher-Vanden
and Thorburn (2011) show that membership in voluntary environmental programmes
is negatively associated with stock returns for the period 1993-2008. Similarly nega-
tive effects are found by Can˜on-de Francia and Garce´s-Ayerbe (2009) for the voluntary
adoption of the ISO 14001 norm between 1996-2002. Oberndorfer et al. (2013) iden-
tify significantly negative returns for firms being included in a sustainability index
between 1999-2002. These studies conclude that voluntary measures to improve the
environmental performance tend to impose unproductive costs and may be a reaction to
institutional pressures. Such additional voluntary costs can therefore lead to negative
stock returns.
Even though it is difficult to identify a time-trend from previous findings because of
different data and study contexts, it is interesting to note that some of the most recent
studies suggest that such negative effects may be reversing. By disaggregating year-
by-year effects Moliterni (2018) shows that firms’ commitment to reduce emissions
has become significantly positively related to their market valuation in the more recent
years of the sample (2013-2016), while it was not significantly related in the earlier
2Green technologies include low-carbon technologies, but also other technologies which help re-
ducing the overall impact on the environment and that may not be directly linked to greenhouse gas
emissions. These include technologies in water management or resource efficiency technologies among
others.
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years (2010-2012). Lourenc¸o et al. (2012b) shows that membership in a sustainability
index is positively associated with firms’ stock performance for the years 2007-2010.
Matsumura et al. (2014) find that voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions is positively
associated with firm value and that higher carbon emissions are punished by investors
for the period 2006 to 2008. Even though heterogeneities in the findings exist, they
seem to suggest that in more recent years, in particular since the mid-2000s, the effect
may be changing towards a positive relationship between firms’ voluntary commitment
to improve their environmental performance and market valuation (see also Moliterni,
2018, for a discussion of time trends across studies).
A number of limitations exist across the present studies. First, studies have largely
been limited to binary measures, such as the inclusion in a sustainability index, the
implementation of an environmental management system or the self-reported commit-
ment to reduce emissions (e.g. Can˜on-de Francia and Garce´s-Ayerbe, 2009; Ziegler
et al., 2011; Ziegler, 2012; Lourenc¸o et al., 2012b; Oberndorfer et al., 2013; Moliterni,
2018). Such results are therefore limited to extensive margin effects and may hide
variation in the actual commitment level. Second, the inclusion in a sustainability in-
dex for instance is not only determined by firms’ environmental performance, but may
also depend on other factors such as its past stock performance, which may make it
difficult to isolate the effect of the environmental performance. Third, in addition to
the above binary indicators, some studies examine firms’ environmental performance
with respect to emissions, i.e. a by-product of firms’ business activity, which is linked
to firms’ production costs (e.g. Khanna and Damon, 1999; Clarkson and Li, 2004;
Rassier and Earnhart, 2015). Emission reductions can be valued because they cap-
ture efficiency improvements in the material or energy input use and not because of
their environmental benefits. These findings are linked to the “cost channel”, through
which firms are able to improve their economic performance through efficiency im-
provements, which in turn result in better environmental performance (see Ambec and
Lanoie, 2008, for a detailed discussion of the cost and revenue channels). While these
effects are clearly important they are limited to capturing the productive efficiency of
firms. Fewer studies have analysed the “revenue channel” through which firms can
improve their economic performance by shifting their business activities towards pro-
ducing “green” goods and services. Rennings and Zwick (2002) and Rennings et al.
(2004) use binary information on whether firms have introduced new green products
using a telephone survey. They find positive associations with firms’ subsequent em-
ployment levels in a cross-sectional analysis. Similar results are obtained by Horbach
(2010) in a panel from 2002-2005. Palmer and Truong (2017) find that green prod-
uct introductions are positively associated with firms’ accounting profitability using
a panel of 79 global firms between 2007-2012. These results are however limited to
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employment levels or accounting based profitability. A related paper by Kruse et al.
(2019) (Chapter 2) examines the relationship between green goods and services and
both accounting and market based indicators using a panel regression. In their panel
setting they are however unable to identify a causal effect.
We are able to overcome some of these limitations by using a continuous measure of
firms’ “green” revenue share. It captures the share of revenues from the production of
green goods and services. This allows us to construct portfolios based on a continuous
variable, capturing the intensity of firms’ green activities. To the best of our knowledge
this is the first event study to examine the reaction of financial markets to a detailed
green product-based measure. It allows novel insight into the market’s perception of
growth opportunities for green goods and services. An advantage of using event study
methodology is that it allows us to identify a plausibly causal effect arising from firms’
green revenue share on their market valuation. This is typically not possible in similar
papers using panel regressions or portfolio analysis (as for example in Ziegler et al.,
2011; Lourenc¸o et al., 2012b; Kruse et al., 2019). We use the Paris Agreement as it
created a large, discrete, and plausibly exogenous shift in the reward for being green.
Without such a discrete event it would be difficult to attribute any change in financial
returns to preferences for financing such firms because the choice of investing in green
firms is endogenous and there are many other factors influencing decision making in
financial markets.
In this paper we examine whether and to what extent, financial markets reward green
goods and services and whether they might punish carbon-intensive firms following
the Paris Agreement. This allows us to provide novel insight on the credibility of
the Paris Agreement with respect to the diffusion and adoption of green goods and
services. More generally, it allows us to asses investors’ perception of the post-Paris
policy landscape. We show that financial markets respond to environmental activities
of companies. In particular they reward the share of revenues from the production of
“green” goods and services. Importantly, the effect exists both at the extensive and
intensive margin of firms’ green revenue share. The emissions-intensity of firms is
however a less clear-cut determinant for market reactions following the Paris Agree-
ment. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 3.2 we review
the related event study literature. Section 3.3 explains the methodology and the differ-
ent data sets we use for our analysis. Section 3.5 presents the results and Section 3.7
discusses the findings and concludes.
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3.2 Event Study Literature
Short-term event studies are particularly common in financial economics. They are
commonly applied to examine the effect of mergers and acquisitions, earnings an-
nouncements, or the effect of new regulation (MacKinlay, 1997).3 Event studies have
recently also become more popular within environmental economics. Oberndorfer
et al. (2013) examines the effect of the inclusion of nearly 30 German firms into a
sustainability stock index between 1999 and 2002. They find that the inclusion is pe-
nalised by the market and results on average in a relative decrease of stock returns
(-2% on average). The authors conclude that such inclusions appear to be regarded
as a reaction to institutional pressures that mandate firms to invest in corporate sus-
tainability activities and result in unproductive costs. A similar finding is obtained
by Can˜on-de Francia and Garce´s-Ayerbe (2009) who examine investors’ responses to
firms’ voluntarily adoption of the ISO 14001 environmental certification. They show
that adopting the norm has generated negative abnormal returns for firms. Similarly,
they argue that investors perceive the voluntary adoption of an environmental standard
to be unproductive and as a response to institutional pressures. Hence, productive re-
sources are diverted to complying with the certification instead of being invested in
productive activities.
In the closely related branch of natural resource economics, event study methodol-
ogy has been applied to examine effects of anticipated or actual regulation on carbon-
intensive firms. Lemoine (2017) identifies Green Paradox effects due to a suggested
strengthening of legislation in the US Senate. The discussion of strengthening environ-
mental policy led to an increase in carbon emissions due to inter-temporal leakage and
firms maximising profits prior to the anticipated regulation. Sen and von Schickfus
(2019) study two large coal-intensive German electricity providers. Using the grad-
ual development of a German climate policy aiming at phasing out coal, they show
negative abnormal returns for German electricity providers. These effects are how-
ever dampened by anticipation of financial compensation. They find that the German
climate levy and coal phase-out scenarios imply substantial losses for these energy
providers and resulted in 4% negative average abnormal returns over a five day win-
dow around the respective events. A slightly different approach to examine investors’
perceptions of stranded asset risks is adopted by Griffin et al. (2015). They use a 2009
3We focus on short-term event studies since they are considered to be more robust compared to long-
term studies. Long-term studies typically examine event-horizons over multiple years (e.g. Lyon et al.
(1999)). Long-term event studies are methodologically similar to portfolio analyses, which typically
compare the development of returns over multiple years (e.g. Mollet and Ziegler (2014)). Trade-offs
exists in the respective approaches. While portfolio analyses can provide insight into the relative perfor-
mance of stock returns over long time horizons they can typically not establish causality. We leave such
long run studies for future research.
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article published in Nature and the subsequent media coverage. The Nature article
argues that a large share of global fossil fuel reserves is ‘unburnable’ when aiming to
remain below 2◦C of global warming. They find that the publication and the subse-
quent media coverage lead to a 1.5-2% decline in average stock prices for a sample of
63 US oil and gas firms.
A related paper by Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) examines the effect of the Paris
Agreement on coal and renewable energy Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). They find
no significant effects of the Paris Agreement on coal ETFs. Furthermore, they find
no strong significant effect for renewable and non-renewable energy ETFs except for
solar energy. They argue that the coal industry has already been declining in many
countries due to cheaper substitutes, increased energy efficiency or slowing growth in
coal consuming countries, so that investment has already started to shift away from
coal prior to the agreement. Using ETFs for Event Studies can potentially be prob-
lematic, as stocks are not only selected into the ETF based on their industry grouping,
but also based on their past stock performance (returns, volatility), which may induce
some form of endogeneity. Abnormal returns on ETFs might therefore potentially not
only arise because firms are active in renewable electricity markets, but also because
they have been selected for example as a particularly well-balanced portfolio or as a
portfolio of highly-promising renewable firms.
In this paper, we use novel data on the precise share of firms’ revenues from producing
green goods and services. This allows us to show that investors value both the extensive
and intensive margin of firms’ involvement in green technologies. Furthermore, we
show that the effect is not only limited to renewable energy generation, but spreads
across a broad category of sectors. Furthermore, we are able to show that emissions-
intensity is a less clear-cut indicator for investors. On its own it appears not to be a
strong determinant of investment decisions following international climate agreements.
Emissions-intensive electricity generating firms seem to be a special case in the current
policy environment. For electricity providers with mixed portfolios of both highly
carbon intensive fossil fuels as well as emerging shares of renewable electricity, we
show that the opportunities arising from the share of renewable electricity appears to
be particularly valued by investors.
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3.3 Methodological Approach
3.3.1 Event Study Methodology
Event studies mostly examine so-called “normal” and “abnormal returns”, which are
estimated from capital asset pricing models (CAPM). The most basic approach is the
one-factor model based on the CAPM for a firm or stock i on day t (i=1,..., N; t=1,...,T)
((Brown and Warner, 1980; Campbell et al., 1997))
rit− r f t = αi +βi(rmt− r f t)+ εit (3.1)
where rit is the return for share i, and rmt is the return of the market portfolio at the end
of day t. The risk-free interest rate at the beginning of period t is expressed by r f t , and
εit is the error term with expectation E(εit) = 0 and variance Var(εit) = σ2εi . The term
(rit− r f t) on the left hand side is also referred to as the excess return reit , and rmt− r f t
as the index excess return remt (with respect to the risk-free rate). All returns are defined
as logarithmic returns. The parameters αi, βi are unknown and estimated by the model.
The normal (excess) returns E(rit−r f t) are unknown and defined as the expectation of
(excess) returns without conditioning on the event. Abnormal returns (AR) are defined
as the difference between the observed and the normal (excess) returns (Oberndorfer
et al., 2013):
ARit = (rit− r f t)−E(rit− r f t) (3.2)
While this one-factor market model for abnormal returns is the simplest approach,
many studies show that the three-factor model developed by (Fama and French, 1993)
has more explanatory power and also shows desirable characteristics for robust statis-
tical inference (Fama and French, 1993, 1996; Hussain et al., 2002; Kolari and Pyn-
nonen, 2010).4 The three-factor model includes two additional terms SMBt and HMLt .
The former is called the small-minus-big market capitalisation factor return. The lat-
ter is referred to as the high-minus-low book-equity/market-equity factor return at day
t. The rationale for the SMB factor is that stocks with small market capitalisations
tend to outperform the market. The HML factor adjusts for the finding that so called
value stocks, which are stocks with a low market valuation relative to its fundamentals
(measured by Price-to-earnings or Price-to-book ratio among others), also tend to out-
perform the market. Including these two factors allows to control for this systematic
4By including the additional two factors the Fama French model reduces cross-sectional correlation
between shares substantially (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010), which is important for correct inference in
particular in the context of event day clustering.
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outperformance. Fama and French (1993) show that these additional terms are partic-
ularly well-suited to capture common variation in stock returns (for further details on
these factors see Fama and French (1993)).5 All of the models require the underlying
assumptions that there is an element of surprise in the event and that there are no other
confounding events occurring.
In the 3-factor model, the abnormal returns are estimated as the difference between the
realised and predicted returns on day t in the event period.
ÂRit = reit−
(
αˆi + βˆi1remt + βˆi,2SMBt + βˆi,3HMLt
)
(3.3)
The estimated abnormal returns can be aggregated cross-sectionally and over multiple
event days. Estimated average abnormal returns (AAR) over the cross-section of N
firms are defined as ((Khotari and Warner, 2006):
ÂARt =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
ÂRit (3.4)
Aggregating these estimated average abnormal returns over multiple event days (start-
ing at time t1 through time t2) results in estimated cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAAR)
ĈAARt1,t2 =
t2
∑
t=t1
ÂARt (3.5)
Figure 3.1 illustrates the stylised time line of event studies. The “estimation period” is
used to generate predictions of returns for the event period. These predictions capture
the returns in the non-observed potential outcome that the event had not taken place.
Abnormal returns are then estimated for each firm i in the “event window” by compar-
ing the observed returns relative to the predicted counterfactual. If the estimation win-
dow is sufficiently large the estimated abnormal returns are approximately normally
distributed with expectation zero and variance σ2εi . The event window is typically de-
fined as beginning twenty days prior to the event, to reduce bias from anticipation. and
5The daily Fama-French factors, are constructed using 6 value-weight portfolios formed on size and
the book-to-market ratio. The SMB factor is constructed by subtracting the average return of the three
‘large portfolios’ consisting of large firms according to their market equity, from the average return of the
three portfolios containing small firms (according to their market equity). The HML factor is constructed
by subtracting the average returns of the two growth portfolios from the two value portfolios. The growth
and value portfolio is constructed based on the ratio of book equity to market equity (BE/ME). Firms in
the top 30% of BE/ME are included in the growth portfolios. Firms with a BE/ME ratio in the bottom
70% are included in the value portfolio. The portfolios include all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks
(Information taken from Kenneth French’s website: https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/
faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.)
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ending up to ten days after the event (t−20,10). In line with the existing literature we
define the estimation window to be the one hundred days prior to the event window
(t−121,−21). The event day t0 is defined as the first trading-day at which the event be-
comes effective (MacKinlay, 1997). In our case this is Monday 14 December, the first
trading day following the agreement (See timeline of negotiation process in Section
3.3.2).
Figure 3.1: Time line for an Event Study (from MacKinlay (1997))
The null hypothesis of event studies is that the event has no effect on excess returns. To
test this hypothesis we use the commonly used nonparametric Corrado (1989) rank test
with the aggregation approach by Cowan (1992) for cumulative average abnormal re-
turns (CAARs), which implicitly accounts for cross-sectional correlations across firms
(Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010; Oberndorfer et al., 2013).6 One advantage of nonpara-
metric tests over parametric tests such as the Patell (1976) and Boehmer et al. (1991)
(also known as the BMP test) is that they do not rely on distributional assumptions of
abnormal returns. Since stock prices are typically not normally distributed, nonpara-
metric tests have become the most commonly used test statistics (Kolari and Pynnonen,
2011). As a robustness check we also use parametric tests, in particular the commonly
used BMP (Boehmer et al., 1991) test as well as the parametric KP test, developed by
Kolari and Pynnonen (2010). One concern in event studies is that the cross-sectional
variation in the true abnormal returns results in variance increases around the event
(also called event-induced volatility). This may bias commonly used parametric tests
towards rejecting the null hypothesis (such as the Patell (1976), or Brown and Warner
(1985) tests). Harrington and Shrider (2007) show that among the parametric tests, the
BMP test is robust to such an event induced increase in volatility.7 Furthermore, we
also use the KP test statistic, which further modifies the BMP-test statistic to account
for cross-correlation in abnormal returns. We report results using the nonparametric
Corrado test in the main part of the paper. Results using the BMP, and KP test statistics
are reported in the Appendix in Figures C.8 & C.9, and C.10 & C.11.
Instead of using OLS to estimate the 3-factor Fama-French model, we use a more
6Using the Cowan (1992) adjustment for CAARs is important as these nonparametric tests were
developed to examine single-day returns (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2011). The Cowan (1992) approach
overcomes the potential problems with the Corrado test by cumulating daily ranks of abnormal returns
within the CAR-period.
7In other words the test is robust to heteroskedasticity arising from unexplained variation in the true
abnormal returns Harrington and Shrider (2007)
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robust GARCH model (Bollerslev, 1986). GARCH stands for generalised autoregres-
sive conditional heteroskedasticity model. One concern for correct inference in event
studies is that the variances of the returns are time varying with some degree of auto-
correlation, which is not accounted for in OLS models. Financial markets are prone
to conditional heteroskedasticity, as upward or downward price spikes can trigger au-
tomated response orders, which are commonly used to manage risks among investors.
Price spikes can therefore induce additional volatility, which is serially correlated, or
in other words conditional on periods with elevated variance. GARCH models con-
sider a varying conditional variance and are therefore able to deal with such serial het-
eroscedasticity by using past values of the variance. More specifically GARCH uses
autoregressive lags and moving average lags of the variance to absorb the effects of
conditional heteroskedasticity (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010, 2011). The GARCH(p,q)
model is a generalised model, in which p and q indicate the order of autoregressive
terms in the model. The GARCH(1,1) model is a specific case commonly applied in
financial time series. It considers one autoregressive lag and one moving average lag.
We use GARCH(1,1) models throughout the analysis.
Similarly to Sen and von Schickfus (2019) we report our main results in 3-day ‘rolling’
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs), which cover the 3-day window centred
around the respective median day (3-day windows are also used by Kogan et al. (2017)
among others). This allows us to show further variation in the data compared to for ex-
ample a 5-day analysis window (used among others in Oberndorfer et al. (2013)). We
also report and discuss results on 5-day CAARs in particular to quantify the magnitude
of the effects over the entire post-event period ( Figures C.6 and C.7 in the Appendix).
Inference based on CAARs reduces the possibility of incorrect rejection of a true null
hypothesis (of no difference) (type I error). However, it increases the possibility of
failing to reject a false null hypothesis (of no difference) (type II error) (Sen and von
Schickfus, 2019).8
3.3.2 Event Studies with Partial Anticipation
One particularity of studying the effect of the Paris Agreement is that it was preceded
by a two-week negotiation period. Information on the negotiation process was reg-
ularly made public and covered in liveblogs and newsfeeds. Hence, the two-week
negotiation period provides us with interesting insight into the uncertainty in the mar-
ket and varying expectations about the agreement as the negotiations progressed. One
8In other words, inference based on CAARs reduces the likelihood of observing significant effects,
even though a true difference exists. It increases the likelihood of observing no significant effects, even
though a true significant difference exists. The comparison is with respect to firm-specific cumulative
abnormal returns and average abnormal returns
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crucial requirement for event studies is that the event contained a surprise element. In
the absence of surprise the outcome would already have been absorbed by the market.
Hence, it is important to show that there was still considerable uncertainty on the last
day prior to the agreement. The agreement was scheduled to be passed on Friday 11
December. The negotiations were however extended until Saturday, as an agreement
could not be reached by Friday. Hence, on the last trading day prior to the signing there
was still considerable uncertainty on whether the agreement would actually be passed,
whether all countries would sign-up and how stringent it would be. In particular it was
unclear if the more stringent 1.5◦C warming target would be included instead of the
more lenient 2◦C. In particular the role of large emerging economies remained unclear
until the very end of the negotiations. Brazil for example only joined the “coalition of
high ambition” (also known as the “progressive alliance”) at around 4:30pm (CET) on
Friday 11 December. This was considered a potential game changer, as it was the first
large emerging country to join this coalition. This raised expectations that it would
become a bridge builder towards the other large emerging economies to increase their
ambition (See for example the Guardian liveblog on 11 December 4:30pm (CET) from
the Paris negotiations (Vaughan, 2015)). Furthermore, large oil producing states like
Saudi Arabia risked an unanimous agreement. In overnight negotiation sessions to-
wards the last officially planned day of the negotiations (Friday 11 December), Saudi
Arabia stepped up its opposition against the 1.5◦C target, arguing that the science is
not entirely conclusive on the issue of whether 1.5◦C warming is preferable compared
to a 2◦C scenario. This objection risked that the more ambitious 1.5◦C target could
be adopted unanimously. Lastly, on Friday 11 December at around 4pm (CET) the
Indian Environment Minister gave a press conference saying that there would still be
a “long road ahead” if there was not more effort from the developed nations and that
the likelihood of passing the agreement hang in balance (ClimateHome, 2015). Hence,
there was still considerable uncertainty on Friday 11 December 2015 on the ambition,
the unanimity, and the final wording.
It is however important to note that the potentially surprising outcome of the agreement
was accompanied by an ex-ante probability. Conceptually our approach is similar to
Kogan et al. (2017) who examine the market’s reaction to firms’ being granted a patent
after a period of uncertainty between the patent application date and the decision of
the patent office. Similar to their theoretical framework we assume that the individual
market value γi for firm i in the potential outcome that the Paris Agreement is accepted
is known to investors. pii denotes the market’s ex ante probability assessment that the
agreement is passed in the final, more ambitious wording. On Monday 14 December a
firm’s stock market reaction ∆Vj is then given by
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∆Vi = (1−pii)γi (3.6)
It represents the change in the market value for firm i in a scenario where the agreement
is passed compared to the counterfactual of it not being passed (Kogan et al., 2017).
In particular, we observe the effect of the resolved uncertainty in the market following
the agreement. The market’s reaction to the agreement therefore understates the total
impact on the firm value since the information about the probability is known prior to
the agreement.
It is important to note that investors’ responses to the Paris Agreement may be dif-
ferent from their response to more common events such as earnings announcements.
The agreement contains a complex set of information that needed to be absorbed by
the market. First, the ambition of countries’ pledges had to be understood. Second,
since emission reduction pledges are voluntary and non-enforceable, the political in-
terpretation became essential to assess how serious countries were in implementing the
agreement. Absorbing such a complex set of information might therefore be different
from reacting to firms’ earnings announcements, which occur frequently and in a stan-
dardised format. Hence, we might expect a gradual onset of effects, as investors had
to digest a rich set of information.
3.4 Data
In this paper we test in particular whether groups of ‘green’ and ‘dirty’ firms have
experienced abnormal returns in the week following the Paris Agreement. To test the
hypotheses we mainly rely on two separate datasets: the share of firms’ revenues gener-
ated by producing green goods and services (“green revenues”), and firms’ emissions-
intensity. Each dataset is outlined below in detail. For each sample, we divide firms
into deciles based on the relative metric (green revenue share, emissions intensity).9
Based on the deciles we construct portfolios of ‘green’ and ‘dirty’ firms. Descriptive
statistics for each of the subsamples are reported in the Appendix in Table C.1. When
grouping firms into particularly ‘green’ or ‘dirty’ portfolios it is important to take a
sufficiently early cut-off date to avoid anticipation effects as much as possible. While
the COP-21 took place at the end of 2015, in 2014, the US and China already made a
joint announcement on climate change to work constructively together to mitigate cli-
mate change.10 The announcement already included emission-reduction pledges from
9The Green Revenue and Trucost Emissions database provide information on a yearly basis.
10See for example this article in the Guardian (Taylor and Branigan, 2014): https:
//www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge,
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both countries. It was considered to be a major milestone in increasing the likelihood
that a global agreement could be passed at the next COP in Paris. Hence, we choose
2013 as the cut-off year to group firms into portfolios to prevent direct anticipation
effects.11 We outline the precise grouping in the following sections for each dataset
separately. First, we discuss the financial data, which we use across all subsamples.
3.4.1 Financial Data
Throughout the analysis we only look at US firms. The crucial assumption required
to obtain robust results from an event study is that the underlying “market” (counter-
factual) is a good comparison to the portfolio of firms being analysed. We use the
daily 3-factor data provided by Kenneth French on his website.12 The US time series
includes all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ, which gives a comprehensive counterfactual market. The Center for Re-
search in Security Prices (CRSP) provides the most comprehensive coverage of US
stock price data covering more than 32,000 securities with primary listings in any of
the main US stock indices. More recently data on the SMB and HML factors has
also been provided for other parts of the world e.g. for Europe or a global coverage.
However, these are constructed by using regions’ value-weighted portfolios. Hence,
different country-weightings in our available green revenue and emissions data would
make the results less reliable and may introduce bias. Early results have confirmed
this concern. For European and global portfolios we observed significant abnormal re-
turns across many pre-negotiation periods, which indicates that the market may not be
a suitable counterfactual for the selected portfolio of firms. This prevents robust causal
analysis, as any significant abnormal returns in a post-event period may also simply
result from using a poor counterfactual. Hence, we have focused on US firms in this
analysis.
3.4.2 Green Revenue Data
We use a novel dataset developed by the financial services company FTSE Russell,
which captures the share of firms’ revenues that is generated by ‘producing’ green
or the statement provided by the Obama Administration (The White House, 2014):
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/
us-china-joint-announcement-climate-change.
11We want to rule out as much as possible that firms anticipated that an ambitious climate agreement
would be passed in 2015 and therefore invested in green technologies in anticipation of positive returns
for their firm.
12The data is available from: https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.
french/data_library.html. (We downloaded the data on 18 March 2019).
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goods and services (See Kruse et al. (2019) (Chapter 2) for a detailed discussion of
the Green Revenues (GR) dataset). When referring to green firms, we refer to firms
that produce a share of their revenue from selling green goods and services. FTSE
Russell developed its own classification for green revenues. It covers a broad group
of products and services, including traditionally green activities such as water-, and
waste-management as well as more recent technologies such as electric vehicles and
renewable electricity. The analysis is conducted in a centralised way within FTSE Rus-
sell to reduce potential bias from self-reported non-quantifiable environmental perfor-
mance metrics provided by the firms themselves. In particular, analysts screen firms’
annual reports to identify the share of revenue being generated in one of the segments
classified as ‘green’. The entire dataset covers approximately 16,500 global publicly
listed firms, representing approximately 98% of global market capitalisation for the
years 2008-2017.13 The data is provided at a sub-firm level depicting the company
segments, in which the revenue share is generated. This information is then aggre-
gated at the company level. In case a firm does not report the precise share of green
revenues generated within a firm-specific subsegment, the analyst provides a green
revenue range. For this analysis we only use the minimum value of this range, which
provides a certain and conservative lower bound in case of uncertainty on the precise
green revenue share.14. As explained above we only include US firms. For our main
specification we divide these firms into deciles according to their green revenue share
in the year 2013. As a robustness check we also use firms’ average green revenue share
between 2009-13 to divide firms into deciles. For the analysis we focus in particular on
the greenest deciles of firms. Our preferred specification is for the top 3 deciles of green
firms (N=63 firms, GR=97-100%). Due to equal values (taking the value of 1) it is not
possible to analyse the top 10 or 20% separately. The smallest feasible cut-off is the
top 30%. In addition, we also construct a portfolio based on firms, which generate one
hundred percent of their revenue from green activities (N=51). As robustness checks
and to establish the intensive margin effects we also examine portfolios constructed as
the top 40% (N=83, GR=70-100%), the median decile (N=22, GR=25-42%), and as
the most conservative estimate, firms with any positive green revenue share between
2009-2013 (N=249).
13We omit the earliest year 2008 due to concerns about data quality for that year similar to Kruse
et al. (2019) (Chapter 2).
14It can be argued that firms, which are actually generating green revenues, but are not included in
our ‘treated’ dataset because they do not disclose their precise revenue share may violate the Stable
Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) assumption. In particular this may mean that the potential
outcomes may not be well defined as some ‘treated’ firms are not identified as such. However, this
would work against our estimated coefficients. Hence, our results are conservative estimates
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3.4.3 Emissions Intensity Data
For emissions intensity, we use the Trucost Emissions dataset. It provides detailed
emissions, and emissions-intensity information for firms representing approximately
93% of global market capitalisation.15. We use Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions for
our analysis. Scope 1 emissions are direct emissions from owned or controlled sources
(typically power plants). Scope 2 emissions are emissions from purchased electricity,
heat or steam. Scope 3 emissions are indirect emissions not captured by Scope 2
such as transport related activities in vehicles not owned or controlled by the entity,
waste disposal or outsourced activities. Scope 3 emissions are notoriously difficult
to measure and we are concerned about the data quality, which is why we omit them
from the analysis. Emissions-intensity (EI) is defined as emissions (tons) of carbon
dioxide equivalents (CO2e) divided by revenue in million US dollars. To categorise
firms into emissions-intensity deciles, we use firms’ average carbon intensity for the
period between 2009-13 to smooth potential outliers.
The sectoral composition of the most emissions intensive firms in Scope 1 and 2 emis-
sions are very different. The most emissions intensive firms according to Scope 1 emis-
sions are mostly electricity producers (see Figure 3.6 panel (b)). Scope 2 emissions are
more dispersed across energy-intensive sectors such as chemical manufacturing or pri-
mary metal industries (see Figure 3.6 panel (d)). However, differences between scope
1 and scope 2 emissions might also simply result from the decision to either produce
electricity on-site or to purchase from the grid. Therefore, we once treat scope 1 and
2 as two separate subsamples, and once group them together. For the latter we simply
construct a portfolio of the most emissions intensive firms according to their sum of
scope 1 and 2 emissions (See Figure 3.6 panel (f) for sectoral composition). Again,
we use the top deciles of the most emissions intensive firms to construct our portfo-
lios of emissions intensive firms (Scope 1: (N=102) mean (median) EI= 2601 (1468)
(tCO2e/USDm); Scope 2: (N=103), mean (median) EI = 170 (125) (tCO2e/USDm);
Scope 1&2: (N=101) mean (median) EI=1356 (909) (tCO2e/USDm)).
3.4.4 Robustness Check using Clean Patent Data
We are concerned that any effect we see from the green revenue data might be an
artefact of this particular dataset, which is still relatively new to the literature. Hence,
as a robustness check and in addition to the Green Revenue data, we use clean patent
data. We use the World Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT), which is maintained by
15For the time period up to 2013, which we use in our empirical analysis, the Trucost data represents
approximately 85% of global market capitalisation.
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the European Patent Office (EPO)16. In particular we adopt the commonly used Y02
patent classification for our “clean” patent measure. The general patent data extends
back until the late 1800s, whereas Y02 patents only start emerging in the later part of
the 20th century. We construct a measure of clean patent intensity by taking the share
of granted Y02-patents between 2000-13 and divide it by the total number of patents
granted over the same period.17 This measure captures the extent, to which firms are
focused on clean patenting (and innovation) activity compared to their overall level of
patenting (and innovation). We would expect to see at least qualitatively similar effects
as for the green revenue data. Otherwise, we might be concerned that any effects on
green revenues could reflect a particularity of the dataset. Thus, we examine the top
decile (N=37) of firms with the highest clean patent intensity as a robustness check.18
19
3.5 Results
We present most of our results in graphs showing the event path over three time win-
dows: (a) the ten days (2-trading weeks) prior to the beginning of the negotiations of
the Paris Agreement (pre-negotiation period). (b) the ten day negotiation period, and
(c) the ten days following the agreement (post-negotiation period). To assess the ro-
bustness of event study results, it is important to show that the portfolios of firms are
not systematically different from the market prior to the treatment (in particular in the
pre-negotiation window). Across the different portfolios, we observe that the abnormal
returns prior to the passing of the agreement are not significantly different from zero.
The Paris Agreement provides a fairly unique case, since information on the negotia-
tion progress was regularly released. This is mirrored in the event path, as we observe
an increase in the volatility during the negotiation window and in particular in the last
days prior to the passing of the agreement.
The uncertainty in the market matches anecdotal evidence from observers of the ne-
gotiation process. Heads of state were present in the first days and contributed to
optimism that the agreement could be passed. The early optimism shifted towards un-
16For a detailed account of the data see Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2017)
17We allow for a slightly larger time period compared to the green revenue and emissions intensity
data since we are using a stock measure of clean patents and since patents might require some time to
be reflected in firms’ products, production processes or other tangible outputs. Also, many firms do not
file a (clean) patent each year, which prevents us from using a single year to define the quantiles.
18This sample of firms with the highest clean patent intensity has an average share of clean to total
patents granted of 0.67. Hence, on average more than half of their granted patents are green.
19Unfortunately, there is no good equivalent to the clean YO2 classification for dirty patents. Deche-
zlepreˆtre et al. (2017) started developing such a classification, which however only covers a narrow
subset of sectors and firms. Due to ambiguity on the classification of dirty patents and the small number
of listed firms with that classification, we decided against using it for our analysis.
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certainty in the last three trading days (Wednesday to Friday). The negotiations had to
be extended, which increased uncertainty (See Section 3.3 for details). The agreement
was then eventually passed on Saturday 12 December. The first trading day after the
agreement was Monday 14 December 2015, which is our first post-treatment day.
We present our results first for ‘green’ firms based on the green revenue variable. This
is followed by the robustness check using clean patent data. Subsequently, we show
our results based on emissions-intensity of firms. All main results are reported using
the nonparametric Corrado (1989) rank test with the aggregation approach by Cowan
(1992) for cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs). As robustness checks and
to quantify the overall magnitude of the effect, we also report the CAARs for the entire
post event window (days 0-5) in Figures C.6 and C.7 in Appendix C.7. As further
robustness checks we use the (Boehmer et al., 1991) BMP and (Kolari and Pynnonen,
2010) KP parametric test statistic (See Figures C.8 and C.9 in Appendix C.8 for results
with BMP tests and Figures C.10 and C.11 in Appendix C.9 for results with KP tests).
Average abnormal returns (AARs) are reported in Figures C.12 and C.13 in Appendix
C.10.
3.5.1 Abnormal returns of green firms
As outlined above, we divide firms for each of our datasets into deciles. Our main
specification is the top 30% of green firms (top 3 deciles). These firms have a green
revenue share of between 97-100%. We also examine separately the effect on those
firms, which have one hundred percent green revenue share. To further examine the
intensive margin of the effect we examine the effect for different decile groupings
individually.
For the greenest firms we observe 3-day ‘rolling’ cumulative average abnormal returns
(CAARs) of around 6% in the days following the agreement (Figure 3.2). These cap-
ture the moving 3-day average returns around the respective median day.20 The effect
persist for approximately five days following the agreement. The confidence intervals
show the higher volatility or variance in the returns in the days prior to passing the
agreement. The uncertainty is then released on the first trading day, when the con-
fidence intervals become much narrower. The abnormal returns then gradually level
off again, so that they are not any more significantly different from zero in the second
week following the agreement. The effect exists similarly for the subsample of firms
with 100% green revenues (CAARs of 6-7%) (Figure 3.3a). When also including the
20An advantage of using ‘rolling’ 3-day average returns is that it allows us to incorporate partial
anticipation into the effects, as suggested by Sen and von Schickfus (2019). It furthermore allows for
more flexibility compared to the commonly used 5-day intervals.
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top 4th decile to examine the top 40% of green firms, we observe significant returns
of around 4-5% (Figure 3.3b). We can also examine just the median green firms (with
a green revenue value between 25-42%) (Figure 3.3c). The effect remains significant
with CAARs around 2-3%. Lastly, we also take a more conservative robustness check
and examine the effect for all firms which have generated at least some positive green
revenue share (> 0%) between 2009-13. We observe significant CAARs of around 2%
for this sample of 249 firms (Figure 3.3d). Across all models we observe that using
the BMP test statistics instead of the Corrado test tends to result in smaller standard
errors and more pronounced significance of effects (see Figure C.8 in the Appendix).
Using the KP statistic instead, we observe that the standard errors increase relative
to the main specification. We however still observe significant effects (at 5%) across
the different portfolios (see Figure C.10 in the Appendix). Thus, overall we observe
a clear effect, showing that green firms have significantly outperformed the market in
the week following the Paris Agreement.
The significant abnormal returns imply a level change in firms market value following
the Paris Agreement. To assess the quantity of the effect, we use the (non-rolling) cu-
mulative average abnormal returns over the entire post event window [0,5] (in line with
Oberndorfer et al., 2013). From the previous results we have seen that the effect per-
sists for about five days following the agreement. Therefore, we use this window size
to quantify the entire magnitude of the effect. Using this wider window also provides
a more conservative robustness check in terms of significance of the coefficients. If for
instance the true effect for a particular sub-sample only exists for the first two days,
then the likelihood of a type 2 error increases, as we average over a wider time win-
dow.21 In this entire post-event window following the Paris Agreement the greenest
firms (top 3 deciles and firms with 100% GR) experienced nearly 10% significantly (at
5%) higher returns (Figures C.6a and C.6b). For the conservative sample of 249 firms
with any green revenue, we still observe significantly (at 5%) higher average returns
of nearly 3% over this entire post-event window C.6e. The effect is also significant for
the top 40% of green firms, which observe 8% higher returns. For the median decile of
green firms the effect is only marginally significant, showing nearly 2% higher returns.
The decline in significance may partly arise because of the relatively small sample size
of the median decile (N=22) in combination with the wider averaging compared to the
main results.22
The effects imply that on average the market capitalisation23 of the firms in the 3
greenest deciles increased by 10% following the Paris Agreement, relative to the over-
21The type 2 error captures the likelihood of failing to reject a false null hypothesis (of no difference).
22The effect is also significant (at 5%) for the sub-sample of the top 3 deciles excluding electricity
generation with 7% higher returns C.6f, which is discussed in more detail in the section 3.5.2.1.
23Market capitalisation is measured as (share price * number of outstanding shares)
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all market. On average these firms have a market capitalisation of 2 billion USD (Table
C.1). Hence, the market capitalisation of the greenest firms increased on average by
approximately 200 million USD following the Paris Agreement and compared to the
overall market. This is equivalent to a relative increase in market capitalisation of ap-
proximately 12.6 billion USD across these firms. The larger sample of 249 firms with
any positive green revenue share has an average market capitalisation of 6 billion USD.
With a 3% higher return over the entire post-treatment period, the market capitalisa-
tion of such firms increased by approximately 180 million USD, compared to before
the agreement, and relative to the overall market. Over the 249 firms this is equivalent
to an increase in market capitalisation of approximately 45 billion USD compared to
the overall market.24 These effects are both statistically significant and economically
meaningful.
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Rolling 3-day CAARs for top 3 Green Deciles of US Firms (N=63) (Green Revenue 97-100%) (with 95% Corrado CI)
Figure 3.2: Event Path for top 30% green firms (top 3 deciles)
While from the above graphs, we can already observe that portfolios with a higher
green revenue share observe larger abnormal returns, we can test whether the returns
are significantly different from another. Table 3.1 shows the results of the t-tests com-
paring CAARs over the entire post-event window (days 0-5). In particular we compare
the returns of the two greenest samples (portfolio of firms in the top 3 deciles, and firms
with a 100% green revenue share) to the firms in the top 40%, to the median decile, and
the conservative group of firms with any green revenue share. Across all six combi-
nations we observe highly significant differences with the greenest firms experiencing
significantly higher abnormal returns than the other three groups. Therefore, we con-
clude that we observe not only an extensive, but also an intensive margin effect. Firms
24For comparison, the overall market capitalisation of all domestic US companies was approximately
25 trillion USD over the same time period. The increase of 45 billion USD is therefore roughly equiva-
lent to a 0.2% increase of the overall US market capitalisation (The World Bank, 2019). It is important
to note that this provides a back-of-the-envelope calculation and denotes the relative increase in market
capitalisation compared to the overall market.
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(a) Event Path for firms with 100% Green Revenue
in 2013)
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(b) Top 40% green firms (top 4 deciles)
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(c) Median (5th) decile of green firms
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(d) Any green revenue (>0) between 2009-13
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Figure 3.3: Event Paths for portfolios consisting of firms with different green revenue intensity
(intensive margin)
with high green revenue shares have outperformed not only the overall market, but also
firms with lower green revenue shares.
3.5.2 Robustness Checks for Green Firms
3.5.2.1 Excluding Electricity Generation
We are concerned that the effects might be driven by renewable energy generation,
which may be a unique sector due to sector-specific subsidies and other support mea-
sures. Electricity generating firms (US SIC 491) also form the largest group of ap-
proximately 18% in our sample. (See Figure C.2)25. Hence, as a robustness check, we
exclude electricity generating firms from the analysis. Figure 3.4 shows that the effect
persists when excluding electricity generation and shows significant abnormal returns
25The sector distribution at the 2-digit SIC code level is shown in Figure C.1
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Sample	(a)	 Mean	(Std.	Dev.)	(CAAR	[0;5]	 Difference	tested	with	respect	to	sample	(b)	
Mean	(CAAR	[0;5])		
Two-sided		t-test	and	(p-value)	 One-sided	t-test	Sample(a)	>	Mean(b)	
Sample	with	Green	Revenue	=100%	
10.81	(2.34)	 Any	Green	Revenue	(>0)	 2.98	 3.34	***	(0.0016)	 	(0.008)***	
10.81	(2.34)	
Deciles	5-7	of	most	Green	firms	(Green	Revenue	range	(25-96%)	
3.83	 2.98	***	(0.004)	 	(0.002)***	
10.81	(2.34)	 5th	Decile	(GR-range:	25-42%	 1.60	 3.93***	(0.0003)	 	(0.0001)***	
Sample	Top	30%	green	(deciles	8-10)	(GR-range	97-100%)	
9.22	(1.96)	 Any	Green	Revenue	(>0)	 2.98	 3.19***	(0.002)	 	(0.001)***	9.22	(1.96)	 Deciles	5-7	of	most	Green	firms	(Green	Revenue	range	(25-96%)	
3.83	 2.75	***	(0.008)	 	(0.004)***	
9.22	(1.96)	 5th	Decile	(GR-range:	25-42%	 1.60	 3.93***	(0.0003)	 	(0.0001)***		
Table 3.1: T-test to test difference in intensive GR-margin for CAAR [0;5]
of around 4-5%.26 The results are still also marginally significant when excluding all
public utilities Electricity, Gas, and Sanitary Services (SIC 49), which however reduces
the sample size substantially (see Figure C.3 in the Appendix).
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Figure 3.4: Event Path of top 30% green firms excluding Electricity Generation
26We report all robustness-checks, which cover only certain sectors with both 90% and 95% confi-
dence intervals. This allows us to also report marginal significance in particular when the portfolio size
becomes small.
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Figure 3.5: Abnormal Returns of top decile of firms with the highest clean patent intensity.
3.5.2.2 Clean Patent Data
We might be concerned that unobservable particularities of the data might be driving
our results. As a robustness check we use use clean patent data, to verify that an
effect exists for firms with a high share of clean innovation activity. Even though
green revenues and clean patents capture different stages of firms’ innovation in green
technologies, we would expect at least the same sign on the effect for firms with a
high intensity of clean patents. It is interesting to note that only 3 firms overlap the
subsamples of the top green firms and the top clean patenting firms. Hence, any similar
effect is not just an artefact of capturing the same firms. Figure 3.5 shows that a
significant positive effect exists with CAARs of around 2-3% for the top decile of
clean patenting firms. While clean patents are a different and potentially a less precise
estimator of firms’ involvement in the green economy, we see qualitatively similar
results for the firms with the highest clean patent shares.
3.5.3 Abnormal returns of emissions-intensive firms
As a next step we examine whether the Paris Agreement also resulted in abnormal
returns for portfolios of highly emissions-intensive firms. Ex-ante we might expect
the opposite sign of an effect. With growing ambition on climate change mitigation
emissions-intensive firms might experience declining market shares or even stranding
of their assets. This might apply to both their physical assets such as fossil reserves as
well as intangible assets such as knowledge stocks. However, we have also observed
political measures to compensate emissions-intensive firms for example in Germany
to dampen losses from a coal phase-out (e.g. Sen and von Schickfus, 2019). Abnormal
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returns for the most emissions-intensive firms might provide insight into investors’
perception of the credibility that the Paris Agreement will result in drastic emission
cuts from phasing out emissions-intensive fossil fuels.
On average, across the most-emissions intensive firms we do not observe significant
abnormal returns following the agreement (Figure 3.6). Yet, interestingly the agree-
ment seems to have introduced a substantial degree of variability in returns for highly
emissions intensive firms, as seen by the large increase in the confidence intervals
around the event date (Figures 3.6a, 3.6c, and 3.6e). This suggests that some firms
might have experienced highly positive returns, while others suffered negative returns.
We disentangle the effect by examining sector-specific returns. The distribution of
firms across sectors is different for scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. Scope 1 is heav-
ily dominated by electric, gas, and sanitary services, whereas Scope 2 shows a more
diverse spread across sectors (Figure 3.6b and 3.6d).
In particular we disaggregate the effect for scope 1 emissions by the largest sectors.
Scope 1 emissions are arguably easier to measure and more salient compared to scope
2 emissions. We do not observe any significant sector-specific effects for scope 2
emissions, which are therefore omitted from the results.27 Within the portfolio of the
scope 1 most emissions-intensive firms we begin by isolating the effect of electricity
generating firms, as the largest sector. Interestingly, for this group of firms we ob-
serve small positive and marginally significant effects (Figure 3.7a). On the contrary,
the effect for the most emissions-intensive firms in oil and gas extraction (the second
largest sector) is negative and marginally significant (Figure 3.7b). Similarly, when
excluding all public utilities (Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services), the effect is nega-
tive and marginally significant (Figure 3.7c). Hence, electricity generating firms and
public utilities appear to play a special role and behave significantly different to other
emissions-intensive firms. Again, we observe smaller standard errors when using the
BMP test statistic so that the effects for the sector-specific sub-samples become signifi-
cant at 5% (Figure C.9 in the Appendix). We also observe significant abnormal returns
for the aggregate sample of the top decile of emissions intensive firms (scope 2). Since
this effect is however insignificant when using the Corrado or the KP test statistics, we
do not consider it to be a robust finding. When using the KP test, the standard errors
tend to increase across models. We still observe some marginal significance for the
sub-sample of electric services firms and after excluding all utilities. The previously
marginally significant results for the oil and gas firms are however not significant any
27It might be difficult for investors to assess the effect on firms that are highly reliant on electricity.
However, it might also be the case that these firms will become automatically less carbon intensive, as
the overall electricity grid shifts to renewables. It could be argued that firms, which purchase electricity
from the grid might only be affected if the electricity price changes substantially as a result of a shift
to renewables. Yet, the sharp decline in the costs of renewables that have in parts already made them
competitive with fossil fuel electricity might mitigate such concerns for investors.
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more (Figure C.11 in the Appendix). Since these findings are also only marginally
significant in the main specification using the Corrado test, they should be interpreted
with caution.
The results for the entire post-event window (days 0-5) show that the standard errors
increase, as we are averaging over a longer time period (See Figure C.7 in the Ap-
pendix). This is particularly the case for the smaller industry-specific sub-samples.
While, the signs of the coefficients remain the same, the effects are not statistically
significant anymore. We therefore do not quantify the magnitude of the effects since
they are not significantly different from zero for the entire post-event window.
Using the FTSE Russell Green Revenue database, we further investigate the electric-
ity generating firms that are among the most emissions intensive firms, but experi-
ence positive abnormal returns after the Paris Agreement. We observe that all of these
firms, even though they are highly emissions intensive, are also engaged in green tech-
nologies, largely in renewable electricity generations. Many firms even have substan-
tial revenue shares from renewable energy generation. The subsample of the most
emissions-intensive (scope 1) firms has a mean of 7% and maximum of 35% in the
conservative minimum green revenue variable. All of the firms in this subsample, are
active in at least one green subsegment as defined by FTSE Russell.28 This finding
suggests that for electricity generating firms with mixed portfolios of highly carbon
intensive fuels as well as renewable shares, the latter appears to be particularly valued
by investors. Investors might anticipate that it could be easier for electricity generating
firms to shift from carbon-intensive to renewable electricity generation compared to
other sectors in the economy.
3.6 Evidence in Support of Event Study Assumptions
A fundamental condition for event studies is the existence of surprise. If the event was
perfectly anticipated we would not expect to see any abnormal returns, as the event
would already be priced into the market. To establish surprise for the Paris Agreement
being passed in its final form, we make use of data on future contracts from the S&P
500 and the S&P 500 Energy Futures. It is possible that the Paris Agreement intro-
duced overall uncertainty in the market, leading to an increased demand for hedging
through futures. Only if the final agreement (or its precise wording) came as a surprise,
this would result in increased trading activity. We observe a substantial increase in the
trading volume of the S&P 500 Futures (Figure 3.8) and the S&P 500 Energy Futures
28Firms in this subsample might have a minimum green revenue share of 0 due to incomplete report-
ing of the precise revenue share from a particular green subsegment. Yet, for all firms in this subsample
the analysts have identified a green subsegment, in which the firm is active.
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(c) Event Path Scope 2
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(e) Event Path Scope 1 & 2
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(f) Sector composition Scope 1 & 2
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Firms are divided by 2-digit US SIC codes. The codes cover the following sectors. (1) Agricultural Products - Crops, (10) Metal Mining, (12)Bituminous Coal and Lignite
Mining, (13) Oil and Gas Extraction, (14) Mining and Quarrying of Nonmet. Minerals, (20) Food and Kindred Products, (22) Textile Mill Products, (24) Lumber and Wood
Products, (26) Paper and Allied Products, (28) Chemicals and Allied Products, (29) Petroleum Refining , (30) Rubber and Misc. Plastic Products, (32) Stone, clay, glass,
concrete products, (33) Primary Metal Industry, (34) Fabricated Metal Products, (35) Indust. and Commercial Machinery, (36) Electronic and other Electrical Equipm., (40)
Railroad Transport, (42) Motor Freight Transport and Warehousing, (44) Water Transport, (45) Transport by Air, (48) Communications, (49) Electric, Gas, Sanitary
Services, (50) Wholesale Trade - durable goods, (58) Eating and Drinking Places, (61) Non-depos. credit inst., (65) Real Estate, (67) Holding and other Invest. Offices, (70)
Hotels and other Lodging, (73) Business Services, (79) Amusement and Recreation Services, (82) Educational Services
Figure 3.6: Abnormal returns of 10% most emissions intensive firms (Panel (a), (c) & (e) and
the respective sectoral distribution (Panel (b), (d) & (f))
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(a) Electric Services
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(b) Oil and Gas Extraction
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(c) Excluding Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
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Figure 3.7: Event Paths for specific sectors (among the 10% most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1))
(Figure C.4 in the Appendix) on and around Monday 14 December 2015. This sug-
gests that the final agreement surprised market participants. To show that the event was
of importance and did not go unnoticed, we use Google Trends as an additional (albeit
less robust) supporting evidence. Google Trends provides a measure of the relative
frequency of searches for a specific keyword by week and region. It shows that the
spike in searches for the term “Paris Agreement” occurred in the US in the week 13. -
19. December 2015, i.e. just after it was passed (See Figure C.5 in the Appendix). The
Google Trend statistics show spikes on dates, for which we would expect increased
searches for the term. We would be concerned if the line was flat or showed no spike
during the event study period. This would suggest that the event might not actually
have been of importance and was largely unnoticed. We have furthermore searched for
odds ratios from betting agencies, which may indicate the ex-ante perceived likelihood
of the agreement being passed. However, to the best of our knowledge odds ratios on
the likelihood of the agreement being passed are not available.
A further concern is that the abnormal returns might have occurred simply due to in-
creased media attention, which may have encouraged individuals to purchase ‘green’
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stocks. The effect might then not reflect a new ‘informed’ perception of the post-Paris
policy framework. Yet, we want to emphasise that in the US the vast majority of
stocks is owned by large scale investors rather than individuals. The latest available
data from 2010 shows that 67% of all common shares were owned by large institu-
tional investors (Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Blume and Keim, 2012) and has been
increasing continuously since the 1950s29. This limits the ability for (potentially unin-
formed) individuals who purchase shares because of the increased media coverage to
drive the substantial trends we observe across a number of relatively large portfolios.
We argue that it is unlikely that the effect is entirely driven by ‘uninformed’ individual
decision makers who simply purchased shares due to the increased media attention.
To fully resolve this concern, we would however require data on the actual volume
of individual stock market orders placed to buy or sell shares in the week following
the agreement. We would need to identify whether orders were placed by professional
investors or individuals. A significant change in the relative magnitude of shares pur-
chased by individuals compared to professional investors in the week following the
agreement could provide further insight. Yet, we are not aware of the availability of
such highly sensitive data.
For the validity of event studies it is also important that there were no other poten-
tially confounding events that might drive our results. We are particularly concerned
about events that effect green or emissions-intensive firms differently from the overall
market. Hence, we apply a news search using the Factiva database to investigate if
other events happened in the week following the agreement that could potentially con-
found and drive the results we observe. We look in particular for events or policy an-
nouncements that would be beneficial to low-carbon technologies or impact emissions-
intensive firms. We are relatively more concerned about any events that might effect
29Large institutional investors are defined as such when having more than 100 million USD under
management.
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firms in the same direction as the Paris Agreement, which would inflate our results. We
search for events using the keywords “climate”, “renewables”, or “emissions”. Similar
to Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) we find no significant events in the week following
the agreement that would affect our results.30
Lastly, we are concerned that more general policies or announcements might effect
our results in ways that are not immediately obvious and that might not be detectable
through keyword searches. Hence, we screen the most important general political and
business news events in the week following the agreement. In particular, we want to
mention two such events. First, in a widely expected move, the US Federal Reserve
increased its interest rate by 0.25 percentage points on 16 December 2015. While this
may be regarded as a positive signal, indicating that the US economy was growing
stronger, it also increased the cost of borrowing for firms and households (Applebaum
(2015), NYT). This event affected the entire market and hence is controlled for in our
identification strategy, assuming that it had no differential effect across firms. Second,
on the night from 15th to 16th December, the US Congress reached a deal to prevent
a year-end government shutdown (Snell and DeBonis (2015) (The Washington Post)).
This deal was reached as a compromise between the Obama White House and the
Republican-controlled Congress. The deal included a $1.1 trillion USD appropriations
package that would fund the federal government for the remainder of the 2016 fiscal
year. It also included a tax break package, costing approximately $650 billion USD
covering a large range of about 50 different credits for businesses and individuals.
In addition, the bill also lifted a ban on crude oil exports. The effect of lifting the ban
would, if anything, work in the opposite direction from what we observe for emissions-
intensive firms in oil and gas extraction. The deal also included an extension of tax
breaks for wind and solar energy producers for five years. The extension of the tax
breaks for solar and wind industry could potentially inflate our results. However, these
specific deductions were a relatively small part of the overall deal, which included
among others state- and local sales tax deductions for businesses, which would have
effected the overall market. The industry-specific extensions in tax breaks covered only
a small set of renewable energy industries. Since our results also hold when excluding
electricity generating firms, we are not concerned that this deal is driving our results.
30Mukanjari and Sterner (2018) state that on 16 December 2015, news articles on record highs of
global temperature as well on solar energy were published. They conclude however that none of the
news coverage on these topics was of a sufficient magnitude or direct importance. We come to the same
conclusion from our key word search.
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3.7 Discussion
The paper shows that international climate agreements, even if based on voluntary
emission pledges, actually matter for financial markets. More specifically we show
that financial markets reward the production of “green” goods and services following
the Paris Agreement.
With this paper we contribute to the literature on the relationship between firms’ en-
vironmental and economic performance. Previous studies have largely been limited
to extensive margin effects using binary indicators (e.g. inclusion in a sustainability
index, adoption of environmental certification) or have examined efficiency improve-
ments in production processes. We are able to overcome some of the limitations by
using a novel dataset capturing the share of firms’ revenues being ‘produced’ from
green goods and services. Few papers have analysed the so called “revenue channel”.
It suggests that firms’ can improve their economic performance by shifting their busi-
ness activities towards producing green goods and services (Ambec and Lanoie, 2008).
Existing studies on the revenue channel have largely been limited to correlations using
cross-sectional or panel regressions. This is to the best of our knowledge the first paper
to identify a plausibly causal effect from firms’ production of green goods and services
on their market valuation. To identify this effect we use event study methodology and
exploit the large, discrete and plausibly exogenous shift in reward for being green, fol-
lowing the Paris Agreement. We are able to show that both the extensive as well as the
intensive margin of firms’ green revenue share matter for investors.
In particular, we show that ‘green’ firms, which are defined as generating a share of
their revenue from producing green goods and services, have significantly outper-
formed the market in the week following the Paris Agreement. The results are both
statistically significant and economically meaningful. We identify a level shift in green
firms’ market capitalisation following the agreement. The sample of the greenest firms
observed on average 10% higher returns for the post-event period (days 0-5) compared
to the overall market. This is roughly equivalent to a relative increase of approximately
200 million USD in market capitalisation per firm, or a total relative increase of 12.6
billion USD in market capitalisation across the 63 greenest firms. The aggregate effect
is even larger for the entire sample of 249 green firms (with any green revenue share
> 0%), which account together for an increase in market capitalisation of approxi-
mately 45 billion USD relative to the overall market, following the Paris Agreement.
Our results hold both at the extensive and intensive margin of firms’ ‘green’ revenue
shares. Firms with high green revenue shares have significantly outperformed not only
the overall market, but also firms with lower green revenue shares. Furthermore, we
show that the overall results are not limited to electricity generation, the largest sector,
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which may be unique due to energy-specific subsidies. Investors seem to evaluate the
post-Paris policy landscape as opening up further potential for firms producing green
goods and services, and for the diffusion and adoption of green technologies.
In contrast to green revenues, firms’ emissions-intensity is a less clear-cut predictor
of investors’ reaction to the Paris Agreement. On aggregate the most emissions in-
tensive firms have not observed significant abnormal returns following the agreement.
Yet, the sectoral disaggregation of the most emissions intensive firms (scope 1) re-
veals an interesting pattern. We observe negative (marginally significant) abnormal
returns in particular for oil and gas extracting firms and for all sectors excluding util-
ities. Such negative returns may reflect the anticipated challenges for firms in these
sectors to adjust their business model to the post-Paris policy landscape. It could also
reflect an increasing risk of ‘asset stranding’, as firms’ carbon-intensive physical or
intellectual assets become less valuable. Interestingly, the most emissions-intensive
electricity generating firms seem to be valued differently. They have experienced pos-
itive (marginally significant) abnormal returns following the agreement. Merging the
green revenue and emissions-intensity databases we are able to see that all of the most-
emissions intensive electricity generating firms are also active in ‘green’ sectors, with
on average 7% (and a range up to a maximum of 35%) of their revenue being generated
from such activities, mostly from renewable electricity generation. For such partially
green and dirty firms, investors may face trade-offs regarding the relative valuation of
the two components. The positive abnormal returns might suggest that investors an-
ticipate the transition to low-carbon technologies to be easier for electricity generating
firms relative to the overall market, and in particular relative to oil and gas firms.
Investors’ responses to the Paris Agreement may be systematically different from their
response to more common events such as earnings announcements, which occur fre-
quently and in a standardised format. Investors had to absorb a large amount of infor-
mation that was contained in the agreement. Moreover, the relative stringency of the
agreement had to be understood by assessing the level of ambition of individual Na-
tionally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Since the agreement relies on voluntary
emission reductions, the political interpretation in the days following the agreement
became important. Absorbing such a complex set of information might therefore be
different from reacting to more common and standardised stock market events such as
earnings announcements (e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). We observe a gradual onset of the
effects in the week following the agreement. This is in line with findings showing that
large and complex amounts of information may overwhelm investors and slow their
reactions to a particular event because of limited cognitive attention (Hirshleifer et al.,
2009)31. Our results show that abnormal returns existed for about a week following
31Hirshleifer et al. (2009) show that on days when a large number of announcements are made
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the agreement. Thus, it appears that the market needed approximately this amount of
time to fully price and absorb the effects of the agreement.
The positive abnormal returns for green firms suggest that the post-Paris policy land-
scape may be able to open up growing opportunities for green goods and services.
This may allow for some optimism with respect to the increasing diffusion and adop-
tion of low-carbon and green technologies. The non-existence of significantly neg-
ative results for the overall sample of emissions-intensive firms is however a more
cautionary finding. The agreement in itself may not be sufficient to exert pressure
on emissions-intensive firms and sectors. It may be due to the voluntary nature of
the reduction pledges or potentially because of anticipated compensation measures for
carbon-intensive firms. Given the drastic emission cuts that are required to limit global
warming to well below 2◦C, the results reinforce the urgency and importance of the
gradual strengthening of the NDCs. The Paris Agreement could then potentially de-
liver the necessary policy framework to increase the diffusion and adoption of green
and low-carbon technologies, while at the same time decarbonising existing technolo-
gies and industries.
by different firms investors tend to under-react to individual firms’ earnings announcements. Hence
investors can also be overwhelmed by a large amount of standardised events.
138
Chapter 4
Understanding Public Support for
International Climate Adaptation
Payments: Evidence from a Choice
Experiment.
Abstract
Climate change adaptation is becoming increasingly important even if all nationally
determined contributions of the Paris Agreement are implemented. However, funding
for climate adaptation in developing countries remains scarce. Increasing and main-
taining public support for such long-term projects is crucial to achieve acceptance, to
ensure willingness-to-pay over a longer time horizon, and to avoid policy reversal. It is
therefore important to understand perceptions of and preferences for international cli-
mate adaptation finance among individuals in donor countries. Previous research has
shown that in particular distributional outcomes of policies determine their overall ac-
ceptability. Using a representative sample of the UK population this is to the best of our
knowledge the first paper to provide comprehensive evidence of distributional prefer-
ences in the context of adaptation finance. We primarily elicit preferences with regards
to two dimensions: (1) the burden-sharing principle among contributors, and (2) the
distribution of financial resources across projects. We show that, contrary to mitigation
policies, residents prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach over the ‘polluter-pays-principle’
for climate adaptation policies. Hence, we would expect that using carbon pricing to
collect revenues for a climate adaptation fund would receive less support compared to a
progressive fee based on income. With respect to the second dimension, we show that
UK residents have distributional preferences for funds to reach the poorest individuals.
This finding supports the adoption of egalitarian policy mandates among international
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climate adaptation funds. Lastly, our results suggest that adopting a communication
strategy that focuses on future benefits to UK residents from contributing to interna-
tional adaptation funds can increase support for such policies. Overall our findings
also reveal that public support for global climate adaptation payments remains vastly
insufficient in light of the overall financing requirements. Further research is required
to identify policy characteristics and framings that can increase public support.
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4.1 Introduction
Climate change adaptation is gaining traction and is becoming increasingly impor-
tant. Even if the international community succeeds in limiting climate change to 1.5
or 2.0◦C warming, climate change adaptation will be necessary, particularly in devel-
oping countries. Given the current gap between the required emission reductions and
the submitted Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), climate change adapta-
tion will likely become an enormous task. An estimated 100 billion US dollars will
be required annually at least until 2050 to help developing countries adapt to the neg-
ative consequences of climate change (IBRD/The World Bank, 2010). The financial
resources will need to be mobilised largely from developed countries. Ensuring pub-
lic support for such long-term projects is important to obtain sustained acceptance,
to ensure willingness-to-pay over a longer time horizon, and to avoid policy rever-
sal. It is therefore essential to have a good understanding of public perceptions of and
preferences for international climate adaptation finance among individuals in donor
countries. Better knowledge of such preferences can advise policy design and help
anticipate potential challenges (e.g. Hovi et al., 2009).
This paper draws upon the related literature on public acceptance for climate change
mitigation policies, which has identified key policy characteristics that tend to in-
crease public support. While the policy effectiveness and the overall costs are essential
drivers, the distributional outcomes tend to play a fundamental role in determining if
a policy receives sufficient public support (Drews and van den Bergh, 2016; Carat-
tini et al., 2017a). Our knowledge of preferences for climate adaptation policies is
however very limited.
In this paper we take a systematic approach to build upon the related mitigation litera-
ture to derive novel insight for climate adaptation policies. With respect to preferences
for distributional outcomes of policies we examine two main elements. First, we exam-
ine the preferred burden-sharing between individuals in donor countries, which relates
to questions of responsibility. Linking individual payments to emissions through a
carbon tax for instance, suggests a more direct responsibility arising from one’s own
emissions in line with a ‘polluter-pays-principle’. Alternative policy approaches could
adopt an ‘ability-to-pay’ principle, in which individuals contribute proportional to their
income or an ‘equal-spares approach’ that equally divides responsibility across all in-
dividuals.
Second, the allocation of scarce financial resources across projects will imply diffi-
cult moral judgements concerning the relative benefits of individual projects. Trade-
offs between utilitarian approaches (protecting the largest group of people) and equity
141
principles (protecting the most vulnerable) may arise (e.g. Le Grand, 1990, 1991).
Such trade-offs may occur in particular when additional basic infrastructure or ca-
pacity building is necessary to allocate financial resources to the most marginalised
communities. Knowledge about public preferences for the distribution of resources in
situations where moral judgements are inevitable can be an important factor, in par-
ticular to avoid or respond to public discontent of project outcomes and to minimise
concerns about wasteful use of public funds. While knowledge of such preferences is
not meant to replace expert judgement, it can support and complement the decision-
making. This is particularly important since existing (albeit scarce) evidence suggests
that adaptation institutions tend to allocate financial resources not to the most vulnera-
ble, but to projects with past experience, sufficient capacity to manage larger funds, and
already established aid workers (Barrett, 2014; Stadelmann et al., 2014). Requirements
to report tangible outcomes and fear of project failure may potentially encourage such
decision-making. Knowing public preferences for the allocation of adaptation funds
can help to manage such concerns. Since international contributions are likely going
to be insufficient to support all communities threatened by climate change, it is impor-
tant to develop decision-criteria, which allow an informed trade-off between projects
in the context of scare resources. Having such transparent criteria may help to avoid
misallocation and preferential treatment for political reasons.
Using a representative sample of the UK population, this paper provides the first com-
prehensive evidence of distributional preferences in the context of climate adaptation
finance. We show that people prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach to a ‘polluter-pays-
principle’. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time this has been demonstrated
in the literature on climate adaptation. It may suggest that people do not see a strong
link between individual emissions and a potential responsibility to contribute to climate
adaptation payments. This is an important finding as it contrasts with results from the
literature on public acceptance of climate mitigation policies, where ‘polluter-pays-
principles’ typically increase public support (Atkinson et al., 2000; Dietz and Atkin-
son, 2010; Carattini et al., 2017a,b). We would therefore expect that using a carbon
price to collect financial resources for an adaptation fund would receive relatively less
public support compared to establishing a climate adaptation fee proportional to in-
come levels. With respect to the allocation of scarce financial resources across projects
we observe that individuals in the UK have distributional preferences with respect to
allocating financial resources to the most vulnerable. We observe that purely utilitar-
ian approaches are expected to be less popular compared to more egalitarian principles
that allocate financial resources based on initial levels of vulnerability.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 gives a detailed
overview of the existing literature and the motivation for the study. In Section 4.3 we
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adopt a systematic approach for the choice experiment attribute selection and elaborate
on our survey design. Section 4.4 describes the methodology of Multinomial Logit,
Random Parameter Logit, and Latent Class Models, which we apply in the analysis.
In Section 4.5 we present the results of the choice experiment and the accompanying
survey. Section 4.6 discusses the findings and concludes.
4.2 Literature Review and Motivation
We divide the existing literature on this topic into three different sub-sections to give a
detailed and systematic overview of the different research fields to which we contribute
in this paper:
4.2.1 The Allocation of Climate Adaptation Resources
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and The World
Bank estimate the global costs to help developing countries adapt to climate change at
USD70-100 billion per year between 2010 and 2050 (IBRD/The World Bank, 2010).
Similarly, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC,
2007b) estimates the required investment to be between USD 44-166 billion per year
globally and USD27-67 billion in developing countries alone (see e.g. Barr et al., 2010;
Fankhauser, 2010; Parry et al., 2009, for a detailed review). Building upon these esti-
mates, the international community called for developed countries to allocate financial
resources to help developing countries adapt to climate change, beginning with the Bali
Action Plan in 2007 (UNFCCC, 2007a). Two years later in the Copenhagen Accord
the international community first agreed upon the target to spend USD100 billion per
year from 2020 onwards to address climate change related needs of developing coun-
tries. The target was further strengthened in the Cancun Agreements in 2010 where
the Green Climate Fund (GCF) was established to act as a key delivery mechanism. It
was subsequently incorporated into the Paris Agreement, in which countries pledged
to provide USD100 billion per year by 2020 for both adaptation and mitigation sup-
port in developing countries (see e.g. Klo¨ck et al., 2018). In the Paris Agreement the
international community also agreed to raise the target after 2025 and decided that
funding would come from a wide variety of sources including public, private, bilateral
and multilateral sources (Westphal et al., 2015). Since the most recent international
pledges from the Paris Agreement include both adaptation and mitigation support,
they are considered a lower bar and are likely insufficient compared to the necessary
financial support for climate change adaptation alone (Fankhauser, 2010; UNFCCC,
2014, 2015; Buchner et al., 2017).
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The likely mismatch between financial pledges and the required financial support, as
well as challenges in mobilising the pledged amounts (Buchner et al., 2017), empha-
sise that a shortage for international climate adaptation payments is likely to exist in
the future. This raises normative questions of how international institutions such as the
Green Climate Fund (GCF) or the Adaptation Fund (AF) are going to allocate scarce
resources across projects. The current mandate of these funds is (a) to protect the most
vulnerable from the detrimental impacts of climate change, (b) to help them adapt to
climate impacts and (c) to increase their resilience to climate related events. It is how-
ever important to note that the adaptation funds do not have precise decision-criteria
on how to make trade-offs in allocating scarce resources across projects that impact
communities of different size and vulnerability (Horstmann, 2011). Thus, guidelines
on dealing with equity-efficiency trade-offs and the underlying distributional prefer-
ences are not explicitly defined within existing mandates. Moreover, recipient coun-
tries can apply their own definitions to classify individuals or groups as ‘vulnerable’.
This leaves room for interpretation and can induce favouritism for political or other
strategic reasons (e.g. Horstmann, 2011; Barrett, 2014; Stadelmann et al., 2014).
Fankhauser and Burton (2011) discuss the difficult trade-offs involved in adaptation
projects, building upon Stern (2008, 2009) who defines ‘good’ adaptation to be (1) ef-
ficient in achieving results at lowest costs, (2) effective in reducing negative impacts of
climate change, and (3) equitable in its distribution to target populations most worthy
of assistance. While these criteria provide an important foundation, their operational
implementation can be challenging in particular when trade-offs exist between the in-
dividual principles (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011). The existing evidence suggests
that such equity-efficiency trade-offs1 can arise in particular since additional techni-
cal assistance and additional capacity building tends to be required to manage projects
among the poorest or most vulnerable communities. Additional financial resources
may therefore be required to provide support for the management of large funds and
projects. Similarly, basic infrastructure such as roads or electricity grids may need
to be extended to such communities before adaptation infrastructure can be installed
(Barr et al., 2010; Barrett, 2014). The poorest individuals are at the same time more
exposed to climate induced events, are more vulnerable and have less formal or infor-
mal safety nets to prevent, prepare, and manage climate impacts and are therefore the
most dependent on outside support (Hallegatte et al., 2016).
Preliminary evidence on decision-making within adaptation funds suggests that they
tend to approve projects from communities with relatively higher incomes (Stadelmann
et al., 2014). In a study on the distribution of subnational adaptation finance in Malawi,
1See also Le Grand (1990) and Le Grand (1991) for discussions on equity-efficiency trade-offs in
public policy making
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Barrett (2014, p.131) finds that the “poorest, most marginalised, and climate vulnerable
districts receive the least adaptation finance”. The author argues that the existing dis-
tribution of adaptation funds does not support the larger goal of climate justice. Instead
donor utility and capacity to absorb the funds seem to drive the allocation. Adaptation
assistance seems to arrive in districts with sufficient capacity to manage the assistance
and where aid workers are already established. It does not seem to be invested to help
the most marginalised improve their ability to manage such assistance in the future.
Similarly, Stadelmann et al. (2014) analyse all 39 projects approved or endorsed by the
Adaptation Fund Board in 2011 and find that all projects rank relatively low on equity
metrics. They conclude that the fund approved projects from relatively high-income
and less vulnerable countries with the potential for relatively high absolute economic
gains, while not approving projects in the poorest and most vulnerable countries with
high relative (but lower absolute) economic gains.
Fankhauser and Burton (2011) identify the challenges that arise due to the desire for
‘additionality’ of adaptation finance and a preference for tangible and visible projects,
which can result in preferential project implementation in areas with sufficient capac-
ity. One of the most fundamental risks for progress on adaptation in developing coun-
tries is “evidence, or even suspicion that the funds are being diverted or used waste-
fully” (Fankhauser and Burton, 2011, p.1038). Multilateral institution might therefore
be overly risk-averse and prefer to implement ‘safer’ projects in communities with suf-
ficient capacity. They may direct funds not to the most vulnerable communities, but to
the safest projects. Perceived public preferences might play a relevant role in approval
decisions for adaptation projects. Since the public acceptance in donor countries is
an important determinant to ensure long-run support, understanding these preferences
is an important first step to obtain such support. Knowing public preferences can
help multilateral institutions in their decision-making process when faced with diffi-
cult moral judgements.
4.2.2 The Importance of Public Support for Policy Making and
Lessons from the Mitigation Literature
The responsiveness of government policy to citizens’ preferences is an important de-
bate within economics, political sciences and political theory. Basic economic theory
assumes a high degree of responsiveness of voters and politicians to questions of public
concern. This high level of responsiveness is largely built on the assumption of perfect
information among all agents in the public sphere. Building upon this stylised model,
the political economy literature has incorporated frictions through information- and
transaction costs, as well as through obstructions created by political interest groups
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(Page and Shapiro, 1983). Nevertheless, a strong impact of public opinion on policy
outcomes remains, even when the activities of political institutions and elites are ac-
counted for. This impact is enhanced when the issue is particularly politically salient
(Page and Shapiro, 1983; Burstein, 2003).
Knowledge about the public opinion helps to anticipate public responses in later stages
of the policy-cycle, which can inform the design and facilitate the implementation of
policies. This can help to improve long run public support for policies, and can pre-
vent frequent policy reversals. This is particularly important for policies dealing with
long-term issues such as climate change (Hovi et al., 2009; Drews and van den Bergh,
2016). Similarly, the lack of public support has been identified as a substantial bar-
rier to implement ambitious carbon mitigation policies (Geels, 2013; Wiseman et al.,
2013).2
A closely related field, on which we build in our attribute selection, is the literature on
public acceptance for climate mitigation policies. The literature has identified five key
attributes that drive public support: Perceived policy effectiveness, level of policy cost,
policy fairness, use of revenues, coerciveness of policy, and trust in the institutional
body implementing the policy (see e.g. Drews and van den Bergh, 2016; Carattini et al.,
2017b). In particular the distributional impacts of climate policy, as well as the under-
lying burden sharing principles appear to be crucial drivers for public support. The
public’s willingness-to-pay for a GHG mitigation policy tends on average to increase
if the payment mechanism is based on the ‘polluter-pays principle’ compared to other
principles such as ‘ability-to-pay’ or an ‘equal-shares principle’. This applies both at
the international level (i.e. the payment distribution between countries) (Bechtel and
Scheve, 2013) and at the national level (i.e. the payment distribution between individ-
uals) (Atkinson et al., 2000; Hammar and Jagers, 2007; Lee and Cameron, 2008; Dietz
and Atkinson, 2010). Policies are however also more likely to be accepted if poorer
individuals bear relatively less of the overall burden or are exempt (e.g. Gevrek and
Uyduranoglu, 2015; Carattini et al., 2017a). Preferences for a ‘polluter-pays principle’
and lower burdens for poorer individuals can therefore conflict at times (Atkinson et al.,
2000; Dietz and Atkinson, 2010). Thus, to reduce the impact on low-income house-
2This paper is also linked to the political economy literature emphasising the impact of institutions
and electoral systems for long-term policy making. A large body of literature highlights the importance
of the institutional set up to be able to deal with long-term issues such as climate change (Hovi et al.,
2009). One branch of that literature examines the importance of the number of veto players in a political
system for policy reversal. Fewer veto players in the political system tend to allow easier policy reversal,
making environmental policies potentially less credible (Lockwood et al., 2016). Furthermore, the liter-
ature on electoral competitiveness shows that a lack of political competition is significantly associated
with higher taxes and lower capital spending. Hence, the overall competitiveness of an electoral system
or even a particular election can affect the likelihood of implementing additional environmental taxes
(Besley et al., 2010; Finnegan, 2018). These institutional factors are all likely to impact individuals’
preferences. The implicit assumption of the literature on public support for climate policy is that these
factors are constant at the point of preference elicitation.
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holds, revenue-recycling mechanisms have been identified as popular policy charac-
teristics. Overall support also tends to increase when emphasising how the majority of
negative climate impacts will be borne by the world’s poor (see e.g. Cai et al., 2010;
Lee and Cameron, 2008). In general the literature on climate mitigation has shown
that the distribution of financial resources and the burden sharing appear to be highly
salient attributes.
We build upon this insight and examine in detail distributional dimensions within the
context of global adaptation payments, which may differ systematically from preferred
mitigation policy designs. In particular the perceived link between individuals’ emis-
sions and their responsibility to pay may be different. Moreover, revenues cannot be
recycled nationally, which makes it more difficult to communicate and create tangi-
ble benefits to individuals contributing to the policy. Lastly, the resource transfer to
other countries may systematically alter preferences for contributions. We explain our
choice of distributional dimensions and attributes in detail in Section 4.3.
4.2.3 Insufficient Public Support for Climate Adaptation Trans-
fers
This paper is in line with recent work by O’Garra and Mourato (2016) who use a con-
tingent valuation survey to provide an assessment of public willingness-to-pay in the
UK for international climate adaptation transfers. They estimate that a yearly payment
of £70-100 per capita will be required to meet the UK’s share of the global target of
£70 billion (or roughly 100 billion USD in 2016). While this is a first back-of-the-
envelope estimation it provides insight into the order-of-magnitude of payments that
is required. They observe that current willingness-to-pay is vastly insufficient (mean
of £27; median of £6), representing less than one third of what the authors estimate
to be necessary. Moreover, they show that an emotive information treatment, which
appealed to respondents’ feelings and emphasised the scale and urgency of the chal-
lenge, did not have an effect on their WTP. It highlights the challenge to mobilise
sufficient public support for global climate adaptation payments. The contingent valu-
ation survey provides an important foundation and allows to establish an overall level
of willingness-to-pay. Using a choice experiment, we are however able to go beyond
the simple level of support and identify design features that may increase the public
acceptance for a climate adaptation levy and show potential trade-offs that may exist
between characteristics. We are also able to estimate the effects more robustly using
more advanced choice modelling methodology.
The literature on public acceptance for climate adaptation policies is still relatively
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small. In particular, most of the papers focus on strategic interactions between coun-
tries rather than on individual or household characteristics. Gampfer et al. (2014) test
the extent, to which individuals respond to fairness in the distribution of costs be-
tween countries. In line with expectations, they find that support increases with higher
burdens being allocated to other countries. Moreover, they find that climate adapta-
tion transfers receive more public support if they flow to more efficient governments,
funding decisions are made jointly by donor and recipient countries and if the funding
is used for joint mitigation and adaptation projects. They find however no effect on
support for attributes that capture the level of income, climate change damage levels
and the emissions of the recipient countries. This might however be a result of the
somewhat unclear attribute levels for income, which state that the income level in the
recipient country is ‘somewhat’ or ‘much’ lower than in the US, which might introduce
ambiguity. Bechtel and Scheve (2013) find that respondents are indifferent between a
polluter-pays-principle and an ability-to-pay approach at the country level, meaning
that they are indifferent between a policy design in which countries pay according to
their current emissions, their historic emissions or their income level. The most impor-
tant driver for policy preferences is the overall policy cost. In line with expectations
citizens are more likely to support costly policies if the burden is shared across a larger
group of countries. In addition they find that sanctions for non-compliant countries in-
crease policy support as well as compliance monitoring by an independent third party.
In addition to a systematic attribute selection, we also improve methodologically upon
the existing papers. Gampfer et al. (2014) do not use an individual payment attribute
and Bechtel and Scheve (2013) use the average cost to a household as their payment
attribute. However, for contingent valuation studies, as well as choice experiments
it is important that the payment mechanism is as credible as possible (Champ et al.,
2017). To reduce hypothetical bias and warm-glow it is important that respondents take
a decision with the knowledge of the direct costs to them as if the payment becomes
effective immediately. By using a more direct payment we try to reduce such known
biases. Furthermore, both studies use random designs for the choice experiment, in-
stead of the preferred Bayesian efficient design, which we employ in this study.
4.3 Attribute Selection and Survey Design
4.3.1 Systematic Attribute Selection
Since the literature on public acceptance of climate adaptation policies is still in its in-
fancy, the selection of policy attributes for choice experiments forms a major challenge
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and needs to be at least partly exploratory. Nevertheless, we tried to take a systematic
approach in our attribute selection, informed by the findings from the closely related lit-
erature on climate mitigation policies. Since climate adaptation is a multi-dimensional
and often less clearly defined concept, the precise selection of attributes can be less
straightforward. Hence, for this choice experiment, we had to make relative judge-
ments for each attribute between how realistic and important the attribute is within the
context of climate adaptation and how easy it is for a respondent to understand an at-
tribute’s meaning. It is important to not leave much room for individual interpretation
of an attribute’s meaning as this may distort overall findings by subjective perceptions
of the attribute (e.g. Champ et al., 2017). Such a trade-off can be illustrated for a policy
effectiveness attribute: One of the most important tasks of international climate adap-
tation payments is to increase the overall resilience of communities. Being resilient
may enable communities to deal with climate-induced shocks by themselves and may
reduce the overall impact. Resilience is however a complex and multi-dimensional
concept in itself. Using such an attribute in the choice experiment would increase the
cognitive burden for respondents and might lead to biased responses depending on
individual perceptions of the concept of resilience.
To select the relevant attributes for the choice experiment, we took a three-step ap-
proach, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. First, we list the attributes that have been identified
as most relevant in the context of climate mitigation policies. Second, we transfer the
meaning of these attributes to the context of climate adaptation policies. This step re-
veals the increased complexity of climate adaptation policies. For example, we now
need to consider the distributional dimension among the individuals paying and among
the individuals receiving transfers. In a third step we then conducted focus groups and
piloted the survey to test and select different attribute framings. After analysing the
results from two survey pilots and discussions in focus groups we decided on the final
set of attributes and their precise wording. The final attributes and levels included in
the choice experiment, as well as the underlying rationale for choosing these attributes
are summarised in Table 4.1.
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The two fundamental variables are the policy effectiveness and the policy cost, as
these also allow us to conduct ‘sanity’ checks on whether individual responses are
credible. We expect to see negative coefficients on the payment attribute and a positive
coefficient on the effectiveness attribute. Choosing a suitable attribute to capture the
effectiveness of an adaptation policy is however a challenging task. It is fundamen-
tally different from a similar task in the context of climate mitigation policies, where
typically emission reductions in absolute or relative terms are chosen. One possible
option is to choose a deliberately vague term such as ‘moderate increase in resilience’.
However, this leaves too much room for individual interpretation and the concept of
resilience might not mean the same to each respondent. Instead we build upon designs
used commonly in other fields such as health economics (Dolan and Tsuchiya, 2009;
Robson et al., 2017), transportation (Rheinberger, 2009; SWOF, 2012; Tsuge et al.,
2005), terrorism research (Viscusi, 2009), or landmine clearance (Gibson et al., 2007)
among others. These studies use the amount of ‘prevented deaths’ or actual ‘lives
lost’ to assess preferences for different policy measures. It allows us to use a clearly
quantifiable variable with as little ambiguity as possible on the precise meaning.
With respect to the distributional dimensions, we incorporate three different types of
policy characteristics as illustrated in Table 4.1. The first distributional dimension
refers directly to the distribution of benefits among eligible recipients and captures the
share of deaths prevented among the extremely poor. It allows us to contrast purely
utilitarian approaches which only value the total number of deaths prevented from
more egalitarian preferences, which might be concerned about the type of individuals
protected and their level of poverty. The second distributional dimension is informed
by the literature on co-financing and potential crowding-in or crowding-out of individ-
ual payments (e.g. Andreoni et al., 2014; Zhang and Maruyama, 2001). It suggests
that individuals’ willingness-to-pay can differ according to the contributions made by
others. A priori the effect of third party contributions on one’s own payment is am-
biguous. One side of the argument suggests that payments made by others can increase
the credibility of projects and can impose moral pressure to also contribute. This could
result in higher individual contributions compared to a case without third party in-
puts (crowding-in). The other side of the argument suggests that third party input can
reduce one’s own contributions, in particular when individuals think of a fixed total
amount that is required to meet a project target. In this case it may reduce individual
support (crowding-out). The relative strength of these effects may however be specific
to the policy context (see e.g. Andreoni et al., 2014; Zhang and Maruyama, 2001). In
particular we want to test the following two hypotheses: (1) Does an additional levy
on UK industries and businesses have a significant impact on individuals’ likelihood to
contribute? (2) Does making the adaptation payment conditional on an additional tax
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levied by the recipient government to also contribute to the project impact individuals’
support?
Our third distributional dimension captures the preferred payment principle for UK
individuals. In line with the existing literature we distinguish between an ‘ability-to-
pay’, a ‘polluters-pay’ and an ‘equal-shares’ principle (for a related application see
for example (Dietz and Atkinson, 2010)). This allows us to identify the preferred
policy design and to compare and contrast the results to findings in the related climate
mitigation literature.
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Attributes Levels 
 
Rationale for 
Attribute 
Total deaths prevented per 
year. 
10,000; 20,000;  40,000 
 
 
 
Distributional 
dimension 1: 
How are the 
payments 
distributed 
among 
recipients? 
 
Share of deaths prevented 
among the extremely poor. 
20%, 50%, 80% 
The project is conditional on 
local government in the 
recipient country to also raise 
taxes to contribute to the 
project. 
No (0), Yes (1),   
Distributional 
dimension 2: 
Co-financing: 
Who contributes 
apart from UK 
households?   
UK industries and businesses 
contribute as well through an 
additional levy. 
No (0), Yes (1) 
 
 
 
 
UK household payment 
scheme. 
(0) Every household pays the same 
amount. (Collected through an additional 
lump-sum household tax).  
(1) Households with higher carbon 
emissions from fuel consumption pay 
more. (Collected through and increase in 
fuel tax).  
(2) Households with higher income pay 
more. (Collected through a proportional 
increase in income tax). 
 
Distributional 
Dimension 3: 
How should the 
burdens be 
shared among 
UK households? 
Your yearly payment. £5, £20, £50, £70, £120 
 
/ 
	
Table 4.1: Attributes and Levels and Underlying Conceptual Meaning
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4.3.2 Information Treatment
As part of the choice experiment, we want to test to what extent the framing of the
issue can impact support for climate adaptation payments. From the literature on the
acceptance of climate mitigation policies, we know that direct benefits to the taxpayer
in the form of revenue recycling can significantly increase public support for a carbon
price for instance (Carattini et al., 2017b; Drews and van den Bergh, 2016) 3. Since the
literature on preferences for climate adaptation support is still relatively young, choos-
ing a particular framing perspective is exploratory in nature. Existing work has shown
that emotive language, appealing to the urgency of the problem, does not seem to have
an effect (O’Garra and Mourato, 2016). Informed by the climate mitigation literature
we decided to focus on potential benefits to the UK, rather than altruistic motives.4
In the case of climate adaptation payments, direct benefits to the UK taxpayer are not
immediately obvious. Such benefits can take the form of larger and more prosperous
markets to sell UK goods and services, more stable global food prices, as well as rel-
atively improved global stability and economic growth (e.g. HM Government, 2017;
UKCCC, 2017). Yet, in a choice experiment the researcher faces the trade-off between
providing a realistic scenario and one that is easily understandable for respondents.
The benefit therefore needs to be as tangible as possible.
We decided to use an assessment of the UK’s Security Forces, which identified climate
change as a potential threat to the UK’s national security (HM Government, 2015).
Much time was devoted to selecting the right phrasing of the information treatment.
Climate change can be a highly polarising topic. While more than 90% of people in
the UK believe that climate change is happening, only 36% believe that it is entirely
or mainly due to human activities. More than 50% believe that natural processes and
human activity cause it equally (Phillips et al., 2018). Hence, it is important to select
an institution that is respected within the population and not believed to have a vested
interest in commenting on climate change. Our decision was influenced by opinion
polls suggesting that the UK’s Security Forces enjoy a highly positive reputation and
are highly trusted by British nationals (YouGov, 2014).
To test potential framing effects we randomly divided participants into a treatment and
a control group. Individuals in the treated group saw an additional paragraph sum-
marising the assessment of the UK’s Security Forces. It states that climate change may
pose an additional risk to the UK’s national security and may exacerbate instability
overseas through resource stresses, migration, impacts on trade, and global economic
and food insecurity, which may result in violent conflict. The information treatment
3Revenue recycling typically takes the form of earmarking revenues to be re-paid to households
either inversely proportional to their income or in a lump sum amount.
4Limited funding only allowed us to use one information treatment and not to test multiple framings.
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furthermore states that international support to help countries adapt to the negative
impacts of climate change can reduce such negative effects.
4.3.3 Survey Design and Implementation
Focus groups and an initial survey design testing took place in October and November
2017. We went through extensive testing among colleagues before piloting the choice
experiment. We then conducted two separate (roughly representative) online pilots
with 100 respondents each. Feedback on the first pilot revealed that the colour coding
of the choice cards was potentially misleading (see Appendix D.1 for the final version
of an example Choice Card). We were concerned that respondents might interpret the
colour coding for the first two attributes incorrectly.5 Following the first pilot, we also
introduced a further comprehension question that tested whether respondents read the
choice card correctly, in particular the colour coding of the first two attributes. Based
on this improved design, a second online pilot was conducted in February 2018. It
appeared however that the additional comprehension question drew too much atten-
tion to the first two attributes, which meant that other attributes were neglected. This
observation illustrates that the researcher needs to make a relative judgement between
(a) ensuring that respondents understand the choice cards correctly and (b) priming
respondents to focus too much on a particular attribute which might not reflect their
true preferences. For the full survey, we decided to keep the improved colour cod-
ing, which makes the distinction between the different household groups clearer. We
decided however to drop the additional comprehension question to reduce priming-
concerns.6 The survey still contained two comprehension questions, which tested if
respondents had read and understood the overall scenario (See Appendix D.2 for the
Scenario).
Each respondent had to read the one-page scenario description, explaining the basic
concept of climate change and adaptation support for developing countries as agreed
by the Paris Agreement7. Each respondent was asked two comprehension questions,
5This involved mainly changing the colouring of the schematically illustrated icons to avoid mis-
understandings potentially arising due to associations with ethnicities of individuals in the respective
projects (see example Choice Card in Appendix D.1). This change was implemented after evaluating
feedback from survey responses.
6The dropped comprehension question asked respondents to select the respective policy alternative,
in which the larger number of deaths were prevented after showing them an example choice card, which
was not used for the actual analysis.
7The scenario description was informed by WHO (2014) and Hallegatte et al. (2016), and IBRD/The
World Bank (2010). The WHO (2014) estimates that climate change will induce an additional 250,000
deaths annually between 2030 and 2050. This is used as the baseline estimate for our scenario. The
estimates for average annual incomes of the extremely poor are informed by The World Bank (2017)’s
definition of extreme poverty (1.90 USD per day, which is roughly equal to 515 GBP per year (using
2017 exchange rates). The definition of the middle-income households is informed by The World Bank
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which tested that they had actually read and understood the scenario. The questions
were chosen to be fairly basic comprehension questions, which is important to obtain
a representative sample.8 Respondents had to answer both questions correctly. Other-
wise, they were immediately redirected to the survey company and did not complete
the survey. This test proved to be an important filter with nearly one thousand respon-
dents being excluded from these testing questions. Respondents were also not able to
attempt the survey more than once.9
The results of the second pilot were used to generate a Bayesian D-Efficient design
for the full survey using the software Ngene.10 For the Bayesian efficient design the
coefficient and standard errors of the pilot were used to generate the new experimental
design. Using both the standard error as well as the coefficient estimate is preferred
relative to using an efficient design, which may be more prone to be affected by outliers
in the pilot.11 Each respondent had to complete 8 choice tasks, with 2 policy options
each and one opt-out option of ‘No additional Policy’. Respondents are randomly
assigned to either a treatment or control group. We use two blocks, which allows us to
have 16 different choice cards within each the treatment and control group.
(2017)’s classification of non-poor but vulnerable individuals who earn up to 13 USD per day, and the
middle class which earns between 13 and 70 USD per day, which is equivalent to approximately 4000
to 20,000 GBP annually. IBRD/The World Bank (2010) estimate that 70-100 billion USD are required
annually to help developing countries adapt to climate change. This is roughly equal to 50-80 billion
GBP.
8The comprehension questions asked respondents in a multiple choice setting to select the correct
answers. Question 1: “Based on the previous description: For what reason are additional financial
resources required?”(Correct Answer: To help poor countries adapt to climate change.). Question 2:
“According to the previous description: What is climate change expected to cause?” (Correct Answer:
Rising average temperatures, rising sea-levels and more severe natural disasters).
9The “Qualtrics” survey setting ‘prevent ballot box stuffing’ prevented individuals from taking the
survey multiple times.
10We used 29,760 iterations to generate the final design. The mean Bayesian MNL D-error is
0.101537.
11For the pilots we generated efficient designs using a combination of small and zero priors. When
generating efficient designs, the researcher has to take a decision between 0 priors (in which case the
design becomes an orthogonal design) and very small positive and negative priors, which allows the
researcher to exclude dominant alternatives from the design. This is not generally possible within or-
thogonal designs, as it would result in a loss of orthogonality of the design. The researcher faces a
trade-off in this case: Including dominant alternatives gives the researcher one additional tool to check
that respondents answered ‘rationally’ and did not select clearly dominated alternatives, perhaps by se-
lecting choices randomly. Yet, including such dominated options also bears the risk that respondents
become irritated, which can lead to an increase in protest responses. We decided to use very small pos-
itive and negative priors where the researcher has good reason to believe that the relationship is either
positive or negative and use zero priors for coefficients, where this is not the case. With small priors and
a Bayesian efficient design, the risk of inserting bias into the design is minimised, while being able to
exclude irritating dominant alternatives.
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4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 MNL and RPL-EC Models
The Choice Experiment (CE) methodology is built upon the Random Utility Theory
established by McFadden (1974). In this framework, utility (U) consists of two com-
ponents: a deterministic or observable part V and a random or stochastic component
ε . Thus, individual i chooses alternative j among n alternatives if Ui j > Uin∀n. In
the Random Utility Framework, the utility of individual i choosing alternative j can
therefore be written as:
Ui j =Vi j + εi j (4.1)
The deterministic or observable component Vi j can written as:
Vi j =
K
∑
k=1
βik jX ′ik j (4.2)
The choice probability P at each choice occasion t is given by:
Pi jt =
exp(βkX ′k jt)
∑ j exp(βkX ′k jt)
(4.3)
where X ′ is a matrix of k attributes in levels, and β is a vector of utility parameters to be
estimated. In the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) the error terms are assumed to be
independently and identically distributed (IID) with an extreme value type 1 distribu-
tion (also known as Gumbel distribution). This model implies independence of irrele-
vant alternatives (IIA). Furthermore, it assumes taste homogeneity across respondents,
since the utility coefficient of an attribute k is the same for all individuals βik = βk (see
e.g. Strazzerra et al., 2012). One alternative provides the Nested Logit (NL) model,
which relaxes the IIA assumption, yet still relies on taste homogeneity (Ben Akiva
and Lerman, 1985; Hensher et al., 2005; Contu et al., 2016). The restrictive taste ho-
mogeneity assumption is relaxed in the Random Parameter Logit Model (RPL), also
known as Mixed Multinomial Logit (MMNL). The RPL model allows variation among
individuals for the utility coefficients by assuming a continuous distribution of parame-
ter vectors (Revelt and Train, 1998; Hensher and Greene, 2003). An alternative model
also relaxing the taste homogeneity assumption is the Latent Class Model (LCM),
which also allows for variation among individuals by assuming a discrete distribution
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with individual parameters clustered in classes (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Greene
and Hensher, 2003).
There is no clear decision-criteria to choose between the two models (RPL and LCM),
and it remains for the analyst to make an informed decision (Hess, 2014). While in the
RPL model the analyst needs to decide on the distribution of the random parameters,
the analyst has to decide on the number of classes in the LCM. We begin by analysing
the basic MNL and the RPL, as the latter allows us to incorporate an error-correction
term, which is not possible in the LCM. The error-correction term allows adjustments
for correlations between individual choice alternatives. We then estimate LCMs to be
able to provide more specific estimates for heterogeneous socio-economic groups.
In the RPL model the utility function of individual i is characterised by an additional
idiosyncratic random deviation ηik from the mean value of βk for each attribute k. The
utility of individual i for alternative j at choice occasion t is (see e.g. Revelt and Train,
1998; Contu et al., 2016):
Ui jt = βkX ′k jt +ηikX
′
k jt + εi jt (4.4)
The distribution must be specified by the analyst. Normal and (negative) log-normal
distributions are the most common in this context, depending on prior expectations on
the sign of the coefficient. Without strong priors on the sign of a coefficient, using the
normal distribution allows full flexibility on the sign and is the preferred option. In this
context the choice probability is given by:
Pi jt =
∫ exp(βikX ′k jt)
∑ j exp(βikX ′k jt)
f (βi|Θ)dβi (4.5)
where f (βi|Θ) represents the density function for the vector of taste coefficients β ,
which could allow for some fixed elements as well as correlation between individual
random elements (Contu et al., 2016). This now allows the vector β to follow a random
distribution with parameters Θ. Furthermore, by adding an error-correction term we
can allow for inter-alternative correlations (Revelt and Train, 1998; Herriges and Pha-
neuf, 2002; Contu et al., 2016). All the random parameters were set to be distributed
using a normal distribution, except for the monetary attribute and the interaction of the
Information treatment with the monetary attribute, which are assumed to be fixed (i.e.
non-random) (following Revelt and Train, 1998; Ruud, 1996; Contu et al., 2016) . The
random parameters are estimated with a simulated maximum likelihood estimation us-
ing 100 inter-person Halton-draws.12
12For the estimation we use the R-package developed by the University of Leeds Choice Modelling
158
Once the parameters have been estimated in the respective models, we can compute
the monetary valuations (MV). These are given by the absolute value of the ratio of the
respective non-monetary coefficient (the marginal utility of each coefficient) over the
coefficient of the monetary attribute (Contu et al., 2016):
MV =
∣∣∣∣βnon−monetaryβmonetary
∣∣∣∣ (4.6)
4.4.2 Latent Class Models (LCM)
While the RPL captures heterogeneity at the individual level, the Latent Class Model
(LCM) accommodates taste heterogeneity at the group-level. It can be seen as a semi-
parametric version of the RPL, as the analyst does not have to make assumptions about
the distribution of the parameters, but instead has to restrict the number of classes and
estimates a computationally simpler MNL (Greene and Hensher, 2003). The motiva-
tion for the LCM is the idea that the population can be divided into a discrete number of
s segments and that preferences within these segments are relatively homogeneous, but
differ across segments. In the LCM individuals are assigned probabilistically into the
segments based on socio-economic variables and attitudes. Utility is then be modelled
as: (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Strazzerra et al., 2012).
Ui j|s =Vi j|s + εi j|s (4.7)
The utility parameters βk can now be divided into s segments. Hence, we now have
βk|s which means that we have a parameter βk for each segment s. The unconditional
choice probability of individual i choosing alternative j becomes the weighted average
of all βk|s (Strazzerra et al., 2012; Contu et al., 2016)13:
PRi j =
S
∑
s=1
hsPR j|s (4.8)
where PR j|s is the probability of choosing alternative j conditional on being a member
in class s. It is expressed as:
PRi j|s =
exp(βi1|sXi1 j +βi2|sXi2 j + ...+βik|sXik j)
∑Nn=1 exp(βi1|sXi1n +βi2|sXi2n + ...+βik|sXikn)
(4.9)
Centre (Choice Modelling Centre (CMC), 2017)
13From here on we drop the subscript t for each choice occasion to improve readability
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The segment membership probabilities h1, ...,hn are estimated using a multinomial
logit model, assuming a logistic distribution. The classes can be characterised by con-
ditioning h on socio-economic covariates, attitudes or perceptions collected alongside
the choice experiment (Strazzerra et al., 2012). The segment membership probabilities
are then expressed as:
hs =
exp(δsWc)
∑Ss=1 exp(δsWc)
(4.10)
where Wc is a vector of c covariates, and δs is a vector of coefficients that is specific
for class s. After estimating the model, it is possible to calculate within each class the
marginal rates of substitution between the attributes. The monetary value (MV) for a
change in attribute k in class s becomes:
MVk|s =
∣∣∣∣∣ βk|sβm|s
∣∣∣∣∣ (4.11)
where βm is the utility coefficient of the monetary attribute for individuals in class s
and βk is a non-monetary coefficient for individuals in class s (see e.g. Gevrek and
Uyduranoglu, 2015; Strazzerra et al., 2012).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Descriptive Results
We collect a sample of completed responses for 1,140 individuals representative of the
UK in terms of gender, age, income, education and 12 UK regions (see Appendix D.1
for demographic summary statistics compared to the UK population). Each respon-
dent answered 8 choice tasks, resulting in a total of 9,120 observations for the choice
analysis. We slightly oversample individuals with lower levels of income (which is
a common problem in online surveys), resulting in a slightly lower average sample
household income (£36,732 vs. £38,291 in the population). We also have slightly
more individuals with a university degree (29% vs. 27.2%), and fewer individuals
with low levels of educational attainment (up to 4 GCSEs) (30.4% vs. 36%).
Overall, we observe an average willingness-to-pay of £27.5 (median £5), which sup-
ports the results obtained by O’Garra and Mourato (2016).14 In our sample about 10%
14We observe a slightly higher mean WTP of £28.4 in the group receiving the information treatment
compared to a mean WTP of £26.6 in the ‘control’ group which does not see the information treatment.
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of the respondents always choose the option ‘No Additional Policy’, whereas 50%
never chose that opt-out option (Figure 4.2). This provides a first indication of some
support for additional policies.
0%	 10%	 20%	 30%	 40%	 50%	 60%	0:	"Never	choose	'No	Additional	
1	2	3	
4	5	6	
7	8:	Always	choose	'No	Additional	
Frequency of  Choosing 'No Additional Policy' 
Frequency	of	Choosing	'No	Additional	Policy'	
Table 4.2: Frequency of Choosing ‘No Additional Policy’
In addition to the choice experiment we asked for respondents’ opinions on topics such
as climate change and social justice (see Appendix D.4 for descriptives on the opinion
questions). In our sample 80% of respondents state that they think climate change is
already happening, and 65% state that climate change is happening and GHGs such
as CO2 are its main cause. We have a little less than 10% of individuals not think-
ing that climate change is happening and 15% disagreeing with the statement that
“Climate change is happening and mainly caused by CO2” emissions. In our sam-
ple 60% disagree with the statement that climate change is largely caused by nature,
while 20% agree with it and 17% don’t know (Figure D.2). The opinions are overall
similar to what is reported by other UK surveys, although there seems to be a some-
what stronger belief in non-natural reasons for climate change compared to other UK
surveys, although the different question phrasing might partially account for this differ-
ence (Phillips et al., 2018). Overall, 65% of our sample thinks that it is either extremely
likely or somewhat likely that their children’s generation will be negatively impacted
by climate change (Figure D.3).
Furthermore, we asked people what they thought is the main reason for why people live
in poverty globally today. We find that slightly more than 20% of the sample thinks
that “people are not doing enough to help themselves out of poverty”, while about
65% believes that “circumstances beyond people’s control” are the main cause (Figure
D.4). We use the information from these opinion questions to inform our Latent Class
Analysis.
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4.5.2 MNL and RPL-EC Results
The results of the Multinomial Logit model (MNL) and Random Parameter Logit with
Error Correction model (RPL-EC) are reported in Table 4.3.15 In the interpretation
we focus on the RPL-EC model (column 2), which provides the more reliable esti-
mates. Most importantly the model does not rely on the assumption of homogeneity
across individuals, but allows for variation among individuals in the utility coefficients.
Firstly, we see as expected a negative coefficient on the payment attribute. Higher
levies clearly imply lower acceptability. This emphasises again, similar to the climate
mitigation literature, the public’s sensitivity to costs from policies related to climate
change. This is an important reminder to policy-makers to proceed in small steps,
starting at moderate levels and increasing the rates gradually over time (in line with
Baranzini and Carattini, 2014). Our results show that the public is willing to give up a
small fraction of income to help poor countries adapt to climate change. We observe a
mean annual WTP of £27 and a much lower median of £6.
Importantly, we see that respondents positively value the ‘benefit’ of projects, i.e. the
number of people protected, but that they also value the share of extremely poor indi-
viduals protected. This provides first evidence that applying a strictly utilitarian frame-
work when allocating adaptation support might not be the preferred strategy. As a ro-
bustness check and to identify potential non-linearities, we also estimate the model us-
ing factor variables for the first two attributes (See Appendix D.2). For the coefficients
on the absolute number of individuals protected, we observe positive and significant
coefficients for larger number of individuals protected. This suggests that individuals
have strong preferences for protecting larger groups of people over smaller groups.
Interestingly, for the share of individuals protected among the extremely poor, we ob-
serve a levelling-off effect. Individuals strongly prefer an equal share of extremely
poor individuals protected to a distribution where only 20% of the protected individ-
uals belong to the most vulnerable group. Yet, they do not significantly prefer the
baseline outcome to a distribution, in which 80% of the individuals protected belong
to the extremely poor group (see Appendix D.2). This suggests that individuals are
concerned about the distribution of resources towards the poorest individuals but that
there is a diminishing effect. Alternatively, the finding might also imply preferences
for an equal allocation between individuals protected among the group of extremely
poor and the lower-middle income households.
We observe that respondents’ preferred payment mechanism is an ability-to-pay ap-
proach, meaning that individuals pay proportionally to their income levels. This is
15The choice models were estimated using the software R and the CMC (2017) choice modelling
package as well as in Stata using lclogit for the Latent Class Analysis.
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significantly preferred to a payment mechanism based on emissions (the baseline cat-
egory). The least (marginally significant) preferred mechanism is to have a flat house-
hold levy. This reveals, that an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach is valued more relative to a
‘polluter-pays-principle’, which is in turn preferred to an ‘equal-shares principle’. This
is an important finding, which contrasts with the results obtained in the literature on
mitigation policies. It suggests that respondents do not see such a strong link between
individual emissions and their potential responsibility to contribute to adaptation pay-
ments. Hence, using carbon pricing to collect revenues to support a global adaptation
fund would be expected to be less popular compared to a progressive fee based on
income.
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Lastly, it is interesting to note that our information treatment has a positive and signifi-
cant (at 5%), impact on respondents’ willingness-to-pay (WTP). Although the effect is
small in terms of actual payment, this provides the first evidence of a successfully used
information treatment within the context of public support for climate adaptation pay-
ments. It suggests that framing the issue in a way that also emphasises potential future
benefits to the UK may be a promising strategy forward. Furthermore, this shows that
using assessments from government institutions that are widely respected within the
population and perceived to be impartial on the topic of climate change may help us
to improve public acceptance. Nevertheless, this finding may also raise difficult moral
concerns. Further work is required to better understand the underlying motivations,
for why such a framing may positively impact individuals’ contributions. The addi-
tional information may have convinced some people that urgent action is necessary,
that climate change is a serious problem and that additional financial resources are re-
quired. It may however also be regarded as a relatively easy way to ‘buy your way
out’ of any international responsibilities to deal with complex issues such as global
food insecurities, conflicts or migration. Any communication strategy would therefore
have to convey very clearly and carefully that financial support for climate adaptation
is additional and not instead of other international responsibilities and commitments.
4.5.3 Latent Class Results
Finally, we consider how exploiting heterogeneity across individuals may provide ad-
ditional information on their preferences for climate adaptation payments. Similarly
to Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015) and Carattini et al. (2017a) in the climate mitiga-
tion literature we apply a Latent Class Model (LCM) to explain heterogeneous pref-
erences. To construct our classes we use a combination of socio-economic variables
and opinion-based questions on climate change and poverty (see Appendix D.6 for
summary statistics of variables used to construct the latent classes).
Latent Class Models (LCM) require the researcher to make an informed decision on
the number of classes to be chosen. The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and the
Aikaike Information Criterion (AIK) are the most commonly used. Both information
criteria are designed for model selection and both incorporate a penalty for additional
parameters. We choose a model with 5 classes as it has the lowest BIC and AIC values
(Table 4.4).16 Results from the LCM are reported in Table 4.5. Panel A in the table
displays how preferences change across classes. Panel B shows the characteristics
of respondents, which describe the composition of classes. The latent class model is
16Selecting LCMs with even more classes can become problematic, as the estimates become impre-
cise and potentially misleading. It is convention in the literature to not estimate models with more than
5 classes unless for studies with much larger sample sizes.
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Number of Classes BIC AIC 
2 13981.01 13839.92 
3 13342.97 13111.19 
4 13009.98 12687.51 
5 12647.88 12234.70 	
Table 4.4: Criteria for selecting the preferred number of classes
estimated using a multinomial logit model (MNL). We summarise the results from this
analysis for each class respectively below.17
Membership in class 1 is associated with being relatively less likely to believe that
climate change will have a negative impact on future generations. Secondly, members
of this class are more likely to believe that individuals hold the main responsibility for
living in poverty.18 They are also less likely to have an above average income. 10%
of our sample falls into this group. Members of this class are more likely to support
policies, which involve industry co-financing. They do not have strong distributional
preferences, which is in line with their view on the underlying reasons for poverty.
Nearly one quarter of our sample falls into class 2. Membership in this class is char-
acterised by a relatively lower income and educational level.19 They are relatively
less likely to choose the status-quo option of no additional policy (ASC Status-quo).
Hence, members in this class are more likely to support additional policy measures.
Individuals in this class are relatively more likely to be a member of an environmen-
tal organisation. They are less likely to support a policy, which requires the recipient
country to also issue additional measures to raise funds.
Approximately 15% of our sample belongs to class 3. Individuals in this class are
relatively sceptic about the existence of climate change and do not have strong distri-
butional concerns. More precisely, membership in this class is associated with a lower
likelihood to believe that carbon emissions are the main reason for climate change and
that climate change will have a negative impact on future generations. Members in this
class are also more likely to believe that individuals hold the main responsibility for
living in poverty. In line with their relative disbelief in climate change they are more
17We do not estimate the LCM with factor variables, as the estimates in LCMs can become unstable,
meaning imprecise and potentially misleading, with too many parameters and classes. As we already
estimate the model with 5 classes, we want to avoid adding further parameters through factor variables.
18This is equivalent to the following statement: Membership in class 1 is associated with being
significantly less likely to believe that the main reasons why some people live in poverty lies in reasons
beyond their control.
19Based on the exact variable specifications, it is expressed as: Membership in class two is associ-
ated with a lower likelihood of having above average income and a lower likelihood of having higher
educational level.
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likely to chose the status-quo option of no further policies. Furthermore, when choos-
ing between additional policies they prefer a payment mechanism, in which individuals
contribute based on their income levels and not proportional to their emissions.
Members of class 4 can be categorised as having relatively strong distributional
and fairness concerns and by being concerned about the negative impacts of
climate change. It consists of nearly 25% of our sample. Membership in this class
is characterised by a higher likelihood of being a member in an environmental
organisation, believing that climate change will have negative impacts on future
generations and believing that the main reason for poverty lies beyond individuals
control. In line with such believes they are more likely to support projects targeted
towards a larger share of extremely poor individuals. Furthermore, they dislike if
projects are conditional on financial contributions by the recipient country. But they
support co-financing by UK industries and businesses. They are less likely to support
a payment mechanism, in which every household pays the same. This may also reflect
their views on the underlying reasons for unequal income distributions, which may
require exemptions for lower income groups.
Individuals attributed to class 5 can be characterised as having strong preferences on
the burden-sharing of additional policies. In particular they care about the distribution
of the burden between donor and recipient countries as well as between households
and industry in donor countries. Nearly 28% of our sample belongs to this class.
Individuals in this class are more likely to support policies, which involve industry
co-financing and are conditional on the recipient country also contributing. They also
prefer a policy design in which richer households pay more. They are less likely to
choose the status-quo option, which suggests that they are willing to contribute to
additional policies.
One way to summarise the results from the Latent Class Analysis is by grouping the
classes 1 and 3 together. Respondents in these groups are sceptical about the existence
or the negative impacts of climate change. Furthermore, they appear to not have strong
distributional preferences. They tend to support the view that individuals are largely
responsible themselves for living in poverty. Approximately 25% of our sample be-
longs to this group. Convincing individuals from this group to contribute to climate
adaptation payments is likely to be challenging. They appear to be opposed to the two
main underlying ideas that may results in a willingness to support such policies: (1)
believing in the existence of climate change, and (2) international solidarity to help
individuals move out of poverty. Yet, reversely this also means that about 75% of our
sample belongs to any of the other classes. This allows potentially for a more opti-
mistic view that a substantial majority believes both in the negative impacts of climate
change and acknowledges that poverty can be caused by reasons beyond individuals’
167
control. The combination of these two factors appears to be somewhat necessary for
being willing to contribute to climate adaptation in the long-run. In particular, since
climate change is expected to affect poor people more severely and to increase and
exacerbate existing poverty.
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Variable Class 1 Class2 Class 3 Class 4 Class 5 
Panel A Coeff. (S.e.)     
      
Total Deaths 
prevented (thds.) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.015*** 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.220*** 
(0.024) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
Share of deaths 
prevented among 
the extremely poor 
-0.285 
(0.465) 
0.284 
(0.205) 
-0.663 
(0.830) 
3.300*** 
(0.646) 
-0.194 
(0.410) 
Payment 
Conditional 
0.237 
(0.233) 
-0.188** 
(0.087) 
-0.017 
(0.456) 
-0.620** 
(0.241) 
0.348*** 
(0.130) 
Industry  
Co-finance 
0.751*** 
(0.208) 
0.087 
(0.067) 
-0.823 
(0.559) 
0.449*** 
(0.128) 
0.154* 
(0.089) 
All HHs pay same 0.368 
(0.230) 
-0.064 
(0.097) 
0.370 
(0.570) 
-0.458** 
(0.190) 
-0.127 
(0.123) 
Richer HHs pay 
more 
0.275 
(0.255) 
-0.027 
(0.104) 
1.046* 
(0.570) 
-0.109 
(0.334) 
0.337* 
(0.180) 
Annual Payment -0.086*** 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.021** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.006) 
-0.036*** 
(0.003) 
Information * 
Payment 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.010 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.036 
(0.003) 
ASC_Status quo -0.432 
(0.514) 
-0.414** 
(0.162) 
3.467*** 
(0.793) 
-0.756 
(0.536) 
-3.965*** 
(0.296) 
ASC_option 2 0.386** 
(0.168) 
0.295*** 
(0.056) 
0.112 
(0.436) 
-0.171 
(0.130) 
-0.164* 
(0.084) 
Panel B      
Class Membership 
Function 
     
High Income -0.755** 
(0.294) 
-0.517** 
(0.254) 
-0.414 
(0.234) 
0.248 
(0.229) 
0a 
A-level & above 0.187 
(0.254) 
-1.108*** 
(0.236) 
-0.294 
(0.236) 
0.120 
(0.216) 
0a 
CO2 main cause 0.004 
(0.274) 
-0.277 
(0.236) 
-0.980*** 
(0.247) 
0.313 
(0.255) 
0a 
CC negative 
impact 
-0.710** 
(0.275) 
-0.069 
(0.250) 
-1.545*** 
(0.254) 
0.549* 
(0.296) 
0a 
Cause Poverty 
beyond control 
-0.764*** 
(0.260) 
-0.228 
(0.232) 
-0.882*** 
(0.234) 
0.873*** 
(0.278) 
0a 
Member in  
Env. Org.  
0.480 
(0.725) 
1.699*** 
(0.516) 
-1.004 
(1.113) 
0.995* 
(0.527) 
0a 
Car ownership 
 (2 or more) 
0.451 
(0.281) 
0.319 
(0.248) 
0.314 
(0.261) 
0.062 
(0.247) 
0a 
Constant -0.057 
(0.307) 
0.574** 
(0.278) 
1.289*** 
(0.252) 
-1.745*** 
(0.394) 
0a 
Average Class 
Probability 
0.104 0.234 0.145 0.239 0.278 
Log-likelihood -6035.35 / / / / 
Observations 9120 / / / / 
Table 4.5: MNL and RPL-EC Models
Robust Standard errors reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at
10%. Omitted category: Payment based on household emissions. a: constrained values.
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
Global climate change adaptation is becoming increasingly important. This holds in
particular since global emission levels are still rising and current emission-reduction
commitments from the Paris Agreement are expected to lead to 3◦C of global warming,
rather than the planned 1.5-2.0◦C (UNEP, 2017; Met Office, 2019). Even if a grad-
ual strengthening of emission reduction pledges can still limit warming to well below
2◦C, large-scale financing to help developing countries adapt to climate change will
be necessary. The estimated (lower-bound) of 100 billion USD that are required annu-
ally, at least until 2050, for global climate adaptation will need to be mobilised largely
from developed countries (IBRD/The World Bank, 2010). Ensuring public support for
such long-term projects is crucial to obtain sustained acceptance and to avoid policy
reversal. It is therefore essential to better understand public perceptions of and prefer-
ences for international climate adaptation finance. Improved knowledge about public
preferences for such policies can inform policy design and help anticipate potential
challenges.
In this paper we examine such preferences based on a representative sample of the
UK population, an important donor country. We systematically draw from previous
work in the related literature on preferences for climate change mitigation policies,
which has shown that distributional policy outcomes are particularly salient and can
drive public perception. Specifically, we elicit (1) preferences with respect to burden-
sharing principles among contributors and (2) distributional preferences with respect
to the allocation of financial resources across projects.
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to show that payment mechanisms
based on ‘ability-to-pay’ are preferred over a ‘polluter-pays-principle’ in the context
of climate adaptation. This is a key result as it contrasts with findings from the mit-
igation literature where public support for policies is typically higher if the payment
mechanism is linked to individual emissions. It suggests that respondents do not make
a strong link between individuals’ emissions and their potential responsibility to con-
tribute to adaptation payments. We would therefore expect that using carbon pricing to
collect revenues for a global adaptation fund would be less popular compared to using
a progressive fee based on income.
With respect to the second distributional dimension, we argue that the allocation of
scarce financial resources across projects can contain difficult moral judgements with
respect to the relative benefits of individual projects. These may involve trade-offs
between efficiency considerations (protecting the largest amount of people) and equity
principles (protecting the most vulnerable) (e.g. Le Grand, 1990, 1991). Such trade-
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offs may arise as for instance additional infrastructure or capacity building is necessary
when allocating funds to the poorest or most vulnerable groups. Existing (suggestive)
evidence states that some adaptation institutions have allocated financial resources not
to the most marginalised, but to projects with sufficient capacity and past experience,
which tend to have relatively higher incomes (Stadelmann et al., 2014; Barrett, 2014).
Fear of project failure or a need to report tangible outcomes may potentially drive such
decision-making. Knowledge about public preferences for the allocation of scarce
public financial resources in the context of moral judgements can be an important
factor. This is particularly relevant to avoid or respond to potential public discontent or
concerns about wasteful use of public funds. It is however important to note that this
is not to replace expert judgement, but rather to inform or complement it.
We show that individuals have preferences for distributing resources to the most vul-
nerable individuals. On average, projects supporting the most marginalised receive
larger public support in our representative sample of the UK population. Respondents
do not only care about the absolute number of people protected. This finding implies
that purely utilitarian approaches, which focus exclusively on the number of people
protected would not be the most popular policies. We however also observe that the
concern for the poorest individuals levels-off at high levels. Exploring such diminish-
ing effects provides an interesting avenue for future research. Our findings imply the
presence of egalitarian principles, which support adaptation funds in making trade-offs
in favour of the most marginalised communities, instead of adopting purely utilitarian
approaches.
In addition, we also test the effectiveness of a novel policy framing in this field that
emphasises potential benefits to the UK from helping developing countries adapt to
climate change, using a randomised information treatment. We show that such a policy
framing can lead to a statistically significant increase in public support, even though
the magnitude of the effect is marginal. This finding provides an interesting avenue
for future research to test similar framings that focus on donor country benefits from
adopting climate policies. Such effects may also be observable beyond this specific
context and could be tested further for climate mitigation or development policies.
Lastly, our latent class analysis has shown that there is a high degree of heterogeneity
in preferences and perceptions of climate change adaptation among individuals in the
UK. We observe that 25% of our sample is either sceptic about the existence of cli-
mate change or sceptic about concepts of solidarity towards people living in poverty.
It appears particularly difficult to mobilise support from this group of individuals. On
the flip side this implies that a large majority of 75% shows the basic requirements to
be willing to contribute to international climate adaptation funds. Overall we however
find that public support for international climate adaptation projects remains vastly
171
insufficient to meet international commitments. Further research in this field is neces-
sary to test additional policy framings and to identify policy attributes that can help to
increase public support for climate adaptation finance.
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Chapter 5
Oil Price Shocks and Income
Inequality: An Analysis of Resource
Dependent Countries and US States.
Abstract
This paper contributes to the literature on socio-economic impacts of natural resource
wealth. In particular we examine the impact of the shift from a low- to a high oil
price regime post 1998 on income inequality in resource rich countries and US states.
The theoretical framework developed by Corden and Neary (1982) and further applied
by Goderis and Malone (2011) predicts that resource booms can reduce income in-
equality, particularly in developing countries through additional spending in domestic
low-skill sectors. We empirically examine the relationship between resource wealth
and inequality using a time period that is characterised by particularly high levels of
inequality, for which outcomes may systematically differ from earlier low-inequality
periods. By adopting panel regression techniques, as well as the quasi-experimental
synthetic control method, we are able to show average effects across all resource rich
units, as well as identify unit-specific effects, which allow for a more detailed insight.
Overall we do not find strong support for an effect of the post-1998 oil price boom on
income inequality within resource dependent countries or US states. Our analysis dis-
cusses challenges in empirically identifying effects on income inequality indices such
as the Gini coefficient.
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5.1 Introduction
The empirical literature on the natural resource wealth of countries and the potential
existence of a “resource curse” was started by the seminal papers by Sachs and Warner
(1995, 1997, 1999b,a, 2001). These studies and the majority of studies that followed in
the literature have examined the effect of resource dependence on aggregate outcomes
such as GDP or the averaged effect of per capita GDP, remaining largely silent on
distributional questions. Little attention has been given to the impacts of resource
dependence on inequality.
Rents from natural resource extraction provide a unique type of income arising partly
by chance due to the location of the resource. It has been argued that these rents take
the form of “unearned income” (Segal, 2011, p.1) that belong to all citizens of a coun-
try equally and should therefore be distributed equally. Depending on the inequality
aversion of the social planner, resource booms might therefore require additional policy
measures to achieve desirable outcomes from resource wealth. Inequality has received
increasing attention in academic- and policy-circles as well as within the general pub-
lic. There is a relatively large body of literature arising mostly out of sociology that
illustrates the negative social consequences of rising inequality (see e.g. Wilkinson and
Pickett, 2009). Similarly, there is an increasing concern within the economics profes-
sion that high levels of inequality might have negative effects on productivity and can
increase transaction costs through lower levels of trust and social cohesion (Stiglitz,
2009; Jayadev and Bowles, 2006; Bowles, 2012).
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways: First, it applies a
quasi-experimental methodology to study distributional outcomes of the oil price
shock post 1998, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done before.
Earlier empirical studies (e.g. Goderis and Malone, 2011) focused on the time horizon
up to the 1990s, which were characterised by relatively low levels of inequality (Fig.
5.1), or only applied panel regression methods (such as OLS, random- or fixed-effect
estimations) (e.g. Parcero and Papyrakis, 2016). We examine a time period that is
characterised by particularly high levels of inequality, for which outcomes may
systematically differ from earlier low-inequality periods. Second, to the best of our
knowledge we are the first paper to provide evidence of the impact of a resource price
boom on income inequality for resource rich US states. The institutional set-up of US
states is different to the set-up of (resource rich) countries. Hence, we might expect
that results may be systematically different for US states compared to resource rich
countries. By adopting panel regression techniques, as well as a quasi-experimental
approach we are able to show average effects across all resource rich units, as well as
the individual effects of each unit compared to a synthetic counterfactual.
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Figure 5.1: Long-run income inequality trends in the US, UK, Canada and Australia measured
as the share of top 0.1% highest income in total income (Source: Piketty (2013))
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an overview of
the literature on the resource curse. Section 5.3 outlines challenges of data availabil-
ity and the selection of a suitable treatment period and treated units. In section 5.4
we describe the theoretical channels between resource wealth and income inequality.
Section 5.5 illustrates the synthetic control methodology and section 5.6 describes the
empirical specification. We present the results in section 5.7 and discuss the results
and conclusions in section 5.8.
5.2 Literature
The extensive literature on the ‘resource curse’ was started by the seminal papers by
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999b,a, 2001). This literature focussed predomi-
nantly on the effect of resource wealth on economic growth at the country-level. The
early papers found support for the existence of a negative relationship between coun-
tries’ resource wealth and their economic growth. They sparked an entire research
area in this field (see for example Anderson and Aslaksen, 2008; Arezki and van der
Ploeg, 2010; Baggio and Papyrakis, 2010; Caselli and Cunnigham, 2009; Gylfason and
Zoega, 2006; Kolstad, 2009; Murshed and Serino, 2011; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004,
2007; Papyrakis, 2011, 2014). While the earlier papers found support for the resource
curse, the more recent papers have typically provided a more sceptical view on such
a generalised relationship. These more recent papers largely focussed on improving
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the econometric approach to identify a causal relationship. They applied instrumental
variable approaches to address problems with endogenous variables and moved from
cross-sectional to panel data analysis to reduce omitted variable bias. Some of the ini-
tial findings of the resource curse literature do not hold anymore when applying such
additional scrutiny by, for example, accounting for country-specific variables (such as
institutional settings, trade-openness etc.) (see for example Arezki and van der Ploeg,
2010, for a discussion). It has therefore become relatively clear that the earlier results
do not hold anymore in a generalisable way. Building upon this initial branch of the
literature, the research field expanded to examine a broader set of outcome variables
beyond economic growth or GDP levels. Natural resource wealth has subsequently
been linked to conflict and civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998; Brunnschweiler and
Bulte, 2008; Dixon, 2009; Lujala, 2010; Lei and Michaels, 2014), to lower values on
the Human Development Index (HDI) (Bulte et al., 2005; Daniele, 2011), higher gen-
der inequality (Ross, 2008), lower rates of poverty alleviation (Pegg, 2006), low lev-
els of human capital accumulation (Bravo-Ortega and De Gregorio, 2005), and lower
health outcomes (Cotet and Tsui, 2013).
Most of these studies find undesirable outcomes for countries with natural resource
wealth. However, some contrary findings were established more recently showing that
resource discoveries can have predominantly positive effects on per capita GDP, with
strongest effects for non-OECD countries (Smith, 2015). A further branch of the litera-
ture has looked at institutional factors around resource booms with varying conclusions
(for example Ross, 2001; Leite and Weidmann, 2002; Brueckner et al., 2012; Caselli
and Tesei, 2011, 2016; Haber and Menaldo, 2011; Caselli and Michaels, 2013). Haber
and Menaldo (2011) examine the relationship between resource wealth and regime
type. Contrary to theoretical predictions (for example from Mahdavy (1970) and Ross
(2001)), they find no evidence that natural resource wealth fuels authoritarianism. Sim-
ilar findings are obtained for example by Herb (2005). They even observe a tendency
in the opposite direction towards more democratic political regimes. In the case of
Brazil, Caselli and Michaels (2013) find that oil-rich municipalities have higher rev-
enues and increased spending on public goods, however survey data do not show a
substantial increase in a number of public services and little benefit to the wider popu-
lation, potentially indicating corruption by government officials. Overall, the evidence
on whether resource wealth is a blessing or a curse remains inconclusive, context spe-
cific and conditional on the type of outcome variable being analysed.
Studies which applied quasi-experimental techniques to study impacts of natural re-
source shocks have largely assessed aggregate outcome variables, but have remained
relatively silent on distributional outcomes. Liou and Musgrave (2014) study the im-
pact of the 1973 oil embargo on per capita GDP and political regimes of resource-
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dependent countries. The authors conclude that their evidence does not support the
existence of a resource curse, for neither outcome variable. Mideksa (2013) examines
the case of petroleum discovery in Norway in the mid 1970s. The author finds that
the oil discovery accounts for about a 20% increase in annual GDP per capita. Smith
(2015) combines evidence from developing and developed countries and concludes
that a significantly positive impact on per capita GDP is only detectable for develop-
ing countries with no effect for developed countries. Overall, there are relatively few
papers employing quasi-experimental methods within this literature.
Since the late 1990s, there has been increasing interest in studying the effect of nat-
ural resource wealth on inequality. Using cross-sectional data, Leamer et al. (1999)
examine why Latin American countries have substantially higher levels of inequality
compared to East Asian countries. They draw upon trade theory to demonstrate that
natural resource intensive sectors absorb capital, which would in the absence of the
natural resource flow into manufacturing sectors. This delays industrialisation and re-
duces workers’ incentives to accumulate skills. The reduced incentive among workers
to gain skills may therefore result in higher levels of inequality. Sokoloff and Enger-
man (2000) elaborate on natural resource wealth endowments and their management
across European colonies in the Americas to explain historic differences in inequality
over the past centuries. Gylfason and Zoega (2003) develop a theoretical model to link
resource wealth with lower economic growth and higher inequality. They also provide
some simple regression results to support their theoretical predictions. Ross (2007)
provides a conceptual overview of the impacts of resource wealth on inequality across
socio-economic groups, as well as across regions in resource rich countries. It fo-
cuses in particular on the (dis-) advantages of decentralising resource revenues across
regions. Subsequently, Goderis and Malone (2011) develop a theoretical framework
in the context of a two-sector growth model to explain income inequality following
a resource boom. Using variations in resource prices, they provide some support for
their theory for the time period 1965 to 1999 using panel data techniques. Parcero and
Papyrakis (2016) apply panel regressions and find that oil rich countries have signif-
icantly lower levels of inequality, with the exception of few very oil dependent coun-
tries, which experience higher levels of inequality. Nevertheless, this remains a field,
in which relatively little empirical work has been conducted.
The literature on comprehensive (or inclusive) wealth accounting is closely related, but
looks at natural resource wealth from a different angle. Instead of being interested in
the immediate effect on economic outcome variables it is primarily interested in the
sustainability of a country’s growth path. It regards natural resources as a form of nat-
ural capital that is part of a country’s total wealth. The literature is concerned about
the use of the natural resources and the way, in which these forms of natural capital
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are invested into other forms of capital. Sustainability is thereby defined such that the
total value of all capital assets of a country (i.e. including natural capital) has to be
non-declining over time (Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Hamilton and Clemens, 1999;
Pezzey, 2004). This literature finds that countries with large natural resource endow-
ments have difficulties in managing their resource revenues sustainably. They tend to
have low or even negative Genuine Savings, which suggests that the country might
be on an unsustainable development path, consuming its overall asset base (Atkinson
and Hamilton, 2003; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). Until lately, this literature has also
focused predominantly on the aggregate wealth accumulation, irrespective of its dis-
tribution. Only over the past years new frameworks were developed that highlight he
implications from unequal distributions of comprehensive wealth for sustainable de-
velopment (Fenichel et al., 2016; Baumga¨rtner et al., 2017; Drupp et al., 2018). These
studies show that inequality can be an important driver for societies’ valuation of pub-
lic goods, and that more equal societies tend to express higher valuations specifically
for non-market environmental goods.
5.3 Data Availability
A key challenge in studying distributional outcomes is the lack of reliable data on in-
come inequality for a sufficiently large panel of countries. The data on income shares
provided by the World Bank (The World Bank, 2016) has many missing observations
as well as often insufficient data coverage. Similar limitations apply to the Deininger
and Squire (1996, 2013) data sets, as well as other sources, such as the Luxembourg In-
come Study (LIS, 2016). The fundamental problem when studying the effect of natural
resource wealth on the income distribution is that most resource wealth exists in de-
veloping or emerging countries, for which income distribution data is hardly available
in a standardised format. On the flip side, countries with reliable income distribution
data (mainly OECD countries) are often not resource dependent. In order to establish
a causal relationship between natural resource discovery and inequality one requires
inequality data for a sufficiently long time period for countries with and without nat-
ural resources to construct a control group. Ideally, one would study the effect of a
natural resource discovery on a country’s change in the inequality level. Resource dis-
coveries contain a degree of exogeneity, as they cannot be perfectly timed. Countries
may increase their efforts to discover resources, which in turn increases the likelihood
of discovery, but the precise timing of discovery may not be possible to plan. Hence,
some exogenous variation can be exploited around natural resource discoveries.
However, to apply quasi-experimental techniques, we require data of more than 10
years prior to the treatment to establish credible control groups (following Abadie and
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Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). Most oil-dependent countries discov-
ered the resource at the latest in the 1960s or early 1970s, if not much earlier. Reliable
inequality data for a sufficiently large group of oil-dependent countries and for suitable
control group countries only exists from the 1970s onwards. Therefore, to the best of
our knowledge, it is currently not possible to systematically examine the effect of oil-
discoveries on within country income inequality for a group of resource-dependent
countries.
5.3.1 Time Period Selection
Most of the past studies in this literature have used the discovery of natural resources as
an exogenous treatment that allowed countries to reap resource rents. Yet, even when
examining the resource discovery, it is not always easy to pick the precise beginning
of the ‘treatment’ year. Mideksa (2013) argued that although Norway discovered oil in
1971, the impact on GDP per capita did not begin until 1974, which is when Norway
expanded its extraction and generated larger shares of oil revenues. The advantage of
using the moment of the resource discovery is the potential exogeneity of the treatment.
Even resource discoveries might however not be entirely exogenous and uncorrelated
with outcome variables due to policy pressures to increase exploration activities. The
potential endogeneity applies even more to expansions in extractions, as these might
be driven by political concerns to increase economic growth.
Since all countries in our sample had already discovered the resource by the mid-
1970s when reliable income inequality data is becoming available, it is not possible
for us to examine the effect of resource discoveries. Instead, we rely on a second-best
identification strategy by examining the effect of an oil price shock. The global oil
price trend reveals two periods of substantially higher oil prices: The first between
1973 and 1986, which was driven by the oil embargo established by OPEC, the Iranian
Revolution and the Iran/Iraq war (Fig. 5.2). A second period of high oil prices started
after 1998 and went until 2008, when the financial crisis started. This period of high
oil prices was driven by stringent OPEC export limits established in 1999 after the
Asian financial crisis, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq (Alhajji and Huettner, 2000; Reuters, 2017). These two time periods of markedly
high oil prices provide the opportunity to study the effect of an increased inflow of oil
revenue for resource-rich countries. Since revenue consists of the product of quantity
and price, it is not necessarily the discovery of the resource per se that has an impact
on the country’s economy, but the combination of resource availability together with
the resource price.
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Figure 5.2: Annual imported crude oil price (nominal and real) (Source EIA (2019))
It is important to note that the second price rise post 1998 has been attributed largely
to Saudi Arabia’s cut in production. During the late 1990s and early 2000s Saudi Ara-
bia was the only ‘swing producer’ and dominated OPEC. It has indeed been argued
that OPEC did not actually operate as a commodity cartel, but was rather fully dom-
inated by Saudi Arabia’s decision-making in 1999. It was the only OPEC member
country (with marginal support from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)),
which actively and voluntarily decided to reduce production (Alhajji and Huettner,
2000; Reuters, 2017). Venezuela, Iran, Ecuador and Indonesia (which are included in
our sample) are members of OPEC during the treatment period. They however did
not voluntarily reduce production in 1999. The oil production levels of these countries
were entirely driven by technical and natural factors and some third-party political fac-
tors due to for example sanctions in the case of Iran and Libya (Alhajji and Huettner,
2000; Reuters, 2017). Therefore, we argue that the treatment is sufficiently exogenous
for our set of countries. Our main endogeneity concern is that the decision to reduce
oil production is correlated with our outcome variable, income inequality. This would
results in reverse causality or simultaneity bias. We believe this concern is sufficiently
alleviated by the observation that the countries included in our analysis did not volun-
tarily reduce oil production in 1999, but that the production cut was entirely driven by
Saudi Arabia, which is not included in our sample.
For our analysis we use a ‘price shock’ to assess the impact of resource wealth
on within unit (country or US state) inequality. We examine the effect on treated
(resource-rich) units compared to the effect on non-treated counterfactual units with
otherwise similar characteristics. In our analysis we focus on the second of these price
shocks due to the availability of income inequality data, i.e. the period from 1999
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until 2007. To select our treatment year, we argue that the year 1998 marks the end of
a low oil price regime, with a treatment commencing from 1999 onwards. In 1998 the
oil prices reached its lowest level since the mid-1970s at US$ 12.28 per barrel. After
1998 the oil price increases and has never reached that same low level again. From
1999 onwards there are multiple exogenous shocks leading to high oil price levels. It
is not easy to pin this shift to a single date, as it is possible with similar analysis of
the 1973 oil crisis and the Iranian Revolution. However, tensions in the Middle East,
the events of 9/11 and the Iraq war were contributing factors for a steep rise in the oil
price after 1999.
We face a trade-off between accidentally either picking a treatment year too early or a
year too late. When choosing a year after the actual treatment it might be difficult to
establish a good synthetic control group in the years just before the treatment and we
might capture other effects that are not due to the treatment. When selecting a treatment
year that is too early, we might observe no treatment effect for the first couple of years
and observe a gradual onset of the treatment. Moreover, the further away from the
actual treatment the observations are, the less reliable becomes the comparison to the
synthetic control unit, as other effects might play a role. The interpretation of effects
becomes less reliable the further away from the selected treatment period. We prefer
selecting a rather early year, to capture all elements of the gradual treatment. This
allows us to observe a gradual onset of the treatment effect similar to other synthetic
control studies (e.g. Abadie and Gardeazabal, 2003). Based on these characteristics
we decided that 1999 would be the preferred treatment year for this analysis. We can
use 1986 until 1998 as the pre-treatment period during which oil prices were relatively
stable and low compared to the two high-price periods. This gives us 13 pre-treatment
periods to create the synthetic control groups for the treated countries.
5.3.2 Selection of ‘Treated’ Units
In our setting, we define ‘treated’ units, as those countries or states that are relatively
dependent on oil revenues. In other words these units generate a relatively large share
of their income from oil revenues. In our selection of resource rich countries, we
follow Haber and Menaldo (2011) who characterise countries based on their fiscal
reliance on oil revenues as being ‘resource dependent’ (the approach is also used by
Liou and Musgrave (2014) among others). They define countries as being fiscally
reliant if on average their share of national income from oil revenues was 5% or larger
for the time period 1972-1999. They identify 16 countries as being reliant on these
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revenues.1 For us the main constraining factor is the availability of inequality data for
the respective countries. In particular for developing countries, obtaining a sufficiently
long time series of income inequality is challenging. We are left with 6 resource rich
countries, which have sufficient income inequality data. These are Ecuador, Indonesia,
Iran, Mexico, Norway, and Venezuela (Table 5.1).
In addition to the country-level analysis, we also examine resource-rich US states.
The institutional setting and the relative dependence on natural resources is clearly
very different for states within the US compared to natural resource rich countries.
Therefore, we keep the two samples entirely separately for the econometric analysis.
We mimic the approach from Haber and Menaldo (2011) at the country level and apply
it to US states. We use the share of state-income from oil and gas extraction and
related support activities to classify states as relatively resource dependent. We use
the last pre-treatment year 1998 to classify states. The fiscal reliance of US states is
comparatively much lower relatively to resource-dependent countries. We select states
generating more than 1% of their state-level income from oil and gas activities in 1998
as being relatively resource dependent (Figure 5.3) 2. This leaves us with Louisiana,
Alaska, Wyoming, Texas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico (Table 5.1) as our ‘treated’ US
states. It is important to note that the list of states is selected based on information
before the recent expansion of hydraulic fracking in the US. Alaska had to be dropped
from the synthetic control analysis. It has much higher levels of income inequality and
is an outliner across all the US states. The synthetic control method was therefore not
able to create a synthetic counterpart to this outlier. This is unfortunate, since Alaska
is a very oil rich state. Yet, Alaska is in many ways different from the other states due
to its extremely low population density and its geographic detachment.
1The 16 countries identified by Haber and Menaldo (2011) as being fiscally reliant on oil and gas
revenues are: Mexico, Venezuela, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Iran,
Algeria, Bahrain, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Yemen, Oman, Kuwait, and Norway.
2The classification is based on the NAICS sectors “Oil and gas extraction” and “Support activ-
ities for mining”, which also includes the support activities for oil and gas extraction. See Bureau
of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Accounts (BEA, 2016) for further details on the sector
definitions: https://apps.bea.gov/iTable/iTable.cfm?acrdn=6&isuri=1&reqid=70&step=
1#reqid=70&step=1&isuri=1.
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Number Resource Dependent 
Countries 
‘Treated’ US 
States 
1 Ecuador Alaska 
2 Indonesia Louisiana 
3 Iran New Mexico 
4 Mexico Oklahoma 
5 Norway Texas 
6 Venezuela Wyoming 
	
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA, 2016).
Oil and gas dependence is defined as the share of total income coming from the sum of the sec-
tors “Oil and gas extraction” and “Support activities for mining”, which also covers the support
activities for oil and gas extraction.
Table 5.1: List of resource dependent countries and ‘treated’ US states
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Figure 5.3: US state-level dependence on oil and gas activities (1998)
5.3.3 Inequality Data
In order to analyse how resource benefits are distributed within countries and states
we would ideally analyse the effect of the shock separately for each income quantile.
Unfortunately, the quantile-level income data provided by the World Bank (The World
Bank, 2016)3 and the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2016)4 do not cover a suffi-
3World Development Indicators: Distribution of income or consumption, The World Bank, 2016,
accessible from: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9# The World Bank (2016).
4Luxembourg Income Study Database (LIS), Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg, accessi-
ble from: http://www.lisdatacenter.org/our-data/ (LIS, 2016).
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ciently large amount of countries and years. The World Wealth and Income Database
(WID) (WID, 2016) (previously known as the World Top Income Database)5 is the
first approach to develop a large panel of top income shares (top 10, 5 or 1 percent).
Yet, the current coverage is not yet comprehensive enough for the treated countries and
non-OECD control countries. Due to these data limitations we are not able to exam-
ine the effect of the oil price shock on separate income quintiles. Instead, we use the
Gini coefficient from the Standardised World Income Database (SWID) (Solt, 2016)
for the country analysis and the Gini coefficient from Frank (2014) for US states, as a
measure of income inequality.6 To the best of our knowledge, these provide the most
comprehensive income inequality data for countries and states respectively.
5.4 Oil and Income Inequality: Theoretical Channels
A number of theories have been developed to assess the effect of natural resource
booms on corruption and rent seeking within developing countries (for example Leite
and Weidmann, 2002; Caselli and Michaels, 2013). These theories suggest that re-
source booms increase corruption and thereby lead to increased inequality, as elites
obtain larger shares of the rents. In parallel, a second branch of literature has been de-
veloped that looks more directly on the effect of income inequality through wages. This
theory was developed by Corden and Neary (1982) and further extended by Goderis
and Malone (2011). We use their theoretical framework as a motivation for our paper.
The economic model developed by Corden and Neary (1982) and Goderis and Malone
(2011) consist of three sectors: Non-traded (N), Non-Resource Traded (T ), and the
Resource Sector (R). Labour is divided into unskilled (L) and skilled (S) labour, with
wages v of skilled worker and w the wage of unskilled worker (with v > w). Output is
generated according to the Cobb-Douglas production functions:
XN = ANS
ΘSN
N L
ΘLN
N (5.1)
XT = AT S
ΘST
T L
ΘLT
T (5.2)
5The World Wealth And Income Database, 2016, accessible from: http://www.wid.world/.
(WID, 2016).
6The Gini coefficient is a statistical measure for distributions. It ranges from 0 (or 0%) to (1 or
100%). An income Gini coefficient of 0 represents a situation in which every individual has the same
income (also called perfect equality). A value of 1 represent a situation of perfect inequality, in which
one individual earns all the income while everyone else earns zero. It can graphically be illustrated
through the Lorenz Curve, which is obtained by plotting the population percentile by income on the
horizontal axis and the cumulative income on the vertical axis. The Gini coefficient is double the area
between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality.
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where output X and productivity A are sector-specific. Perfect factor mobility is as-
sumed, as well as constant returns to scale, so that: ΘSN +ΘLN = 1 and ΘST +ΘLT =
1.7 Aggregate income is denoted as:
Y = pNXN +XT +AT R (5.3)
where pN is the relative price of non-traded goods in terms of traded goods. A resource
boom is defined as an increase in R. Following Torvik (2001) they measure resource
income in the productivity units of the traded sector (AT ).8
Goderis and Malone (2011) distinguish between two relevant sources of inequality
following a resource boom: (1) the unequal distribution of resource income, and (2)
the shift of production factors to the non-traded sector, because at least some parts of
the resource income are spent domestically, whereas the traded sector is not directly
affected by the increase in R. It might even be influenced negatively due to ‘Dutch-
disease’ effects such as an appreciation of the currency. Thus, total inequality (IT )
consists of non-resource inequality (INR) and resource inequality (IR), i.e.
IT = INR + IR (5.4)
The literature focuses on non-resource inequality, as it is argued that this inequality
dominates overall inequality. The non-resource effect dominates in particular the direct
effect from the unequal distribution of resource income. The implicit assumption is that
compared to the total economy the wage payments and the resulting inequality arising
directly from these wage payments within the resource sector are negligible. (Goderis
and Malone, 2011). Non-resource inequality is then defined as:
I =
vS
wL
(5.5)
It is the inequality that arises in the overall economy as a result of the resource ex-
traction, but does not explicitly include the potentially unequal distribution of resource
income. It measures the value share of unskilled labour relative to the value share of
skilled labour.
7They furthermore assume that unskilled and skilled labor earn their marginal products, and with
perfect factor mobility, the marginal product of each factor is equal across sectors. Agents have identical
preferences with Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) utility. Agents maximise their utility with
respect to N and T consumption goods. The model is closed and the markets for traded and non-traded
goods must clear.
8They state that measuring resource income in the productivity units of the traded sector is irrelevant
in the short-run since productivity is assumed to be constant. For further details on long-run implications
see Goderis and Malone (2011).
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In short, a resource boom leads to an increase in R. This additional influx into the
economy leads to a relative increase in spending in the non-traded sector compared
to the traded sector since at least part of the revenues are spent domestically. The
traded sector is not directly impacted by the increase in R, or declines relatively to the
non-traded sector due to ‘Dutch Disease’ effects.
The effect of the natural resource extraction on the above defined non-resource in-
equality is defined by the relative skill intensity of the traded versus the non-traded
sector. Thus, if the non-traded sector is relatively intensive in its use of unskilled
labour, i.e. if ΘLN >ΘLT , then inequality will decline with the resource boom. This is
because the total wages of unskilled labour will increase more than the total wages of
the skilled workers, which reduces inequality, since v>w. If however the traded sector
is relatively intensive in its use of unskilled labour, which means that the non-traded
sector is relatively intensive in it is use of skilled labour, then inequality will increase.
In this case skilled worker will benefit more than unskilled worker from the increase
in R. Goderis and Malone (2011) argue that in developing countries the non-traded
sector tends to be relatively intensive in unskilled labour (e.g. taxi drivers, shop and
restaurant owners, hair dressers, etc.). The traded sector needs to compete with inter-
national standards and tends to require higher skill levels. One would therefore expect
a relative decline in inequality in resource-rich developing countries after a natural re-
source boom. For developed countries, the authors argue that the effect is more likely
to be reversed, although differences in skill-level between traded and non-traded sec-
tors tend to be less strong9. The anticipated effect might therefore be more ambiguous
or less pronounced in developed countries. These theoretical predictions provide the
background for our analysis and may help us interpret any empirical findings.
5.5 Methodology: Synthetic Control
The Synthetic Control method is developed and described in the landmark papers by
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). In our paper we use
two different samples, namely resource-dependent countries and US states, and within
each sample we also have multiple treated units. The method is applied to each sample
separately and within each sample it is also applied separately for each treated unit
at a time. Thus, for each sample (and for each treated unit) we observe the units
j = 1, . . . ,J + 1, which are countries or US states respectively in the analysis10. We
9Goderis and Malone (2011) argue that non-traded sectors which require high skill levels such as
banking, healthcare and other high value-added services tend to dominate the non-traded sectors in
developed countries and are at least as intensive in high-skill labour as the traded sectors.
10Treated units are never used as potential control units for other treated units.
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observe these for the time periods t = 1, . . . ,T in a balanced panel, in which the units
are observed at the same time periods. The first unit is the respectively treated unit (i.e.
j = 1 is the “treated unit”, which is exposed to the shock). So, we are left with J control
units in our “donor pool” that can form the synthetic control unit. The “treatment” or
“shock” occurs in period T0 + 1. Hence, the time periods 1,2, . . . ,T0 are a positive
number of pre-intervention periods, and T0 +1,T0 +2, . . . ,T are a positive number of
post-intervention periods.
We have two potential outcomes: Y Njt is the outcome variable (here the Gini coefficient)
for the untreated unit j at time t. Y Ijt is the Gini coefficient of unit j at time t when
treated. Formally we want to find the effect α1t = Y I1t−Y N1t , which is the difference in
the two potential outcomes. It captures the effect of the treatment on the outcome for
the treated unit j = 1 in the post-intervention period. However, Y Njt cannot be observed
in the post-intervention period for the treated unit j = 1. Thus, we do not know what
the treated unit would have looked like post-treatment if it had not been treated. This is
the motivation for constructing a synthetic control group, which allows us to estimate
this missing potential outcome as closely as possible given the observations in the
donor pool.
Instead of taking a single untreated unit, as it is done in a typical difference-in-
difference setting the synthetic control method takes a weighted average of untreated
units and constructs a synthetic untreated unit. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015) show that this is often more accurate than relying
on a single untreated unit. The synthetic version of the treated country or state is
constructed as a weighted average from the country or states from the donor pool,
i.e. units j = 2, . . . ,J + 1. We have a (J x 1) vector of weights W = (w2, . . . ,wJ+1)′,
for which 0 ≤ w j ≤ 1 and w2 + · · ·+wJ+1 = 1. We then want to choose the weights
W so that the synthetic control resembles most closely the treated unit pre-treatment.
We therefore have a (k x 1) vector X1, which contains the pre-treatment values of the
treated unit of both the key predictors as well as the outcome variable itself. We want
to match these values as closely as possible with the values in the donor pool. We
therefore have a (k x J) matrix X0, which contains the values for the same variables
for the non-treated units (see also Andersson, 2015).
The method aims to find the optimal weights W ∗ = w∗2 + · · ·+w∗J+1 so that the syn-
thetic version of the treated unit best resembles the actually treated unit with respect to
covariates Z j and pre-treatment outcomes, so that
J+1
∑
j=2
w∗jYj1 = Y11,
J+1
∑
j=2
w∗jYj2 = Y12, . . . ,
J+1
∑
j=2
w∗jYjT0 = Y1T0,and
J+1
∑
j=2
w∗jZ j = Z1 (5.6)
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For the post-treatment period T0 +1,T0 +2, . . . ,T we obtain an estimator α1t :
αˆ1t = Y1t−
J+1
∑
j=2
w∗jY jt (5.7)
To implement the synthetic control method, we need to define a measurable distance
of pre-treatment values of the predictors and of the outcome variables, which we can
then minimise. This will give us the most appropriate synthetic counterpart to the
treated unit based on the available observations. Hence, we choose W ∗ to minimise the
distance ||X1−X0W || subject to the weight constraints. More explicitly the synthetic
control method solves for a W ∗ that minimises (see also Abadie et al., 2010; Andersson,
2015)
||X1−X0W ||V =
√
(X1−X0W )′V (X1−X0W ) (5.8)
where V is a symmetric and positive semidefinite (k x k) matrix, which assigns weights
to minimise the mean square prediction error of the synthetic control estimator. The
term V allows us to weight the predictors and assign larger weights to more important
predictors. We choose the data-driven approach to select V , which is recommended by
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2011, 2015). Thus, we select
V so that the mean square prediction error of the outcome variable is minimised over
the entire pre-treatment period11.
Instead of result tables that are typically the standard output of regression analysis, the
synthetic control analysis provides graphical illustration of the effects. It compares
the trend of the weighted untreated unit to the treated unit over the pre- and post-
treatment periods. Robustness checks are obtained through placebo-tests. These can
be conducted either as placebo-in-space or placebo-in-time tests. The placebo-in-space
test applies a placebo-treatment to the control states and compares the effect of the
treatment on the treated unit with the placebo-treatment effect on the control units.
The placebo-in-time test assumes a hypothetical treatment at an earlier year than the
actual treatment. Comparing the outcomes of these placebo tests to the main results
allows the researcher to make an assessment of the robustness of the results. This is
particularly important since the synthetic control method does not provide standard
errors that can be used to assess the statistical significance of effects.
11For non-data driven approaches the researcher could for instance manually assign weights based
on findings from prior studies. This would however require the existence of a large and consolidated
literature, which is not the case in our context.
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5.6 Empirical Specifications
We begin our empirical analysis with simple panel regression estimations to obtain
average effects across multiple treated units. In a second step we will use the quasi-
experimental synthetic control technique to probe a more robust identification of the
effect and to illustrate the effect for each treated unit (country or US state) separately.
Goderis and Malone (2011) observe only short-run effects with the strongest effects for
the first year after a resource boom. Their effects level off over a 5-year period post the
resource boom.12 This provides part of the motivation to apply a quasi-experimental
technique, which is particularly well suited to examine short-term effects using a po-
tential outcomes framework. While we start with simple panel regression techniques
to motivate our study, the emphasis lies on the synthetic control analysis.
For each sample we begin by running pooled OLS, random effects, and fixed effects
regressions. Our regressions set-up is similar to the potential outcome framework with
quasi-experimental techniques. Similarly to the synthetic control method, we define a
pre- and post-treatment period, as well as treated and control units. We prefer to use
the potential outcome framework in this context as it can be regarded as a conservative
estimation strategy. A caveat of this approach is that it uses relatively little variation,
coming only from the binary classification into treated and control units and differences
between the pre- and post-treatment periods. Hence, it does not make use of yearly
variations in oil prices to estimate an effect. An alternative approach would be to use
a panel regression framework that exploits yearly variation in oil prices to estimate the
effect on inequality. However, since inequality moves rather slowly and since the time
lags on the relationship are unclear, we preferred the quasi-experimental approach.
Our preferred fixed-effect regression is specified as follows13
GINI jt = β1NatRes j +β2Shockt +β3NatRes j ·Shockt +β4X jt +α j + γt + ε jt (5.9)
Gini is the respective inequality variable for the unit (country or US state) j at time t.
The variable NatRes is a dummy variable that indicates whether unit j is considered
resource rich. This variable is fixed over time in our analysis. The variable Shock
indicates the treatment at a particular time t, which in our case are the years 1999 on-
wards. Hence, it takes the value of 0 for observations in years prior to 1999 and the
12Their coefficients on long-term effects are insignificant.
13The pooled OLS and Random Effects models are specified similarly without the unit fixed effects.
The pooled OLS does not take into account the panel structure of the data. It is run using Stata’s ‘reg’
command. Random and Fixed Effects estimations are run using Stata’s ‘xtreg’ commands.
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value of 1 from the years 1999 onwards. Our panel starts in 1986 for the country-
level analysis and in 1987 for US states due to missing values in the inequality data
for 1986. The variable of interest is the interaction term of the time-treatment variable
with the dummy variable characterising a natural resource endowment. The estimated
coefficient tells us whether there was a heterogeneous change in inequality after 1998
for countries with natural resource endowments compared to countries without such
endowments. We include a vector X jt of control variables, which is different for the
country- and US state analysis and explained in more detail separately below. In the
respective samples we use the same control variables for the regressions and the syn-
thetic control analysis. α j are country-or state dummies, γt are year fixed effects, and
ε jt is the error term.
Since inequality is a complex phenomenon, there is no consensus on the set of control
variables. A few key variables have been recognised: Per capita income was already
identified as a determinant of inequality by Kuznets (1955). As an economy develops,
workers move from low-income jobs in agriculture to higher income jobs in the indus-
trial sector, which increases inequality initially. As more people move into the indus-
trial sector inequality declines subsequently again, giving rise to an inverted U-shape
(Goderis and Malone, 2011). Education has also been identified as a key determinant
of income inequality. With higher levels of education there is more skilled labour,
which lowers their relative wages and wage inequality (Tinbergen, 1975). Saint-Paul
and Verdier (1993) draw upon the median voter model to explain the link between in-
equality and education. In their theoretical framework with high inequality the median
voter is poor and votes for redistribution through public education, resulting in gradu-
ally increasing levels of human capital, which in turn influence wages and inequality.
A third key determinant of inequality has been attributed to the political economy of
a society and its form of governance. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002) develop a the-
ory to explain the Kuznets curve using political stability and the institutional set-up of
society.
5.6.1 Country-level specification
In our country-level analysis we include the following variables in line with the ex-
isting literature (see Table 5.2 for the summary statistics of the variables). Following
empirical work by Barro (2000) we include GDP per capita in constant 2005 dollars
(GDPpcconstant2005), the level of human capital (HumCapPc) based on the average
years of schooling14, and the PolityScore, which is a measure of the type of governance
14This variable is based on data from Barro and Lee (2013) and assumed rates of return to education
based on Mincer equation estimates around the world from Psacharopoulos (1994).
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in place in the respective country (CSP, 2014). It has a point scale and ranges from -10
(hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Furthermore we add to these
variables: Number of people engaged in the labour market as a proportion of the popu-
lation (NoEngagedPop) as a characteristic of the labour market, Gross Capital Forma-
tion (GrossCapForm) to capture investment, and GDP growth (GDPgrowthpercent)
to control for different trends in economic development. Apart from the Polity Score
all variables are taken from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al., 2015). The depen-
dent variable (GINI) is taken from the Standardised World Income Inequality Database
(SWIID) (Solt, 2016), which provides the most comprehensive country-year coverage
for inequality data.1516
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max 
Gini 45.97 6.60 20.25 69.36 
Nat. Res. Dep. 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Oil Price Shock 0.48 0.50 0 1 
NatResDep*Shock 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Share of population engaged in 
labour market 
0.41 0.08 0.20 0.72 
Education  level (human capital 
per capita) 
3.35 5.00 1.29 49.40 
Gross Capital Formation (% of 
GDP) 
0.23 0.07 0.03 0.59 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 
USD) 
15924.66 16954.81 136.65 87772.69 
GDP growth (%) 3.76 4.17 -50.25 35.22 
Polity Score 6.18 5.45 -9 10 	
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for country-level variables.
5.6.2 State-level Specification
For the US state-level analysis the variable selection differs from the cross-country
analysis (see Table 5.3 for descriptive statistics of the variables used in the state-level
analysis). While states differ to some degree in their institutional set-up they are nev-
ertheless constrained within the US federal system and thus institutional differences
do not have the same relevance as in the cross-country analysis. Furthermore, the
United States is a single labour market, in which individuals can move relatively freely
between states. Compared to the cross-country analysis differences in educational at-
tainment across US states are less pronounced. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge
15We use the market inequality variable, which is the inequality arising from the market before redis-
tribution, as it captures more closely the concept of the non-resource sector inequality in the theoretical
model developed by Goderis and Malone (2011).
16For the Synthetic control method we also use three pre-treatment Gini values as special predictors,
which is in line with Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015).
191
there is no comprehensive data on annual state-level educational attainment reaching
back until the 1980s.17 Furthermore, we are constrained by the available data for
a sufficiently long panel within the Regional Economic Accounts of the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) (BEA, 2016). We selected GDP per capita (GDPpc) and
GDP growth (GDPgrowth) to control for different levels of development and differ-
ent trends. We also included the employment rate (EmploymentPop), which is sim-
ilar to the proportion of individuals engaged in the labour force in the cross-country
analysis. We include government transfers received per capita (Trans f erPop) to al-
low for redistributive policies within the states and include average dividend incomes
(DividendsPop) to control for non-wage incomes. For the US state-level analysis the
inequality data is taken from Frank (2014), which is to our knowledge the only avail-
able source of long-run annual inequality data at the state-level.1819
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gini 58.07 3.64 48.94 71.14 
Nat. Res. Depend. 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Price shock 0.54 0.50 0 1 
NatRes*Shock 0.06 0.24 0 1 
GDP per cap. (USD) 38825.74 17786 15468 172917 
GDP growth (%) 2.61 2.88 -10.3 19.5 
Transfers Received per 
capita (thds. USD) 
4.12 1.83 1.23 9.29 
Share of population in 
employment 
0.59 0.11 0.40 1.38 
Dividend payments per 
capita (thds. USD) 
5.52 1.94 1.91 15.40 
	
Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for US state-level variables
17The US Census bureau provides yearly estimates based on its 5-yearly census collec-
tion back until 2009 (https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/
productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_S1501)
18Again, in the synthetic control analysis, we also use three pre-treatment GINI values as special
predictors, as recommended by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2015).
19To the best of our knowledge there is no equivalent variable to the gross fixed capital formation at
the US state level available from the BEA. We believe that any differences in these investment levels,
which are much smaller between US states than between countries, are controlled for by the state- and
year- fixed effects. Furthermore, the variable is not significant in any of the robust regression models at
the country-level, suggesting that it may not be an important determinant of income inequality.
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5.7 Results
As a starting point and to motivate our further analysis using quasi-experimental meth-
ods, we begin with simple panel data estimation techniques. We run separate regres-
sions with the Gini coefficient as the dependent variable starting with pooled OLS,
followed by random- and fixed effects.20
Our main variable of interest is the interaction of natural resource dependence and the
post 1998 price shock (NatRes ·Shock). It captures the average effect of the price rise
on resource dependent units relative to non resource-dependent units. Across the two
samples and the different models we observe a negative sign for the coefficient. We
run the random and fixed effect models initially without any further controls (Models 3
and 6). We run all models once with standard errors clustered at the unit-level (country
or state respectively) (Models 2, 5, 8) and once without clustering (Models 1, 4, 7).
Without clustering the effects of the coefficient of interest (the interaction NatRes ·
Shock) are significant particularly in the US analysis. However, the coefficients be-
come insignificant across all models once we cluster the standard errors at the unit
level. Without clustering the standard errors are likely to be too small as they rely on
the assumption that the error term is independently and identically distributed and that
there is no correlation between observations in the same unit. Yet, observations within
the same state- or country are likely to be correlated. Clustering standard errors at the
unit level allows for such serial correlation within units. The sharp drop in significance
after clustering the standard errors at the unit level is a problem that is similarly dis-
cussed in Parcero and Papyrakis (2016) and also may arise in part due to the use of
variables with relatively little variation over time.21
Overall we observe negative coefficients on the interaction variable across all models.
Yet, we do not observe significance after clustering the standard errors at the unit-level.
We discuss the panel regression results in more detail separately for the country- and
the state-level analysis below:
5.7.1 Panel Results - Country Level
The country-level regression results are presented in Table 5.4. Across all models we
observe that the post-1998 time period is characterised by significantly (at 1%) higher
levels of inequality. This is in line with findings by Piketty (2013) who showed that for
20Since the country-status on natural resource ownership is not time-variant, the coefficient gets
dropped from the fixed effects estimation.
21Furthermore, we have relatively few units at which we cluster the standard errors (51 states; 52
countries), which may become problematic for fixed-effect estimations.
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developed countries inequality levels have been rising since the 1980s. The interaction
term (NatRes ·Shock) is negative but not significant in the robustly estimated models.
Furthermore, the coefficients on the interaction are smaller than the coefficients of the
post-1998 dummy variable (Shock). This suggests that inequality levels also increased
for resource rich countries, but relatively less so compared to non-resource rich ones
(although the difference is not significant). For the control variables, we see that the
employment share is negatively and significantly associated with income inequality,
which is as expected. In the random- and fixed-effects models we see that the polity
score is negatively associated (although not significantly so in the robustly estimated
models). This would suggest that higher scores, meaning more democratic forms of
government, are associated with lower levels of inequality. Interestingly, we observe
that per capita income and the level of schooling seem to be positively associated with
income inequality. This suggests that on average for the countries in our panel higher
levels of income and schooling are associated with higher levels of income inequality.
5.7.2 Panel Results - US States
The results of the regression analysis at the state-level are presented in Table 5.5. From
the OLS and random effects models, we see that relatively resource dependent US
states have significantly higher levels of income inequality.22 We also see that post-
1998 inequality levels seem to have increased in US States. Yet the significance dis-
appears when clustering standard errors at the state level. The interaction between re-
source wealth and the time-dummy is negative, but the size of the coefficient is smaller
than the coefficient of the time dummy. Hence, income inequality increased post 1998
on average also for resource dependent states, but slightly less so than for non-resource
dependent ones. Again, the coefficients on the interaction term become insignificant
after clustering the standard errors at the state-level. For the control variables, we
see that per capita income is significantly (at 5%) negatively associated with income
inequality, which is different from the country-level analysis, but might reflect the
overall higher level of income in the US compared to some of the countries covered in
the country-analysis. The employment share appears to be negatively associated with
inequality, although the coefficient is only significant in the fixed effect framework
without clustered standard errors. Transfer payments per capita are positively asso-
ciated with income inequality. This might seem counter-intuitive. Yet, these do not
show causal estimates. This coefficient might just reflect the need for larger transfer
payments in states with higher levels of income inequality. The other control variable
coefficients show no significant associations across models.
22The natural resource dummy is automatically dropped from the fixed-effects specifications, as it
does not vary over time.
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5.7.3 Results - Synthetic Control
In this section we present the results from the quasi-experimental Synthetic Control
method. While the above regression gave us average effects across the group of coun-
tries or states, this approach allows us to explore in detail the paths of individual
units.23 An advantage of the synthetic control method is that it allows for more ro-
bust inference by creating a synthetic counterfactual. The synthetic counterfactual is
created by a data-driven approach that minimises the distance between the respectively
treated unit and synthetic counterfactual. Results are shown graphically. Figures 5.4
and 5.5 contain the main effects for the country- and state-level analysis respectively.
The solid blue line indicates the trend of the respectively ‘treated’ unit and the grey
dashed line shows the trend of the respective synthetic counterpart. The red line indi-
cates the last year of the pre-treatment period (i.e. 1998). To the left of the red line we
try to match the treated and synthetic counterpart as closely as possible. If the synthetic
counterpart is sufficiently well matched before the treatment, the difference between
the blue and the dashed grey line on the right side indicates a treatment effect.
5.7.3.1 Synthetic Control: Country-level Analysis
In the country-level analysis we see the challenge in obtaining sufficiently close coun-
terfactuals for country-level variables. Countries differ across many characteristics and
hence it can be quite difficult to get a close match. In addition, inequality appears to
be a variable that is difficult to predict across countries through other macro-variables.
Overall, we tend to see that post-1998 the respectively treated units observe lower
levels of income inequality, as the blue lines tend to be below the dash lines. This
can be interpreted as being in line with the panel regression results. Yet, as in the re-
gression results we remain doubtful whether this indicates a significant relationship.
Overall, the pre-treatment match is not very close in particular for Indonesia, Mex-
ico and Venezuela. This raises concerns on whether the synthetic counterfactuals are
sufficiently precise and show a true treatment effect. To verify the results we conduct
placebo-in-time (Figure E.1 in Appendix E.2) and the placebo-in-space (Figure E.3
in Appendix E.3) tests. The placebo-in-time test assumes a hypothetical treatment at
an earlier year than the actual treatment. We set the year to be 1993, as it lies in the
23Regression-specifications with country dummy-variables, would also allow us to offer further in-
sights at the country-by-country level. However, we decided instead to apply the synthetic control
method, as it allows for more robust inference due to a more flexible and thereby arguably better con-
trol group. The method allows for more flexibility compared to other panel regression specifications
(e.g. difference-in-difference). It is a data-driven approach to create a synthetic counterfactual consist-
ing of shares of individual counterfactual units. Thereby, the researcher does not have to choose the
counterfactual itself, but only the variables based on which the counterfactual is generated.
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middle of the pre-treatment time period. Changing the year for the placebo test does
not change the results. We would like to observe two lines that follow each other very
closely. This would indicate that there is no placebo treatment in 1993 and that the
treated and control units behave similarly. However, for the cross-country data we ob-
serve for some countries large differences between the two lines. The countries in the
sample appear to differ on unobserved characteristics, making it difficult to create good
synthetic counterparts. Furthermore, by setting an earlier placebo treatment we now
only have seven pre-treatment observations to create the synthetic counterpart. With
fewer observations the algorithm has less data to draw from to create the synthetic
counterparts, making the match less precise.
The placebo-in-space test (Figure E.3 in Appendix E.3) applies a placebo treatment
to the control units and compares the effect of the treatment for the treated unit with
the placebo effect on the control units. The grey lines show the difference in the Gini
coefficient between each country in the donor pool and its synthetic counterfactual.
What we would ideally like to observe is that units with a good pre-treatment fit, i.e.
units which are grouped closely around zero pre-treatment, observe less extreme values
post-treatment relative to the solid black line (the treated unit). This would increase
our confidence that the lower levels of inequality for the treated units do not just occur
due to chance. With our sample we are not able to observe such clear-cut placebo-in-
space tests. Yet, these challenges in obtaining precise placebo tests with macro-level
variables are not uncommon in similar studies (see for example Liou and Musgrave,
2014).
Our country-level results do not allow us to draw strong conclusions on the relationship
between resource dependence and income inequality. The negative interaction and the
relative decline of the respectively treated units compared to the synthetic counterparts
could suggest supporting evidence for the theoretical framework developed by Goderis
and Malone (2011). However, our data does not allow us to conclude that the effect is
statistically significant.
5.7.3.2 Synthetic Control: US-State Analysis
For the US we observe that the pre-treatment fit is better compared to the cross-country
analysis. This indicates that US states are more similar to each other than countries,
and that for US states it is easier to predict income inequality based on other macro-
variables. Texas has the most notable post-treatment trend, for which we observe lower
levels of income inequality relative to the synthetic counterfactual. For Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Wyoming and New Mexico we observe no strong treatment effects. The
treated and counterfactual lines follow each other relatively closely post treatment.
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Figure 5.4: Synthetic Control Results Country-level
This holds particularly for the first two. In the case of Wyoming and New Mexico the
results could be interpreted as having slightly higher levels of inequality compared to
their counterfactuals. The effects tend to emerge a few years after the treatment.
The placebo-in-time tests (Figure E.2 in Appendix E.2) look relatively good for New
Mexico and Oklahoma. The solid and the dashed lines follow each other fairly closely
throughout. Regarding the placebo-in-space tests, we can again not rule out that the
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Figure 5.5: Synthetic Control Results for US States
effects emerge due to chance. None of the black lines show the most pronounced
treatment effect relative to the placebo treatments for the control states (grey lines)
(Figure E.4 in Appendix E.3). We observe placebo treatments among control states
with a good pre-treatment fit and more extreme post-treatment values. Therefore, we
cannot rule out that our effects occurred due to chance. As stated above this is not
an uncommon problem in synthetic control studies on macro variables (e.g. Liou and
Musgrave, 2014). Overall we are more confident in the US-state level results than in
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the country-level findings, since the pre-treatment fit is better than in the case of the
cross-country analysis. The results however suggest no significant treatment effect of
the post-1998 oil price boom on within state income inequality.
5.8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature on the relationship between natural resource
booms and socio-economic outcome variables at the country- and US state-level. Most
of the existing literature on the resource curse looks at aggregate outcome variables
such as GDP, or human development indicators, but not explicitly at distributional
variables. While the early literature on natural resource wealth has found support for
a resource curse largely from cross-sectional data, many of the more recent findings
using panel data have attenuated the earlier results. Country-specific characteristics,
such as institutional systems and institutional quality, matter for the management of
natural resource wealth. Hence, the use of panel data (with unit fixed effects) and the
construction of suitable counterfactuals are important in this context. Inequality has
become an increasingly important outcome variable as high levels of inequality tend
to be associated with lower levels of social cohesion, productivity and may increase
transaction costs in society due to lower levels of trust. If high levels of inequality lead
to social unrest, they can also have negative impacts on economic growth and overall
welfare (see e.g. Jayadev and Bowles, 2006; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Stiglitz,
2009).
Natural resources provide a unique type of income arising partly by chance due to
the location of the resource and can be considered a form of “unearned income” (Se-
gal, 2011, p.1). The overall distribution of benefits arising from natural resources can
therefore be particularly contentious. Studying the effect of natural resource booms on
inequality is therefore important. It can help in anticipating distributional implications
and help design policies that can counteract such effects.
In this paper we examine the impact of the shift from a low- to a high oil price regime
post 1998 on income inequality for resource dependent countries and US states using
panel data. We specifically contribute to the literature in two ways. First, we apply a
quasi-experimental methodology to study distributional outcomes of the oil price shock
post 1998, which to the best of our knowledge has not been done before. Second, to
the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to provide evidence of the effect of
resource booms on income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) within US
states. We analyse the relationship for a time period that is characterised by particularly
high levels of inequality, for which outcomes may systematically differ from earlier
201
low-inequality periods.
Our empirical approach is motivated by the theoretical framework of Corden and Neary
(1982) and Goderis and Malone (2011). The framework predicts a relative decline
in inequality following a resource boom, in particular for developing, resource rich
countries. By adopting panel regression techniques, as well as the quasi-experimental
synthetic control method, we are able to show average effects across all resource rich
units, as well as identify unit-specific effects, which allows for a more detailed insight.
Overall we do not find strong support for an effect of the post-1998 oil price boom on
income inequality within resource dependent countries or US states.
While we observe negative coefficients on inequality for resource rich units in the post-
treatment period, the results are not robustly significant. Similar results are obtained
from the synthetic control analysis. While we tend to see a relative decline in income
inequality for the resource rich units, the effect is not well identified due to difficulties
in creating sufficiently good control groups. The placebo tests cannot rule out that
we observe any of the effects due to chance. It shows the difficulty in creating close
counterfactuals for inequality levels for resource dependent countries and US states.
Furthermore, the measurement of income inequality data may provide a challenge for
empirical analysis. Since the data is typically collected from household surveys, the
data may be imprecise or imperfectly measured. Limited yearly variation in inequality
data also provides a challenge for statistical inference. Overall, the main constraint
for our analysis arises from the availability of comprehensive and sufficiently detailed
time series inequality data for resource dependent countries.
We conclude that further work in this field is necessary to better understand the rela-
tionship between resource discoveries, -prices and distributional outcomes. With more
granular data becoming available on income deciles (such as for example the top in-
come shares), disaggregating effects by decile will become possible. This could iden-
tify individual income groups that benefit and those that lose out from resource booms.
This is important for policy-making to anticipate and manage the distributional impacts
of resource wealth.
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Concluding remarks
This thesis makes contributions to two broader literatures within environmental eco-
nomics. In the first part, it helps to improve our understanding of the relationship
between firm-level environmental and economic performance variables. In the second
part it examines distributional questions within environmental economics.
The first part begins with a review of the extensive literature on the relationship be-
tween environmental and economic performance variables at the firm level. The liter-
ature has generally found positive associations between firms’ environmental and their
economic performance, although reverse effects also exist. Most of these studies have
focused on environmental performance measures capturing emissions of pollutants and
the adoption of international standards. One main reason for such effects appears to be
that firms, which reduce material or energy costs are able to improve their economic
performance, while reducing their environmental impact. A limitation of the exist-
ing literature is that it has largely relied on cross-sectional data, binary environmental
performance indicators, or limited sector coverage. Moreover, the evidence on the rela-
tionship between environmental or ‘green’ product differentiation and firms’ economic
performance is very scarce. Examining whether diversifying into such goods and ser-
vices is financially rewarded is however important as it can inform policy design to
harness market forces to stimulate innovation that addresses environmental problems.
In chapter 2 we contribute to this literature by using a novel measure capturing firms’
share of revenues from producing ‘green’ goods and services. We investigate in par-
ticular the ‘revenue channel’, through which firms may improve their economic per-
formance by (green) product differentiation or improved access to new markets. The
data allows us to examine the relationship using a continuous variable in a multi-year
panel across a broad group of sectors for listed firms covering approximately 98% of
global market capitalisation. We draw on the financial accounting literature and use
a comprehensive set of accounting- and market based economic indicators and offer
insight into the relationship between these indicators. We show that producing green
goods and services is associated with higher operative profitability margins, across a
broad group of sectors. These higher operative margins may however not translate into
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higher overall profitability. Producing green goods and services tends to require addi-
tional investments, which impose a downward drag on firms’ overall profitability. With
respect to investor valuation, higher green revenues are neither punished nor rewarded
by investors, except for utilities, which tend to be sheltered from market forces and face
unique regulatory settings. We show that relevant heterogeneities exist across sectors
and economic performance metrics. Our empirical findings suggest that public policies
can support and potentially accelerate the transition towards low-carbon technologies
by facilitating cheaper access to capital for investments into green technologies. R&D
support may also be necessary to reduce the costs of low-carbon technologies in sec-
tors, in which the costs of such technologies are still relatively high. Helping to create
and expand clearly distinguished markets for green goods and services (e.g. through
labelling or additional information) may also help firms to move into such markets and
invest in green technologies. While this chapter overcomes some important shortcom-
ings of the prior literature and provides novel insights, an important limitation of this
chapter, and the broader literature, remains that we are not able to establish causality.
We address this limitation partly in chapter 3.
In chapter 3 we use event study methodology to examine whether financial markets
reward environmental activities of firms. In particular we use the Paris Agreement, as
it potentially created a shift in rewards for such environmental activities. We show that
firms generating revenues from producing green goods and services have significantly
outperformed the market in the week following the agreement, with the greenest firms
experiencing 10% higher returns relative to the overall market. The effect exists both
at the extensive and intensive margin of firms’ green revenue share. This finding sug-
gests that investors perceive the Paris Agreement to provide a credible mechanism to
increase the diffusion and adoption of green technologies. We however observe that
emissions intensity is a less clear-cut predictor for firms’ stock performance follow-
ing the agreement. Overall, the most emissions-intensive firms have not experienced
different returns compared to the overall market. We observe important sectoral het-
erogeneities, and show that emissions-intensive electricity providers have marginally
outperformed the market. Despite being emissions-intensive, these firms are also ac-
tive in green technologies, largely by producing electricity from renewable sources.
Investors might anticipate that the transition towards low-carbon technologies will be
easier for these firms relative to firms in other sectors.
The second part of the thesis examines distributional questions within environmen-
tal economics. In chapter 4 I analyse distributional preferences within the context
of global climate adaptation finance. I use primary data collected through a discrete
choice experiment from a representative sample of the UK population, a large donor
country. Understanding public preferences for climate policies is crucial to ensure
204
and increase public support for such policies. I elicit preferences with respect to two
distributional dimensions. First, the preferred burden sharing principle among UK
individuals. Second the preferred distribution of financial resources across heteroge-
neous groups of individuals. The results show that, contrary to climate mitigation
policies, individuals tend to prefer an ‘ability-to-pay’ approach over a ‘polluter pays’
mechanism in the context of climate adaptation finance. This suggests that using car-
bon pricing to collect financial resources for a climate adaptation fund is likely to be
less popular compared to payment mechanisms based on income levels. This finding
may imply that individuals do not see a strong link between their individual carbon
emissions and their potential responsibility to contribute to global climate adaptation
funds. This might suggest that generating support for climate adaptation policies may
be even more challenging than in the case of climate mitigation. With regard to the sec-
ond distributional dimension, we show that individuals have distributional preferences
and prefer relatively egalitarian allocation decisions over purely utilitarian ones. Since
financial support for global climate adaptation is likely to be scarce, difficult moral
judgements will need to be made with respect to the resource allocation. While expert
knowledge will be key in deciding how to allocate such resources, having broad public
support for the allocation decisions will be important to ensure public support in the
long run. While the results provide a first indication of such distributional preferences,
further work is required to quantify such equity-efficiency trade offs more precisely.
Overall, the results reveal vastly insufficient support for climate adaptation policies.
Further work is also required to test alternative policy framings and -attributes, which
could help to increase public support.
In Chapter 5 this thesis contributes to the literature on socio-economic outcomes of nat-
ural resource wealth. Most of the prior literature has focused on aggregate outcomes
such as GDP or human development indicators. Relatively little work has examined
the distributional impacts of resource booms. The distribution of income arising from
natural resources may however be particularly contentious and require a unique man-
agement. Natural resource income arises partly due to chance because of the resource
location. It has therefore been argued that such income should be distributed equally
across the population. Since high levels of inequality can be detrimental to societies
by diminishing societal cohesion and willingness to pursue public goods, it is particu-
larly important for policy makers to manage any distributional implications of resource
wealth. This chapter examines the impact on income inequality arising due to a shift
from a low- to a high oil price regime for resource rich countries and US states. Us-
ing panel regressions as well as quasi-experimental methodology, it shows average
impacts, as well as country- or state-specific effects. Overall, it does not find strong
support for an effect of the post-1998 oil price boom on income inequality. The avail-
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ability of inequality data provides a major limitation for this analysis. Furthermore,
limited variation in the variables at the country- or state-level may make it difficult
to identify an effect, in particular when using quasi-experimental methods. As more
granular data on individual income quantiles becomes available, this offers an interest-
ing avenue for further research. It would be valuable to know impacts on individual
income groups, rather than analysing the effect on aggregate inequality metrics, which
may hide quantile-level effects.
Lastly, I would like to emphasise two main concluding remarks from this thesis. First,
climate change requires drastic and fast measures to reduce emissions across a broad
group of industries and technologies in the economy. Setting the right policy frame-
works and incentives will be fundamental to achieving the transition towards a low-
carbon economy within the remaining time window and with manageable costs. Sec-
ond, considering and managing the distributional consequences of climate and envi-
ronmental policies will be essential for building and ensuring long run public support
for such measures.
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En
er
gy
 (M
IN
ER
) (
pu
bl
ic
). 
 
B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
 a
nd
 In
co
m
e 
St
at
em
en
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ar
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l 
Se
cu
rit
ie
s M
ar
ke
t C
om
m
is
si
on
 
(C
N
M
V
), 
w
hi
ch
 is
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fo
r p
ub
lic
ly
 li
st
ed
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
.  
 
Pa
ne
l (
19
90
-
19
95
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s s
tu
dy
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
Sp
an
is
h 
In
du
st
ria
l a
nd
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
fo
r t
he
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t (
PI
TM
A
), 
a 
su
bs
id
iz
ed
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t p
ro
gr
am
m
e.
 T
he
y 
fin
d 
a 
sm
al
l n
eg
at
iv
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
or
k 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 a
nd
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
de
di
ca
te
d 
to
 c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
w
ith
 
th
e 
po
llu
tio
n 
st
an
da
rd
. T
he
y 
ar
gu
e 
th
at
 th
is
 re
su
lt 
is
 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
to
 th
e 
co
m
m
an
d-
an
d-
co
nt
ro
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
st
ud
ie
d 
an
d 
m
ay
 n
ot
 b
e 
ge
ne
ra
liz
ed
 to
 
m
or
e 
fle
xi
bl
e 
ty
pe
s o
f 
re
gu
la
tio
n.
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B
ro
be
rg
 e
t a
l. 
20
13
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t. 
Te
ch
ni
ca
l 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y.
 
Fi
ve
 S
w
ed
is
h 
in
du
st
rie
s:
 w
oo
d 
an
d 
w
oo
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
 (2
79
 o
bs
.),
 
pu
lp
 a
nd
 p
ap
er
 (3
04
 o
bs
.),
 
ch
em
ic
al
s (
28
9 
ob
s.)
, r
ub
be
r 
an
d 
pl
as
tic
s (
22
3 
ob
s.)
, b
as
ic
 
m
et
al
s (
19
9 
ob
s.)
. 
 Tw
o 
da
ta
 so
ur
ce
s f
ro
m
 
St
at
is
tic
s S
w
ed
en
: 1
) 
In
du
st
ria
l E
co
no
m
ic
 S
ta
tis
tic
s 
(li
ce
nc
e)
, 2
) I
nd
us
tri
es
’ 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 (l
ic
en
ce
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
99
-
20
04
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 u
se
 u
ni
qu
e 
da
ta
 o
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
 th
e 
Sw
ed
is
h 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
st
ry
 a
s a
 
pr
ox
y 
fo
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
st
rin
ge
nc
y.
 T
hi
s a
llo
w
s t
he
m
 
to
 se
pa
ra
te
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 in
to
 
po
llu
tio
n 
pr
ev
en
tio
n 
an
d 
po
llu
tio
n 
co
nt
ro
l. 
Th
ey
 u
se
 a
 
st
oc
ha
st
ic
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fr
on
tie
r 
m
od
el
 to
 e
st
im
at
e 
if 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
af
fe
ct
s f
irm
s’
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y.
 T
he
y 
do
 n
ot
 fi
nd
 
su
pp
or
t f
or
 th
e 
Po
rte
r 
H
yp
ot
he
si
s a
s t
he
y 
ob
se
rv
e 
a 
w
ea
k 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y.
 
D
ar
na
ll,
 2
00
9 
N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
U
se
, S
ol
id
 
W
as
te
, W
as
te
-w
at
er
 
ef
flu
en
t, 
A
ir 
po
llu
tio
n,
 
G
re
en
ho
us
e 
G
as
es
, O
ve
ra
ll 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
. 
Se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
pr
of
its
. 
Th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
va
rie
s a
cr
os
s m
od
el
s d
ue
 to
 
di
ff
er
en
t r
es
po
ns
e 
ra
te
s f
or
 
ea
ch
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 N
at
ur
al
 
re
so
ur
ce
 u
se
 (2
60
9)
, S
ol
id
 
W
as
te
 (2
64
2)
, W
as
te
 W
at
er
 
(2
38
6)
, A
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
(2
12
3)
, 
G
H
G
s (
17
23
), 
O
ve
ra
ll 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
 (1
51
7)
. 
 Su
rv
ey
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
O
EC
D
’s
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
D
ire
ct
or
at
e.
 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(s
ur
ve
y 
w
as
 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
in
 
20
03
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s u
se
 a
n 
O
EC
D
 
su
rv
ey
 a
cr
os
s s
ev
en
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
to
 te
st
 th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
st
rin
ge
nc
y 
on
 fi
rm
s' 
pr
of
its
. 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 th
at
 m
or
e 
st
rin
ge
nt
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ol
ic
y 
re
gi
m
es
 
ar
e 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s' 
pr
of
its
. T
hi
s r
es
ul
t 
ho
ld
s f
or
 e
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
.  
Fu
jii
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
3 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s, 
ch
em
ic
al
 
em
is
si
on
s r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 sa
le
s. 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 A
ss
et
s 
(R
O
A
), 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 
Sa
le
s (
R
O
S)
, 
C
ap
ita
l T
ur
no
ve
r 
(C
T)
. 
75
8 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s f
or
 C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s;
 2
49
8 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s 
fo
r t
ox
ic
 c
he
m
ic
al
s e
m
is
si
on
s. 
 
Pa
ne
l; 
fo
r C
O
2 
em
is
si
on
s (
20
06
-
20
08
); 
fo
r t
ox
ic
 
ch
em
ic
al
s (
20
01
-
20
08
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
di
ff
er
s a
cr
os
s p
ol
lu
ta
nt
s:
  
Fo
r t
ox
ic
 c
he
m
ic
al
 su
bs
ta
nc
es
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G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
m
an
da
to
ry
 G
H
G
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
an
d 
R
ep
or
tin
g 
Sy
st
em
 o
f t
he
 
Ja
pa
ne
se
 M
in
is
try
 o
f 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t, 
Po
llu
ta
nt
 
R
el
ea
se
 a
nd
 T
ra
ns
fe
r R
eg
is
te
r 
(P
R
TR
) f
ro
m
 M
in
is
try
 o
f 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t (
lic
en
ce
), 
fin
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 N
ik
ke
i 
Ec
on
om
ic
 E
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
da
ta
ba
se
 
sy
st
em
 (l
ic
en
ce
). 
 
th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
ve
rte
d 
U
-s
ha
pe
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
R
O
A
 a
nd
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. F
or
 C
O
2 
Em
is
si
on
s t
he
y 
fin
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 p
os
iti
ve
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
R
O
A
, 
R
O
S 
an
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. T
he
y 
fin
d 
no
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 
C
T.
 
G
ra
y 
an
d 
Sh
ad
be
gi
an
, 
20
03
 
 A
ba
te
m
en
t c
os
ts
. 
 P
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
. 
 1
16
 U
S 
pu
lp
 a
nd
 p
ap
er
 p
la
nt
s. 
 Lo
ng
itu
di
na
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(L
R
D
) c
on
ta
in
in
g 
da
ta
 fr
om
 th
e 
A
nn
ua
l S
ur
ve
y 
of
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 th
e 
C
en
su
s o
f M
an
uf
ac
tu
re
rs
 
lin
ke
d 
to
ge
th
er
, P
A
C
E 
su
rv
ey
 
fo
r a
nn
ua
l a
ba
te
m
en
t c
os
t d
at
a 
(li
ce
nc
e)
.  
Pa
ne
l (
19
79
-
19
90
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 te
st
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
on
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 d
iff
er
s b
y 
pl
an
t v
in
ta
ge
 a
nd
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
. 
Pl
an
ts
 w
ith
 h
ig
he
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t c
os
ts
 h
av
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 lo
w
er
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 le
ve
ls
. T
he
 e
ff
ec
t 
de
pe
nd
s s
tro
ng
ly
 o
n 
pl
an
ts
’ 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
. T
he
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
hi
gh
er
 
ab
at
em
en
t c
os
ts
 a
nd
 lo
w
er
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 le
ve
ls
 is
 la
rg
el
y 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
m
ill
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
in
co
rp
or
at
e 
a 
pu
lp
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s. 
Th
ey
 sh
ow
 a
 st
ro
ng
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f a
ba
te
m
en
t c
os
t o
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. F
or
 m
ill
s 
w
ith
ou
t s
uc
h 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 is
 n
eg
lig
ib
le
. 
H
ib
ik
i e
t a
l.,
 
20
03
 
IS
O
14
00
1 
ce
rti
fic
at
io
n.
 
St
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
s;
 
To
bi
n'
s Q
 (m
ar
ke
t 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
fir
m
). 
57
3 
pu
bl
ic
ly
-h
el
d 
fir
m
s i
n 
th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
st
ry
 li
st
ed
 
at
 th
e 
To
ky
o 
St
oc
k 
Ex
ch
an
ge
. 
  
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(y
ea
r 2
00
2)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s f
in
d 
th
at
 th
e 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
IS
O
 1
40
01
 c
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
co
nt
rib
ut
es
 to
 a
 st
at
is
tic
al
ly
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f t
he
 fi
rm
 b
y 
11
%
 to
 1
4%
. T
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
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ex
pl
ai
n 
th
is
 fi
nd
in
g 
w
ith
 tw
o 
po
ss
ib
le
 e
ff
ec
ts
: t
he
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l r
is
k 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
lo
w
er
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t c
os
t 
if 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ol
ic
y 
is
 
tig
ht
en
ed
 in
 th
e 
fu
tu
re
.  
H
or
va
th
ov
a,
 
20
12
 
C
om
po
si
te
 in
di
ca
to
r o
n 
93
 
po
llu
ta
nt
s (
ai
r, 
w
at
er
, l
an
d,
 
of
f-
si
te
 tr
an
sf
er
s o
f w
as
te
, 
po
llu
ta
nt
s i
n 
w
as
te
 w
at
er
 
fr
om
 in
du
st
ria
l f
ac
ili
tie
s)
. 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 A
ss
et
s 
(R
O
A
), 
R
et
ur
n 
on
 
Eq
ui
ty
 (R
O
E)
. 
13
6 
C
ze
ch
 fi
rm
s. 
 En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
da
ta
 fr
om
 in
te
gr
at
ed
 re
gi
st
er
 
of
 p
ol
lu
ta
nt
 e
m
is
si
on
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
is
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
Po
llu
ta
nt
 R
el
ea
se
 a
nd
 T
ra
ns
fe
r 
re
gi
st
er
 (E
PR
T)
 (p
ub
lic
ly
 
av
ai
la
bl
e)
, d
at
a 
on
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
sy
st
em
s a
re
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 u
si
ng
 
pu
bl
ic
ly
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
da
ta
ba
se
 
(w
w
w
.is
o.
cz
) a
nd
 d
ou
bl
e-
ch
ec
ki
ng
 th
e 
w
eb
si
te
s o
f 
co
m
pa
ni
es
, f
in
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 fr
om
 a
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 
fir
m
 d
at
ab
as
e 
C
re
di
tIn
fo
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
04
-
20
08
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
B
et
te
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
ec
re
as
es
 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 in
 th
e 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
ye
ar
, b
ut
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
fte
r 
tw
o 
ye
ar
s. 
 
Ja
co
bs
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
10
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
In
iti
at
iv
es
 (C
EI
) 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
, w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
co
rp
or
at
e 
ef
fo
rts
 to
 a
vo
id
, m
iti
ga
te
 o
r 
of
fs
et
 th
e 
fir
m
's 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
. 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l A
w
ar
ds
 a
nd
 
C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
(E
A
C
) 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
, w
hi
ch
 a
re
 
aw
ar
ds
 g
ra
nt
ed
 b
y 
th
ird
 
pa
rti
es
. E
A
C
 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
 in
cl
ud
e 
IS
O
 
14
00
1 
an
d 
LE
ED
 
A
bn
or
m
al
 re
tu
rn
s 
on
 st
oc
k 
pr
ic
es
. 
34
0 
fir
m
s a
cr
os
s 6
3 
th
re
e-
di
gi
t 
N
A
IC
S 
co
de
s, 
w
ith
 a
 to
ta
l o
f 
78
0 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
; 4
17
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
In
iti
at
iv
es
 (C
EI
), 
36
3 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l A
w
ar
ds
 a
nd
 
C
er
tif
ic
at
io
n 
(E
A
C
). 
 D
at
as
et
 c
re
at
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
 in
 n
ew
sp
ap
er
s. 
 
Pa
ne
l; 
ev
en
t 
st
ud
y 
ov
er
 a
 2
00
-
da
y 
pe
rio
d,
 w
hi
ch
 
is
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 fi
rm
's 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s e
xa
m
in
e 
th
e 
st
oc
k 
m
ar
ke
t r
ea
ct
io
n 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
ts
 o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 n
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
ff
ec
t 
fo
r t
he
 a
gg
re
ga
te
d 
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 
C
EI
 a
nd
 E
A
C
 a
nn
ou
nc
em
en
ts
. 
Y
et
, t
he
y 
ob
se
rv
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
ef
fe
ct
s f
or
 su
b-
gr
ou
ps
 o
f t
he
 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
ts
. 
A
nn
ou
nc
em
en
ts
 o
f 
ph
ila
nt
hr
op
ic
 g
ift
s f
or
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l c
au
se
s a
nd
 IS
O
 
14
00
1 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
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ce
rti
fic
at
io
n,
 a
s w
el
l a
s 
fe
de
ra
l, 
st
at
e 
or
 lo
ca
l 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l a
w
ar
ds
.  
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 p
os
iti
ve
 m
ar
ke
t 
re
ac
tio
n.
 V
ol
un
ta
ry
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 a
re
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
t 
re
ac
tio
ns
.  
K
ha
nn
a 
an
d 
D
am
on
, 1
99
9 
To
xi
c 
re
le
as
es
 o
f 1
7 
hi
gh
 
pr
io
rit
y 
to
xi
c 
ch
em
ic
al
s 
re
gu
la
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
U
S 
EP
A
 3
3/
50
 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e.
  
R
et
ur
n 
on
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t (
R
O
I)
, 
Ex
ce
ss
 v
al
ue
 p
er
 
un
it 
sa
le
s (
EV
S)
. 
12
3 
U
S 
ch
em
ic
al
 fi
rm
s. 
 S&
P’
s C
om
pu
st
at
 d
at
ab
as
e 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
C
D
 c
or
po
ra
te
 
da
ta
ba
se
 (c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
To
xi
c 
R
el
ea
se
 In
ve
nt
or
y 
(p
ub
lic
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
91
-
19
93
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
U
S 
EP
A
 3
3/
50
 p
ro
gr
am
m
e 
le
d 
to
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ec
lin
e 
in
 
to
xi
c 
re
le
as
es
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 n
on
-
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s, 
af
te
r c
on
tro
lli
ng
 
fo
r s
am
pl
e 
se
le
ct
io
n 
th
ro
ug
h 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 fa
ct
or
s. 
Pr
og
ra
m
m
e 
pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
ha
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
on
 c
ur
re
nt
 re
tu
rn
s o
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t (
R
O
I)
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
no
n-
pa
rti
ci
pa
nt
s. 
Y
et
, i
t h
ad
 a
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
th
e 
Ex
ce
ss
 V
al
ue
 p
er
 u
ni
t 
Sa
le
s (
EV
S)
. T
hi
s i
nd
ic
at
es
 
th
at
 in
ve
st
or
s a
nt
ic
ip
at
e 
th
at
 in
 
th
e 
lo
ng
 ru
n 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t e
ff
or
ts
 
to
 re
du
ce
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
im
pr
ov
e 
th
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
fir
m
s p
ar
tic
ip
at
in
g 
in
 th
e 
pr
og
ra
m
m
e.
   
K
in
g 
an
d 
Le
no
x,
 
20
01
 
To
ta
l E
m
is
si
on
s:
 T
ot
al
 
fa
ci
lit
y 
em
is
si
on
s o
f t
ox
ic
 
ch
em
ic
al
s;
 R
el
at
iv
e 
Em
is
si
on
s:
 E
m
is
si
on
s 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 o
th
er
 fa
ci
lit
ie
s o
f 
si
m
ila
r s
ec
to
r, 
an
d 
si
ze
. 
In
du
st
ry
 E
m
is
si
on
s:
 
Em
is
si
on
s p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
ct
or
s i
n 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
ﬁr
m
 
op
er
at
es
. 
To
bi
n'
s Q
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
 (m
ar
ke
t 
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 a
 fi
rm
 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
re
pl
ac
em
en
t c
os
ts
 o
f 
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s)
. 
65
2 
U
S 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
 To
xi
c 
R
el
ea
se
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
(T
R
I)
 , 
fa
ci
lit
y 
da
ta
 fr
om
 D
un
 
an
d 
B
ra
ds
tre
et
 (D
&
B
), 
co
rp
or
at
e 
da
ta
 fr
om
 S
ta
nd
ar
d 
&
 P
oo
r’
s C
om
pu
st
at
 d
at
ab
as
e 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
19
87
-
19
96
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s i
de
nt
ify
 th
re
e 
ke
y 
re
su
lts
: 1
) H
ig
he
r t
ot
al
 
em
is
si
on
s a
re
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
lo
w
er
 fi
na
nc
ia
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
2)
 F
irm
s w
ith
 h
ig
he
r r
el
at
iv
e 
em
is
si
on
s c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 fi
rm
s 
of
 si
m
ila
r s
ec
to
r a
nd
 si
ze
 h
av
e 
lo
w
er
 fi
na
nc
ia
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
3)
 N
o 
ef
fe
ct
 fo
r I
nd
us
try
 
Em
is
si
on
s:
 O
pe
ra
tin
g 
in
 a
 
cl
ea
ne
r i
nd
us
try
 d
oe
s n
ot
 h
av
e 
an
 e
ff
ec
t p
er
 se
 o
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
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K
on
ar
 a
nd
 
C
oh
en
, 2
00
1 
Th
e 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
po
un
ds
 o
f 
to
xi
c 
ch
em
ic
al
s e
m
itt
ed
 p
er
 
do
lla
r r
ev
en
ue
; T
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l l
aw
su
its
 
pe
nd
in
g 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 fi
rm
 in
 
19
89
. 
In
ta
ng
ib
le
-a
ss
et
 
va
lu
e 
(m
ar
ke
t 
va
lu
e)
. 
32
1 
m
os
tly
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s i
n 
th
e 
S&
P 
50
0;
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 d
at
a 
ta
ke
n 
fr
om
 C
om
pu
st
at
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
 
an
d 
co
nc
en
tra
tio
n 
da
ta
 fr
om
 
W
ar
d’
s B
us
in
es
s D
ire
ct
or
y 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
R
&
D
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s u
si
ng
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 
th
e 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
da
ta
ba
se
, 
ad
ve
rti
si
ng
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(A
D
V
A
L8
9)
 w
er
e 
ta
ke
n 
fr
om
 
da
ta
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
by
 th
e 
A
rb
itr
on
 
C
om
pa
ny
, t
he
 n
um
be
r o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l l
aw
 su
its
 
pe
nd
in
g 
an
d 
to
xi
c 
em
is
si
on
s 
da
ta
 fr
om
 In
ve
st
or
 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
C
en
te
r (
co
m
m
er
ci
al
). 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(y
ea
r 1
98
9)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s o
bs
er
ve
 th
at
 b
ad
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 is
 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
fir
m
s. 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 th
at
 a
 1
0%
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 e
m
is
si
on
s o
f 
to
xi
c 
ch
em
ic
al
s r
es
ul
ts
 in
 a
 
U
S$
34
 m
ill
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
. T
he
ir 
ev
id
en
ce
 
su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 fi
rm
s a
re
 
re
w
ar
de
d 
in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 
fo
r o
ve
r-
co
m
pl
yi
ng
 w
ith
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
fo
r e
xt
er
na
lly
 p
or
tra
yi
ng
 a
n 
im
ag
e 
of
 b
ei
ng
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lly
 c
on
ce
rn
ed
.  
R
as
si
er
 a
nd
 
Ea
rn
ha
rt,
 2
01
0b
 
Pe
rm
itt
ed
 w
as
te
w
at
er
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
its
 fo
r B
O
D
 
(b
io
ch
em
ic
al
 o
xy
ge
n 
de
m
an
d)
 a
nd
 T
SS
 (t
ot
al
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
so
lid
s)
.  
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
as
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 re
tu
rn
s 
on
 sa
le
s (
R
O
S)
. 
Pu
bl
ic
ly
 h
el
d 
ch
em
ic
al
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 a
nn
ua
l d
at
a 
co
nt
ai
ns
 
33
7 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
, c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 7
3 
ch
em
ic
al
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
pa
ne
l o
f 
qu
ar
te
rly
 d
at
a 
co
nt
ai
ns
 9
26
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
, c
on
si
st
in
g 
of
 5
9 
ch
em
ic
al
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
  U
S 
EP
A
’s
 P
er
m
it 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
Sy
st
em
 (P
C
S)
 d
at
ab
as
e 
fo
r 
pe
rm
itt
ed
 d
is
ch
ar
ge
 li
m
its
 
(p
ub
lic
), 
S&
P 
C
om
pu
st
at
 fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 d
at
a,
 P
C
S 
da
ta
ba
se
 
fo
r f
ac
ili
ty
 le
ve
l 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l d
at
a 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
- 
20
01
) y
ea
rly
 
da
ta
.  
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s o
bt
ai
n 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 
re
su
lts
 a
cr
os
s b
ot
h 
of
 th
ei
r 
sa
m
pl
es
. A
 1
0%
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
pe
rm
itt
ed
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
it 
ca
us
es
 th
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n 
sa
le
s t
o 
de
cr
ea
se
 b
y 
as
 li
ttl
e 
as
 0
.8
%
 a
nd
 a
s m
uc
h 
as
 2
.7
%
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
90
%
 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 in
te
rv
al
 o
f t
he
 
es
tim
at
ed
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
 o
n 
th
e 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
it 
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R
as
si
er
 a
nd
 
Ea
rn
ha
rt,
 2
01
0a
 
Pe
rm
itt
ed
 w
as
te
w
at
er
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
its
 fo
r B
O
D
 
(b
io
ch
em
ic
al
 o
xy
ge
n 
de
m
an
d)
 a
nd
 T
SS
 (t
ot
al
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
so
lid
s)
. 
To
bi
n’
s Q
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
.  
22
9 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 c
ov
er
in
g 
54
 
pu
bl
ic
 o
w
ne
d 
ch
em
ic
al
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
 En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
A
ge
nc
y’
s (
EP
A
’s
) P
er
m
it 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
Sy
st
em
 (P
C
S)
 fo
r 
pe
rm
itt
ed
 li
m
its
 o
f w
as
te
w
at
er
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
(p
ub
lic
), 
St
an
da
rd
 &
 
Po
or
’s
 C
om
pu
st
at
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
In
si
gh
t f
or
 fi
na
nc
ia
l d
at
a 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
-
20
00
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
cl
ea
n 
w
at
er
 re
gu
la
tio
ns
 a
nd
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 fu
tu
re
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. T
he
 m
or
e 
st
rin
ge
nt
 c
le
an
 w
at
er
 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
in
du
ce
s i
nv
es
to
rs
 to
 
re
vi
se
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
th
ei
r 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f f
ut
ur
e 
pr
of
its
. 
A
 5
0%
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fir
m
’s
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
it 
ge
ne
ra
te
s a
 
de
cr
ea
se
 o
f 1
.3
%
 o
r 
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
$3
10
.4
 m
ill
io
n 
in
 th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
fir
m
’s
 m
ar
ke
t 
va
lu
e.
 
R
as
si
er
 a
nd
 
Ea
rn
ha
rt,
 2
01
1 
Pe
rm
itt
ed
 w
as
te
w
at
er
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
its
 fo
r B
O
D
 
(b
io
ch
em
ic
al
 o
xy
ge
n 
de
m
an
d)
 a
nd
 T
SS
 (t
ot
al
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
so
lid
s)
. 
R
et
ur
ns
 o
n 
Sa
le
s. 
53
 U
S 
fir
m
s b
el
on
gi
ng
 to
 th
e 
ch
em
ic
al
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
st
ry
. 
EP
A
 P
er
m
it 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
Sy
st
em
 d
at
ab
as
e 
on
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
its
 (p
ub
lic
), 
S&
P 
C
om
pu
st
at
 fo
r f
in
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
qu
ar
te
rly
; 
1s
t q
ua
rte
r o
f 
19
95
 to
 2
nd
 
qu
ar
te
r o
f 2
00
1;
 
m
ax
im
um
 o
f 2
6 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 p
er
 
fir
m
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Lo
w
er
 e
m
is
si
on
s i
m
pr
ov
e 
fir
m
 fi
na
nc
ia
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
bo
th
 in
 th
e 
sh
or
t a
nd
 lo
ng
 ru
n,
 
w
ith
 a
 st
ro
ng
er
 e
ff
ec
t i
n 
th
e 
lo
ng
 ru
n.
  
R
as
si
er
 a
nd
 
Ea
rn
ha
rt,
 2
01
5 
Pe
rm
itt
ed
 w
as
te
w
at
er
 
di
sc
ha
rg
e 
lim
its
 fo
r B
O
D
 
(b
io
ch
em
ic
al
 o
xy
ge
n 
de
m
an
d)
 a
nd
 T
SS
 (t
ot
al
 
su
sp
en
de
d 
so
lid
s)
. 
A
ct
ua
l P
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
(r
et
ur
n 
on
 sa
le
s)
, 
In
ve
st
or
s 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f 
fu
tu
re
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 T
ob
in
's 
q.
  
74
0 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 fr
om
 4
7 
fir
m
s. 
 EP
A
's 
Pe
rm
it 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
Sy
st
em
 (P
C
S)
 d
at
ab
as
e 
(p
ub
lic
), 
S&
P 
C
om
pu
st
at
 fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
-
20
01
) q
ua
rte
rly
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ei
r r
es
ul
ts
 o
n 
ac
tu
al
 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
ar
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 
w
ith
 th
e 
Po
rte
r H
yp
ot
he
si
s 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
at
 ti
gh
te
r c
le
an
 
w
at
er
 re
gu
la
tio
n 
is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
ir 
re
su
lts
 o
n 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 su
gg
es
t 
th
at
 in
ve
st
or
s a
pp
ea
r t
o 
ex
pe
ct
 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
cl
ea
n 
w
at
er
 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
an
d 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y.
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Sa
nc
he
z-
V
ar
ga
s 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
3)
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
(a
s m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 p
la
nt
’s
 
po
llu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s)
. 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
90
3 
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
 o
f M
ex
ic
an
 
fir
m
s. 
 D
at
a 
fr
om
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l 
in
du
st
ria
l s
ur
ve
y 
in
 M
ex
ic
o 
by
 
th
e 
M
ex
ic
an
 S
ta
tis
tic
s a
ge
nc
y 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(2
00
2)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 n
on
-li
ne
ar
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. T
he
y 
fin
d 
a 
no
n-
lin
ea
r r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
, a
nd
 fi
nd
 th
at
 a
 
de
cr
ea
si
ng
 tr
ad
e-
of
f b
et
w
ee
n 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 a
nd
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
ex
is
ts
. M
or
eo
ve
r, 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
de
pe
nd
s o
n 
th
e 
pl
an
t s
iz
e 
an
d 
th
e 
tra
de
-o
ff
 is
 
m
or
e 
im
po
rta
nt
 fo
r s
m
al
l 
fir
m
s a
nd
 a
 n
ea
rly
 n
eg
lig
ib
le
 
on
e 
fo
r l
ar
ge
r o
ne
s. 
Sh
ad
be
gi
an
 a
nd
 
G
ra
y,
 2
00
3 
A
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
(P
ar
tic
ul
at
e 
M
at
te
r, 
Su
lp
hu
r D
io
xi
de
) 
pe
r u
ni
t o
f o
ut
pu
t. 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
68
 U
S 
pu
lp
 a
nd
 p
ap
er
 m
ill
s. 
 Lo
ng
itu
di
na
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(L
R
D
) (
lic
en
ce
), 
PA
C
E 
fo
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t 
co
st
s (
lic
en
ce
). 
 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(y
ea
r 1
98
5)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s a
na
ly
se
 th
e 
lin
k 
be
tw
ee
n 
fir
m
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 a
nd
 
po
llu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t. 
Th
ey
 
fin
d 
th
at
 p
la
nt
s w
ith
 a
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t h
ig
he
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
ha
ve
 2
.5
 p
er
ce
nt
 lo
w
er
 
em
is
si
on
s, 
su
gg
es
tin
g 
th
at
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
an
d 
po
llu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t e
ff
ic
ie
nc
y 
ar
e 
co
m
pl
em
en
ts
. B
et
te
r 
m
an
ag
er
s a
re
 b
et
te
r a
t b
ot
h 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
an
d 
ab
at
em
en
t, 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
tin
g 
on
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
at
 th
e 
ex
pe
ns
e 
of
 a
ba
te
m
en
t 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
. 
Te
lle
, 2
00
6 
Pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
in
te
ns
ity
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
fr
om
 a
n 
ag
gr
eg
at
e 
po
llu
tio
n 
in
de
x 
co
ns
is
tin
g 
of
 G
H
G
s, 
ac
id
s, 
pa
rti
cl
es
 a
nd
 o
zo
ne
 
pr
ec
ur
so
rs
 (n
m
vo
c-
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s)
. 
R
et
ur
n-
on
-S
al
es
 
(R
O
S)
 (c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 S
al
es
 m
in
us
 
va
ria
bl
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
co
st
s d
iv
id
ed
 b
y 
sa
le
s)
. 
10
12
 p
la
nt
-y
ea
rs
 fr
om
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
pl
an
ts
. 
 Po
llu
tio
n 
da
ta
 fr
om
 th
e 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
Po
llu
tio
n 
C
on
tro
l 
A
ge
nc
y 
(N
PC
A
) (
lic
en
ce
), 
Ec
on
om
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 d
at
a 
Pa
ne
l (
19
90
-
20
01
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
In
 th
e 
po
ol
ed
 re
gr
es
si
on
, 
w
hi
ch
 ju
st
 c
on
tro
ls
 fo
r 
ob
se
rv
ab
le
 p
la
nt
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s, 
th
e 
au
th
or
 
fin
ds
 th
at
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 a
nd
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
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(p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
s, 
em
pl
oy
ee
s, 
gr
os
s i
nv
es
tm
en
t) 
fr
om
 S
ta
tis
tic
s N
or
w
ay
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, w
he
n 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 
fo
r u
no
bs
er
va
bl
e 
pl
an
t 
he
te
ro
ge
ne
ity
 u
si
ng
 p
la
nt
 
fix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
, t
he
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 
no
 lo
ng
er
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
. 
 
Tr
um
pp
 a
nd
 
G
ue
nt
he
r, 
20
17
 
C
ar
bo
n 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
(n
eg
at
iv
e 
G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 sa
le
s)
, W
as
te
 
in
te
ns
ity
 (n
eg
at
iv
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 w
as
te
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 a
 fi
rm
 
di
vi
de
d 
by
 sa
le
s)
.  
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
(R
et
ur
n 
ov
er
 a
ss
et
s)
, s
to
ck
 
m
ar
ke
t p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
(a
nn
ua
l c
ha
ng
e 
in
 
st
oc
k 
pr
ic
es
 p
lu
s 
di
vi
de
nd
s)
. 
23
61
 fi
rm
-y
ea
rs
. 
 G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s f
ro
m
 C
ar
bo
n 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Pr
oj
ec
t (
pu
bl
ic
), 
w
as
te
 in
te
ns
ity
 a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
da
ta
 fr
om
 T
ho
m
so
n 
R
eu
te
r’
s 
A
SS
ET
4 
da
ta
ba
se
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
08
-
20
12
). 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 n
on
-li
ne
ar
 U
-
sh
ap
ed
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ca
rb
on
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
nd
 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y,
 a
s w
el
l a
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
as
te
 in
te
ns
ity
 a
nd
 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y.
 T
hu
s, 
w
ith
in
 
th
ei
r s
am
pl
e 
fir
m
s w
ith
 a
 lo
w
 
co
rp
or
at
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (C
EP
) t
en
d 
to
 
ha
ve
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 c
or
po
ra
te
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 (C
FP
), 
w
he
re
as
 
fir
m
s a
t h
ig
h 
le
ve
ls
 o
f C
EP
 
ha
ve
 a
 p
os
iti
ve
 re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
ith
 C
FP
.  
W
ag
ne
r a
nd
 
B
lo
m
, 2
01
1 
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
M
an
ag
em
en
t S
ys
te
m
s 
(E
M
S)
. 
Fi
rm
s’
 fi
na
nc
ia
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
(R
et
ur
n 
on
 S
al
es
). 
 4
97
 fi
rm
s f
ro
m
 G
er
m
an
y 
an
d 
th
e 
U
K
. 
 Su
rv
ey
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
s 
on
 E
M
S 
sy
st
em
, f
in
an
ci
al
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 A
M
A
D
EU
S 
da
ta
ba
se
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
 
 C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(s
ur
ve
y 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
in
 
20
01
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s u
se
 th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Sy
st
em
 (E
M
S)
 fo
r f
irm
s’
 le
ve
l 
of
 su
st
ai
na
bi
lit
y.
 T
he
y 
fin
d 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
EM
S 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 fo
r a
lre
ad
y 
w
el
l-
pe
rf
or
m
in
g 
fir
m
s o
nl
y.
 F
or
 
le
ss
 w
el
l-p
er
fo
rm
in
g 
fir
m
s 
th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
EM
S 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.  
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 n
o 
ef
fe
ct
 fo
r t
he
ir 
po
ol
ed
 d
at
as
et
.  
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Pa
pe
rs
 re
vi
ew
ed
 in
 se
ct
io
n 
2.
2:
   
U
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 th
e 
dr
iv
er
s:
 w
hy
 e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 c
an
 g
o 
ha
nd
 in
 h
an
d 
w
ith
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
2.
2.
2 
 B
et
te
r e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 th
ro
ug
h 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
re
ve
nu
es
 
A
nt
w
ei
le
r a
nd
 
H
ar
ris
on
, 2
00
3 
19
2 
to
xi
c 
ai
r, 
w
at
er
, l
an
d,
 
an
d 
su
bs
oi
l p
ol
lu
ta
nt
s 
co
ve
re
d 
in
 C
an
ad
a's
 
N
at
io
na
l P
ol
lu
ta
nt
 R
el
ea
se
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
(N
PR
I)
. 
C
on
su
m
er
 m
ar
ke
t 
ex
po
su
re
. 
25
00
 C
an
ad
ia
n 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s, 
w
hi
ch
 re
po
rt 
em
is
si
on
s u
nd
er
 
C
an
ad
a's
 N
PR
I. 
 C
an
ad
a’
s N
at
io
na
l P
ol
lu
ta
nt
 
R
el
ea
se
 In
ve
nt
or
y 
(N
PR
I)
 
(p
ub
lic
ly
 a
cc
es
si
bl
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
eb
si
te
), 
C
an
ad
ia
n 
C
en
su
s f
or
 
fa
ci
lit
y 
lo
ca
tio
n 
(p
ub
lic
), 
St
at
is
tic
s C
an
ad
a 
(p
ub
lic
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
93
-
19
99
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 th
at
 a
re
 re
la
tiv
el
y 
m
or
e 
ex
po
se
d 
to
 fi
na
l 
co
ns
um
er
s a
nd
 th
at
 h
av
e 
a 
gr
ea
te
r d
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f e
m
is
si
on
s 
ac
ro
ss
 p
ro
du
ct
s (
i.e
. a
re
 m
or
e 
"e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
lly
-le
ve
ra
ge
d"
) 
re
du
ce
 th
ei
r r
el
ea
se
s t
o 
ai
r a
nd
 
tra
ns
fe
rs
 o
f w
as
te
s o
ff
 si
te
 
m
os
t s
tro
ng
ly
. Y
et
, t
he
y 
al
so
 
in
cr
ea
se
 m
or
e 
th
e 
le
ss
 v
is
ib
le
 
re
le
as
es
 o
f s
ub
so
il 
em
is
si
on
s. 
Th
ey
 a
rg
ue
 th
at
 th
is
 in
di
ca
te
s 
th
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
of
 a
 "
gr
ee
n 
co
ns
um
er
is
m
",
 a
lth
ou
gh
 it
s 
ov
er
al
l e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l i
m
pa
ct
 
is
 sm
al
l. 
 
  
H
or
ba
ch
, 2
01
0 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
 
in
no
va
tio
ns
. 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
 
90
0 
G
er
m
an
 fi
rm
s o
pe
ra
tin
g 
in
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
ec
to
rs
; 1
2.
40
0 
G
er
m
an
 fi
rm
s o
pe
ra
tin
g 
in
 
no
n-
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l f
ie
ld
s. 
 Es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t p
an
el
 o
f t
he
 
In
st
itu
te
 fo
r E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
N
ur
em
be
rg
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. 
Pa
ne
l (
20
02
-
20
05
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s i
n 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
se
ct
or
 th
at
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 n
ew
 o
r 
m
od
ifi
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
s f
ro
m
 2
00
2 
to
 2
00
3 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
ei
r 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t f
ro
m
 2
00
3 
to
 
20
05
. T
he
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t i
m
pa
ct
 
of
 in
no
va
tio
n 
is
 la
rg
er
 th
an
 fo
r 
fir
m
s i
n 
no
n-
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
se
ct
or
s. 
Pa
lm
er
 a
nd
 
Tr
uo
ng
, 2
01
7 
Te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l g
re
en
 
pr
od
uc
t i
nt
ro
du
ct
io
ns
 (N
PI
). 
Fi
rm
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
tu
rn
ov
er
 a
nd
 re
tu
rn
 
on
 c
ap
ita
l. 
79
 g
lo
ba
l f
irm
s (
10
20
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l g
re
en
 p
ro
du
ct
 
in
tro
du
ct
io
ns
. 
 A
ut
ho
rs
 c
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 th
e 
Pa
ne
l (
20
07
-
20
12
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
po
si
tiv
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
-b
as
ed
 g
re
en
 n
ew
 
pr
od
uc
t i
nt
ro
du
ct
io
ns
 (N
PI
) 
an
d 
sh
or
t t
er
m
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
256
da
ta
se
t o
f N
PI
s b
as
ed
 o
n 
pr
es
s 
re
le
as
es
. 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 tu
rn
ov
er
 o
r 
re
tu
rn
 o
n 
ca
pi
ta
l. 
Th
ey
 a
ls
o 
fin
d 
a 
w
ea
kl
y 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
w
he
n 
us
in
g 
th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
 g
re
en
 
N
PI
s t
o 
th
e 
to
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f 
N
PI
s. 
Th
is
 fi
nd
in
g 
m
ig
ht
 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t a
 h
ig
he
r s
ha
re
 o
f 
gr
ee
n 
pr
od
uc
ts
 is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 e
xt
ra
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
.  
R
en
ni
ng
s a
nd
 
Zw
ic
k,
 2
00
2 
In
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 n
ew
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
s;
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
ns
.  
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
 
15
94
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lly
 in
no
va
tiv
e 
in
du
st
ry
 a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 G
er
m
an
y,
 It
al
y,
 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
, U
K
, a
nd
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s. 
Th
e 
fir
m
s s
pa
n 
ac
ro
ss
 8
 N
A
C
E 
se
ct
or
s (
D
-K
). 
Fi
rm
s w
er
e 
on
ly
 in
cl
ud
ed
 if
 
th
ey
 se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
to
 h
av
e 
do
ne
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
pa
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s. 
 
 Su
rv
ey
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
s. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
er
e 
ca
rr
ie
d 
ou
t i
n 
20
00
). 
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
ns
 
ha
ve
 a
 sm
al
l b
ut
 p
os
iti
ve
 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
Pr
od
uc
t a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
e 
in
no
va
tio
n 
ge
ne
ra
te
 
m
or
e 
jo
bs
 th
an
 p
ro
ce
ss
 
in
no
va
tio
ns
. E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
im
pa
ct
s d
iff
er
 a
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 th
e 
in
te
nd
ed
 g
oa
ls
 o
f t
he
 
in
no
va
tio
ns
: I
f t
he
y 
ar
e 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
co
st
 re
du
ct
io
ns
, 
th
ey
 te
nd
 to
 re
du
ce
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
If
 th
ey
 a
re
 
m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
go
al
s t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
m
ar
ke
t s
ha
re
, t
he
 e
ff
ec
t 
ca
n 
be
 p
os
iti
ve
 o
r n
eg
at
iv
e.
  
R
en
ni
ng
s e
t a
l.,
 
20
04
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l I
nn
ov
at
io
ns
. 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
 
15
94
 in
te
rv
ie
w
s o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
lly
 in
no
va
tiv
e 
in
du
st
ry
 a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 G
er
m
an
y,
 It
al
y,
 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
, U
K
, a
nd
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s. 
Th
e 
fir
m
s s
pa
n 
ac
ro
ss
 8
 N
A
C
E 
se
ct
or
s (
D
-K
). 
Fi
rm
s w
er
e 
on
ly
 in
cl
ud
ed
 if
 
th
ey
 se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
to
 h
av
e 
do
ne
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
in
 
th
e 
pa
st
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s. 
 
Su
rv
ey
 c
on
du
ct
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
s. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
s w
er
e 
ca
rr
ie
d 
ou
t i
n 
20
00
). 
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
th
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 
in
cr
ea
se
s i
ts
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ba
se
. Y
et
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l e
nd
-
of
-p
ip
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
th
at
 th
e 
fir
m
 
de
cr
ea
se
s i
ts
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
ba
se
.  
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2.
2.
3 
 Im
pr
ov
ed
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 th
ro
ug
h 
re
du
ce
d 
co
st
 o
f i
np
ut
s 
 E
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
m
at
er
ia
ls
 
B
lo
om
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
10
 
En
er
gy
 In
te
ns
ity
. 
To
ta
l f
ac
to
r 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
, 
Q
ua
lit
y 
of
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
30
0 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s i
n 
th
e 
U
K
. 
 U
K
 e
st
ab
lis
hm
en
t-l
ev
el
 
C
en
su
s o
f P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
da
ta
 
fr
om
 th
e 
U
K
 O
N
S 
(li
ce
ns
e)
, 
su
rv
ey
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
C
en
te
r f
or
 
Ec
on
om
ic
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 (C
EP
). 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(M
an
ag
em
en
t 
Su
rv
ey
 D
at
a 
fr
om
 
20
06
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 a
 ro
bu
st
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 a
nd
 
en
er
gy
 in
te
ns
ity
. I
m
pr
ov
in
g 
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ra
ct
ic
es
 fr
om
 
th
e 
25
th
 to
 th
e 
75
th
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 1
7.
4%
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
ity
 
an
d 
w
ith
 a
 3
.7
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
to
ta
l-f
ac
to
r p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
. T
he
y 
al
so
 fi
nd
 th
at
 b
et
te
r e
co
no
m
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 a
s m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 
TF
P 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 lo
w
er
 
en
er
gy
 in
te
ns
ity
. T
he
 re
su
lts
 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 th
at
 a
re
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 im
pr
ov
ed
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
ar
e 
no
t l
in
ke
d 
to
 w
or
se
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
.  
 
G
os
ne
ll 
et
 a
l.,
 
20
17
 
A
irp
la
ne
 fu
el
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
n,
 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s. 
A
irp
la
ne
 fu
el
 c
os
t. 
(E
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
tre
at
m
en
ts
: 
M
on
ito
rin
g,
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 
pe
rs
on
al
 ta
rg
et
s, 
pr
o-
so
ci
al
 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
). 
33
5 
V
irg
in
 A
tla
nt
ic
 a
irl
in
e 
ca
pt
ai
ns
, 1
10
.0
00
 c
ap
ta
in
-
le
ve
l o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 o
ve
r 4
0.
00
0 
un
iq
ue
 fl
ig
ht
s. 
 D
at
a 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
V
irg
in
 
A
tla
nt
ic
 to
 th
e 
au
th
or
s. 
 
Pa
ne
l (
ei
gh
t-
m
on
th
 
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l 
st
ud
y 
pe
rio
d 
in
 
20
14
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
Th
e 
ex
pe
rim
en
t i
n 
pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
 
w
ith
 V
irg
in
 A
tla
nt
ic
 A
irl
in
es
 
fin
ds
 th
at
 lo
w
-c
os
t 
be
ha
vi
ou
ra
l t
re
at
m
en
ts
 
(m
on
ito
rin
g,
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 p
er
so
na
l t
ar
ge
ts
, 
an
d 
pr
os
oc
ia
l i
nc
en
tiv
es
) 
re
du
ce
d 
ca
pt
ai
n'
s f
ue
l 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
pr
e-
fli
gh
t 
(a
irc
ra
ft 
fu
el
 lo
ad
), 
in
-f
lig
ht
, 
an
d 
po
st
-f
lig
ht
 (t
ax
i) 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
. S
im
pl
y 
in
fo
rm
in
g 
pi
lo
ts
 th
at
 th
ey
 a
re
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be
in
g 
m
on
ito
re
d 
al
re
ad
y 
re
du
ce
s t
he
ir 
fu
el
 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
. 
Th
e 
be
ha
vi
ou
ra
l c
ha
ng
es
 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
m
or
e 
th
an
 7
70
0 
to
ns
 o
f f
ue
l s
av
ed
 fo
r t
he
 
ai
rli
ne
 o
ve
r t
he
 e
ig
ht
-m
on
th
 
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l p
er
io
d 
($
6.
1 
m
ill
io
n 
in
 2
01
4 
pr
ic
es
), 
w
hi
ch
 
tra
ns
la
te
s t
o 
ab
ou
t 2
4.
50
0 
to
ns
 
of
 C
O
2 a
ba
te
d.
 T
he
y 
es
tim
at
e 
a 
m
ar
gi
na
l a
ba
te
m
en
t c
os
t p
er
 
to
n 
of
 C
O
2 a
t n
eg
at
iv
e 
$2
50
 
(i.
e.
 $
25
0 
sa
vi
ng
s p
er
 to
n 
ab
at
ed
) f
ro
m
 im
pl
em
en
tin
g 
th
e 
lo
w
-c
os
t b
eh
av
io
ur
al
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
, w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e 
lo
w
es
t m
ar
gi
na
l a
ba
te
m
en
t 
co
st
 so
 fa
r c
al
cu
la
te
d 
in
 th
e 
lit
er
at
ur
e.
   
H
or
ba
ch
 a
nd
 
R
en
ni
ng
s, 
20
13
 
C
le
an
er
 P
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
no
va
tio
ns
, E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
en
d-
of
-p
ip
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
. 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
 
B
et
w
ee
n 
37
00
 a
nd
 4
50
0 
G
er
m
an
 fi
rm
s f
ro
m
 th
e 
C
om
m
un
ity
 In
no
va
tio
n 
Su
rv
ey
 (C
IS
), 
co
ve
rin
g 
m
in
in
g 
an
d 
qu
ar
ry
in
g,
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g,
 
en
er
gy
 a
nd
 w
at
er
 su
pp
ly
, l
ar
ge
 
nu
m
be
r o
f s
er
vi
ce
 se
ct
or
s 
(li
ce
nc
e)
.  
 20
09
 w
av
e 
of
 th
e 
G
er
m
an
 
C
om
m
un
ity
 In
no
va
tio
n 
Su
rv
ey
 (C
IS
) (
lic
en
ce
). 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(C
om
m
un
ity
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Su
rv
ey
 2
00
9)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
re
al
iz
at
io
n 
of
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ro
ce
ss
 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 le
ad
s t
o 
a 
hi
gh
er
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t w
ith
in
 th
e 
fir
m
. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 m
at
er
ia
l a
nd
 
en
er
gy
 sa
vi
ng
s a
re
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 to
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 h
el
p 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 
th
e 
pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y 
an
d 
co
m
pe
tit
iv
en
es
s o
f t
he
 fi
rm
. 
Y
et
, e
nd
-o
f-
pi
pe
 te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 
(in
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
 a
ir 
an
d 
w
at
er
 
pr
oc
es
s i
nn
ov
at
io
ns
) h
av
e 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
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K
um
ar
 a
nd
 
M
an
ag
i, 
20
10
 
SO
2 e
m
is
si
on
s p
ric
e.
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
ac
tiv
ity
. 
50
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
pl
an
ts
. 
 Fe
de
ra
l E
ne
rg
y 
R
eg
ul
at
or
y 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 (F
ER
C
) f
or
 
el
ec
tri
ci
ty
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
at
 th
e 
pl
an
t l
ev
el
, e
m
pl
oy
ee
s a
nd
 
ca
pi
ta
l s
to
ck
 (l
ic
en
ce
), 
U
S 
EP
A
 A
er
om
et
ric
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
R
et
rie
va
l S
ys
te
m
 (A
IR
S)
 
da
ta
ba
se
 fo
r S
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s 
an
d 
em
is
si
on
s p
ric
es
 (p
ub
lic
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
-
20
07
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s h
av
e 
te
st
ed
 
w
he
th
er
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 S
O
2 
em
is
si
on
s p
ric
es
 le
ad
s t
o 
a 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
em
is
si
on
s. 
Th
ey
 o
bs
er
ve
 th
at
 
el
ec
tri
ci
ty
 g
en
er
at
in
g 
pl
an
ts
 
ex
pe
rie
nc
e 
po
si
tiv
e 
in
du
ce
d 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
ca
l c
ha
ng
e.
 
El
ec
tri
ci
ty
-g
en
er
at
in
g 
pl
an
ts
 
ar
e 
ab
le
 to
 in
cr
ea
se
 e
le
ct
ric
ity
 
ou
tp
ut
 a
nd
 re
du
ce
 e
m
is
si
on
s 
of
 S
O
2 a
nd
 N
O
x 
fr
om
 1
99
5 
to
 
20
07
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 th
e 
al
lo
w
an
ce
 tr
ad
in
g 
sy
st
em
. 
M
ar
tin
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
12
 
En
er
gy
 in
te
ns
ity
 (e
ne
rg
y 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 / 
gr
os
s o
ut
pu
t) 
an
d 
(e
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
ity
 / 
va
ria
bl
e 
co
st
); 
C
om
po
si
te
 
In
de
x 
on
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
 re
la
te
d 
to
 c
lim
at
e 
ch
an
ge
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 th
ro
ug
h 
in
te
rv
ie
w
s. 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
19
0 
U
K
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
pl
an
ts
. 
 O
R
B
IS
 d
at
ab
as
e 
fo
r r
an
do
m
 
se
le
ct
io
n 
of
 U
K
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
pl
an
ts
 (c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Su
rv
ey
 
da
ta
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
au
th
or
s. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(in
te
rv
ie
w
 d
at
a 
co
lle
ct
ed
 in
 
20
09
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
lim
at
e 
fr
ie
nd
ly
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
pr
ac
tic
es
, a
s m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 a
n 
in
de
x 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 fr
om
 su
rv
ey
 
re
sp
on
se
s a
re
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
lo
w
er
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
ity
 a
nd
 
hi
gh
er
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 a
t t
he
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t l
ev
el
. T
he
y 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t t
he
re
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
a 
w
in
-w
in
 sc
en
ar
io
 fr
om
 
im
pr
ov
in
g 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 c
ou
ld
 
al
so
 ra
is
e 
fir
m
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
.  
 
Pf
ei
ff
er
 a
nd
 
R
en
ni
ng
s, 
20
01
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l I
nn
ov
at
io
ns
. 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
t t
he
 
fir
m
 le
ve
l. 
 
41
9 
G
er
m
an
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
lly
 
in
no
va
tiv
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s (
a 
co
m
pa
ny
 w
as
 d
ef
in
ed
 
as
 su
ch
 if
 it
 c
ar
rie
d 
ou
t a
t l
ea
st
 
on
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
19
93
 a
nd
 1
99
5)
. 
 Su
rv
ey
 o
f t
he
 M
an
nh
ei
m
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Pa
ne
l (
lic
en
ce
). 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(1
99
6 
w
av
e 
of
 
th
e 
M
an
nh
ei
m
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Pa
ne
l).
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
le
an
er
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
se
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 e
nd
-
of
-p
ip
e 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
. T
he
 
au
th
or
s c
on
cl
ud
e 
th
at
 th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
 fr
om
 e
nd
-o
f-
pi
pe
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 to
 c
le
an
er
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ca
n 
le
ad
 to
 a
 n
et
 
cr
ea
tio
n 
of
 jo
bs
.  
Sh
ad
be
gi
an
 a
nd
 
G
ra
y,
 2
00
5 
Po
llu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
. 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
68
 U
S 
pu
lp
 a
nd
 p
ap
er
 m
ill
s, 
55
 o
il 
re
fin
er
ie
s, 
an
d 
27
 st
ee
l 
m
ill
s. 
Pa
ne
l (
19
79
-
19
90
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s a
na
ly
se
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f t
ra
di
tio
na
l 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
on
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 Lo
ng
itu
di
na
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(L
R
D
) f
or
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
ou
tc
om
es
 (l
ic
en
ce
), 
PA
C
E 
fo
r p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t 
co
st
s (
lic
en
ce
). 
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 in
 U
.S
. p
ap
er
 
m
ill
s, 
oi
l r
ef
in
er
ie
s, 
an
d 
st
ee
l 
m
ill
s. 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 th
at
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
ab
at
em
en
t c
on
tri
bu
te
s l
itt
le
 o
r 
no
th
in
g 
to
 fi
rm
s' 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
.  
Sh
ad
be
gi
an
 a
nd
 
G
ra
y,
 2
00
6 
A
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
(P
ar
tic
ul
at
e 
M
at
te
r, 
Su
lp
hu
r D
io
xi
de
), 
w
at
er
 p
ol
lu
tio
n 
(b
io
lo
gi
ca
l 
ox
yg
en
 d
em
an
d,
 to
ta
l 
su
sp
en
de
d 
so
lid
s)
, t
ox
ic
 
re
le
as
es
; a
ll 
in
 p
er
 u
ni
t o
f 
pl
an
t o
ut
pu
t. 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
(m
ea
su
re
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
st
oc
ha
st
ic
 fr
on
tie
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
m
od
el
s)
.  
pl
an
ts
 in
 3
27
 p
ul
p 
an
d 
pa
pe
r 
m
ill
s, 
12
1 
oi
l r
ef
in
er
ie
s, 
an
d 
83
 st
ee
l m
ill
s;
  
Lo
ng
itu
di
na
l R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(L
R
D
) (
lic
en
ce
), 
C
en
su
s B
ur
ea
u’
s B
os
to
n 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
a 
C
en
te
r 
(li
ce
nc
e)
, 
Fi
rm
 fi
na
nc
ia
l d
at
a 
fr
om
 
C
om
pu
st
at
, P
A
C
E 
su
rv
ey
 fo
r 
ab
at
em
en
t c
os
ts
, 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
m
ea
su
re
s c
om
e 
fr
om
 se
ve
ra
l 
EP
A
 d
at
ab
as
es
 (l
ic
en
ce
): 
N
at
io
na
l E
m
is
si
on
s I
nv
en
to
ry
 
(N
EI
), 
Pe
rm
it 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
Sy
st
em
 (P
C
S)
, T
ox
ic
 R
el
ea
se
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
(T
R
I)
, a
nd
 
C
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
D
at
a 
Sy
st
em
 
(C
D
S)
 (p
ub
lic
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
90
-
20
00
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
 p
os
iti
ve
 c
or
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l 
an
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
t 
th
e 
pl
an
t l
ev
el
. T
he
 fi
nd
in
g 
su
gg
es
ts
 th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 
un
m
ea
su
re
d 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
th
at
 im
pr
ov
e 
bo
th
 th
e 
pl
an
t's
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
its
 e
co
no
m
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
.  
va
n 
Le
eu
w
en
 
an
d 
M
oh
ne
n,
 
20
17
 
Ec
o-
in
no
va
tio
ns
 (p
ro
ce
ss
-, 
an
d 
en
d-
of
-p
ip
e)
. 
To
ta
l f
ac
to
r 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. 
A
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
20
00
 D
ut
ch
 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s. 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l C
os
t o
f F
irm
s 
(E
C
F)
 su
rv
ey
 fo
r e
co
-
in
no
va
tio
ns
, C
om
m
un
ity
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
Su
rv
ey
 (C
IS
) f
or
 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
or
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
fo
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l i
nn
ov
at
io
n 
ta
rg
et
s (
lic
en
ce
), 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n 
St
at
is
tic
s S
ur
ve
y 
fo
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 fi
rm
 
da
ta
 (l
ic
en
ce
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
03
-
20
08
) y
ea
rly
, b
ut
 
w
ith
 im
pu
ta
tio
n.
 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
er
e 
is
 a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
po
si
tiv
e 
co
rr
el
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
ex
is
tin
g 
or
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
ed
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
n 
an
d 
ec
o-
in
no
va
tio
ns
. M
or
eo
ve
r, 
th
ey
 o
bs
er
ve
 th
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s e
co
-in
no
va
tio
ns
 a
re
 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 
fir
m
s' 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
, w
he
re
as
 
en
d-
of
-p
ip
e 
in
no
va
tio
ns
 a
re
 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
co
rr
el
at
ed
 w
ith
 
fir
m
s' 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
.  
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La
bo
ur
 c
os
ts
 
D
el
m
as
 a
nd
 
Pe
ko
vi
c,
 2
01
3 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
st
an
da
rd
s (
IS
O
14
00
1,
 
or
ga
ni
c 
la
be
lli
ng
, f
ai
r t
ra
de
 
la
be
lli
ng
, o
th
er
 ty
pe
s o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l-r
el
at
ed
 
st
an
da
rd
s)
. 
La
bo
ur
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
. 
10
.6
63
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s f
ro
m
 5
22
0 
fir
m
s. 
 Fr
en
ch
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
C
ha
ng
es
 a
nd
 C
om
pu
te
riz
at
io
n 
(C
O
I)
 2
00
6 
su
rv
ey
, A
nn
ua
l 
En
te
rp
ris
e 
Su
rv
ey
 (E
A
E)
, 
A
nn
ua
l S
ta
te
m
en
t o
f S
oc
ia
l 
D
at
a 
(D
A
D
S)
 (l
ic
en
ce
). 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(2
00
6)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s t
ha
t h
av
e 
ad
op
te
d 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 e
nj
oy
 
a 
on
e 
st
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
hi
gh
er
 la
bo
ur
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t h
av
e 
no
t a
do
pt
ed
 su
ch
 st
an
da
rd
s. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 
su
ch
 st
an
da
rd
s i
s a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
 
tra
in
in
g 
an
d 
in
te
rp
er
so
na
l 
co
nt
ac
ts
, w
hi
ch
 c
an
 in
 tu
rn
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 im
pr
ov
ed
 la
bo
ur
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
.  
G
ro
lle
au
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
12
 
A
do
pt
io
n 
of
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
st
an
da
rd
s (
IS
O
14
00
1,
 
or
ga
ni
c 
la
be
lli
ng
, f
ai
r t
ra
de
 
la
be
lli
ng
, o
th
er
 ty
pe
s o
f 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l-r
el
at
ed
 
st
an
da
rd
s)
. 
Se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
di
ff
ic
ul
tie
s i
n 
re
cr
ui
tin
g 
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 a
nd
 
no
n-
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 
st
af
f. 
 
10
.8
40
 F
re
nc
h 
fir
m
s. 
 Fr
en
ch
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l 
C
ha
ng
es
 a
nd
 
C
om
pu
te
riz
at
io
n’
s (
C
O
I)
 2
00
6 
su
rv
ey
, A
nn
ua
l S
ta
te
m
en
t o
f 
So
ci
al
 D
at
a 
(D
A
D
S)
 a
nd
 th
e 
A
nn
ua
l E
nt
er
pr
is
e 
Su
rv
ey
 
(E
A
E)
 fo
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
on
 
w
ag
es
 a
nd
 e
xp
or
t r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y 
(li
ce
nc
e)
.  
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(2
00
6)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 v
ol
un
ta
ry
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 is
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 re
du
ce
d 
se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
di
ff
ic
ul
tie
s i
n 
th
e 
re
cr
ui
tm
en
t o
f p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l 
an
d 
no
n-
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
La
nf
ra
nc
hi
 a
nd
 
Pe
ko
vi
c,
 2
01
2 
Fi
rm
 re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
w
ith
 a
t 
le
as
t o
ne
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
st
an
da
rd
 (I
SO
14
00
1,
 
or
ga
ni
c 
la
be
lli
ng
 o
r f
ai
r 
tra
de
 la
be
lli
ng
). 
Se
lf-
re
po
rte
d 
em
pl
oy
ee
 a
tti
tu
de
s 
(u
se
fu
ln
es
s t
o 
ot
he
rs
, e
qu
ita
bl
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 fo
r 
w
or
k,
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
's 
in
vo
lv
em
en
t, 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 w
or
k 
ho
ur
s)
.  
11
60
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s a
t 7
70
0 
Fr
en
ch
 fi
rm
s f
ro
m
 a
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
Fr
en
ch
 
em
pl
oy
er
-e
m
pl
oy
ee
 d
at
as
et
 o
f 
fir
m
s w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 2
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
 Fr
en
ch
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l C
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
IC
T'
s (
C
O
I)
 2
00
6 
su
rv
ey
, 
Fr
en
ch
 O
rg
an
iz
at
io
na
l C
ha
ng
e 
an
d 
IC
T'
s (
C
O
I)
 2
00
6 
su
rv
ey
 
fo
r e
m
pl
oy
ee
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n,
 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(2
00
6 
su
rv
ey
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Em
pl
oy
ee
s o
f f
irm
s t
ha
t h
av
e 
ad
op
te
d 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
re
po
rt 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 h
ig
he
r 
fe
el
in
g 
of
 u
se
fu
ln
es
s a
t w
or
k.
 
Fi
rm
s' 
re
gi
st
ra
tio
n 
fo
r 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l-r
el
at
ed
 
st
an
da
rd
s i
s a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
hi
gh
er
 fe
el
in
gs
 o
f u
se
fu
ln
es
s 
to
 o
th
er
s a
nd
 fe
el
in
gs
 o
f b
ei
ng
 
eq
ui
ta
bl
y 
re
co
gn
iz
ed
 a
m
on
g 
th
e 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
W
hi
le
 th
e 
262
A
nn
ua
l E
nt
er
pr
is
e 
Su
rv
ey
 
(E
A
E)
 fo
r f
irm
 e
xp
or
t l
ev
el
s 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. 
em
pl
oy
ee
s d
o 
no
t c
la
im
 to
 b
e 
m
or
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
ei
r j
ob
s, 
th
ey
 a
re
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 w
or
k 
un
co
m
pe
ns
at
ed
 fo
r 
su
pp
le
m
en
ta
ry
 w
or
k 
ho
ur
s 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 w
or
ke
rs
 in
 n
on
-
gr
ee
n 
fir
m
s. 
 
N
yb
or
g 
an
d 
Zh
an
g,
 2
01
3 
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
oc
ia
l 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 (C
SR
) 
re
pu
ta
tio
n 
ra
tin
g 
co
lle
ct
ed
 
th
ro
ug
h 
a 
su
rv
ey
. 
R
es
po
nd
en
ts
 st
at
ed
 w
he
th
er
 
th
ey
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 a
 g
iv
en
 fi
rm
 
w
ith
 C
SR
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
. T
hi
s 
re
sp
on
se
 w
as
 c
om
bi
ne
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
’s
 
op
in
io
n 
on
 w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 
co
ns
id
er
 th
e 
fir
m
 a
n 
"i
de
al
 
em
pl
oy
er
" 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
a 
re
la
tiv
e 
C
SR
 re
pu
ta
tio
n 
sc
or
e.
  
Em
pl
oy
ee
 w
ag
es
. 
10
0.
00
0 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
 Y
ou
ng
 P
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls
 S
ur
ve
y 
an
d 
G
ra
du
at
e 
St
ud
en
t s
ur
ve
y 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
um
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
of
fic
ia
l 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
em
pl
oy
ee
-
em
pl
oy
er
 re
gi
st
er
 fo
r w
ag
es
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. 
C
ro
ss
-s
ec
tio
n 
(2
00
7)
. 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 h
ig
he
r C
SR
 ra
tin
gs
 
pa
y 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 a
nd
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 lo
w
er
 w
ag
es
. 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s t
he
re
fo
re
 
co
nc
lu
de
 th
at
 e
ve
n 
if 
C
SR
 is
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 h
ig
he
r c
os
ts
 
(e
.g
. h
ig
he
r e
m
is
si
on
 
ab
at
em
en
t e
xp
en
se
s)
, 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
fir
m
s a
re
 st
ill
 a
bl
e 
to
 c
om
pe
te
 in
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t e
ve
n 
in
 th
e 
ab
se
nc
e 
of
 e
th
ic
al
 
co
ns
um
er
s o
r i
nv
es
to
rs
.  
C
os
t o
f c
ap
ita
l 
A
tti
g 
et
 a
l.,
 2
01
3 
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
oc
ia
l 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 (C
SR
) s
co
re
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
a 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 
re
se
ar
ch
 c
om
pa
ny
. 
Fi
rm
 c
re
di
t r
at
in
gs
 
(c
om
pi
le
d 
by
 S
&
P)
. 
15
85
 U
S 
fir
m
s. 
 S&
P 
cr
ed
it 
ra
tin
gs
, 
C
om
pu
st
at
, C
en
te
r f
or
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
in
 S
ec
ur
ity
 P
ric
es
 
da
ta
ba
se
 (C
R
SP
), 
Th
om
ps
on
’s
 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l B
ro
ke
rs
 E
st
im
at
e 
Sy
st
em
, M
SC
I E
SG
 S
ta
ts
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
91
-
20
10
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s f
in
d 
a 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 
po
si
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f C
SR
 o
n 
fir
m
 c
re
di
t r
at
in
gs
. T
he
y 
su
gg
es
t t
ha
t b
y 
in
ve
st
in
g 
in
 
C
SR
, f
irm
s' 
fin
an
ci
ng
 c
os
ts
 
ar
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
du
e 
to
 
th
e 
be
tte
r c
re
di
t r
at
in
g,
 w
hi
ch
 
al
l e
ls
e 
eq
ua
l s
ho
ul
d 
en
ha
nc
e 
fir
m
 v
al
ue
 a
nd
 sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
' 
va
lu
e.
 
C
he
ng
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
13
 
   
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
oc
ia
l 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 (C
SR
) s
co
re
 
pr
ov
id
ed
 b
y 
a 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
. 
C
ap
ita
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
fiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ra
tio
s:
 1
) c
as
h 
flo
w
 
to
 to
ta
l c
ap
ita
l, 
2)
 
24
39
 p
ub
lic
ly
 li
st
ed
 fi
rm
s 
ac
ro
ss
 4
9 
co
un
tri
es
. 
 Th
om
ps
on
 R
eu
te
rs
 A
SS
ET
4 
da
ta
ba
se
 (c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
02
-
20
09
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 b
et
te
r C
SR
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 fa
ce
 lo
w
er
 
ca
pi
ta
l c
on
st
ra
in
ts
.  
263
      
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 
ra
tio
, 3
) d
eb
t t
o 
to
ta
l 
ca
pi
ta
l, 
4)
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 
to
 to
ta
l c
ap
ita
l, 
5)
 
ca
sh
 h
ol
di
ng
s t
o 
to
ta
l c
ap
ita
l. 
El
 G
ho
ul
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
11
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
oc
ia
l 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 (C
SR
) 
ra
tin
gs
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 a
 th
ird
 
pa
rty
 re
se
ar
ch
 c
om
pa
ny
.  
Ex
-a
nt
e 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
ui
ty
 c
ap
ita
l 
im
pl
ie
d 
in
 st
oc
k 
pr
ic
es
 a
nd
 a
na
ly
st
s' 
ea
rn
in
gs
 fo
re
ca
st
s. 
28
09
 U
S 
fir
m
s;
 
Th
om
ps
on
 In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
B
ro
ke
rs
 E
ar
ni
ng
s S
er
vi
ce
s f
or
 
an
al
ys
t f
or
ec
as
t d
at
a,
 
C
om
pu
st
at
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
fo
r 
in
du
st
ry
 a
ff
ili
at
io
n 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 d
at
a,
 K
LD
 S
TA
TS
 
fo
r C
SR
 d
at
a,
 C
R
SP
 m
on
th
ly
 
re
tu
rn
 fi
le
s f
or
 st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
s 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
19
92
-
20
07
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 h
ig
he
r C
SR
 sc
or
es
 
en
jo
y 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 lo
w
er
 c
os
t 
of
 e
qu
ity
 c
ap
ita
l. 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s 
co
nc
lu
de
 th
at
 im
pr
ov
ed
 C
SR
 
ca
n 
en
ha
nc
e 
fir
m
 v
al
ue
 b
y 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
fir
m
's 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
ui
ty
 c
ap
ita
l. 
Th
ey
 a
rg
ue
 th
at
 
C
SR
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 c
an
 e
nh
an
ce
 
th
e 
co
m
pa
ny
's 
in
ve
st
or
 b
as
e 
by
 a
ttr
ac
tin
g 
so
ci
al
ly
 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
 
G
os
s a
nd
 
R
ob
er
ts
, 2
01
1 
C
or
po
ra
te
 S
oc
ia
l 
R
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 (C
SR
) 
ra
tin
gs
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 a
 th
ird
 
pa
rty
.  
Sp
re
ad
 b
as
is
 p
oi
nt
s 
(th
e 
am
ou
nt
 th
e 
bo
rr
ow
er
 p
ay
s o
ve
r 
LI
B
O
R
 fo
r e
ac
h 
lo
an
 d
ol
la
r)
.  
39
96
 lo
an
s t
o 
U
S 
fir
m
s. 
 K
LD
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
A
na
ly
tic
s 
In
c.
 fo
r m
ea
su
re
 o
f s
oc
ia
l 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y,
 C
om
pu
st
at
 fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n,
 
Th
om
ps
on
 C
D
A
 sp
ec
tru
m
 fo
r 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l o
w
ne
rs
hi
p,
 
D
ea
ls
ca
n 
fo
r l
oa
n 
pr
ic
in
g 
da
ta
 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
91
-
20
06
). 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Fi
rm
s w
ith
 so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y 
co
nc
er
ns
 p
ay
 
be
tw
ee
n 
7 
un
d 
18
 b
as
is
 p
oi
nt
s 
m
or
e 
th
an
 fi
rm
s t
ha
t a
re
 m
or
e 
re
sp
on
si
bl
e.
 L
en
de
rs
 d
em
an
d 
hi
gh
er
 y
ie
ld
 sp
re
ad
s f
ro
m
 
bo
rr
ow
er
s w
ith
 th
e 
w
or
st
 
re
co
rd
s i
n 
so
ci
al
 
re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
y.
 Y
et
, t
he
y 
re
co
gn
iz
e 
gr
ee
nw
as
hi
ng
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
nd
 p
un
is
h 
C
SR
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 th
at
 a
re
 u
nl
ik
el
y 
to
 
ad
d 
va
lu
e.
 
264
Pa
pe
rs
 r
ev
ie
w
ed
 in
 se
ct
io
n 
3:
  T
he
 im
pa
ct
 o
f g
re
en
 g
ro
w
th
 p
ol
ic
ie
s o
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
3.
1.
   
  T
he
 im
pa
ct
 o
f g
re
en
 g
ro
w
th
 p
ol
ic
ie
s o
n 
ec
on
om
ic
 o
ut
co
m
es
 
A
lb
riz
io
 e
t a
l.,
 
20
17
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l P
ol
ic
y 
St
rin
ge
nc
y 
In
de
x 
 
Pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 G
ro
w
th
 
19
1,
59
7 
fir
m
s a
cr
os
s 2
2 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
se
ct
or
s i
n 
11
 
O
EC
D
 c
ou
nt
rie
s. 
 
Fi
rm
 M
FP
 is
 c
on
st
ru
ct
ed
 u
si
ng
 
O
rb
is
 (c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
In
du
st
ry
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 g
ro
w
th
 is
 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 fr
om
 O
EC
D
 
ST
A
N
 a
nd
 P
D
B
i d
at
ab
as
e,
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l P
ol
ic
y 
St
rin
ge
nc
y 
In
de
x 
fr
om
 th
e 
O
EC
D
 (p
ub
lic
). 
Pa
ne
l(2
00
0-
20
09
) 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
A
 m
or
e 
st
rin
ge
nt
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ol
ic
y 
is
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
in
cr
ea
se
 fo
r t
he
 m
os
t 
pr
od
uc
tiv
e 
fir
m
s a
nd
 a
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 sl
ow
do
w
n 
fo
r t
he
 
le
ss
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
e 
on
es
. T
he
 
av
er
ag
e 
fir
m
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 n
o 
ef
fe
ct
.  
D
lu
go
sc
h 
an
d 
K
oz
lu
k,
 2
01
7 
En
er
gy
 p
ric
e 
in
fla
tio
n 
as
 a
 
pr
ox
y 
fo
r e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
po
lic
y 
st
rin
ge
nc
y,
 
Fi
rm
-le
ve
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
(m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 c
ap
ita
l 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 c
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
). 
70
,4
79
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 (f
irm
-
ye
ar
s)
 fr
om
 p
ub
lic
ly
 li
st
ed
 
fir
m
s f
ro
m
 3
0 
O
EC
D
 
co
un
tri
es
 a
cr
os
s 1
0 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
st
rie
s. 
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
da
ta
 
fr
om
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
) 
an
d 
O
EC
D
 
ST
A
N
 
da
ta
ba
se
, 
En
er
gy
 P
ric
e 
in
de
x 
fr
om
 S
at
o 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
5)
  (
pu
bl
ic
) 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
-
20
11
) 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
H
ig
he
r e
ne
rg
y 
pr
ic
es
 a
re
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
 sm
al
l b
ut
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 to
ta
l 
in
ve
st
m
en
t a
cr
os
s f
irm
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
ot
al
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
cr
ea
se
s i
n 
th
e 
m
os
t e
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
se
ct
or
s. 
H
ig
he
r 
en
er
gy
 p
ric
es
 a
re
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 a
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
do
m
es
tic
 in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t o
f t
he
 e
ne
rg
y 
in
te
ns
ity
, w
hi
ch
 th
e 
au
th
or
s 
in
te
rp
re
t a
s a
n 
in
di
ca
to
r f
or
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
of
fs
ho
rin
g.
  
265
G
ar
so
us
 a
nd
 
K
oz
lu
k,
 2
01
7 
En
er
gy
 p
ric
es
 a
s a
 p
ro
xy
 fo
r 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l p
ol
ic
y 
st
rin
ge
nc
y 
Fo
re
ig
n 
D
ire
ct
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t (
FD
I)
 
(m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 th
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l-t
o-
to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
 ra
tio
) 
68
06
 p
ub
lic
ly
 li
st
ed
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 2
3 
O
EC
D
 c
ou
nt
rie
s a
nd
 
9 
in
du
st
rie
s 
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
va
ria
bl
es
 
fr
om
 
W
or
ld
sc
op
e 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
), 
En
er
gy
 P
ric
e 
in
de
x 
fr
om
 S
at
o 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
5)
 (p
ub
lic
) 
Pa
ne
l (
19
95
-
20
11
) 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f h
ig
he
r d
om
es
tic
 
en
er
gy
 p
ric
es
 is
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 fi
rm
s o
ut
w
ar
d 
st
oc
k 
of
 F
D
I, 
bu
t s
m
al
l i
n 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
. T
he
 e
ff
ec
t i
s 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
m
or
e 
pe
rm
an
en
t 
sh
oc
ks
 to
 e
ne
rg
y 
pr
ic
es
.  
3.
2.
   
 T
he
 e
m
pi
ri
ca
l e
vi
de
nc
e 
on
 th
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l e
ff
ec
tiv
en
es
s o
f g
re
en
 g
ro
w
th
 p
ol
ic
ie
s  
A
hm
ad
i, 
20
17
 
Pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s, 
em
is
si
on
s i
nt
en
si
ty
 
Pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ou
tp
ut
 
24
,2
00
 p
la
nt
-y
ea
rs
 fo
r t
rip
le
 
di
ff
er
en
ce
, 3
5,
22
7 
pl
an
t-y
ea
rs
 
fo
r D
iD
.  
C
an
ad
ia
n 
A
nn
ua
l S
ur
ve
y 
of
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
(li
ce
nc
e)
 fo
r 
pl
an
t l
ev
el
 d
at
a 
(f
ue
l 
pu
rc
ha
se
s, 
sh
ip
m
en
t 
de
st
in
at
io
ns
, s
al
es
, f
in
al
 
pr
od
uc
ts
, p
la
nt
 lo
ca
tio
n,
 p
la
nt
 
to
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
co
st
s)
. F
ue
l 
pr
ic
es
 c
ol
le
ct
ed
 fo
r c
iti
es
 a
nd
 
pr
ov
in
ce
s t
o 
es
tim
at
e 
pl
an
t-
le
ve
l f
ue
l q
ua
nt
iti
es
. 
Em
bo
di
ed
 G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s b
y 
fu
el
-ty
pe
 to
 e
st
im
at
e 
G
H
G
 
em
is
si
on
s. 
Fu
el
 p
ric
es
 a
re
 
fr
om
 N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 
C
an
ad
a 
an
d 
St
at
is
tic
s C
an
ad
a 
(p
ub
lic
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
20
04
-
20
12
) 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
U
si
ng
 a
 D
iD
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
th
e 
au
th
or
 fi
nd
s a
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 8
%
 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 C
O
2 
em
is
si
on
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
B
rit
is
h 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
ca
rb
on
 ta
x.
 Y
et
, t
he
 tr
ip
le
 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 m
et
ho
d 
re
su
lts
 in
 
no
n-
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 2
%
 re
du
ct
io
n.
 
Th
e 
au
th
or
 c
on
cl
ud
es
 th
at
 th
e 
B
C
 c
ar
bo
n 
ta
x 
ha
d 
ze
ro
 to
 
lit
tle
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
pl
an
ts
’ 
G
H
G
 e
m
is
si
on
s i
n 
B
rit
is
h 
C
ol
um
bi
a.
 Y
et
, t
he
y 
fin
d 
th
at
 
pl
an
ts
’ o
ut
pu
t l
ev
el
s i
nc
re
as
ed
 
an
d 
th
e 
em
is
si
on
s i
nt
en
si
ty
 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
ab
ou
t 7
%
. T
he
y 
at
tri
bu
te
 th
is
 fi
nd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
un
iq
ue
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
th
e 
re
ve
nu
e 
ne
ut
ra
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
ta
x.
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W
al
ke
r, 
20
11
 
Pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 C
le
an
 A
ir 
A
ct
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 st
at
us
 (p
ro
xy
 fo
r 
pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
) 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t l
ev
el
s 
an
d 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
gr
ow
th
. 
47
0,
95
8 
pl
an
ts
 in
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
an
d 
U
til
ity
 
se
ct
or
s 
C
en
su
s B
ur
ea
u 
Lo
ng
itu
di
na
l B
us
in
es
s 
D
at
ab
as
e 
(L
B
D
) (
lic
en
ce
) 
fo
r e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
pa
yr
ol
l, 
fir
m
 a
ge
, e
nt
ry
/e
xi
t a
t t
he
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
t l
ev
el
. A
ir 
Fa
ci
lit
y 
Su
bs
ys
te
m
 fo
r 
pl
an
t r
eg
ul
at
or
y 
an
d 
pe
rm
it 
da
ta
 (l
ic
en
ce
) 
Pa
ne
l (
19
85
-
20
05
) 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
Pl
an
t-l
ev
el
 n
on
-a
tta
in
m
en
t 
de
si
gn
at
io
n 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
a 
de
cl
in
e 
in
 p
la
nt
-le
ve
l 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t g
ro
w
th
. 
3.
3 
Th
e 
jo
in
t i
m
pa
ct
 o
f e
nv
ir
on
m
en
ta
l r
eg
ul
at
io
ns
 o
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l a
nd
 e
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
3.
3.
1 
Th
e 
jo
in
t i
m
pa
ct
 o
f t
he
 E
U
 E
TS
 o
n 
ca
rb
on
 e
m
is
si
on
s a
nd
 fi
rm
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
 Li
st
 e
t a
l.,
 2
00
3 
 A
ir 
po
llu
tio
n 
(N
itr
og
en
 
ox
id
e 
an
d 
vo
la
til
e 
or
ga
ni
c 
co
m
po
un
ds
 a
s t
he
 p
rim
ar
y 
ch
em
ic
al
 p
re
cu
rs
or
s t
o 
oz
on
e)
.  
 Pl
an
t l
oc
at
io
n 
(o
pe
ni
ng
s, 
cl
os
in
g,
 
ex
pa
ns
io
ns
, 
co
nt
ra
ct
io
ns
). 
 28
0 
po
llu
tio
n-
in
te
ns
iv
e 
pl
an
ts
 
ac
ro
ss
 th
e 
62
 c
ou
nt
ie
s i
n 
N
ew
 
Y
or
k 
St
at
e.
 
 In
du
st
ria
l M
ig
ra
tio
n 
Fi
le
 th
at
 
w
as
 m
ai
nt
ai
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
N
ew
 
Y
or
k 
St
at
e 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f 
Ec
on
om
ic
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
(li
ce
nc
e)
.  
    
 Pa
ne
l (
19
80
-
19
90
). 
 C
au
sa
tio
n 
 Po
llu
tio
n-
in
te
ns
iv
e 
pl
an
ts
 
re
sp
on
d 
ad
ve
rs
el
y 
to
 m
or
e 
st
rin
ge
nt
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
l 
re
gu
la
tio
n.
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Fr
an
ce
 
 
 
W
ag
ne
r e
t a
l.,
 
20
14
  
G
re
en
ho
us
e 
G
as
 E
m
is
si
on
s, 
C
ar
bo
n 
In
te
ns
ity
. 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
95
00
 F
re
nc
h 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fir
m
s (
ap
pr
ox
im
at
el
y 
12
.0
00
 
es
ta
bl
is
hm
en
ts
) w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 2
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
 
 EA
C
EI
 (A
nn
ua
l s
ur
ve
y 
of
 
en
er
gy
 c
on
su
m
pt
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
in
du
st
ry
) f
or
 e
ne
rg
y 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n,
 F
re
nc
h 
an
nu
al
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 su
rv
ey
 (E
nq
ue
te
 
A
nn
ue
lle
 d
es
 E
nt
re
pr
is
e)
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
 fo
r b
al
an
ce
 sh
ee
t 
da
ta
, E
TS
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
lo
g 
fo
r 
em
is
si
on
s a
llo
w
an
ce
s (
pu
bl
ic
). 
Pa
ne
l (
19
99
-
20
10
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
Fr
en
ch
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
pl
an
ts
 
re
gu
la
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 E
U
 E
TS
 
re
du
ce
d 
ca
rb
on
 e
m
is
si
on
s b
y 
15
%
 d
ur
in
g 
Ph
as
e 
II
 (2
00
8-
20
13
) c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
un
re
gu
la
te
d 
pl
an
ts
. N
o 
ef
fe
ct
 
ha
s b
ee
n 
fo
un
d 
du
rin
g 
Ph
as
e 
I 
(2
00
5-
20
07
). 
Th
ey
 d
o 
no
t f
in
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 im
pa
ct
s o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t o
r o
n 
em
is
si
on
 
re
al
lo
ca
tio
n.
  R
ed
uc
tio
ns
 in
 
em
is
si
on
s a
pp
ea
r t
o 
be
 la
rg
el
y 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
ca
rb
on
-in
te
ns
ity
 o
f 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
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G
er
m
an
y 
Pe
tri
ck
 a
nd
 
W
ag
ne
r, 
20
14
 
C
ar
bo
n 
em
is
si
on
s a
nd
 
ca
rb
on
 in
te
ns
ity
.  
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
tu
rn
ov
er
, e
xp
or
ts
. 
16
58
 G
er
m
an
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
fa
ci
lit
ie
s w
ith
 m
or
e 
th
an
 2
0 
em
pl
oy
ee
s. 
 A
Fi
D
-B
et
rie
bs
pa
ne
l f
ro
m
 
G
er
m
an
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
at
a 
C
en
tre
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
, C
IT
L 
fo
r l
is
t o
f 
tre
at
ed
 p
la
nt
s, 
A
M
A
D
EU
S 
(c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
07
-
20
10
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
Th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 c
au
se
d 
tre
at
ed
 
fir
m
s (
fir
m
s t
ha
t w
er
e 
re
gu
la
te
d 
by
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
) t
o 
re
du
ce
 th
ei
r e
m
is
si
on
s b
y 
25
 
to
 2
8 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s m
or
e 
th
an
 n
on
-tr
ea
te
d 
fir
m
s (
no
n-
re
gu
la
te
d 
fir
m
s w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
ot
he
rw
is
e 
si
m
ila
r)
. T
he
 c
ar
bo
n 
in
te
ns
ity
 o
f t
re
at
ed
 fi
rm
s 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
18
 a
nd
 3
0 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s f
as
te
r f
or
 
EU
 E
TS
 fi
rm
s r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 
co
nt
ro
l f
irm
s. 
Fi
rm
s l
ar
ge
ly
 
re
du
ce
d 
th
ei
r c
ar
bo
n 
em
is
si
on
s b
y 
sw
itc
hi
ng
 fr
om
 
hi
gh
-c
ar
bo
n 
fu
el
s t
o 
lo
w
-
ca
rb
on
 fu
el
s. 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s f
in
d 
no
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
th
at
 b
ei
ng
 
re
gu
la
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 E
U
 E
TS
 
ha
d 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s 
es
tim
at
e 
th
at
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
gr
os
s o
ut
pu
t 
be
tw
ee
n 
4 
an
d 
7 
pe
rc
en
t f
or
 
re
gu
la
te
d 
fir
m
s c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 
no
n-
re
gu
la
te
d 
fir
m
s. 
Th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 fi
rm
s 
re
sp
on
de
d 
to
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
by
 re
du
ci
ng
 th
ei
r 
ca
rb
on
 in
te
ns
ity
 a
nd
 n
ot
 b
y 
re
du
ci
ng
 th
e 
sc
al
e 
of
 th
ei
r 
pr
od
uc
tio
n.
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N
or
w
ay
 
K
le
m
et
se
n 
et
 a
l.,
 
20
16
 
A
ir 
po
llu
ta
nt
s (
C
O
2, 
N
2O
, 
PF
C
s)
 a
ll 
m
ea
su
re
d 
in
 C
O
2 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
s, 
Em
is
si
on
s 
In
te
ns
ity
 (e
m
is
si
on
s d
iv
id
ed
 
by
 m
an
 h
ou
rs
), 
Em
is
si
on
s 
Le
ve
l. 
V
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 a
t 
fa
ct
or
 p
ric
es
, l
ab
ou
r 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
. 
15
2 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
pl
an
ts
, o
f 
w
hi
ch
 7
2 
pl
an
ts
 a
re
 re
gu
la
te
d 
by
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
.  
 A
nn
ua
l e
m
is
si
on
s o
f 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
pl
an
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
N
or
w
eg
ia
n 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
A
ge
nc
y 
(li
ce
nc
e)
, S
ta
tis
tic
s 
N
or
w
ay
 fo
r p
la
nt
 le
ve
l d
at
a 
on
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d,
 
en
er
gy
 u
se
 a
nd
 p
ric
es
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. 
Pa
ne
l (
20
01
-
20
13
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
(y
et
 
th
er
e 
re
m
ai
n 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s i
n 
tre
at
m
en
t a
nd
 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
 
af
te
r m
at
ch
in
g)
. 
Pl
an
ts
 re
gu
la
te
d 
un
de
r t
he
 E
U
 
ET
S 
re
du
ce
d 
em
is
si
on
s b
y 
30
%
 in
 P
ha
se
 II
 o
f t
he
 E
U
 
ET
S,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 in
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
ph
as
es
. P
la
nt
s d
id
 n
ot
 re
du
ce
 
th
ei
r e
m
is
si
on
s i
nt
en
si
ty
 in
 
an
y 
ph
as
e.
 T
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
 fi
nd
 
po
si
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
s o
n 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d 
an
d 
la
bo
ur
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
fo
r p
la
nt
s r
eg
ul
at
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
.  
Li
th
ua
ni
a 
Ja
ra
ite
 a
nd
 D
i 
M
ar
ia
, 2
01
6 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s, 
C
O
2 
in
te
ns
ity
. 
Pr
of
ita
bi
lit
y,
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t. 
35
3 
Li
th
ua
ni
an
 fi
rm
s (
41
 E
TS
 
fir
m
s, 
31
2 
no
n-
ET
S 
fir
m
s)
. 
 Sa
m
pl
e 
su
rv
ey
 o
f n
on
-
fin
an
ci
al
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
 (F
-0
1)
 
fr
om
 S
ta
tis
tic
s L
ith
ua
ni
a 
fo
r 
m
ai
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
di
ca
to
rs
 
(li
ce
nc
e)
. E
U
 C
IT
L 
fo
r 
em
is
si
on
s d
at
a 
(p
ub
lic
). 
 
Pa
ne
l (
20
05
-
20
10
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
D
ur
in
g 
Ph
as
e 
I t
he
 E
U
 E
TS
 
di
d 
no
t c
au
se
 a
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s. 
Y
et
, C
O
2 
in
te
ns
ity
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 sl
ig
ht
ly
 
be
tw
ee
n 
20
06
 a
nd
 2
00
7.
 T
he
y 
fin
d 
no
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 e
ff
ec
t o
n 
fir
m
 p
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
 fr
om
 th
e 
EU
 
ET
S.
 Y
et
, t
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
 su
gg
es
t 
th
at
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 m
ig
ht
 h
av
e 
in
du
ce
d 
th
e 
re
tir
em
en
t o
f o
ld
 
an
d 
le
ss
 e
ff
ic
ie
nt
 c
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
 
du
rin
g 
Ph
as
e 
I, 
an
d 
le
d 
to
 
so
m
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 
in
to
 n
ew
 c
ap
ita
l e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
fr
om
 2
01
0.
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Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 st
ud
ie
s 
A
br
el
l e
t a
l.,
 
20
11
 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s. 
Pr
of
its
, 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d.
 
21
01
 E
ur
op
ea
n 
fir
m
s. 
 C
om
m
un
ity
 In
de
pe
nd
en
t 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
Lo
g 
(C
IT
L)
 
co
lle
ct
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
C
om
m
is
si
on
 fo
r e
m
is
si
on
 
al
lo
w
an
ce
s (
pu
bl
ic
), 
A
M
A
D
EU
S 
fo
r f
irm
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
da
ta
 (c
om
m
er
ci
al
). 
Pa
ne
l (
20
05
-
20
08
). 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
Em
is
si
on
 re
du
ct
io
ns
 w
er
e 
3.
6%
 h
ig
he
r b
et
w
ee
n 
20
07
 
an
d 
20
08
 th
an
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
05
 
an
d 
20
06
, w
hi
ch
 th
e 
au
th
or
s 
at
tri
bu
te
 to
 th
e 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
st
rin
ge
nc
y 
of
 th
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
EU
 E
TS
. T
he
y 
ar
gu
e 
th
at
 
th
e 
sh
ift
 fr
om
 P
ha
se
 I 
to
 P
ha
se
 
II
 o
f t
he
 E
U
 E
TS
 h
ad
 a
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 im
pa
ct
 o
n 
fir
m
s' 
em
is
si
on
 re
du
ct
io
ns
. T
he
y 
fin
d 
th
at
 th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 d
id
 a
t 
m
os
t m
od
es
tly
 a
ff
ec
t p
ro
fit
s, 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 v
al
ue
 a
dd
ed
 
of
 re
gu
la
te
d 
fir
m
s. 
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 a
 c
au
sa
l e
ff
ec
t, 
ye
t t
he
y 
ta
ke
 c
on
tro
l f
irm
s o
nl
y 
fr
om
 
no
n-
re
gu
la
te
d 
se
ct
or
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
lik
el
y 
in
tro
du
ce
 a
 se
le
ct
io
n 
bi
as
 a
t t
he
 se
ct
or
 le
ve
l).
 
D
ec
he
zl
ep
rê
tre
 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
8)
 
C
O
2 e
m
is
si
on
s 
R
ev
en
ue
s, 
as
se
ts
, 
pr
of
its
 a
nd
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t. 
24
0 
m
at
ch
ed
 p
ai
rs
 o
f 
EU
 
ET
S 
an
d 
si
m
ila
r 
no
n-
EU
 
ET
S 
in
st
al
la
tio
ns
 
ac
ro
ss
 
Fr
an
ce
, 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s, 
N
or
w
ay
, a
nd
 th
e 
U
K
.  
 C
ar
bo
n 
em
is
si
on
s d
at
a 
at
 
th
e 
in
st
al
la
tio
n 
le
ve
l a
re
 
fr
om
 th
e 
na
tio
na
l P
ol
lu
ta
nt
 
R
el
ea
se
 a
nd
 T
ra
ns
fe
r 
R
eg
is
te
rs
 (P
R
TR
) f
ro
m
 
Fr
an
ce
, N
et
he
rla
nd
s, 
N
or
w
ay
 a
nd
 th
e 
U
K
.  
Th
es
e 
ar
e 
 c
om
pl
em
en
te
d 
w
ith
 
Pa
ne
l (
20
05
-
20
12
) 
C
au
sa
tio
n 
Th
e 
au
th
or
s u
se
 a
 m
at
ch
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e 
in
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
w
ith
 a
 d
iff
er
en
ce
-in
-
di
ff
er
en
ce
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
to
 
id
en
tif
y 
th
e 
ca
us
al
 e
ff
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 o
n 
fir
m
s’
 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
Th
ey
 fi
nd
 th
at
 b
et
w
ee
n 
20
05
 a
nd
 2
01
2 
th
e 
EU
 E
TS
 
ha
s l
ed
 to
 c
ar
bo
n 
em
is
si
on
 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 o
f a
ro
un
d 
10
%
 
w
hi
le
 n
ot
 h
av
in
g 
an
y 
ad
ve
rs
e 
im
pa
ct
s o
n 
fir
m
s’
 
ec
on
om
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
. 
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da
ta
 fr
om
 th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
PR
TR
.  
Ec
on
om
ic
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 d
at
a 
ar
e 
fr
om
 
th
e 
B
vD
 O
rb
is
 d
at
ab
as
e.
  
Th
e 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
se
em
s t
o 
ha
ve
 e
ve
n 
le
d 
to
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 re
ve
nu
es
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B.1 FTSE Russell Low Carbon Economy Sector Clas-
sification
Green Revenues Classification Enhancement — February 2019
Green Revenues Classification Model
Sectors, Sub Sectors and Micro Sectors
ENERGY GENERATION ENERGY EQUIPMENT ENERGY MANAGEMENT 
AND EFFICIENCY
ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESOURCES
ENVIRONMENTAL 
SUPPORT SERVICES
EG EQ EM ER ES 
Bio Fuels Bio Fuels Buildings & Ppty (Integrated) Advanced & Light Materials Environmental Consultancies
Bio Gas Bio Fuel (1st & 2nd Gen) Controls Key Raw Minerals & Metals Finance & Investment
Bio Mass (Grown) Bio Fuel (3rd Generation) Energy Mgmt Log & Support Cobalt Carbon Credits trading
Bio Mass (Waste) Bio Gas  Industrial Processes Lithium Sustainable Investment Funds
Cogeneration Bio Mass (grown) IT Processes Platinum & Platinum-Group Smart City Des & Engineering
Cogeneration (Biomass) Bio Mass (waste) Cloud Computing Rare Earths
Cogeneration (Renewable) Cogeneration Equipment Efficient IT Silica
Cogeneration (Gas) Cogeneration (Biomass) Lighting Uranium
Fossil Fuels Cogeneration (Renewable) Power Storage Recyclable Prods & Matls
Clean Fossil Fuels Cogeneration (Gas) Power Storage (Battery) Recyclable Materials
Geothermal Fossil Fuels (Integrated) Power Storage (Pumped Hydro) Recyclable  & Resusable 
Hydro (General) Carbon Capture & Storage Smart & Efficient Grids
Large Hydro Fuel Cells Sustainable Ppty Operator
Small Hydro Geothermal
Nuclear Hydro (General)
Ocean & Tidal Large Hydro
Solar (General) Small Hydro
Waste to Energy Nuclear
Wind (General) Ocean & Tidal
Solar (General)
Waste to Energy
Wind (General)
FOOD & AGRICULTURE TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT TRANSPORT SOLUTIONS WATER INFRASTRUCTURE & 
TECHNOLOGY
WASTE & POLLUTION 
CONTROL
FA TE TS WI WP 
Agriculture Aviation Railways Operator Adv Irrigation Sys & Devices Cleaner Power
GM Agriculture Railways General Railways Desalination Decontam Services & Devices
Machinery Railway (Infrastructure) Electrified Railways Flood Control Air Decontamination 
Meat & Dairy Alternatives Trains (Electric / Magnetic) Road Vehicles Meteorological Solutions Land & Soil Decontamination
Non GM Advanced Seeds Trains (General) Bike Sharing Natural Disaster Response Sea & Water Decontamination 
Organic & Low-Impact Farming Road Vehicles Bus and Coach operators Water Infrastructure Environ. Test. & Gas Sens.
Aquaculture Advanced Vehicle Batteries Car Clubs Water Treatment Particles & Emiss. Reduc. Dev.
Aquaculture (General) Bikes and Bicycles Ride Hailing Water Treatment Chemicals Industrial Pollution Reduction
Aquaculture (Sustainable) Bus and Coach Manufacturers Video Conferencing Water Treatment Equipment Transport Pollution Reduction
Land Erosion Electrified Vehicles & Devices Water Utilities Recycling Equipment
Logistics Energy Use Reduction Devices Recycling Services 
Food Safe, Process & Pack'g Shipping Waste Management (General)
FSP&P - no single use plas Hazardous Waste Management
FSP&P - with single use plas Organic Waste Process
Sustainable Planations General Waste Management
Sustainable Forestry
Sustainable Palm Oil
Page 1 of 2
Table B.1: FTSE Russell Low carbon Economy Sectors and Sub-sectors
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B.2 Measuring Green Revenue
We illustrate the green revenue imputation with an example company (see Figure B.1).
For this particular company, we do not know the share of hybrid- and electric vehicles
that are being sold in a particular year. However, we know that the sector Road vehicles
generates 60% of the company’s revenues. Since the company’s primary industry code
(US SIC) is manufacture of transportation equipment, we take the year-specific average
of that primary SIC code and multiply it by the firm-specific segment revenue share
(here 60%) and use that result as the imputed value. We did this imputation once at
the 2- and once at the 4-digit SIC averages and generated separate augmented green
revenue values for each. Furthermore, we also generate the industry averages for (1)
the entire sample of approximately 16,500 companies (full sample) and (2) the 3,500
companies which generate some green revenue (restricted ‘green candidate’ sample).
Focusing on the potential green firms restricts the sample to more similar firms. In
this specific case, the industry averages at the 2-digit SIC level are 2% for the full
sample and 5% for the restricted sample. Hence, in this example for Manufacture and
Sale of hybrid and electric vehicles, we would impute a green revenue share of 1.2%
(0.02 ·0.6) and 3% (0.05 ·0.6) for cases (1) and (2) respectively. The respective value at
the sub-segment level is then added to the conservative FTSE minimum green revenue
value at the company level (here 8%). The same approach applies at the 4-digit level.1Segment	–	Name	 Segment-	Revenue	(%)	 Sub-Segment	Name		 Sub-Segment	Revenue	(%)	
Road	vehicles	 60%	 Non-green	conventional		cars	 95%	Manufacture	and	Sale	of	hybrid-	and	electric	vehicles	 N.A.	Energy	Storage	Solutions	 5%	 Sale	of	energy	storage	solutions	for	PV	energy		 100%	Machinery	Manufacturing	 5%	 Non-green	machinery	manufacturing	 100%	
Industrial	Processes	 30%	
Non-green	industrial	process	products	 20%	Sale	of	energy-efficiency	improving	technologies	 10%	
Overall	Green	
Revenue	Share	
(%)	
	
8.00	–	32.00%		
Figure B.1: Example of Database and Missing Values
After extensive verification and manual checking, we chose the version, which used
2-digit SIC codes from the “green candidate” sample as our preferred augmented mea-
1Note that if for instance the revenue share on green Industrial processes had been missing, we
would still use the primary SIC code average green revenue share to impute the missing share. The
sub-sector industry averages cannot be used for imputation, as these values are more strongly impacted
by missing values.
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Figure B.2: Raw FTSE Minimum Green
Revenue
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Estimated Green Revenue
(based on 2-digit SIC industry average imputation in green candidate sample)
Figure B.3: Augmented Green Revenue
based on imputation
sure. Figures B.2 and B.3 show how the imputation procedure changed the distribution
in particular in the lower range between 0 and 20%. This augmented measure is our
main variable for the analysis as well as in the descriptive statistics. We also refer to
it as ‘Green Revenue’. When using the ‘raw’ FTSE Russell minimum green revenue
value, we refer to it as FTSE Minimum Green Revenue.
0 200 400 600
Absolute Green Revenue by 2-digit SIC code
(2016 in bn USD)
Metal Mining
Manuf. of Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Products
Oil and Gas Extraction
Communications
Manuf. of Rubber and Plastic Products
Misc. Retail
Business Services
Manuf. of Paper and Allied Products
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
Local and Suburban Transit
Measuring, Analysing, and Controll. Instruments
Engineer., Account., Research, Manag. Related. Services
Primary Metal Industries
Railroad Transportation
Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing
Petroleum Refining and related Industr.
Manuf. of Food and Kindred Prod.
Building Construction
Manuf. of Chemicals and allied Products
Heavy Construction (other than Building)
Manuf. of Transportation Equipm.
Manuf. of Industr. and Commerc. Machinery
Manuf. of Electronic and other Electrical Equip.
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
Figure B.4: Decomposition of Green Revenue (in billion USD) by 2-digit SIC code
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Average Green Revenue Share by 2-digit SIC code
(2016 ) (values >2%)
Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining
Manuf. of Transportation Equipm.
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods
Metal Mining
Primary Metal Industries
Manuf. of Food and Kindred Products
Building Construction
Manuf. of Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Products
Engineer., Account. Research, Services
Manuf. of Textile Mill Products
Construction Special Trade Contractors
Agricultural Services
Agricultural Products - Livestock
Manuf. of Paper and Allied Products
Manuf. of Industr. and Comm. Machinery and Equipm.
Manuf. of Rubber and Misc. Plastics
Forestry
Personal Services
Misc. Repair Services
Manuf. of Lumber and Wood Products
Manuf. of Electronic. and Electr. Equipm.
Motor Freight Transport and Warehousing
Heavy Construction other than Buildings
Agricultural Products - Crops
Local and Suburban Transit and Int. Urban Highway
Railroad Transport
Misc. Services
Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services
Figure B.5: Average Green Revenue Share by 2-digit SIC code
B.3 Green Revenue Decomposition by 3-digit SIC code
0 100 200 300 400
Absolute Green Revenue in 2016 by 3-digit SIC codes
Manuf. of Computer and Office Equip.
Manuf. of Industr. Organic Chemicals
Manuf. of Elect. Indust. Apparatus
Telephone Communications
Computer Program., Data Process., rel. Services
Manuf. of Lab. Apparat., Analyt., Optic., Meas. and Control Equipm.
Manuf. of Steel Works, Blast Furn., Mills
Manuf. of Household Audio and Video Equipm.
Manuf. of Agricultural Chemicals
Engineering, Architectural and Surveying
Manuf. of Plastics and Synth Resins
Local and Suburb. Passenger Transp.
Manuf. of Electr. Lighting and Wiring
Water Supply
Operative Buildings
Nonresidential Building Contractors
Gas Production and Distribution
Railroads Transportation
Trucking and Courier Services
Heavy Construction
Petroleum Refining
Manuf. of Engines and Turbines
Manuf. of Communic. Equipm.
Misc. Electr. Mach., Equip., & Supplies
Sanitary Services
Combined Electric & Gas and other Utility
Highway and Street Construction
Manuf. of Electronic Components and Access.
Manuf. of Motor Vehicles and Equipment
Electric Services
Absolute Green Revenue in 2016 (in billion USD)
(by 3-digit SIC)
Figure B.6: Decomposition of Green Revenue (in billion USD) by 3-digit SIC code
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0 80%60%40%20%
Average Green Revenue Share by 3-digit SIC
(2016) (values >10%)
Vegetables and Melons
Electronic Components and Acess.
Paperboard Mills
Electrical Industrial Apparatus
Misc. Metal Ores
Electric Transmission and Distribution Equipm.
Manuf. of Carpets and Rugs
Animal Specialities
Railroad Transportation
Horticultural Specialities
Misc. Electrical Machinery, Equipm., Supply
Heavy Constrution (except Highway & Street)
Trucking and Courier Services (except Air)
Misc. Personal Services
Cash Grains
Sawmills and Planing Mills
Misc. Wood Products
Misc. Services (e.g. environm. consulting)
Secondary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous
Combined Electric and Gas and other utility
Electrical Lighting and Wiring Equipm.
Engines and Turbines
Forestry Services
Local and Suburban Passenger Transportation
Steam and Air-conditioning Supply
Electric Services
Sanitary Services
Water Supply
Figure B.7: Average Green Revenue Share by 3-digit SIC code
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B.5 Descriptive Statistics for Green- and Non-Green
Firms
Table B.3: Descriptive Statistics of Green- and Non-Green Firms
Variable Green Non-Green
Median Median
(Mean) (Mean)
Employees 5,000 2,084
(16,417) (9,013)
Total Assets (thds USD) 2,101,094 604,726
(8,340,089) (3,284,654)
Market Capitalisation (thds USD) 1,540,340 682,350
(5,449,818) (3,008,581)
Return-on-Equity 0.09 0.08
(0.08) (0.04)
Return-on-Assets 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.03)
Return-on-Sales 0.08 0.08
(0.05) (-0.11)
Leverage 0.04 0.03
(0.13) (0.11)
Tobin’s Q 1.24 1.44
(1.57) (1.98)
‘Green Firms’ are defined as generating at least some positive green revenue
share over the sample period (2009-2016) (based on the augmented green rev-
enue share).
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B.6 Additional Descriptive Statistics: Matching
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Figure B.8: Number of employees
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Figure B.9: Assets/Sales
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Figure B.10: Leverage
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Figure B.11: Dividends per Share
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Figure B.12: Revenue Growth
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Figure B.13: Return-on-Assets (ROA)
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Figure B.14: Tobin’s Q
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B.7 Additional Results
B.7.1 Green Revenues and Sales/Assets (from next page onwards).
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B.7.2 Green Revenues and Assets/Equity (from next page
onwards).
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B.8 Robustness Checks
B.8.1 Controlling for negative ROS (from next page onwards).
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B.8.2 FTSE Minimum Green Revenue Measure (from next page
onwards).
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B.8.4 Excluding all Utilities (from next page onwards).
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B.9 Sector-specific Effects
B.9.1 Only Utilities (4900-4999) (from next page onwards).
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B.9.5 Manufacturing of Electronic and other Electrical
Equipment (SIC 367 & 36) (from next page onwards).
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C.2 Sector Distribution of Green Firms (top 3 deciles
of Green firms) by 2-digit US SIC codes
Electricity, Gas,
and Sanitary Services
Manuf. of Electronic
and other
Electrical Equipment
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Sector distribution of Green Firms
(top 3 deciles of Green Firms)
(by US SIC code)
The horizontal axis denotes 2-digit US SIC codes. The codes correspond to the following sectors. (10) Metal Mining, (12) Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining, (15)
Building Construction General Contractors and Operative Builders, (16) Heavy Construction other than Building Construction Contractors, (20) Manuf. of Food and
Kindred Products, (22) Manuf. of Textile Mill Products, (28) Manuf. of Chemicals and Allied Products, (33) Primary Metal Industries, (35) Manuf. of Industrial and
Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment, (36) Manuf. of Electronic and other Electrical Equipment and Components, except Computer Equipment, (37) Manuf. of
Transportation Equipment, (38) Manuf. of Measuring, Analysing and Controlling Instruments, (42) Motor Freight Transportation and Warehousing, (49) Electric, Gas, and
Sanitary Services, (50) Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods, (59) Misc. Retail, (73) Business Services, (87) Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management, and rel. serv..
Figure C.1: Sector Distribution of Green Firms (top 3 deciles of Green firms) by 2-digit US
SIC code
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C.3 Sector Distribution of Green Firms (top 3 deciles
of Green firms) by 3-digit US SIC codes
Electric Services
Water supply
Manuf. of Electronic
Components and Access.
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The horizontal axis denotes 3-digit US SIC codes. The codes correspond to the following sectors. (109) Misc. Metal Ores, (122) Bituminous Coal and Lignite Mining,
(153) Operative Builders, (162) Heavy Construction, exc. Highway and Streets, (207) Manuf. of Fats and Oils, (227) Carpets and Rugs, (286) Industrial Organic
Chemicals, (287) Agricultural Chemicals, (335) Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding of Nonferrous Primary Metals, (351) Engines and Turbines, (353) Construction, Mining,
and Materials Handling, (355) Spec. Industry Mach., exc. Metalworking, (364) Elect. Lighting and Wiring Equipm., (367) Electronic Components and Accessories, (369)
Misc. Electr. Mach., Equipm., Supplies, (371) Motor Vehicles and Motor Vehicle Equipm., (382) Laboratory App. and Analytical, Optical, Measuring and Controlling
Instr., (421) Trucking and Courier Services, exc. Air, (491) Electric Services, (494) Water Supply, (495) Sanitary Services, (503) Lumber and other Construction Materials,
(596) Nonstore Retailers, (735) Misc. Equipm. Rental and Leasing, (737) Computer Program., Data Processsing, and other Computer Related Services, (873) Research,
Development, and Testing Services, (874) Management and Public Relations Services.
Figure C.2: Sector Distribution of Green Firms (top 3 deciles of Green firms) by 3-digit US
SIC code
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C.4 Event Path for Green firms (top 3 deciles) exclud-
ing public utilities: Electricity, Gas, and Sanitary
Services (SIC 49)
Pre-negotiation Negotiation Period Post-negotiation
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Rolling 3-day CAARs of greenest firms (top 3 deciles) excluding
Electricity, Gas, and Sanitary Services (N=38)
95% Corrado CI90% Corrado CIs
Figure C.3: Event Paths for Green firms (top 3 deciles) excluding public utilities: Electricity,
Gas, and Sanitary Services (SIC 49)
C.5 S&P 500 Energy Futures Trading Volume
Paris Agreement
14. Dec. 2015
Charleston Church Shooting
South Carolina, US
17 June 2015
Attempted Coup d'état in
Burkina Faso;
Yemeni forces take control
of Saudi town
15/16. Sept. 2015
Russia launches major
assault in Syria
7. Oct. 2015
Attacks in Somalia;
Rising tensions in Burundi
21./22. Jan. 2016
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Note: After a careful news search, the authors decided that the indicated events appeared to be the most
significant and likely drivers of the trading volume. This does however not imply that the spikes were
caused by the respective events.
Figure C.4: S&P 500 Energy Futures Trading Volume
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C.6 Google Trend Statistics
Paris Agreement
13-19. Dec. 2015
Signing Ceremony
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22 April 2016 Threshold for entry
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5 Oct. 2016
Paris Agreement
enters into force
4 Nov. 2016
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Go
og
le 
Tr
en
d 
St
at
ist
ic
01
 M
ar
 2
01
5
01
 A
pr
. 2
01
5
01
 M
ay
 2
01
5
01
 Ju
ne
 2
01
5
01
 Ju
ly 
20
15
01
 A
ug
 2
01
5
01
 S
ep
. 2
01
5
01
 O
ct.
 2
01
5
01
 N
ov
. 2
01
5
01
 D
ec
. 2
01
5
01
 Ja
n.
 2
01
6
01
 F
eb
. 2
01
6
01
 M
ar
ch
 2
01
6
01
 A
pr
. 2
01
6
01
 M
ay
 2
01
6
01
 Ju
ne
 2
01
6
01
 Ju
ly 
20
16
01
 A
ug
. 2
01
6
01
 S
ep
t. 
20
16
01
 O
ct.
 2
01
6
01
 N
ov
. 2
01
6
01
 D
ec
. 2
01
6
Date
Figure C.5: Google Trend Statistics for the term ‘Paris Agreement’ (searched for in the US
between March 2015 and December 2016).
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C.7 Results with 5-day CAARs
(a) Top 30% green firms
Pre-negotiation Negotiation Period Post-negotiation
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95% Corrado CIs90% Corrado CIs
(b) Firm with 100% GR
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(c) Top 40% green firms
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(d) Median (5th) decile of green firms
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(e) Any green revenue (>0) between 2009-13
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(f) Top 30% of green firms excluding electricity
generation (SIC 491)
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Figure C.6: Results with 5-day Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (part 1)
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(a) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1)
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(c) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1&2)
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(d) Electric Services firms (SIC 491) among top
10% of most emissions intensive firms (scope 1)
Pre-negotiation Negotiation Period Post-negotiation
0
-1
5
-1
0
-5
5
10
[-20, -16] [-15, -11] [-10, -6] [-5, -1] [0, 5] [6, 10]
Trading Day
5-day CAARs of Electric Services (SIC 491) (N=23) within the top 10% of scope 1 emissions intensive firms.
95% Corrado CIs90% Corrado CIs
(e) Oil and gas extraction (SIC 13) firms among top
10% of most emissions intensive firms (scope 1)
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(f) Excluding Electric, gas and sanitary services
(SIC 49) firms among top 10% of most emissions
intensive firms (scope 1)
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Figure C.7: Results with 5-day Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (part 2)
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C.8 Robustness Check using the BMP test statistic (de-
veloped by (Boehmer et al., 1991))
(a) Top 30% green firms
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(e) Any green revenue (>0) between 2009-13
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Figure C.8: Robustness checks using BMP test statistic (developed by (Boehmer et al., 1991))
(part 1)
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(a) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1)
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(e) Oil and gas extraction firms (SIC 13) among top
10% of most emissions intensive firms (scope 1)
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(f) Excluding Electric, gas and sanitary services
firms (SIC 49) among top 10% of most emissions
intensive firms (scope 1)
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Figure C.9: Robustness checks using BMP test statistic (developed by (Boehmer et al., 1991))
(part 2)
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C.9 Robustness Check using the KP test statistic (de-
veloped by (Kolari and Pynnonen, 2010))
(a) Top 30% green firms
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(c) Top 40% green firms
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Figure C.10: Robustness checks using KP test statistic (developed by (Kolari and Pynnonen,
2010)) (part 1)
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(a) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1)
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(c) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
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(f) Excluding Electric, gas and sanitary services
firms (SIC 49) among top 10% of most emissions
intensive firms (scope 1)
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Figure C.11: Robustness checks using KP test statistic (developed by (Kolari and Pynnonen,
2010)) (part 2)
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C.10 Average Abnormal Returns (AARs)
(a) Top 30% green firms
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(d) Median (5th) decile of green firms
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Figure C.12: Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) (part 1)
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(a) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
(Scope 1)
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(c) Top 10% of most emissions intensive firms
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Figure C.13: Average Abnormal Returns (AARs) (part 2)
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D.2 Scenario Description
Developed countries, including the UK, are responsible for most of the historic greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions such as carbon dioxide (CO2) that cause climate change. Global climate change is a serious
environmental problem faced by humankind. It is caused by greenhouse gas emissions such as CO2
that originate from burning of fossil fuels like coal, oil or natural gas. Climate change is expected
to cause rising average temperatures, rising sea-levels and more severe natural disasters. The World
Health Organization estimates that climate change will cause additional 250,000 annual deaths across
the world by 2030. To prevent any of these deaths, financial resources are required from now on to
gradually improve the resilience of affected people.
The developed countries have committed themselves to help poor countries adapt to the impacts of
climate change. Globally, approximately £75 billion per year will be required to help poor countries
adapt. Contributions for these climate adaptation programmes will come from all advanced economies,
based on GDP and population size.
The UK Department for International Development (DFID) requires additional financial resources
to implement such climate change adaptation projects. These projects focus on preventing deaths
from droughts, floods, and heatwaves for example by building flood barriers, and distributing
drought-resistant crops and air-conditioning units.
Project Characteristics: Projects available to DFID differ along a set of characteristics. One such char-
acteristic is the distribution of resources within the recipient country. Two groups are eligible to receive
funding:
1. The extremely poor: These people live in shanty towns on less than £515 per year. These groups
are particularly vulnerable to any natural disasters and climatic changes. (For comparison, the median
annual household income in the UK is £26,000).
2. Middle-income households: These people live in basic but solid housing on approximately £5000
per year. These people do not live in poverty but are still vulnerable to climate change events (for
comparison, the median annual household income in the UK is £26,000).
Yet, without support climate change induced deaths will occur in both groups. Depending on the distri-
bution of the resources across these groups the total cost may differ. However, the surviving members
of the extremely poor face greater difficulties in managing the impact of a death on their household
compared to middle-income households. Extremely poor families experiencing such a climate change
induced death are expected to receive less support from the community and friends, as they are also
poor. The extremely poor also have less access to social safety nets and formal financial tools (e.g. sav-
ings, credit, insurance) to help them manage these negative impacts resulting from the death of a family
member compared to middle-income households.
You will be asked to give your preferred choice on a sequence of policy alternatives. Each set of policy
alternatives is completely independent of any preceding or following alternative. The policies differ in
their characteristics and you can only choose one of them. You can also choose the “no additional pol-
icy” scenario, in which case no additional costs would be incurred and zero deaths would be prevented.
I’d like you to think how much each of these programmes are worth to you. Then please consider
whether you would be willing to pay a surcharge, to support either of these programmes.
You will now be asked two comprehension questions on the above description.
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D.3 Demographic Summary Statistics	
Variable Statistic Overall Sample UK Population 
Statistics 
Gender  % Male 47.0 49.3 
Mean Age Mean 47.7 46.9 
Household 
Income (£) 
Mean 36,732 38,291 
Education % University Degree 29 27.2 
 % 2 or more A-levels or 
equiv. 
13.4 12.3 
 % 5 or more GCSEs or 
equiv. 
16.7 15.3 
 % Up to 4 GCSEs 30.4 36 
 % Apprenticeship 3.9 3.6 
 % Other 6.1 5.7 
Region %South East 15.2 13.7 
 % London 12.0 13.4 
 % North West 10.7 11.0 
 % East 10 9.3 
 % West Midlands 8.7 8.8 
 % South West 8.3 8.4 
 % Yorkshire and the 
Humberlands 
9.1 8.3 
 % East Midlands 7.6 7.2 
 % North East 4.5 4.0 
 % Wales 4.7 4.7 
 % Scotland  7.2 8.2 
 % Northern Ireland 1.9 2.8 
Table D.1: Demographic Summary Statistics
1
1Note on Sources for the UK Population Statistics:
Geographic Statistics: (For England (ONS, 2017b): https://www.statista.com/statistics/
294681/population-england-united-kingdom-uk-regional/ ;
For Wales and Northern Ireland (ONS, 2017d,c): https://www.ons.gov.uk/
peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates#
timeseries.
Gender Statistics (ONS, 2014a): https://www.ons.gov.uk/visualisations/nesscontent/
dvc219/pyramids/index.html (Based on predictions for 2017 based on last Census).
Age Statistics (ONS, 2014a): https://www.ons.gov.uk/visualisations/nesscontent/
dvc219/pyramids/index.html (based on predictions for 2017 based on last Census).
Education Statistics (ONS, 2014b) (only available for England and
Wales): http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105191238/
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/census/2011-census-analysis/
local-area-analysis-of-qualifications-across-england-and-wales/
rpt---local-area-analysis-of-qualifications-across-england-and-wales.html#
tab-Overview-of-Qualifications-in-England-and-Wales.
Income Statistics (ONS, 2017a):
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/personalandhouseholdfinances/
expenditure/adhocs/006770grosshouseholdincomebyincomedecilegroupukfinancialyearending2016
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D.4 Summary of Survey Results of Respondents’ Opin-
ions on Climate Change and Distributional Ques-
tions
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Figure D.2: Opinions on Climate Change
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Figure D.3: Opinions on Future Impacts of Climate Change
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Figure D.4: Opinions on Main Underlying Reasons for why People Live in Poverty
D.5 MNL and RPL-EC Models with Factor Variables
(next page)
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D.6 Descriptive Statistics of Class Membership Func-
tions in LCM
Variable Mean  Std. Dev.  Min Max Observations 
Income above average 
(yes=1) 
0.3368 0.4727 0 1 9120 
A-level or above (yes=1) 0.4289 0.4950 0 1 9120 
GHGs are the main cause 
of climate change (yes=1) 
0.6412 0.4797 0 1 9120 
Climate Change is likely 
to have negative impacts 
on future generations 
(yes=1) 
0.6702 0.4702 0 1 9120 
Biggest reason for 
poverty lies in reasons 
beyond individuals’ own 
control (yes=1) 
0.6632 0.4727 0 1 9120 
	
Table D.3: Descriptive Statistics of Variables to Characterise Class Membership Functions in
LCM
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E.1 List of Potential Control Units
Number List of Potential Control 
Countries 
Number List of Potential Control Countries  
(cont.) 
1 Argentina 29 Netherlands 
2 Australia 30 New Zealand 
3 Austria 31 Pakistan 
4 Bangladesh 32 Panama 
5 Belgium 33 Peru  
6 Bolivia 34 Philippines 
7 Brazil 35 Portugal 
8 Bulgaria 36 Rwanda 
9 Canada 37 Singapore 
10 Chile 38 South Africa 
11 China 39 Spain  
12 Colombia 40 Sri Lanka 
13 Costa Rica 41 Sweden 
14 Denmark 42 Thailand 
15 Finland 43 Tunisia 
16 France 44 Turkey 
17 Germany 45 Uganda 
18 Greece 46 United Kingdom 
19 Hong Kong 47 United States 
20 India 48 Uruguay 
21 Ireland   
22 Italy   
23 Japan   
24 Jordan   
25 South Korea   
26 Luxembourg   
27 Malawi   
28 Malaysia   	
Table E.1: List of Potential Control Countries
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Number List of Potential Control States Number 
List of Potential Control States  
(cont.) 
1 Alabama 26 Nebraska 
2 Arizona 27 Nevada 
3 Arkansas 28 New Hampshire 
4 California 29 New Jersey 
5 Colorado 30 New York 
6 Connecticut 31 North Carolina 
7 Delaware 32 North Dakota 
8 District of Columbia 33 Ohio 
9 Florida 34 Oregon 
10 Georgia 35 Pennsylvania 
11 Hawaii 36 Rhode Island 
12 Idaho 37 South Carolina 
13 Illinois 38 South Dakota 
14 Indiana 39 Tennessee 
15 Iowa 40 Utah  
16 Kansas 41 Vermont 
17 Kentucky 42 Virginia 
18 Maine 43 Washington 
19 Maryland 44 West Virginia 
20 Massachusetts 45 Wisconsin 
21 Michigan   
22 Minnesota   
23 Mississippi   
24 Missouri   
25 Montana   	
Table E.2: List of Potential Control States
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E.2 Placebo-in-Time Tests
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Figure E.1: Placebo-in-Time Tests Country-level
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Figure E.2: Placebo-in-Time Tests US States
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E.3 Placebo-in-Space Tests
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Figure E.3: Placebo-in-Space Tests Country-level
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Figure E.4: Placebo-in-Space Tests US States
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